A People's History
of the American Revolution
Page Smith
[Part 4 of 4]
PART VI (continued)
Patriots and Tories / 9
The year that intervened between Lexington and Concord and
Washington's arrival with his army in New York was one in which the
American patriots worked hard to put their house in order. This meant,
primarily, suppressing - or neutralizing the influence of - the Tories
and of the royal governors. [p. 656]
A careful analysis of the patriot and loyalist parties was written by
David Ramsay, delegate to the Continental Congress and historian of
the Revolution, who had the advantage of living through the events he
subsequently described. Ramsay pointed out:
The governors thereof had long been in the habit of
indulging their favourites with extravagant grants of land. This had
introduced the distinction of landlord and tenant. There was
therefore in New York an aristocratic party, respectable for
numbers, wealth and influence, which had much to fear from
independence. [pp. 656-657]
Ramsay emphasized that the majority of Tories in the Southern states
were found on the frontier. Their grievances against tidewater
plantation owners alienated them from the patriot cause.
The
Quakers, with a few exceptions, were averse to independence. In
Pennsylvania they were numerous, and had power in their hands.
Revolutions in government are rarely patronized by any body of men,
who foresee that a diminution of their own importance is likely to
result form the change. [p. 657]
It is clear enough why the Tories asserted themselves in all the
colonies. They never had any doubts about what the outcome of the
struggle would be once the mother country overcame her weak and
vacillating policy towards the colonies and acted with resolution to
bring the demogogues and agitators to book. Then the Tories would be
vindicated, their fortunes restored, and their tormenters punished.
[p. 659]
The Southern frontier thus became, outside of certain counties in the
province of New York, the only region in colonial America that could
be properly called a Tory stronghold. [p. 661]
Among the conclusions to be drawn from these facts are these: While
the leadership in each colony was important, especially as it affected
the promptness with which the people of a particular colony supported
their New England cousins, of far greater significance was the fact
that the resistance to Britain was a widespread and deep-rooted
popular movement.. Indeed, nothing could bear more striking testimony
to its "popular" nature - a profound protest of the people
against a position of dependence and subordination - than the common
forms that the resistance took in every colony. And this despite the
many differences among the colonies - differences in religion, in
politics, in social structure and stratification, and in historical
development. In the words of one historian: "In not a single
colony did a royal governor keep his authority: in none was there a
loyalist party resisting by the old legal forms the coming of the new.
The old Assemblies and Councils quietly disappeared: those governors
who had not yet fled remained only on sufferance and were presently to
go. And in their places the solid men of the new politics had control
of each colony." [p. 663]
Of far more consequence than the retreat or ousting of the colonial
governors was the suppression of the Tories. This unpleasant duty, if
we may properly call it that, was carried on primarily on the local
level by Committees of Safety and Committees of Observation. Here
neighbor was pitted against neighbor, friend against friend, and, not
infrequently, father against son. [p. 663]
The persecution of the Tories was mitigated by the fact that many
patriot leaders had close friends among the Loyalists. Also, since the
Tory-patriot split was often a split between the young and the old,
there were many instances where fathers remained loyal to the Crown
while their sons took up the patriot cause. [p. 665]
It was one thing to nourish bitter feelings toward Tories as a group,
Tories in general, Tories as an abstraction of wickedness; it was
quite another matter when the Tory was a brother, a son, a dear
friend, or a father. One knew them then in all their vulnerability and
their humanity as friends and companions, as kin, bound together by
many of the most precious acts and associations of our common life. It
is this that makes civil war, which in a substantial measure the
Revolution was, the bitterest of all conflicts. [p. 666]
Many Americans were neither patriot nor Tory, but found themselves
victims of divided loyalties. Some favored resistance to British
encroachments on American freedoms but could not stomach the idea of a
declaration of American independence. [p. 668]
James Allen
was
brought under guard to Philadelphia to
be examined as t his views and actions. Allen reiterated his devotion
to the cause of liberty - and his abhorrence of independence.
There
was no question by now of where Allen's own feelings lay, and it was
equally clear that there was a large element of class feeling in his
view of the course that the revolution had taken. "The Province
of Pennsylvania," he wrote, "
may be divided into two
classes of men, via. Those that plunder and those that are plundered.
No justice has been administered, no crimes punished for 9 months. All
Power is in the hands of the associators, who are under no
subordination to their officers.
To oppress one's countrymen is
a love of Liberty. Private friendships are broken off, and the most
insignificant now lord it with impunity and without discretion over
the most respectable characters." [p. 670]
Common Sense / 10
The entire chapter in unabridged form has been scanned
and is available HERE.
Toward Independence: The Virginia Resolves / 11
As the spring of 1776 wore on, Congress inched closer and closer to
the final, irrevocable act of rebellion, a declaration of
independence. Many were loath to cut off all hope of reconciliation
with Britain. But these laggards were given a spur by the daring
declarations passed by the Virginia Provincial Congress, the so-called
Virginia Resolves. [p. 685]
Most of the delegates shared Adams' view that "there must be a
decency, and respect and veneration introduced for persons in
authority, of every rank, or we are undone. In a popular government,
this is the only way of supporting order, and in our circumstances, as
our people have been so long without any government at all, it is more
necessary than in any other." It was this kind of problem that
the author of
Common Sense, with his romantic indictment of all authority
and good order, had no inkling of. Hence the "dangerous"
consequences of his essay. [p. 686]
There was something very unnatural and odious in a government a
thousand leagues off. A whole government of our own choice, managed by
persons whom we love, revere, and can confide in, has charms in it,
for which mean will fight.
" There were so many sharp
disputes and divisions among the colonies just over land and
boundaries that the chances of the radical whigs "Lugging us into
independence" were, [Virginia delegate Carter Braxton] mistakenly
assured his uncle, very slim. [p. 690]
By the end of May, the radicals felt that all their labor, their
maneuvers, their patience was about to come to fulfillment. But there
were still obstacles and perplexities. Word from Maryland indicated
that colony was still obdurate: "They repeat and enforce their
former instructions - declare that they have not lost sight of a
reconciliation with Great Britain.
" New York also hung
back. John Adams tried to reassure himself and a constituent, Benjamin
Kent, who had written that a declaration of independence was long
overdue. [p. 691]
Under the pressure created by the meeting in the State House yard,
the Pennsylvania Assembly at last gave way on the fifth of June and
appointed a committee to bring in new instructions for their delegates
to Congress. Two days later Richard Henry Lee read a crucial
resolution from the Virginia convention, urging Congress to "declare
that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and
independent states
and that all political connection between
them and the state of Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved."
[p. 692]
John Adams wrote to his friend William Cushing: "Objects of the
most stupendous magnitude and measure in which the lives and liberties
of millions yet unborn are intimately interested, are now before us.
We are in the midst of a Revolution, the most complete, unexpected,
and remarkable of any in the history of nations." [p. 693]
All that could be retrieved for the moment was the appointment of a
five-man committee to frame a declaration in conformity with the
Virginia resolution "That these United Colonies are, and of right
ought to be, free and independent states." The members of the
committee were Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger
Sherman, and Robert Livingston, Jefferson to be chairman.
The
committee, apparently without discussion, designated Jefferson as the
drafter of the statement that was to explain and justify the action of
the Americans in declaring independence. [p. 693]
The fact of independence was the important thing. A "declaration"
was almost an afterthought. The drafting of it would provide a little
more time to bring reluctant delegates into line. Certainly some
formal statement was appropriate, in fact necessary, but it need not
be elaborate; a simple listing of the steps by which the colonists had
been forced, as they saw it, to declare themselves independent of the
mother country would do. [p. 694]
Jefferson was the right man for the job. Adams told him: "Reason
first - You are a Virginian, and a Virginian ought to appear at the
head of this business. Reason second - I am obnoxious, suspected, and
unpopular. You are very much otherwise. Reason third - You can write
ten times better than I can." The last reason is the most
suspect. Adams wrote very well and knew it. In any event the chore
fell to Jefferson, largely by default. [pp. 694-695]
The Declaration of Independence / 12
It is not too much to say that, as the original of the declaration
and as the basis of the first ten amendments of the Federal
Constitution, the far less well-known Virginia Bill of Rights is one
of the most influential documents ever written, entirely worthy of a
place beside the Magna Carta and the Declaration of Independence
itself. [p. 696]
The Virginia document had begun with the statement: "That all
men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society,
they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity; namely,
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and
possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."
[pp. 696-697]
The paragraph was almost pure Locke, taken from his
Second Treatise on Government, where the Englishman had
sketched out the basis of human society as a contract or compact that
man, leaving "a state of nature," had entered into to
procure greater security for himself and his possessions. The natural
and inherent rights of man Locke had listed as the right of "life,
liberty and property." When Locke wrote his Treatise,
Englishmen were struggling to establish beyond question that the king
could not arbitrarily seize the property of his subjects through
taxation or, indeed, by any other means. Taxes could only be levied by
a Parliament in which the people were represented - no taxation
without representation. The security of property was thus one of the
most essential and basic of all rights. [p. 697]
In purely logical terms, or in regard to history or political theory
in general, "property" makes much more sense than "happiness."
Few people would seriously contend (1) that happiness is a "right"
in any real sense, the equivalent of life or property; (2) that it
should be "pursued"; or (3) that if pursued, it can be
caught. The happiness of the governed may be the proper aim of
government, but at best that happiness can only be assured in a
negative way, by preventing, or abstaining from, persecution,
injustice or any arbitrary acts; by protecting the citizen's life,
liberty, and property so that he is free to seek his own happiness if
and as he wishes. If a man's life, liberty, and property are respected
and to a reasonable degree protected, it may be presumed that he has
some expectation of being happy. [p. 698]
Jefferson himself was a great property owner. There were thus
entirely valid reasons for preserving "property" as a basic
right. Yet it was an inspiration on Jefferson's part to replace it
with "pursuit of happiness." Unsatisfactory as the phrase
was from a logical or even a philosophical point of view, it was psychologically
right, because it embedded in the opening sentences of the declaration
that comparatively new and certainly splendid and luminous idea that a
life of weary toil - meager, grim, laborious, anxious, and ultimately
tragic - was not the only possible destiny of "the people,"
the great mass of whom had, theoretically, been created "equal."
That "equality," aside from answering the purpose of
political philosophers, might mean that in the opportunity for
happiness there was, or might be, or should be, equality as well. [pp.
698-699]
And that was the most revolutionary part of the Declaration of
Independence, which, aside from that one felicitious if misleading
phrase, contained few notions that were not political commonplaces in
1776. [p. 699]
All public papers should be as brief and simply stated as possible.
Would-be writers of an imperishable document should make it no longer
than a schoolboy or schoolgirl of average intelligence can memorize.
[p. 699]
Adams liked the draft, felt its force and trenchancy, and had only
two or three minor suggestions for improving it. Franklin proposed
more changes
[p. 700]
John Adams
wrote to Samuel Chase that the "great
debate" that was to have terminated in a unanimous vote had been,
instead, "an idle dispence of time."
He added with
characteristic realism. "If you imagine that I expect this
declaration will ward off calamities from this country, you are much
mistaken. A bloody conflict we are destined to endure. This has been
my opinion from the beginning.
If you imagine that I flatter
myself with happiness and halcyon days after a separation from Great
Britain, you are mistaken again. I do not expect that our new
government will be as quiet as I could wish, nor that happy harmony,
confidence and affection between the colonies that every good American
ought to study, labor and pray for, will come for a long time. But
freedom is a counterbalance for poverty, discord and war, and more. It
is your hard lot and mine to be called into life at such a time. Yet,"
he added, "even these times have their pleasures." [p. 702]
The most striking of all the charges leveled against the king by
Jefferson was that he had "waged cruel war against human nature
itself, violating its most sacred rights of life & liberty in the
persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating &
carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur
miserable death in their transportation hither. [p. 704]
The effort to indict George III for the misery of slavery was surely
one of the most exaggerated efforts in the history of political
rhetoric. Allowing everything possible for the heat and passion of the
moment, the charges were nonetheless so manifestly absurd that it is
hard to imagine, from this perspective in time, how a rational man
could have composed such a turgid and flamboyantly written tirade. [p.
704]
It should not take a trained psychologist to discern in this mistaken
indictment the strength of Jefferson's feelings about slavery. What we
cannot bear to face ourselves, we are most prone to blame on others.
Jefferson's fear and horror are only too clearly manifest in these
sentences. Perhaps the whole intolerable burden of slavery could be
transferred from the slaveholders of America to the shoulders of the
king of England, and thus the paradox of a people claiming their
rights as free men while holding other human beings as slaves might be
obscured or somehow palliated. [p. 705]
A few of the Northern delegates seemed inclined to swallow it, and
Jefferson was certainly not the only Southerner whose deepest feelings
were reflected in it; but South Carolina and Georgia, whose prosperity
was even more dependent on slavery than their neighboring colonies,
Virginia and North Carolina, were adamant. The whole portion was
dropped in the name of unanimity and, one would hope, of decency. [p.
705]
Finally, on July 4, having much improved Jefferson's draft, all of
the delegates present, except John Dickerson, approved it, and
President John Hancock and Secretary Charles Thomson signed it. [p.
706]
PART VI
Washington in New York / 1
Washington
hurried on ahead of his army and arrived in New
York on April 13. He was convinced that the city should be defended
against the landing by Howe that he anticipated.
However,
Washington well realized that the defense of the city against seaborne
attack presented almost insurmountable problems. [pp. 712-713]
Throughout May and into June, the fortifications that had been
started were completed and strengthened and new works begun at
strategic points on Manhattan.
The construction of such works
was striking evidence of the resourcefulness and energy of the
Americans and contradicted in the most emphatic way the British charge
that they were lazy. [p. 715]
While Washington's army worked on the fortifications of New York,
General Howe set out from Halifax on the tenth of June with a fleet of
127 vessels. Sailing on a fast frigate, the
Greyhound, he arrived off New York a week before the main body
of his fleet. He was as yet uncertain of the strength of the force
that he would have under his command for the purpose of seizing and
occupying New York City.
He decided wisely to wait for
reinforcements from the fleet under the command of his brother,
Admiral Lord Richard Howe, which he knew was on the way from England,
and, hopefully, from Sir Peter Parker's fleet with Henry Clinton's
soldiers, returning from their attack on Charles town. [p. 723]
The Battle of Long Island / 2
Through the summer months of 1776, Washington's army waited
suspensefully while the elements of Howe's army assembled and the
impending battle drew near. The Americans nervously strengthened their
fortifications, looking out uneasily as they did so on one of the most
formidable fleets ever gathered. [p. 730]
The total force under Howe's command numbered nearly 32,000 of the
best-trained and best-equipped soldiers in the world, supported by
dozens of warships and almost 500 transports and supply vessels. [p.
731]
General Howe decided that Brooklyn Heights on Long Island was the key
to the American defensive works around New York.
On the morning
of the twenty-second of August, Howe began to debark his troops on
Long Island.
By twelve o'clock, fifteen thousand men with their
arms and supplies had been landed "without mishap or delay"
at Gravesend Bay, south of Brooklyn Heights. [pp. 731-732]
With Howe's attack on Long Island, the Revolution entered an entirely
new phase. First of all, it signaled a realization on the part of the
British government that the American resistance could only be crushed
by a major military campaign. The notion that a few thousand soldiers
in Boston and elsewhere could intimidate and overawe the Americans had
been abandoned and a campaign planned, the extent and seriousness of
which was demonstrated by the forest of ships' masts crowding New York
waters. [p. 732]
Where before they had chosen their own ground and fought
indifferently or well in situations most favorable to their particular
skills and style of life, the Americans must now meet the enemy on his
own terms. It was a task so formidable that no one who has not already
a zealous partisan of the colonial cause, now the cause of
independence, would have given it even the remotest chance of success.
[p. 732]
A good account of the battle - and of much of the entire war - is
provided by Private Joseph Martin of the Connecticut line. Martin
wrote and published his account of the war many years after it was
over, but his memory remained fresh and sharp, and his descriptions of
the Revolution's battles remain one of the most vigorous and amusing
eyewitness records that we possess. [p. 736]
Howe's carefully worked out plan of attack called for a feint against
the first line of defense. This feint was to be directed against
Stirling's positions on the American right. Meanwhile, Clinton was to
move far to the American left, slipping through Jamaica Pass and
coming down on the American forward lines from the rear. [p. 738]
Clinton, moving slowly and cautiously and in complete silence, with
his scouts well in advance of the main body, reached the causeway at
three in the morning. Even the most rudimentary American defensive
works would have delayed his progress for hours, but Sullivan, in
command of the division on Prospect Hill behind Bedford Pass, had
neglected to block the road, and Clinton passed over the bridge
without incident.
The pass was occupied along with the heights
on either side, and the troops were given time to eat and rest. [p.
738]
The British were now in possession of the high ground along the
ridgeline and astride the Jamaica Road. The Battle of Long Island was,
for all intents and purposes, decided. A considerable amount of
fighting remained, but the Americans, by failing to secure their left
flank at its most vulnerable point, had exposed themselves in such a
way that only an extraordinary effort could have retrieved the
situation. [pp. 738-739]
In conventional terms, it was a serious defeat for Washington. Aside
from the large bag of more than a thousand prisoners, the Americans
lost more than twice as many in killed and wounded as the British, and
they had been driven from the field. But a closer look revealed,
paradoxically, some grounds for encouragement. For one thing the
Battle of Long Island was a the first large-scale battle of the
Revolution. [pp. 742-743]
The Battle of Long Island, however, was a classic set piece,
essentially a battle of maneuver between what were, for that day,
large armies - 9,000 Americans and 15,000 British and Hessians. In the
battle the American soldiers proved that they could preserve their
discipline and morale in the most difficult and demanding of military
exercises - maneuvers in the field under heavy enemy fire. [p. 743]
There was one ultimate and disastrous failure (which was certainly
not of the soldiers' doing), and that was, of course, the inexcusable
failure of Sullivan, and to a lesser degree Putnam, to fortify, or at
least have heavily patrolled, the Jamaica Road. It was this error that
undid everything - the tedious weeks of preparation, the bravery and
enterprise of many soldiers and men, the tenacious (one is tempted to
say brilliant) defense of the American right by Stirling's brigade.
[pp. 743-744]
The Evacuation of Brooklyn / 3
in war, where at certain echelons (among the noncommissioned
officers, for instance) experience is essential, in generals, where
one would assume experience is essential, in generals, where one would
assume experience would be of the essence, it seems to count for
relatively little. Few great generals have failed to display their
genius from the first moment they took the field, experience only
augmenting their natural gifts. And few, on the other hand, of the
merely competent have, through experience, become great. One of the
best measures of an efficient army is the speed with which it gets rid
of the inefficient or blundering leader - and the infrequency with
which it ever gives him a command to begin with. [pp. 745-746]
Washington, at least at this stage of things, was far less concerned
with being outmaneuvered than with this army being outfought. He could
give the British two-thirds of the American colonies and triumph in
the end if he could preserve his army more or less intact. [p. 746]
Washington realized that he had no real alternative to extricating,
as best he could, that portion of his army now marooned on Brooklyn
Heights. [p. 746]
Washington's overall strategy now was to avoid another major
confrontation, choose his own ground, keep open his lines of retreat,
school his army (especially his officers) in the painfully learned
lessons of war, and, above all, keep his army in existence. It was
this last that was to prove the most essential and formidable task.
[p. 748]
Historians have criticized Howe for not ordering an immediate attack
that, had it been carried out, would perhaps have netted Washington.
This assumes first that Howe had complete information about the extent
of Washington's withdrawal, rather than initial rumors that had to be
confirmed before any sensible action could be planned; and second that
he had only to press a button, so to speak, to start an assault by
British troops. [p. 750]
It must be kept in mind in all discussions of military engagements
that there is, even in the best-trained and best-managed armies, an
inevitable gap between the time that a decision is made and an order
based on that decision is written and distributed (often by messenger
even in the present day of instant communication) and then acted upon.
Officers have to be roused from sleep, drink, cards, amours, or
whatever their ingenuity may have suggested as a way of escaping the
endless boredom of army life even in the field. The men themselves
have to be mustered, the missing accounted for, equipment checked,
additional ammunition secured. Rations distributed, and a thousand
things made ready. Unless troops are already on the alert and prepared
to move instantly - unless, in other words, all these things have been
attended to in consequence of "preliminary" orders - an
interval of some two hours intervenes between the issuing of an order
and its being carried out, and this in an experienced and well-trained
army. [pp. 750-751]
Kip's Bay / 4
After Washington had brought his army from Brooklyn Heights to
Manhattan, he was faced with the problem of what his next move should
be. [p. 754]
While Washington was regrouping his forces and making new tactical
dispositions, the British pushed ahead energetically, completing the
occupation of the western end of Long Island, especially the towns
facing Manhattan Island across the East River and those islands
that dot the river and harbor. British ships also ventured up the
river as far as Wallabout Bay and Newtown Inlet. [p. 755]
To the Howe brothers it seemed an excellent time to try again to
negotiate a peace.
Perhaps sensing that the captured New
Hampshire general, John Sullivan, was somewhat overawed by the might
of British arms, the Howes decided to employ him as an emissary to
Congress. Consequently, he was packed off to Philadelphia. Congress
received the defeated Sullivan rather coolly, and after four days of
debate over whether to pay any attention to the Howes' advances, it
appointed Benjamin Franklin, Edward Rutledge, and John Adams to confer
with the Howes at the general's headquarters on Staten Island. They
were to go as a committee representing "the free and independent
states of America." [p. 756]
By giving the committee such a provenance, Congress hoped to make it
impossible for Howe to receive it without thereby appearing to
acknowledge officially the independence of America. [p. 756]
Lord Howe met the American at the landing, and there was a
ceremonious exchange of courtesies.
Adams could not help but
notice that the admiral seemed to have a poor grasp of the real issues
in the conflict. [p. 756]
The negotiation with the representatives of Congress had at least the
effect of delaying General Howe's pursuit of Washington's demoralized
army.
Howe and a succession of British commanders have been too
harshly criticized for procrastination, failure to press advantages,
and an inability to finish off a beaten and demoralized enemy. In
their defense - Howe's and his successors' - it must be said that they
were, in a manner of speaking, the victims of their own
professionalism. They were trained to fight a particular kind of war,
a war in which professional soldiers were deployed like chessmen in
elaborate moves and countermoves. Hurried and hasty movements were as
inappropriate to the campaigns that made up such wars as they would be
in a chess match. [pp. 758-759]
Furthermore, in a conventional European conflict the people of the
rival nations were never active participants. They were passive
observers or, often, unhappy victims of war. It made little difference
to them by which monarch they were ruled, what officials taxed them,
or two oppressed them; they were little to choose between one
authority and another; all were repressive or indifferent. [p. 759]
Now, however, the people of America were very much involved. The
American Revolution was the first "people's movement" of
modern times, the first instance in which a substantial number of
quite ordinary people had attempted to assert some degree of control
over their own lives and fortunes. [p. 759]
Washington wrote Congress [on Septmeber 8],
"On our side,
the war should be defensive: it has been called a war of posts; we
should on all occasions avoid a general action, and never be drawn
into a necessity to put anything to risk. Persuaded that it would be
presumptuous to draw out our young troops into open ground against
their superiors in numbers and discipline, I have never spared the
spade and pickaxe.
I am sensible that a retreating army is
encircled with difficulties; that declining an engagement subjects a
general to reproach: but when the fate of America may be at stake on
the issue, we should protract the war, if possible. That the enemy
mean to winter in New York, there can be no doubt; that they can drive
us out, is equally clear: nothing seems to remain, but to determine
the time of their taking possession." [p. 760]
Washington, by continually denigrating the quality of his
soldiers, took out a kind of disaster insurance. No one was surprised
when such poor soldierly material did poorly in battle. When they did
well, most of the credit accrued to the general himself for having
accomplished so much with so little. This was not dishonestly but
rather common prudence. [pp. 760-761]
On the thirteenth of September, four or five British frigates sailed
up the East River. These were supplemented the next day by six more
men-of-war.
On Sunday, September 15, three British warships
sailed up the Hudson, effectively cutting off escape in that quarter.
[p. 761]
One does not have to look far for the reason why the American
soldiers fled in disorder from their positions. In virtually every
engagement they performed well in the face of enemy musket fire and
badly in the face of heavy bombardment. The most demoralizing
experience for the untrained soldier is heavy artillery fire (or, in
modern warfare, aerial bombardment). The comparative remoteness of the
enemy, the sense that, safely beyond range of your own weapons, he can
strike at your with impunity, and that your only defense is to lie
still and pray that a random ball will not destroy you - this is the
most severe test of morale. [p. 765]
The British were greeted as liberators by the Tories who had waited
anxiously for their coming. [p. 766]
Turnabout: Harlem Heights / 5
During the long afternoon following the debacle at Kip's Bay,
scattered groups of Americans from all over Manhattan Island made
their way north
The positions on Harlem Heights were the
rallying point for the Americans who had fled at Kip's Bay, for
Putnam's rear guard, and for every company or detachment that could
find its way north. [pp. 768-769]
While Washington's army regrouped on Harlem Heights, a destructive
fire broke out in New York to the south. Before the retreat from the
city, there had been a warm discussion among the members of
Washington's staff centering on whether to burn New York and thus deny
it to the British as a headquarters. The official decision had bee not
to burn the city. Nevertheless around midnight on September 20, "a
most dreadful fire broke out in New York, in three different places in
the South, and windward part of the town." The wind spread the
flames so rapidly that nothing could be done by the British troops to
check the fire's progress until almost a quarter of the city had been
burned down. [pp. 772-773]
If Howe was discomforted by the fire in New York, Washington was
enduring even graver setbacks. The situation on Harlem Heights
deteriorated day by day as soldiers terms of enlistment were up left
for home. The Americans had shown that with effective leadership they
would fight, but every time there was a lull in the fighting they
demonstrated anew that they were restless, impatient, and ill-equipped
by temperament for the tedious routines of camp life. [p. 773]
Again it was in the staffwork that Washington suffered most severely.
He could give orders, but unless he personally supervised their
execution, they would often be changed or ignored. [p. 776]
[General] Knox was convinced that until Congress ordered sufficient
incentives for the development of a first-rate officer corps, "it
is ten to one" the Americans would be beaten until they were "heartily
tired of it." We ought to have academies," he concluded, "in
which the whole theory of the art of war shall be taught, and every
other encouragement possible given to draw persons into the army that
may give a luster to our arms. As the army now stands, it is only a
receptacle for ragamuffins." [p. 776]
What Congress must understand was that appeals to patriotism were not
sufficient to form an effective army. It was true that men would then
"irriteated, and the passions inflamed
fly hastely and
cheerfully to Arms; but after the first emotions are over, to expect,
among such People, as compose the bulk of the Army, that they are
influenced by any other principles than those of Interest, is to look
for what never did, and I fear never will happen; the Congress will
deceive themselves therefore if they expect it.
" [pp.
776-777]
The same principle applied to the enlisted men. They had been
encouraged to think that a reconciliation would be effected and that
the war would be over in a short time. They had thus been enlisted for
brief periods, they were poorly paid and inadequately clothed and fed,
and they were constantly tempted by the easier terms of militia
service, so that the Continental Army had to compete continually with
the particular states for soldiers. [p. 777]
White Plains / 6
Washington had shown his amazing resourcefulness in getting his army
safely across the East River from Brooklyn, and then again in taking
the advantageous high ground of Harlem to fortify. But the British,
moving not fast but inexorably, would not let him rest. Soon he was to
have once more to extricate his army from a potential trap and once
more to improvise a line of defense, testing again his own stamina and
that of his army. [p. 779]
An army cannot fight unless it is equipped properly and, even more
important, placed, by one means or another, on the field of battle. It
is here that logistics becomes as important as the fighting qualities
and the leadership of the soldiers and officers themselves. Logistics
is the domain of staff officers and their subordinates, the most
complete professionals in any army. [p. 781]
The bulk of Washington's army was safely out of Manhattan; but it was
by no means in first-class fighting trim. The men were woefully short
of even the simplest comforts of the field - blankets, tents, and warm
clothes - and were perpetually hungry. [p. 784]
While Washington improvised his defenses at White Plains, Howe
established his army two miles beyond New Rochelle. There Howe waited
for General Von Heister and his Hessians to join up; and then, in
command of a splendid army, he advanced, step by cautious step, until
he came within a mile of the village of White Plains
[p.
785]
The defensive positions that Washington chose at White Plains were
well selected.
The defense was still being perfected when the
British approached. [p. 786]
Washington moved his army some five miles to the north to an
imminence called North Castle Heights and prepared for Howe's renewed
attack. Reconnoitering the new position, Howe decided that it was
virtually impregnable, and after lingering near White Plains for
several days, he encamped his army at Dobbs Ferry on the east bank of
the Hudson. Here British ships, having broken the blockade of the
Hudson at Fort Washington, could supply his troops. Once more
Washington had fought well against a determined and well-planned
British attack, and had survived. [p. 789]
The Struggle for Fort Washington / 7
Washington and the major portion of his army were secure in their
earthwork-defended high ground north of White Plains. But he had left
a portion of his army behind on Manhattan, the garrison of Fort
Washington.
It commanded, or was intended to command, the lower
Hudson. The fort proper was the center of extensive American positions
that included four other strongpoints. To abandon it without a fight
would be to concede to the British the control of the Hudson. [p. 790]
Greene
recaptured Fort Independence, scarcely a mile north of
Fort Washington, which had been abandoned, as part of the retreat to
White Plains.
Washington gave Greene authority to decide whether
to fight or evacuate.
Anticipating that Howe might move into New
Jersey, [Greene] made careful calculations as to the best lines of
defense that Washington would find there.
However, Greene
persisted in thinking that Fort Washington gave an advantage to the
Americans. [pp. 790-791]
Leaving the final decision on the defense of the fort to Greene,
Washington began to move his army across the Hudson at Peekskill.
Washington
established his own headquarters at Hackensack, some nine miles from
Fort Lee, and waited to see what action the British might take against
Fort Washington. [pp. 791-792]
The attack on the fort was planned and carried out with boldness and
imagination. While the Hessians were attacking the fort from the
North, Lord Percy began what was at first intended as a feint against
the old positions at Harlem Heights, still held by an American
regiment
British Generals Mathews and Cornwallis landed their
units from transports in the Harlem River. This force met heavy fire
from Americans on Laurel Hill but nevertheless advanced, driving the
Americans back on the Fort Washington redoubts.
How now ordered
Colonel Sterling to land a half mile to the south of the fort with two
more battalions.
The British were now able to converge on Fort
Washington from three directions. [pp. 794-795]
The final act of the drama came suddenly. General Magaw, hoping that
he might escape across the river that night with the greater part of
his force, asked for a five-hour parley. The British consented to no
more than half an hour. Magaw thereupon surrendered the fort and its
defenders to the British. The bag consisted of almost three thousand
soldiers and officers, 161 cannon, 400,000 cartridges, and of course
the weapons of the soldiers themselves.
The losses for the
Americans were staggering, although the killed and wounded amounted to
no more than 130. [p. 795]
If the Americans had been officered well enough for the men to be
able, without retreating, to sustain casualties in proportion to their
numbers, the British and Hessians might well have suffered too heavily
to persist in their attack. [p. 795]
Washington's vacillation about the defense of Fort Washington was
undoubtedly related to the fact that Howe had on numerous occasions,
most lately indeed at White Plains, shown a marked reluctance to
attack strong defensive positions. [p. 796]
One of the most destructive consequences of the loss of Fort
Washington was the erosion of confidence in Washington's leadership.
Even Washington's closest and heretofore more loyal officers had
misgivings about his competence. [p. 796]
Washington, reporting the disaster to Congress, noted, "The loss
of such a number of officers and men, many of whom have been trained
with more than common attention, will I fear be severely felt. But
when that of the arms and accoutrements is added, much more so, and
must be a farther incentive to procure as considerable a supply as
possible for the new troops, as soon as it can be done." The loss
of the fort was of little consequence; the loss of the men and
equipment was a staggering blow to the American cause. [p. 797]
The New York Tories
were both irritating and pathetic. They
formed a closed company who fed each other's fantasies. Living in
relative comfort and surrounded by the reassuring power and splendor
of the British army of occupation, they persisted in the assurance
that they would be vindicated. [p. 800]
Every new Tory who appeared to swell the little group of exiles found
a ready audience for his tales of patriot impotence, for his
assurances that the great body of Americans were sick of the war and
sick of their leaders and only waiting for the right moment to rise up
and declare their loyalty to king and Parliament. [p. 800]
Howe Invades New Jersey / 8
Sir William Howe, encouraged by the capture of Fort Washington,
pushed ahead with his plans t invade New Jersey. He was assured that
the region swarmed with Tories who would flock to his support.
Washington's army was there, and just possibly Howe might be able to
catch Washington's force, engage it in a major battle, and defeat it.
[p. 802]
There were
thirteen colonies, now states, each a potential
center of resistance and each able, if necessary, to give aid to its
neighbors.
Howe was, in effect, conceding that the Revolution
could not be suppressed simply by defeating Washington's army. It was
plain, in any case, that Washington was determined to avoid the kind
of large-scale engagement that Howe sought that might result in the
capture or destruction of Washington's army. Howe and Washington might
play cat and mouse forever. As long as Washington could fall back and
in doing so draw on fresh supplies of manpower, no conclusion, Howe
realized, could be reached. [p. 803]
Washington was convinced by Cornwallis's activity that the British
intended to push on and take the key city of Philadelphia at once. But
there was little that Washington could do. His small army shrank
continuously, neither General Lee nor General Heath showed up with his
reinforcements, and the troops Washington did have were in dreadful
shape. [p. 804]
One of the most unusual soldiers in the army that made its way by one
narrow escape after another across New Jersey was Thomas Paine of the
Pennsylvania Flying Camp. Paine's
Common Sense had crystallized American feeling against British
authority in the symbolic person of the king and in favor of
independence as no single other essay or address had. Now, serving as
a volunteer assistant aide-de-camp to General Greene, Paine wrote the
first of his "crisis papers," which was printed in the Pennsylvania
Journal on December 19 and distributed to the soldiers in
Washington's command. The essay opened with words that were like a
bugle call. "These are the times that try men's souls,"
Paine wrote. "The Summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will,
in this crisis, shrink from the service of his country; but he that
stands by it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and women.
Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this
consolation with us, that the harder the conflict the more glorious
the triumph; what we obtain too cheap we esteem too lightly.
Heaven
knows how to put a proper price on its goods; and it would be strange
indeed if so celestial an article as Freedom should not be highly
rated.
I have as little superstition in me as any man living,
but my secret opinion has ever been, and still, is, that Gold Almighty
will not give up a people to military destruction, or leave them
unsupportedly to perish, who have so earnestly and repeatedly sought
to avoid the calamities of war by every decent method which wisdom
could invent." Paine also had a word for George III, who, Paine
said, had no more right to look to Heaven for support of his cause
than "a common murdered, a highwayman or a house-breaker."
[pp. 804-805]
After tracing the painful story of the retreat from Fort Lee, in
which he had participated, Paine, doubtless aware that some members of
Congress were beginning to question Washington's leadership, ended his
essay with warm praise of the general. "There is a natural
firmness in some minds which cannot be unlocked by trifles, but which,
when unlocked discovers a cabinet of fortitude; and I reckon it among
those kind of public blessings which we do not immediately see, that
God hath blessed [Washington] with uninterrupted health, and given him
a mind that can even flourish upon care." [p. 805]
it still seemed that nothing could stop the progress of the
British toward Philadelphia. That at least was the conclusion of
Congress, and that body departed with almost indecent haste for
Baltimore. [p. 806]
Washington's frame of mind is indicated by a letter to his brother
Lund, which, after describing the condition of the army, ends: "A
large part of the Jerseys have given every proof of disaffection that
they can do, and this part of Pennsylvania are equally inimical. In
short, your imagination can scarce extend to a situation more
distressing than mine. Our only dependence is now upon the speedy
enlistment of a new army. If this fails, I think the game will be
pretty well up, as from disaffection and want of spirit and fortitude,
the inhabitants, instead of resistance, are offering submission and
taking protection from Gen. Howe in Jersey." [p. 806]
As soon as Washington learned that Howe had returned to New York and
that the British and Hessians had gone into winter quarters, he began
to make plans for an attack upon one of the British encampments. [p.
807]
Trenton / 9
While the British and Hessians luxuriated in cozy winter quarters,
Washington's army, camped in the open on the western bank of the
Delaware River, kept warm and fed as best it could. Despite the
desperately ragged shape of his suffering troops, Washington plotted
one of the most daring strikes against the enemy of this - or any -
war. [p. 811]
Congress had fled from Philadelphia to Baltimore at the near approach
of British troops, but before its departure it had passed a very
useful act: "
Resolved: that until Congress shall otherwise order, General
Washington be possessed of full power to order and direct all things
relative to the department and to the operations of the war." In
short, Congress gave Washington dictatorial powers. Washington replied
to the Congress, assuring the members that he would not misuse his new
powers. "Instead of thinking myself freed from all civil
obligations, I shall constantly bear in mind that, as the sword was
the last resort for the preservation of our liberty, so it ought to be
the first thing laid aside when those liberties are finally
established.
I shall instantly set about making the most
necessary reforms of the army." [p. 811]
Howe was a victim of the accuracy of his intelligence sources. Every
report confirmed the picture of an army depleted in numbers,
wretchedly clothed and equipped, near the end of its period of
enlistment, and powerless to take any aggressive action. If Howe had
had no intelligence at all, he might have been better off. Then, as a
well-trained soldier, he would have insisted on those precautions -
ceaseless patrolling, round-the-clock guard duty, and so forth - that
any army must take when on campaign against a resolute and resourceful
enemy. [p. 813]
The men, poorly clothed and in consequence half-frozen, started out
on the twenty-fifth in a violent storm. [p. 815]
Each phase of the attack had its own hardships that core cruelly on
the soldiers. First there was the long wait, hour after tedious hour,
while the army assembled at the point of embarkation and the boats
were brought down the river.
The crossing was the most difficult
phase of the attack. [p. 816]
It is a formidable task at best to move even a well-trained and
well-staffed army at night under such wealth conditions over
unfamiliar terrain.
It was not remarkable that the army found
itself three hours late; what was remarkable was that under the worst
possible conditions Washington had managed to get it across the river
and, having passed that formidable barrier, was able to march on to
Trenton. What made the achievement all the more remarkable was that it
had to be conducted as silently as possible with a minimum of light.
[p. 818]
The attack on Trenton reminds us of several important facts. Perhaps
the most important was simply Washington's physical stamina. Where any
ordinary man would have long come to the end of his rope both
emotionally and physically, Washington was still completely in command
of himself and of his army. In terms of endurance, it was one of the
most remarkable performances by a general in all military history. [p.
824]
By an act of his will, [Washington] drove a pathetic remnant of an
army through the most desperate venture of the war and on to the most
dazzling victory. By doing so, he saved his army, or what was left of
it; he discomfited his domestic enemies, or at least those who had
lost confidence in him and wished to see him replaced by General Lee;
and thus undoubtedly he saved himself and, in saving himself, saved
the army of which he had become, increasingly, the embodiment. [p.
824]
One thing more should be kept in mind. The Battle of Trenton was,
pre-eminently, an artillery action. Without the artillery, which at
every juncture performed crucial service, it is extremely doubtful
that the Americans could have overwhelmed the Hessians. Indeed, there
is every reason to believe otherwise. [p. 825]
The results of Trenton were, in truth, incalculable. The battle was
like a stone dropped in a pond, waves spreading out farther and
farther. [p. 826] A most important consequence of the victory was that
a substantial portion of the soldiers who intended to return home when
their enlistments ended on the first of the new year were persuaded to
re-enlist, while hundreds of others who had been reluctant to join a
lost cause now were proud to go with a winner. [p. 826]
In Britain, Lord Germain declared, "All our hopes were blasted
by the unhappy affair at Trenton"' and Burke, writing an account
of the battle for the Annual Register, noted, "It has
excited not less astonishment in the British and auxiliary quarters
than it has done joy in those of the Americans. The Hessians will be
no longer terrible and the spirits of the Americans will rise
amazingly." [p. 827]
Princeton / 10
Washington had little time to savor his victory at Trenton. There was
every reason to believe that General Cornwallis would be pressed by
his commander, General Howe, to strike some decisive blow that might
counteract the effect of Trenton on popular opinion. [p. 828]
Washington
had determined to recross the Delaware and carry
the warfare to the enemy while he still had the semblance of an army
to command.
On December 30, Washington once again crossed the
Delaware and occupied Trenton. [pp. 829-830]
Hearing that Washington had re-established himself at Trenton,
Cornwallis set out by way of Princeton to drive him back over the
Delaware or, more to be hoped, to pin Washington's army against the
river and destroy it.
It was in fact almost dark when Cornwallis
finally pushed back the American advance guard and reached Trenton,
but he nonetheless sent skirmishers along the river to test the
American defenses and search out possible fords. [p. 830]
Washington's dilemma was how to avoid a battle with a superior
adversary without at the same time undertaking another of those
extended retreats that were so demoralizing to his men and so
disheartening to patriots in general.
The solution was as
ingenious as the assault on Trenton. It seemed clear that Cornwallis,
fired by the desire to avenge the Trenton fiasco, was busy collecting
his resources for an all-out attack. Washington's scheme was to slip
away from Cornwallis's army during the night and, by a forced march,
make an attack on Cornwallis's base of supplies at New Brunswick. [p.
831]
By dawn, Washington's army had reached Stony Brook, a few miles
southeast of Princeton. Here he re-formed his columns and detached
General Hugh Mercer with instructions to destroy the bridges across
the stream, thereby delaying pursuit by Cornwallis when he discovered
that the fox had escaped his trap, while at the same time protecting
the left flank of the main army, moving on to New Brunswick, against
any foray from the British forces that remained in Princeton. [p. 832]
Washington had no time to tally his gains and losses.
Word came
that Cornwallis and his troops were rushing up from Trenton
Not
only had Cornwallis's hope of a pleasant interlude in England been
destroyed, he had been made a fool of in the bargain
Washington
consulted with his general officers about the plan to attack New
Brunswick. They were strongly of the opinion that further offensive
action was quite beyond the physical resources of the men. The army
would do well enough to escape its pursuers, hot on the trail.
Reluctantly Washington concurred. New Brunswick, with its store of
supplies and seventy thousand pounds in British army pay chests, would
be a splendid prize, but one's luck could only be pushed so far. [p.
834]
The British had launched their campaign in New Jersey partly because
the area was supposed to be crawling with Tories who would help the
British cause. This mass of Tories did not appear. In fact, the people
of New Jersey had been thoroughly alienated by the pillaging of the
British and Hessian troops. The Hessians had the reputation for being
the most thorough and the most ruthless of requisitioners, seizing
whatever they wished and destroying much out of a spirit of simple
wantonness. [pp. 835-836]
The soldiers simply took from anyone they encountered whatever they
wished, the hats off their heads, the coats off their backs, their
horses, sheep, and hogs, and burned what they could not carry off. [p.
836]
Washington's recrossing of the Delaware, his challenge to Cornwallis
and his skillful evasion of the British general - culminating in the
success at Princeton - were part and parcel of his seizure of Trenton
on the morning of December 26. He had, by two brilliant maneuvers,
changed the entire complexion of the war. It was his supreme moment as
a general. Frederick the Great of Prussia declared, "The
achievements of Washington and his little band of compatriots between
the 25th of December and the 4th of January, a space of 10 days, were
the most brilliant of any recorded in the annals of military
achievements." [p. 837]
The Continental Congress / 11
While the battles were fought and armies marched and counter-marched,
while Washington with one desperate expedient after another kept his
ragged army in being, the Congress kept on meeting and doing the
absolutely essential task of supply Washington as best it could with
money, armament, and supplies. The Congress did not do a very
efficient job of it;
In the meanwhile, the Congress kept itself
in being month after difficult month, becoming a symbol, second only
to the Continental Army, that such a thing as the United States, a
free and sovereign nation, existed. [p. 839]
<
Whatever shreds of authority Congress might have drawn about itself
were often denounced as a reckless lust for power. [p. 840]
Philadelphia had a large number of Tories, and even after the avowed
Tories were driven out, there remained fellow-traveling Tory
sympathizers not bold enough to publicly declare their allegiance to
George III. These were men and women who, in their hearts, hoped for
an American defeat and a return to the authority of Great Britain.
While these lukewarmers, from their very disposition, did not openly
oppose Congress or impede the cause, they gave it little or no support
unless coerced into doing so, and they created an atmosphere that was
debilitating to the patriots. [p. 840]
There was so much logrolling among delegates that Cyrus Griffin, an
irascible Virginian, wrote to Jefferson, "Congress exhibit not
more than two or three Members actuated by Patriotism.
Congress
are at present a Government of
Men. It would astonish you to think how all affairs proceed
upon the interested Principle: Members prostituting their votes in
expectation of mutual assistance upon favorite Points."
With
all this carping, the delegates still accomplished much. They
provided, however inadequately, for Washington's army, and this
primary task was the principal excuse for their existing at all, the
mortar that held them together, and their best claim to the gratitude
of their countrymen. [p. 842]
Congress also established the rudiments of a foreign service by
dispatching a series of amateur diplomats to Europe and directing
their activities through the Committee of Secret Correspondence, which
functioned rather like a state department. [p. 843]
Perhaps most notably of all, they worked out a procedure of admitting
new states to their precarious union on the basis of equality with the
original states, the first time in history that an existing government
had shown such generosity in enlarging its jurisdiction.
They
even hammered out a constitution - the Articles of Confederation -
which, while it was not adopted until near the end of the war and was
never adequate to the exigencies of the time, nevertheless marked a
clear advance in the notion of a confederated government that could
draw together thirteen disparate political entities called states. [p.
843]
Viewed in this light, the Congress's accomplishments were remarkable.
Out of their own membership, which fluctuated constantly during the
war as weary veterans left and were replaced by novices, the members
of Congress, in effect, carried on all the functions of a modern
government. They made up the legislature, executive, and judicial
departments. Among themselves they performed a host of functions if
not well at least adequately. [pp. 843-844]
John Dickinson, reconciled to independence, was the principal author
of the Articles of Confederation, and his small-state predilections
became evident as the attention of the delegates focused on Article
Seventeen: "In determining questions, each colony shall have one
vote." This was the single most important constitutional issue
faced by the delegates. It divided the states into two groups that cut
across sectional lines - the large states and the small ones. The
large states had accepted earlier the principle of equal
representation, but they had done so only under the heaviest pressure,
and they were plainly dissatisfied with the bargain. Franklin, from a
large state, put the matter most bluntly: "Let the smaller
colonies have equal money and men, and then have an equal vote.
If
they have an equal vote without bearing equal burdens, a confederation
upon such an iniquitous base will never last long." [p. 844]
Adams argued that "reason, justice and equity" never could
be counted on, but only self-interest. If thus followed that the
interests within Congress "should be the mathematical
representative of the interests without doors." The argument that
the states were in some way like individuals was "mere sound."
It had some validity under the authority of Great Britain and some
present reality, but the real question was what America would be "when
our bargain shall be made" - when a constitution was adopted. "The
confederacy," he insisted, "is to make us one individual
only, it is to form us, like separate parcels of metal, into one
common mass. We shall not longer retain our separate individuality,
but become a single individual," at least in all questions that
came before the confederacy. [p. 845]
The debate revealed, besides the division between small-state men and
large-state men, a difference in basic philosophy between those
delegates who felt that the individual states should retain their
essential sovereignty and simply join in a loose union for certain
common purposes, and those who felt they were engaged in creating a
single nation in which the states would be subordinate. [p. 845]
Each state had its quota of industrious land speculators. Usually
their speculations were based upon the claims of their own state to
extensive holdings in the west.
Members of Congress and
prominent patriots in every state were actively engaged in land
speculation. Washington himself was a member of a company established
to speculate in Western lands, and so were Franklin, Patrick Henry,
and numerous others. These men, good patriots though they were,
constituted a lobby, or rather a series of lobbies, each one of which
attempted to protect his own particular land venture. [pp. 845-846]
The States Make Constitutions / 12
As the Revolution progressed, virtually all the states drew up their
own constitutions. This flurry of constitution-making was one of the
most remarkable political episodes in history. It demonstrated as
nothing else could the degree of political sophistication that had
developed in the American colonies in the years of crisis prior to the
outbreak of hostilities. [p. 847]
The writing of these constitutions also produced remarkable results.
In them the leading patriot politicians worked out many of the
principles of constitutional government that would eventually find
their way into the Federal Constitution. [p. 847]
"Nothing is more certain," [John Adams] wrote, "from
the history of nations and the nature of man, than that some forms of
government are better fitted for being well administered than others."
The principal end of government was the happiness of the governed, and
"all sober inquiries after truth, ancient and modern, pagan and
Christian" agreed that happiness was found only in virtue. Thus
that government was best which most effectively stimulated the virtue
of its citizens and suppressed their vices. [p. 848]
Adams' concern about the tendency of a single or unicameral
legislature to be carried away by emotion or popular prejudice was an
article of political faith or virtually all the statesmen of the
Revolutionary generation. It reached back to Rome and Greece for its
antecedents; to Thucydides, Polybius, Plato and Aristotle. The history
of ancient times was understood to demonstrate the dangers of
unchecked democracy, the placing all power directly in the hands of a
simple majority of the people. In all such cases, it was argued, the
majority had, by their emotional reactions, produced a degree of
political instability verging on anarchy., In such instances the
rights of the minority were ruthlessly trampled on - and this, in
turn, had resulted in the rise of a dictator or tyrant whose principal
attraction was that he promised to restore order. [p. 849]
Yearly elections, Adams pointed out, would teach politicians "the
great political virtues of humility, patience and moderation, without
which every man in power becomes a ravenous beast of prey." [p.
849] Adams was encouraged to hear both that Virginia was well advanced
in forming a constitution and that Patrick Henry was actively
involved. Adams considered Henry a "masterly
builder,"
It was the will of the great body of the people and their
leaders in every state "that a more equal liberty than has
prevailed in other parts of the earth must be established in America."
The "insolent domination" of "a few, a very few,
opulent, monopolizing families" would "be brought down
nearer to the confines of reason and moderation.
" [pp.
850-851]
In practical fact, George Mason had much more to do with the Virginia
constitution than Patrick Henry, which may have been for the best.
Henry was viewed with open suspicion by the more conservative planters
of the tidewater. To such men as Carter Braxton he was a radical,
imbued with the heretical notions of Thomas Paine and much too
sympathetic to the "leveling tendencies" of New England.
George Mason, however, was widely respected for his levelheaded
wisdom, and the Virginia constitutional convention was dominated by
men like Mason and Archibald Cary. [p. 851]
The final paragraph of the Virginia constitution states that the
delegates to the convention that had framed the document should also
choose the governor and privy council and whatever other officers were
needed to run the affairs of the state. There was no mention of any
process of ratification. The times were too pressing for such
niceties; a government was needed whatever its deficiencies or however
certain its legitimacy.
The striking fact about the Virginia
constitution is that it was widely imitated by the other states.
Hastily constructed as it was, it proved an influential model. [pp.
853-854]
the resistance of South Carolina patriots to independence was
virtually ended by the news that Parliament had authorized the
confiscation of the property of Americans as rebels. [p. 855]
the New York constitution was distinguished by the fact that
it provided for the direct popular election of the governor and came
closer to giving him powers adequate to his office than any other
constitution. Both senate and assembly were directly elected, the
assembly annually, the senate quadrennially. [p. 856]
The Pennsylvania constitution is a fascinating document. It was the
high-water mark of the democratic idealism expressed most typically in
Thomas Paine's
Common Sense. Despite its awkwardness and impracticality, it
had about it a spaciousness of spirit that did credit to its framers.
For whatever combination of reasons - and the principal one was
undoubtedly that the stubborn resistance of the conservatives to
independence had destroyed their power in the state and had removed
them from the arena of local politics at least for the moment -
Pennsylvania came up with the most original, one might safely say
bizarre, constitution of all the thirteen states, as well as (by no
means coincidentally) the most democratic one. [p. 857]
The preamble of the Pennsylvania document is a revealing one.
The
prefacing "Declaration of Rights" was modeled on that of
Virginia, but with several interesting additions. One, out of
deference to the Quakers, stated that no man could be forced to bear
arms "if he will pay such equivalent." Another stated the
right of people to emigrate from one state to another "or to form
a new State in vacant countries
whenever they think that
thereby they may promote their own happiness." The clause
advanced the interests of the land speculators, of which there were a
number in Pennsylvania, and joined their interests with those of
settlers who might wish to move west. [p. 858]
What is perhaps most astonishing of all is not that the constitutions
were framed - obviously something had to be done to provide legitimate
governments - but that they survived in a number of instances for
fifty years or more and in that time worked reasonably well. Most
important of all, the state constitutions were an indispensable
preliminary to the formation of the United States Constitution. There
is hardly a single idea or article contained in the Federal
Constitution that was not first proposed or assayed in a state
constitution, with the important exception of the role of the Supreme
Court. [p. 861]
Virtually all of the leading figures in the Federal Convention had
served their apprenticeships in the constitutional conventions of
their own states. They had thought through and fought through
principles that, in most cases, they were eager to apply to a national
constitution. Indeed, if we were to trace the ideas most warmly
espoused by various delegates to the Federal Convention, we would find
that these were for the most part ideas that the same men had
championed, successfully or unsuccessfully, in their own state
conventions. [p. 862]
It has been truly said that the state constitutions, like the Federal
Constitution, were the work of a prosperous aristocracy in the south
and of an upper-class professional and business elite in the middle
states and New England. Most of these men had profound reservations
about what they thought of as "democracy" - the direct and
unlimited rule of the majority. [p. 862]
Layers of conservative leadership were, in a manner of speaking,
stripped away by successive crises until at last the more radical or
resolute patriots in each state held the reins of government. At the
same time there was an important counterweight to the radicals. In
most states the need to preserve unity in the face of the enemy had
the effect of disposing the radical leaders to compromise with the
moderate and conservative patriots. Such men, powerful, experienced,
wealthy, could not simply be tossed aside. Their support was vital to
the revolutionary cause. The moderates and conservatives for their
part were brought to accept constitutions that, in many instances,
were a good deal more radical (or republican) than they would have
wished. The pressure of an invading army and their desire to preserve
unity in the patriot ranks disposed them to compromise. [p. 863]
England/ 13
Through most of the Revolution, large majorities in both the House of
Commons and the House of Lords supported measures aimed at defeating
America and bringing the rebellious colonies to heel. Yet it is
important to keep in mind that America had, all through the
revolutionary crisis, eloquent and courageous English friends who
resolutely opposed the measures taken by Parliament against the
colonies. [p. 864]
Popular opinion in Britain swung sharply in favor of the war,
however, as the year 1776 progressed. English morale, which had sunk
so low after the news of the Battle of Bunker Hill, revived with
General Howe's successes on Long Island and in New York. [p. 868]
Burke's warnings that Britain was pursuing a hopeless course and
could never extract a revenue from America fell on deaf ears, as did
his argument that practical considerations rather than philosophical
principles should guide British policy. One of the things that
troubled Burke most was that dissent was suppressed on the ground that
it constituted treason. In the process, traditional principles of
British liberty were discredited, and the Tory party, indifferent to
ancient rights and freedoms, was so strengthened that hopes of ever
overturning it seemed infinitely remote. Just the fact that the
Americans presented themselves as champions of British liberties
served to discredit those liberties in England. [p. 869]
It was evident to the Whigs that the king more and more was taking
the direction of affairs into his own hands. Nothing of importance was
done without his orders or his concurrence, and it was rumored that
even speeches in Parliament were outlined by him and assigned to Tory
orators. This development appeared to the Whigs, not unnaturally, as a
frightening accretion of royal power. [p. 870]
The king believed that a firm hand was all that was needed to bring
the Americans around. The Indians should be used for their ability to
terrorize; any inclination to leniency or mercy should be sternly
suppressed. Fear was the only agency that could be counted on to bring
the colonists to a more tractable mood. [p. 871]
It might even be argued that the Whigs, by their tenacity and
aggressiveness, kept North and his party constantly on the defensive
and more preoccupied with exculpating themselves than with seeking a
resolution of the American conflict. By this line it could be
maintained that ultimately they did a disservice to the American cause
and prolonged the war by confusing that issue with party politics in
England. But this is a tendentious and precarious argument. It was
most important that the genuine moral outrage that the Whigs felt
toward the efforts of the government to beat the Americans into
submission be openly and eloquently expressed. By doing so, the Whigs
kept open both the hope of reconciliation and the possibility of
reform in British society itself. [p. 872]
Although the Whigs did not prevent the disastrous policy of the
government or manage to terminate the war at any of those half-dozen
points at which its futility was plain enough to any sensible man,
they nonetheless performed an essential function by constantly
enunciating (and thereby keeping alive) the great principles of
British constitutional liberty. They did this with courage and
resolution, often in the face of heavy pressure from their colleagues
and constant imputations concerning their loyalty. I believe that they
thereby saved Britain from a social revolution more ferocious and
destructive than the French Revolution, because they preserved that
faint but persistent hope among the commonalty of England that justice
might finally be done them, that principles might ultimately become
practice. [p. 872]
No matter how heedless, insensate, materialistic, selfish, unjust,
and greedy a society may be, if there can be found in it a few clear
and powerful voices that speak out unafraid against its corruptions,
the spirit and the hope of reform can persist. The Whigs, unsuccessful
as they were, stood as proof to the Americans that their sacrifices
were in a great cause; that they were fighting for more than selfish
ends; that they had brothers of the same faith in their former
homeland. These matters are not quantifiable, they cannot be fed into
computers and reduced to columns of statistics, to charts and
diagrams; but they are, perhaps for that very reason, the quintessence
of the drama of history, as everyone who has felt them vibrate in his
own heart knows. [p. 872]
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