

the evil has spread through all the ramifications of business. The petty tips from small tradesmen to butlers and other household servants are comparatively mere trifles. They are hardly worth considering except as they picture forth to the common observer, as in a camera obscura, what actually is going on beyond the range of common observation. The old idea, sane and healthful, that no man can serve two masters, and that therefore a trusted intermediary must not take pay from both sides, has been crushed out of the modern moral sense by modern business methods.

In calling this evil blackmail rather than bribery, we are distinguishing a very pronounced difference. The business "graft" custom has become so fixed, that supply houses are confronted with a more complex problem than the one of increasing their business. The problem affects the very life and existence of their business. To refuse to bribe purchasing agents is not merely to lose custom. It is to risk destruction. This is made possible by the fact that while expertism has taken a high place in business the parties in interest in purchasing establishments are seldom experts. When the owner of an establishment is not an expert in any particular department of his business, he must employ an expert for that department; and if this expert chooses to buy only of supply houses that "sweeten," both the competitors of these supply houses and the head of the purchasing house are helpless.

Suppose a defeated competitor complains to the owner of the purchasing house that its purchasing agent buys where he gets "sugared." The answer of the corrupt agent is baffling. He glibly remarks that the complaining house sells inferior goods and is a "sorehead." What is this rascal's employer to do then, if he is not an expert in these goods? He is practically helpless, and the probabilities are that the complaining house will be much more likely to

avoid breakers if it cultivates the good will of the buyer regardless of the interests of his ignorant employer. So much as to getting the custom of that buyer's house. But suppose the house to be influential in the trade. Then its refusal to deal with a supply house gives the goods of the latter a black-eye throughout the trade which may easily be destructive. With purchasing corporations, the power of the "grafters" is much greater. All the officials of a corporation are employes. The persons in interest are only stockholders. If the employes are stockholders, too, then "graft," plus their legitimate dividends, may be more valuable to them than no graft with larger legitimate dividends. In this case a complaining seller cannot reach the real party in interest, and if he complains of a "grafting" purchasing agent or manager his complaint must go to a board of directors or a president, technically ignorant it may be, or possibly themselves getting a "rake-off" from the graft.

Rather than risk his business under these circumstances, the seller "gets wise," looks virtuous, talks patriotism, and submits to the extortion. For illustration: A dealer in some line of supplies resorts to all the legitimate arts he knows to secure the patronage of a leading corporation. He wants the profits of dealing with that house, and he wants the prestige in order to hold his present trade with other houses and to get more. But he is unable to make a single transaction with the managers. Pretty soon hints circulate that he deals in inferior goods, hints which travel all the faster and hit all the harder because they are reinforced with suspicions that this is the reason the leading house won't touch his goods. Some day another kind of hint reaches him. He acts upon it, and, without one word of negotiation, nor any reason for the change whatever except what is suggested by the increase in his expenditure for "commissions," this leading house becomes a regular

customer. He has bribed a buyer, and under the proposed Massachusetts law would be amenable. The buyer has taken the bribe, and under that law would also be amenable. Wherefore both would probably cover their tracks and let the law take its futile course.

What else is there for the seller to do but submit to the extortion? He is conducting a legitimate business in a state of society where legitimate business cannot be legitimately done. Bribery is a necessity where extortion is the rule; and that extortion is the rule, every selling house which deals with hired buyers knows. Such a custom cannot be uprooted by restrictive laws; it is too firmly entrenched in a perverted moral sense. It cannot be uprooted by elevating the moral sense; few men are capable of being, and none ought to be, so ascetic as to abandon useful work rather than submit to extortion as a condition of doing it. It can be uprooted only by freeing the channels of trade from legalized obstructions. The moral sense to be elevated is not that which makes for asceticism in business, when business opportunities are congested and business conditions are thereby demoralized. It is that which makes for greater freedom of opportunity.

CONSERVATISM AND RADICALISM.

The conviction that our social system must be reformed on conservative lines if we are to avoid its being changed on radical lines, is present in the minds of the great mass of independent thinkers on social conditions, and it finds quite frequent expression even among professed teachers of political economy, who are generally so far from being alarmists as to fairly subject them to the charge of being blind leaders of the blind. Prof. Ely, in discussing "The Possibilities of Social Reform," argues strongly that the reform of our competitive system is the alternative of socialism. The question whether conservatism is equal to the task of making adequate reform, and whether it

is ready for the emergency, is an interesting and important one.

A reputation for conservatism is distinctly desirable in the business and political world. But, like some other reputations, it is not infrequently both acquired and forfeited undeservedly; and this is especially likely as to a reputation for conservatism because of a general lack of any distinct conception as to its essential characteristics. We not infrequently hear men somewhat deprecatingly admit that they are conservative; but as a matter of fact they obviously feel quite virtuous both because of the alleged fact and of the frankness of the admission—which is an entirely agreeable frame of mind. However, it is noticeable that the statement is not always made in a mere spirit of self-complacency, but that it is often made to serve as an excuse for cutting off discussion or consideration of questions which suggest unwelcome answers. It is interesting to notice, also, that this avowed conservative will at times become vehement in his condemnation of persons whom he denounces as opposers of progress because they fail to approve of or support certain strenuous policies to which his own broad mind has given welcome acceptance; and this without arousing any misgivings as to what the perverse opposers may think about the quality of his conservatism, or any suspicion that the said opposers may pride themselves upon their conservatism in rejecting such policies. From which it would apparently be natural for a third person, disinterested, and therefore, neutral concerning the particular question at issue, to infer that a conservative is one who is strongly opposed to change—so far as his own opinions are concerned—and who effectually shuts off the possibility of such disaster by giving no consideration to facts or arguments which might tend to change them.

The acceptance of such a definition, however, would hardly support the good reputation which attaches to conservatism. And since good reputation, though to be sure somewhat unreliable, is not to be lightly set aside as unwarranted, it is worth while to see

if possible what there is in conservatism to justify such good repute. In this connection the story of the Negro orator in Texas, who, in beginning a political speech, said: "When you are a-going to talk about Democracy you want to name the brand," is suggestive of the advisability of not accepting as genuine all that is labeled conservative.

Among the different brands under which conservatism is marketed, as it were, there is, presumably, a genuine article, on the real merits of which fraudulently or ignorantly circulated counterfeits are trading; such counterfeits being passed, however, with considerable success among easy-going respectable people who readily accept what is presented with a label that appears reputable and to whom genuineness is too unimportant to call for troublesome investigation so long as proper appearances are maintained.

To recognize the genuine article, we must first know its essential characteristics. To conserve, the dictionaries agree, is, broadly, "to keep from loss, decay, or injury". But what would conservatism thus care for? Evidently something that is already held, for we can only keep safe that which we have. It therefore concerns itself with holding rather than acquiring. It will not play the part of the foolish dog and drop the bone from its mouth in order to grasp at the shadow in the water. What has been attained it would hold safely, avoiding risk of loss rather than greedily reaching for that which has not been attained.

But evidently this does not sufficiently answer the question, To conserve what? Must conservatism concern itself equally with preserving all that is in possession? Must it be content to preserve what has been attained, and oppose the attainment of new things. Is the advocacy of change from existing conditions necessarily inconsistent with conservatism and a lapse toward radicalism?

To answer these questions in the affirmative indicates a lack of capacity for distinguishing between conservatism and what may be termed inane old-fogyism.

But if we answer no, we must determine what line, if any, can be drawn between a sane conservatism and radicalism.

To conserve what is of value is certainly a fair statement of the primary object of conservatism. What one man considers of value, however, another may consider useless or harmful; and when it is a matter of public interest their attitudes with regard to it will be antagonistic. One will aim to conserve, the other to abolish. If we conclude from this that the one is a conservative and the other a radical, we may find on further acquaintance that their positions concerning another matter of equal public interest are reversed, the first leaning towards abolition and the other towards conservatism, and, therefore, that a reverse conclusion as to their conservatism would be equally warranted. One's views on a particular question, therefore, cannot be reasonably assumed to indicate a conservative disposition or the reverse, and we must look for a common impulse or tendency which, though leading to opposite attitudes on particular questions, in each case forms the basis of the conservative position taken. This may be found in the fact that each seeks to conserve that which he himself conceives to be of value. Therefore they differ finally in their opinion as to what is of value. Each can lay claim to conservatism so far as yet appears. From which the conclusion follows that conservatism must relate to and be indicated by the spirit in which opinions are formed rather than the opinions themselves. In addition to this it relates to the spirit in which endeavor is made to carry opinions into effect.

True conservatism does not require that whatever is in possession or in vogue must be considered good, and its retention unchanged be insisted upon. It does not assume that there is nothing further to be attained; or even that further attainment shall not involve eventual radical change in what now is. It may even require the advocacy of decided changes, not only in the interest of progress, which is entirely consistent with conservatism, but particularly for the preservation of

some fundamental value in possession, which it believes to be otherwise endangered, and the safe keeping of which is its primary object.

But if all this may be required by conservatism, it becomes interesting to determine in what respect it differs from radicalism; for in such case the two are apt at times to be found in close company. It is a common experience, however, for extremes to meet; and even when thus brought together, the differing characteristics of conservatism and radicalism will not be lost any more than those of forcibly mixed oil and water.

The spirit in which the conservative mind will consider a question is one in which the element of caution is never lost sight of; in which whatever is established is assumed to be worthy of preservation, to the extent of throwing the burden of proof upon the advocate of change. Moreover, proofs submitted are considered with jealous regard for the probability of their having been offered and duly weighed and found wanting, before the institution antagonized could have become established. A decision presumably based on the experience of the past is not to be lightly set aside; the superior wisdom of the present is not to be arrogantly and ignorantly assumed. Eternal vigilance is the price not only of liberty but of the maintenance of all that has been attained in the progress of the race; retrogressive movements are started by insidious changes. Conservatism, therefore, stands on guard. No pretended friend shall be admitted too easily or too fully until proven.

But conservatism cannot perform its full duty as a guard in a negative way. It must give warning of danger and adopt positive plans for avoiding it. More than that, it must not refuse to listen to demands for admission. It must not and dare not act as an indiscriminating bar to what is new, lest it be discredited and the gates be opened wide for radicalism to run riot. Conservatism must distinguish between what it considers fundamentally good and what not, among existing institutions and policies, and be ready to give up that which is found wanting,

whenever required; and especially to note when such surrender is necessary to the preservation of the fundamental good.

But, while conservatism thus enters into the consideration of abstract questions, and effects the forming of opinions regarding them, another important influence is evidenced in determining action rather than opinion. The conservative mind can be induced to form what might be termed radical opinions; yet, when asked to advocate radical measures designed to carry such opinions into effect, it does not yield ready assent. Not so much because of any misgivings as to the correctness of the opinions formed; for, though there will be an ever present desire to test them practically as opportunity offers, yet the careful mental experiment to which they have been subjected before adoption gives a confidence amounting to deep-seated conviction. But because of an inherent dislike of any change involving upheaval and savoring of revolution; a lack of confidence in the soundness and stability of results attained under the impulse of abnormal excitement, such as is commonly incident to radical movements; and a fear that the guard of conservatism will be so broken down as to expose what is fundamentally good to danger, and ultimately produce a reaction that will injure the good cause which it is desired to further—these considerations will largely influence the actions of the true conservative and not infrequently force him into an attitude of antagonism to particular measures intended perhaps to advance just what he desires to achieve.

But if it be true that conservatism and radicalism may have the same good end in view, then it is unfair to dismiss radicalism with the mere statement that it is the antithesis of conservatism; the more so as radicalism is not of good repute and therefore stands in far more need of honest defense. Briefly, then: While conservatism looks mainly to the preservation of what it conceives to be good, radicalism looks to the overthrow of what it conceives to be bad. Appreciation of what has been attained on the one hand, is equaled by appreciation of what

needs to be attained on the other; regard for legal rights is met by the plea for moral rights; the claim of vested rights by the condemnation of vested wrongs; the charge of blindness to threatened dangers by that of blindness to existing injustices; the charge of recklessness by that of cowardice; the charge of irresponsible revolutionism by that of easy going selfishness.

Now, while it is true that these claims and countercharges of radicalism have little force against genuine conservatism, it is also true that they have great force as against much that passes current as such. And, on the other hand, it is true that there is a sane radicalism against which the charges and denunciations referred to are in large degree unjustified.

Radicalism, as the word indicates, looks to the roots for primary causes of defective fruit; and having as it believes discovered such deep cause, it is not content to potter over defective twigs and branches, but would endeavor to apply what it conceives to be adequate though heroic treatment. It has no patience with the policy of concocting and applying poultices and lotions to persistent sores which it conceives to be mere symptoms of deep-seated disease.

It will not be questioned that the good physician must look for the underlying cause of evident abnormal physical conditions before he can intelligently prescribe for the sufferer. While he will not disdain prompt palliatives in acute cases his chief concern must be to ascertain the cause, direct or remote, and to remove it. He must thoroughly diagnose the case.

As concerns the body politic, radicalism accepts and boldly acts upon this principle. It does diagnose the case. Whether thoroughly and intelligently or not is another question. Nor can conservatives refuse to indorse this principle, or fail of an honest effort to apply it. It cannot stop short of finding an adequate cause without being guilty of the charge of incompetence or dishonesty. And having determined such cause it must act upon its knowledge or be guilty of cowardice or deliberate malpractice.

Conservatism and radicalism, therefore, go so far together. Both may be assumed to approach the case with an honest desire to thoroughly diagnose it, and both with the same ultimate object in view of attaining the normal state of social health.

WALTER G. STEWART.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

AUSTRALIA.

Corowa, N. S. W., Australia, April 22. —The Federal ministry was defeated in the House last night on the arbitration and conciliation bill, an amendment moved by a Labor member to include all Commonwealth and State public servants under the provisions of the bill being carried against the ministry by nine votes. The voting was as follows:

	For the Amendment.	Against.
Labor	23	0
Ministerialists	2	19
Opposition	13	10
	38	29

Several members of the Opposition voted for the amendment to wreck the bill and overthrow the ministry. Mr. Reid, leader of the Opposition, voted against the amendment.

Last year the same amendment was proposed, but negatived, and an amendment to include railway (State) employes was carried against the ministry, which then dropped the bill. It was not thought that the Labor party would carry the public service amendment this time, but it was expected that, as before, they would win over the railway employes.

Mr. Deakin, the ministerial leader, will resign, and it is considered probable that Mr. Watson, leader of the Labor party, will be sent for by the Governor General to form a ministry.

ERNEST BRAY.

NEWS

Week ending Thursday, May 26.

Notwithstanding the startling headlines of the daily press during the week, relative to the progress of the Russo-Japanese war (p. 103), nothing of serious concern has been reliably reported since our last issue, except the destruction of a first-class Japanese battleship, the Hatsuse, by Russian mines off Port Arthur, and the sinking of the Japanese cruiser Yoshino in a collision. The total loss of life reported by the Japanese vice admiral, Togo, was 210 on the Yoshino and 441 on the Hatsuse.

A diplomatic event, reported on the 20th, is of more importance than any of the military occurrences so far as they are known. It is the revocation by Corea of all treaties and agreements with Russia. This revocation comprises the Yalu timber concessions, which are said to be one of the principal factors in bringing about the war. So long as the Russians remained on the western bank of the Yalu the Japanese, though very much discontented at the failure to evacuate Manchuria, were not willing to plunge into hostilities; but the procurement by Russia through M. Pavloff, the resident Russian agent and minister at Seoul, of a large concession of land on the Korean side of the Yalu precipitated the crisis. The Japanese felt that the alleged timber concession was really intended for military purposes, and they were confirmed in their suspicion by Russian opposition to the application of Japan, England and the United States to have free ports opened at the mouth of the Yalu river and above at Wiju and Antung.

Reports of the 22d relative to the British invasion of Thibet (p. 104) tell of an engagement near Gyantse on the 21st in which three farmsteads occupied by Thibetans were captured by the British. In this report, a special to the London Times, it is said that the British losses within the preceding two weeks were 57, which, the report continues—

perhaps will surprise men who have been inclined to underestimate the importance of the present military operations. The self-confidence and military ability of the enemy [the Thibetans] has increased greatly of late. Diplomacy has failed utterly, and the commanders of the British forces now see that it will be necessary to carry out the fight to the end.

France is in a diplomatic controversy with the head of the Roman Catholic Church over the relations of the Church to the French government. This controversy appears to be supplementary to the closing of the Catholic schools in France (vol. vi, p. 822) and to promise a complete dissolution of the French union of church and state. The immediate pretext is a diplomatic note of protest sent

to some of the Powers by the papal secretary of state with reference to the French government. In consequence of this the French government has withdrawn the French ambassador, Mr. Nisard, from the Vatican. In announcing their act the council of French ministers said on the 24th:

The government is convinced of the authenticity of the reported protest sent by the Vatican to the Powers, and therefore has decided to recall M. Nisard, leaving routine business in the hands of the third secretary of the Vatican embassy.

The resulting situation is reported from Rome to be regarded there as hopeless with reference to the relations of the Vatican and France. The Pope himself is described as being convinced that the separation of church and state in France is now only a question of time. He is quoted, however, upon high but anonymous authority by press dispatches to have observed that the presence of a French ambassador at the Vatican has not prevented the French government from adopting measures extremely objectionable to the Church, and that the separation perhaps might prove not an unmitigated evil. In this connection he is reported to have pointed out to the cardinals that, wherever the Church is supported wholly or in part by the state, it is made subservient to the political exigencies of the government, while in those countries where the Church gets only voluntary support it generally is untrammelled in the exercise of its rights. The prosperity of the Catholic Church in England and the United States is said to have been referred to by him with a statement of his belief that French Roman Catholics also will supply their clergy with the support which the French government will refuse.

On the American side of the globe labor disturbances upon a large scale are attracting attention and causing alarm. The largest of these is the general strike, begun on the 24th, of the freight handlers employed by the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad in New York and New England and the marine firemen employed on the boats of this railroad system. The strike was or-