Prince of Peace. The power necessary to conquer "inferior" peoples in South America and Asia, will be available to subdue "inferior" citizens and subjects at home, and for that purpose it will assuredly be used. If you would forecast the further history of this Christian crusade, read the story of Rome.

In criticism of our approving comment, on page 260, upon a New York court's decision in a labor case, we are in receipt of the following protest from William J. Strong, the eminent Chicago lawyer, who has for the past five or six years been waging a relentless legal fight against the "black listing" of workingmen:

I desire to challenge the pernicious doctrine laid down by the court in the case of the National Steamfitters vs. Enterprise Steamfitters and approved by you in an editorial on page 260 of The Public of August 4, 1900, wherein you assert that "That which all men have a right to do individually, all, or any number less than all, have a right to do together." This doctrine is pernicious because it fails to take note of the fact that there are many acts which can be done individually and not work an injury to others, but which when done in combination with others become oppressive. In other words, there is a power for oppresson residing in numbers, when acting in concert, that does not exist in individuals when acting alone. No two men are likely to act in the same manner when acting as individuals; hence the evils which may arise from concert of action are not likely to happen. For instance, I have a right acting as an individual to deny a man employment, from whim or caprice, because, for instance, I do not like the color of his hair; but I have no right to combine with others for the malicious purpose of preventing that man from getting work at his trade. The reason is that as an individual I could not work him an injury. I might deny him work, and he might get work elsewhere; but if every employer in his trade combined to keep him out of work, then an injury could be inflicted. The public is interested in having men work at their trades, and when men cannot find work at their trades they become either paupers or criminals, and a charge on the community, and the public is injured as well as the individual; and as it is one of the highest duties of the state to protect the weakest of its members from oppression, those combinations which are oppressive to the individual are treated as misdemeanors and are punishable as such, as well as giving a right of action for civil damages to the individual who has been deprived of a legal right. The boycott, for instance, has always been held to be unlawful. On the same principle the blacklist also is illegal.

Neither do these injuries, in my judgment, arise from monopoly, as you seem to think. Take the packers who have blacklisted girls who struck because Libby, McNeil & Libby cut their wages — girls who were able to earn $16 a week as expert labelers, and who solely by reason of the combination between the packers, are unable to find work at their trade, and are compelled to go to the department stores and work for four and five dollars a week. It cannot be because these packers have any "legal monopoly" that thy are able to perpetrate this wrong. Neither is it because their packing establishments are located on the railroad terminals (which are monopolies), that they are enabled to do it. They could combine and do the same thing if all their business were done by wagons on the public highways.

It cannot be that the monopoly in land is the cause, for under the single tax they could rent the ground, unless it be that the single tax would prevent men from engaging in the packing business.

Even if we had an ideal state where there were no monopolies, and the demand for labor exceeded the supply, they could still do it if the employers in any trade took it into their heads to impoverish a man by keeping him from working at his trade. They might have work for him, and still for the malicious purpose of injuring him they might combine and keep him from getting work. The question of whether they would be likely to do it if monopolies were established is not the question. But could they do it? And if so, what is it that enables them to work the injury? Is it the power of combination, or the fact of monopoly. These illustrations are made to show that there are many evils which may be accomplished by the power of combination and by concert of action, that could not be done by individuals acting as individuals. Hence it is not true as a matter of morals or law, that what a man may do alone he always has the right to do in combination with others, as there are many things which are made wrong solely by reason of the power of oppression which resides in the concert of action of numbers

I will not refer to the many adjudicated cases which sustain my contention, as you may say that the judges who rendered these decisions were "striving to serve one class by interfering with the rights of another."

The decision you refer to is not, in my judgment, good law, nor is it founded on justice or the rights of man. And if taken to the higher courts it will be reversed.

The blacklist is an issue in the coming campaign, and I cannot believe that The Public will justify the iniquitous practice of the railroads and other corporations who are attempting to terrorize their employes and make them slaves by means of the blacklist, by using the argument they use, viz.: that whatever a man has a right to do individually, he has in all instances a right to combine with others in doing. If a combination has the justification of competition it may be lawful; but combinations which have only the purpose of injuring others, cannot be held to be just or legal.

We assure Mr. Strong that The Public does not justify the railroad "blacklisting," which he, as a lawyer and citizen, is fighting so valiantly. But we dissent from his view that "blacklisting" can be accomplished by mere combination. No combination of competitive establishments can make it effective. What makes it effective with railroads is the fact that railroads are not in any true sense competitive. Railroad combinations are combinations of monopolists. Nor is it an answer to speculate upon what might happen even in competitive conditions if all competitors in a given branch of trade combined in a "blacklist." That is an impossible hypothesis. In conditions truly competitive all employers could not combine in a blacklist. They could no more do that than an engineer could build a dam that would prevent the waters of the Hudson from finding their way to the sea. Competition is a force which nothing but legalized monopoly can resist. And when instances are cited, like that of the packers, to show that competitors actually do combine, they prove nothing; they are not instances of competitive conditions. In the first place the packers are lessees of monopolized terminal privileges, whereby they strangle competition; and in the next place, the monopolization of land in general has so far lessened opportunity for self-employment as to have completely killed off that most natural of all competition, which consists in employers bidding against each other for help. It is

monopoly, not combination, that makes blacklisting effective. We would, therefore, destroy blacklisting by abolishing monopoly. It can be done in no other way.

With all possible respect for Mr. Strong's judgment, we deny that anything that would be innocent if accomplished by one person, becomes wrongful when done by a combination of several persons. The essence of wrong is the concurrence of an evil act with a corresponding evil purpose. Whether this be the individual purpose and act of one or the joint purpose and act of many, makes no difference in principle. A purpose and act which would not be wrongful in an individual cannot be wrongful in a combination of individuals. Mere numbers do not in the nature of things change what is innocent into what is criminal. In other words, we believe the law of conspiracy—ancient though it undoubtedly is—to be an unprincipled innovation. And while in exceptional cases, like those of the railroad "blacklisting," it may be invoked as a labor palliative, its main use will continue to be a club for the judicial pounding of workingmen.

As an organ of McKinleyism, the New York Times feels, of course, in duty bound to discredit the doctrine of the declaration of independence that government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. But it has the sense to refrain from candid denunciations. The hour for that has not precisely arrived. It would be as yet highly impolitic openly to attack the mass of "prejudice" which holds the heads and hearts of the American people true to the declaration of independence. So the tactics of the Times are for the present those of the sapper and miner. The doctrine of the fathers is assailed with masked satire, which it is hoped may by an imperceptible process make the doctrine ridiculous. The Times accordingly sets itself the task of demonstrating in an underhand way that government by consent of the governed is impracticable and absurd.

Divested of the smartness that characterizes its editorial writing, and put into blunt English, an argument which the Times in one of its recent issues makes against the declaration of independence is as follows: The McKinley policy of criminal aggression in the Philippines, the imperialism which proposes to rule distant peoples as crown colonies, is right; because the principle of "the consent of the governed" is not acted on in domestic affairs. For example: (1) The Indians are governed without regard for the letter and spirit of the declaration of independence. (2) The District of Columbia is administered without the advice and consent of its inhabitants. (3) The entire woman population is so governed. (4) The army and navy are administered without reference to the opinions of the soldiers and sailors. (5) The committee on rules in congress is a governing body which "derives its powers" from a party caucus and not from the consent of the governed. This, apparently, is the best that the ablest administration organ can do by way of apology for imperialism. We may safely leave its effort to the consideration of our readers, with the bare suggestion that proved deviations furnish no reason for abandoning an ideal. Because men stray from the path of rectitude, that is no reason for closing it. Because a pledged teetotaler has fallen from grace to the extent of drinking now a glass of beer and now a glass of wine, or even to the extent of getting "jolly drunk" at times, that is no good reason for his deliberately becoming a sot.

Apropos of the death of the duke of Argyll, an American magazine, Scribner's, recently discussed the uses of a leisure class. It began with the proposition that "a priori, a man who inherits money enough to be all his life, as the French say, 'at his ease,' is the man from whom we should expect the things that make the world better, and for which there does not seem to be any immediate market in money." But that is just what ought not to be expected a priori. A leisure class is of necessity a parasitical class. It is supported arbitrarily by the labor of others. And by no rational inference can we expect from a parasitical class devotion to the world's betterment. As well expect grapes from thorns or figs from thistles. It is of the nature of parasites to be always too intent upon their own selfish enjoyment and the perpetuation of their parasitical privileges to know or care about anything else. In self-satisfaction and the effort at holding on, their energies are exhausted. And this is what the magazine in question discovers a posteriori with reference to the British leisure class. It finds that Argyll "was the only duke in Great Britain who within living memory has amounted to anything;" and that the marquis of Salisbury, when he was Lord Robert Cecil, was, upon the authority of Bagehot, "the only member of the British aristocracy who had shown the capacity of earning his own living." To these two, Scribner's adds Lord Rosebery, and, speaking of them as "three out of 500 members of the house of lords" who are worth their salt as workers, adds:

> Perhaps an ordinarily well-informed observer might manage to pick out half a dozen more lords who might fairly be called distinguished for something else than being lords, barring the achievements. But that is a sorry showing for so many holders of what may be called perpetually endowed new men, who owe their titles to their fellowships.

From a consideration of these and similar facts Scribner's finally comes to the sensible conclusion that the necessity of earning one's own living is the necessary condition of all worthy achievements, and "that the desire to have been born a duke, which often assails lazy people as a delightful dream, is really a desire to have foregone a much better birthright." Yes, indeed. If it were not for the parasites who suck away the earnings of the workers, there could be no richer birthright than the so-called "curse of Adam."