

doctrine of local self-government and who believe that the people of a community are capable of determining what is best for them, will find it difficult to oppose the amendment. In the first place the experiment cannot be tried unless a majority of the people of the county desire it, and after it has been tried the people of the county have a right to determine whether the system shall be continued or changed. What objection can the people of one county make if the people of another county favor the experiment? Every good citizen is anxious for the ultimate triumph of every correct principle, and the correctness of a principle can only be determined by experiment. A theory must be tested by experience before it can secure any extended indorsement. If the single tax theory proves to be a good one, it will spread. If it proves unsatisfactory, it will be abandoned, but whether it spreads or is abandoned, good and not harm will come from the amendment which has been submitted to the people of Colorado. To withdraw it now would indicate either a fear that the people will not act wisely in their own matters or a fear that the single tax principle may, if tried, prove successful. The democrats and populists of Colorado cannot afford to entertain either fear.—William J. Bryan, in *The Commoner* of Feb. 21.

THE HORRIBLE ROAD WE HAVE ENTERED UPON.

The following article appeared as an editorial in the issue for Dec. 13, 1901, of *The Manila Freedom*, published in Manila, P. I., Edward F. O'Brien, editor. It was read in the United States senate Jan. 28 by Hon. H. M. Teller.

Nothing can be accomplished in the Philippines until force has defeated permanently the enemy. It is useless to fool ourselves. We have tried civil government; we have placed prominent Filipinos in high places; we have prated of Americanism and progress, and with what results? Batangas, Samar, Tayabas, Laguna—and the list might be extended to cover the entire archipelago—all show the results. There is as much insurrection fomenting here as there was three years ago, and there will be as much three years from now.

There is only one remedy. The military must be supreme—must be given absolute control of the situation. There must be an army of at least 75,000 men here, and the desired end will be accomplished sooner with 100,000. The Filipinos must be defeated, absolutely and unconditionally defeated.

They must be swept aside at no matter what cost.

Reconcentration—the same reconcentration which we deplored in Cuba—must be used. Those who evidence a desire to be peaceful must be gathered in camps or towns and protected by American troops. America, unlike Spain in Cuba, must furnish, if necessary, to these people the means of life when their supplies run out. In return they must be made to assist in the erection of trenches and military works.

All source of livelihood must be cut off from the enemy in the field. The navy must furnish sufficient vessels to patrol the island and prevent filibustering, for we are blind when we deny that the enemy is receiving encouragement from the exterior.

Americans must occupy the positions of responsibility. There are places for but few Filipinos in the government until all armed resistance is put down once for all.

The results of a policy of this sort must be severe. Thousands of lives will pay the forfeit, but it is the only way to accomplish the desired end. The captures or death of Lukban and Malvar will not end the insurrection—no more than the capture of a hundred others has ended it. For every leader who falls there are a dozen ready to fill his shoes.

The time has come when the matter must be viewed from the front. We have fooled ourselves, and we have made ourselves the dupes of those whom we have trusted. The money we pay, supposedly for peace, is going to strengthen the insurrection. It is time to admit that we have made a grand mistake and undo the skein we have tangled. We must go back to the crossroads and take the other path.

They tell us that capital will conquer the islands. But when is capital coming? Will it come when it is as much as life is worth to go through the islands without a body-guard? The answer is "No!" Capital will come to the islands only when peace reigns, and according to our present procedure we will never have peace.

We are only fostering a spirit which will eventually defeat us. This may not come about through the force of arms, but it is bound to come about through the taxpayers of the United States who will refuse to sanction an unending and eminently costly warfare.

Let us have peace, and as a sure means of peace let us have warfare

unconditional, and warfare in the sense in which warfare is really meant.

DEMOCRACY AND IMPERIALISM.

In embracing imperialism—that is, the doctrine of racial ascendancy and territorial aggression—democracy sins against its own principles. If and so far as it was held that democracy would never sin against its own principles, that is certainly a "shattered delusion." But then it was never at all a plausible illusion. Everything human sins against its own principles, and why democracy should be exempt from the weaknesses that beset all other institutions and creeds there is nothing to show. * * * The errors of democratic imperialism are an argument against ascribing supreme wisdom to any self-governing people, but clearly are no argument against leaving people to govern themselves. It is not democratic self-government but democratic imperialism that is condemned, and the only illusion that is destroyed is the belief, if it ever was definitely held, that a people enjoying self-government could never be imperialist. That was, indeed, a hasty belief, for it implied an expectation that self-government would change human nature. The love of ascendancy is not peculiar to any one class or race, nor does it arise from any special form of government. All men, as Mill long ago remarked, love power more than liberty. All nations are, with opportunity, more or less aggressive. All are firmly persuaded that in their most inexcusable aggressions they are acting purely on the defensive. * * * We in England, through long immunity, had become wholly ignorant of the nature of the passions raised by war. History does not tell us much of these things. It preserves the glory of war, but suppresses its barbarities and its meannesses. It says little of that secondary war of tongues which accompanies the war of weapons and keeps up the flame of passion. It preserves the fair exterior of chivalry, and does not turn its light on the calumnies, the barbarities, the credulity as of savages which luxuriate in the national mind in war time. I remember shortly before the war broke out asking one of the ablest and most consistent opponents of the policy of aggression whether he did not think that those who were then shouting for war would not, when it came, be revolted by its realities. My friend, who remembered the Crimean war, took a very different view, and gave me clearly to understand