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With the close of the war the United States is to be congratulated, not upon good department service nor good generalship, for it had the benefit of neither, but upon its good luck. Its naval engagements were brilliant and decisive, and the courage of its soldiers was proved beyond cavil; but that would have gone for nothing had not the best of luck redeemed the worst of army management. The Cuban campaign was a series of blunders, or worse than blunders, from the start.

Instead of placing the management of all the campaigns under the commanding general, whose experience, studies, observation and position were calculated to qualify him especially for such a responsibility, the administration ignored him, and virtually gave the conduct of the war to Secretary Alger, who—but as Kipling says, that's another story. The Cuban campaign was planned and directed over the head of Gen. Miles. When he went to Tampa he was promptly and peremptorily recalled; and when later he went to Santiago it was only to prepare for his Puerto Rican expedition—a campaign "on the side." Instead of being held to the responsibility of directing the land campaigns of the war, he was given charge of a minor expedition, while Secretary Alger directed the war and Secretary Alger's particular Michigan chum, a subordinate officer, was given command of the principal expedition. It was deemed bad politics to allow Gen. Miles to administer his own military office, lest he might distinguish himself and politically extinguish McKinley.

The declaration of war was followed also by the wholesale appointment of more or less incompetent civilians to important military office. Many were appointed because they were sons or nephews of distinguished men, others because they were able to pull political strings that reached into the white house, and some because they were millionaires. The number of appointments for competency could be enumerated without excessive weariness. The comfort, the health, even the lives of the troops, and the success of the cause, were secondary to the "claims" upon the administration for unearned military commissions. So anxious was the president to serve his senatorial friends in this matter, that when he learned of the enlistment as a private of a son of Senator Elkins, he hastened to assure that exceptionally patriotic scion of American nobility that he would "take care of him."

For a rendezvous, one of the worst places in all the United States was selected, without any other reason, so far as has yet been learned, than that its owner and the owner of the street car and railroad lines in the neighborhood, was another chum to the secretary of war. Here the troops were corralled for weeks, while the Spaniards leisurely fortified Havana and made almost impregnable that vital point of attack which, so Gen. Lee had asserted, could have been taken in five days.

But it is urged that our troops were not equipped. That may easily be believed. The administration was too busy considering the effect of the war upon the next elections to set about procuring equipment. When the fact appears, as it recently has appeared, that equipment in some most important particulars was not even ordered until two weeks after the war began, it is easy to understand that troops could not have been moved promptly against Havana, for lack of equipment. But the very lack of equipment is only further proof of mismanagement.

At last, however, two months after the declaration of war, our troops, still badly equipped, landed upon Cuban soil. Here the good luck of the United States began to redeem the bad management from which it suffered. Had the Spanish met their enemy at the landing in force, no landing could have been made; and had the Cubans been as useless as they have since been described to be, no landing could have been made except with great loss of life. But thanks to Spanish generalship and Cuban fidelity, a bloodless landing was effected.

Similar good luck attended our advance toward Santiago. Instead of utilizing the strong positions near the coast, and compelling the Americans to assault one after another the lines of natural defenses, which would have exhausted them, the Spanish retired toward Santiago, making their only stand at the last natural defense. When the Americans had taken that, a bold dash would have driven them back and enabled the Spanish to pluck victory from defeat; but that dash was not made. The good luck of the United States secured to Shafter's troops the position they had so desperately won.

This was followed by another piece of good luck, most extraordinary good luck. When the Americans, nominally victors but really in an embarrassing position, were hesitating between

an assault upon Santiago which would have cost thousands of lives, and a retreat that would have cost them the prestige of victory and have prolonged the war indefinitely, Cervera's fleet abandoned Santiago to her fate and rushed upon its own. But for that fateful proceeding our departure from Cuba might have been humiliating.

Dsease had already crept in among the American troops. Weakened by hardship and continued exposure, pitiful victims of gross mismanagement in connection with medical supplies, Shafter's army was fast becoming a corps of invalids. It is now evident that its condition was such that it could no more have taken Santiago by storm than it could have taken Gibraltar. But, luckily again, if Shafter's army was about to succumb to sickness, the Spanish army was in danger of starvation. Spanish starvation won the day for us. To escape it, Gen. Toral meekly surrendered.

We were now in possession of a city which was of not the slightest use to us. In the ordinary course of events, luck eliminated, it had not been worth the taking. If the war had continued it would have become a burden. But the luck which took Cervera out of the harbor struck us a second time. The destruction of his ships by our navy forced Spain to sue for peace. Had her plea for peace been delayed a little longer, Spain would have discovered the demoralized condition of our troops in Cuba, and might have tuned her plea accordingly. But she had committed herself before the world knew that our army of occupation must be hustled away in transports to escape the pestilence. Such luck as we have had is unprecedented in military history.

But the luck was only national. It could not come personally to the victims of the bad management which for the nation it had offset. They have sickened and many of them have died, because, as Dr. Senn, Chicago's famous surgeon, charges, "the precautions outlined by Col. Greenleaf, chief surgeon of the army in the field, were entirely ignored by the commander of the invading force" —Secretary Alger's protege. Not only did the commander ignore precautions, but, according to Dr. Senn, he seems also to have refused his cooperation in stamping out disease. On this point Dr. Senn says:

Major La Garde applied to General Shafter for a detail of a company of infantry to aid him in fighting the disease. His request was promptly denied under the pretense that all of the troops available were needed more at the front than in the rear. This action left the major powerless in checking the extension of the disease. Fortunately Maj. Gen. Miles arrived in the nick of time, and with him Colonel Greenleaf, chief surgeon of the army in the field. Col. Greenleaf made the same request of General Shafter for troops to aid him in gaining control over the disease, but it was ignored as peremptorily as that of Major La Garde. He now turned to General Miles, who placed at his disposal not only a battalion, but a whole regiment of colored troops.

Dr. Senn's complaints of dereliction against Gen. Shafter are confirmed by Assistant Surgeon Munson in an official report to Surgeon-General Sternberg. Medical supplies were sent in sufficient quantity from Tampa, says Dr. Munson, but were not unloaded at Baiquiri. They were carried out to sea on the transports after the troops had debarked. The utter lack of medical supplies thus occassioned was reported to Shafter by the chief surgeon, who requested the assignment of a launch to the medical department to be used in fetching supplies from the transports. But, in Dr. Munson's language, "The exigency of the situation did not apparently appeal to the commanding general, and for two days the medical department was unable to get transportation of any kind to the other ships or to the shore, although there were a large number of naval launches and boats engaged on various other duties." As a result no medical supplies were landed until after the first fighting occurred, at which time, says Dr. Munson, "there were absolutely no dressings, hospital tentage, or supplies of any kind on shore within reach of the surgeons already landed."

The indifference thus manifested to the comfort, health and life of the American troops continued, exhibiting itself in various ways, until the subordinate generals, encouraged by the temerity of the dauntless Roosevelt, signed an open letter of protest. The situation was not at all misrepresented by the London Times when it said, editorially: "There undoubtedly has been most serious mismanagement in connection with the Santiago forces, and had not public opinion intervened upon the manifesto of the generals, it is not improbable that the war office would have gone on covering up its own mistakes until the Santiago force had succumbed entirely to disease and privation."

For his part in the protest against further subjecting the Santiago troops to the perils of yellow fever, Roosevelt was quickly punished. On the 23d of July he had written a private letter to Secretary Alger begging him to send the Santiago cavalry division to Puerto Rico, and at the close of it had argued that the 4,000 men of the cavalry division who could be landed in Puerto Rico "would be worth, easily, any 10,000 national guards armed with black powder, Springfields, or other archaic weapons." The sting in the tail of that letter was indirectly intended for the department, but Alger cunningly assumed that it was for the national guards. So on the 4th day of August, 12 days after Roosevelt's letter, Alger replied by cable, giving out both the letter and his reply for publication, and in the reply warned Roosevelt against making invidious comparisons. "The rough riders," he said, "are no better than other volunteers; they had an advantage in their arms, for which they ought to be very grateful." This was a neat backhanded blow at Roosevelt as a candidate for governor of New York. His invidious comparison of the rough riders with the national guards would

be a good weapon against him at the convention in the hands of the party bosses. But an inquiry or two naturally arises. Why did the rough riders have an advantage over the national guards in their arms? and why should they be very grateful for it? Did Providence give them this advantage? or was it the war department? And if it was the war department, would it not be more in order for the national guards to be very indignant than for the rough riders to be very grateful?

In fact, the weakness of the national guard, from its archaic weapons, is another of the blunders or worse than blunders in the long series with which Alger is chargeable. Smokeless powder and its advantages in warfare have long been understood. Yet the department sent troops into battle with old-fashioned powder which disclosed their position to the enemy's marksmanship whenever they fired a gun. And not only that, but within the present week Alger has exposed his incapacity by announcing that "now that it has been discovered" that smokeless powder is the best, orders have been given to furnish the soldiers with it. "Now that it has been discovered"!

The blame for all this mismanagement is concentrating upon the devoted head of Secretary Alger. And justly so. He is responsible even for Shafter's follies, for Shafter is his favorite who was lifted bodily over the head of Miles. But who is responsible for Alger? How came he to be in place to divest our victories of so much glory? Had he, like Miles, won his way by exhibitions of merit to the place he holds? Not at all. In the civil war he wore the shoulder straps of a general; but his name long remained upon the war records as a deserter. He became exceedingly wealthy; but he did it by grabbing timber lands. Every dollar of his millions represents somebody else's sweat; not his own. And he won his place in the cabinet by contributing magnificently to Mark Hanna's corruption fund.

The same moneyed classes whose contributions made up Hanna's corruption fund are now seeking to avail themselves of the good luck which, in spite of bad management, has brought the war to a favorable close, by fostering a policy which they fondly hope will bring good luck to themselves. To borrow from an old political cry, they are hell-bent for imperialism. Their sentiment is fairly expressed by a newspaper correspondent who sympathizes with them. He describes this class in New York as having come to feel that "we are spending an enormous amount of money and sacrificing many precious lives in the war, and that we should have some more substantial compensation than the consciousness of right!" The idea couldn't have been more pointedly put if the correspondent had intended, as he certainly did not, to bring it into contempt. We should have more substantial compensation than the consciousness of right! And what is it that these people propose? Have they any intention of supplementing the consciousness of right with substantial compensation? Not at all. They propose substantial compensation as a substitute for consciousness of right. For what they brazenly aim to do is to secure, in the language of the same correspondent, "the immediate annexation of Cuba without regard to the declaration of the president and congress." In other words, to obtain substantial compensation, we are to repudiate our solemn pledge. In the estimation of some people, possibly, that may be done without sacrificing consciousness of right; but they are moral paralytics.

The chief impulse behind this disposition to go back on our pledges and annex conquered territory is monopolistic. A corporation has been organized in New Jersey, for instance, for the development of Cuba. It proposes undertaking the improvement and sale of lands, the cultivation of stock farms, plantations and ranches, the construction and operation of railroads, water works and electric light plants, and the ownership and operation of mines. This corporation is typical. And we of the United States know the functions of such corporations. They do the land grabbing and owning; poorly-paid employes are to do the working and operating.

There is, however, an honest but misguided species of patriotism, which also yearns for territorial expansion, even at the expense of violated national pledges. This is the "business" man's patriotism. What he wants is more markets, to which American goods may be carried for sale. He is oblivious to the fact that within our own country there is a vastly larger market than all the territory we could possibly grab can offer. Every hungry, ragged, homeless man, and every man who is hungry, ragged or homeless in any degree, is a possible new customer for American products. All he needs is a chance to work, or a chance to work for better wages, and he will buy. Why not give, then, to this large and growing class, the working chance they need, and thus open a vast and never-failing market for American products? That is the door we need to open. That is the commercial invasion we need to make.

Is it said that we must have new land upon which our capital may employ itself in order to give employment to our people? We already have the land—better land than there is in Cuba, Puerto Rico or the Philippines—land that is still virgin. It is a mistake to suppose that American land is all occupied. Most of it has been appropriated, but only a little is occupied. We refer not alone to the unplowed acres of our prairies, but also to the monopolized mines of our hills and the vacant lots of our cities. Here is abundant territory—territory that would be most inviting to capital and more responsive to

labor's demands for employment than the coveted islands of the West Indies and the Pacific. But the policy of the "closed door" is now applied to that territory by land monopolists. Let us open the door. If we neglect to do that, what reason have we to believe that in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the "closed door" policy will not be as effectually maintained by land monopolists as it is already here?

In this connection, it is interesting to note the ease with which monopoly newspapers glide from accounts of American capital seeking vainly for profitable enjoyment and therefore yearning for territorial expansion, to assurances that we are living in a period of marvelous prosperity. Why should capital seek so vainly for profitable employment in a period of prosperity? Here is a contradiction which should put any sensible man instantly upon his guard against the prosperity touters. If capital cannot find profitable investments—and the fact that it pours into the treasury to purchase three-per-cent. bonds is conclusive evidence that it cannot—it must be true, as workingmen insist, that labor cannot find profitable employment. For capital—real capital, not monopoly values—works together with labor. When capital is employed, labor is employed; when interest is good, wages are good; when interest is low, wages are low; when capital is redundant, labor is out of employment. And that labor is now in bad condition, just as capital is, all intelligent observers know, and all the honest ones admit.

If direct proof of the bad condition of labor were required, we need only point to the strike still in progress in Cleveland. The men on strike there have had their wages reduced twice since the presidential election, until at the time when the strike began their wages were 50 per cent. less than when the men were marching through the streets of Cleveland bearing the banners of "the advance agent of prosperity." Though organs of speculation are full of assurances that we have tumbled into the butter tub of prosperity, the fact remains that opportunities for profitable employment of labor, like opportunities for profitable investments of capital, are as restricted as ever, and that wages of labor, like interest on capital, are still declining.

Since Aguinaldo does not lend himself to the designs of American imperialists, he has lost prestige with them, and from a great military leader has become a savage chief. But Aguinaldo is no fool. Doubtless he has heard of the way in which we are treating the Cuban republic, so he declines to throw himself unreservedly into the arms of Gen. Merritt as the confiding Garcia did into the arms of Shafter. Why should he outline his policy, Aguinaldo asks, when America will not be frank with him. And then with penetrating pointedness he asks: "Am I fighting for annexation, protection or independence?" We are glad that Aguinaldo has asked that question, and hope he may get an answer. Should he get one, the American people would welcome his confidence. They too would like to know whether the Philippines are to be annexed, protected, or freed.

We should like to see some of the papers of the New York Nation type draw a moral for home consumption from Gen. Wood's order compelling the Santiago merchants to reduce the price of their goods. Gymnastics would hardly describe the liveliness of the performance. For on the one hand these papers are violently and democratically opposed to governmental dictation in private business, while on the other they incline with autocratic bent to military rule. Of course they might object to military rule with reference to prices; but if that kind of rule works well in that respect in Santiago, why would it not work well also in New York? At any rate, is its successful operation in Santiago not as good an argument for autocratic control of prices everywhere and at all times, as other successful experiments in military rule are for their general adoption. If, when popular government seems to fail in some particular we may urge a military or other autocratic substitute and draw arguments from the experience of Santiago, why not fall back upon the Santiago regime when prices rise too high or fall too low? It would be a simple reform, at least. What trouble and disorder it might save, for example, in cases of strikes. The military commandant would have only to satisfy himself that the strikers were asking too much, and then order them at the point of the bayonet to go back to work at the old wages, or at the cut wages, as the case might be. The great advantage of autocratic over popular government is its directness, its effectiveness, and withal, its extreme simplicity. And when very strong, it is also very stable.

Some light is thrown upon the value of a city franchise, by a recent mortgage transaction in Chicago. The Commonwealth Electric Light Company, with hardly any property except its franchise, has floated a mortgage for the neat amount of $2,500,000 at 5 per cent. Nearly all of that sum was put into the company's treasury by the board of aldermen which voted the franchise. Is it any wonder that aldermen are thought to be corrupt, or that corporation mongers object to abolishing private ownership of franchises?

The real estate assessment of 1898, for the entire city of Chicago—land, buildings and all—is only $140,246,107. If the business section alone were destroyed by fire, the smouldering site of that very small portion of Chicago real estate, would be worth more than that assessment.

One plank in the populist platform of Cook Co., Ill., indicates that some populists are drifting toward the advocacy of an effective reform. It demands, to use its own language,

"the God given privilege of local option in taxation, favoring a system of taxation based on land values." In testimony of good faith the convention which adopted this platform nominated single tax men for assessors.

Treasury statistics show that in the beer tax the beer consumers of the country are contributing most heavily to the support of the war. Beer consumers are on the whole the poorer classes—not the poorest, but the poorer; and it is because they consume beer that beer is taxed. If they were not beer consumers, a tax on beer would yield but little revenue. What, then, would the government do if the poorer classes stopped drinking beer? Would it tax the rich? By no means. That would be confiscation. If the poorer classes stopped drinking beer, the plutocratic advocates of beer taxes would propose a bread tax. That is the way the poor are made to bear public burdens in those countries of Europe where the poor are too poor to drink beer. Though they can't afford beer, they must either starve or eat bread; so their pockets are reached by taxes on bread. As there are more ways than one of cooking an oyster, so there are more ways than one of taxing the poor and letting the rich escape.

AN HISTORICAL PARALLEL.

American experience in the Spanish war, down to the appeal of Spain for peace, almost parallels the experience of England in the war of the Crimea. There is, at any rate, a most astonishing resemblance in some of the principal features of these two wars.

For nearly 40 years before the Crimean war, England had been at peace; and that generation of Englishmen was wholly without military experience in conflicts with civilized nations. The only fighting with which they were at all familiar—their familiarity with that being confined to a small professional class—was in campaigns against weak barbarians. The veterans of Waterloo were either dead or aged. Precisely so was it with us when our war with Spain broke out. Thirty-three years had passed since the final shot was fired in the civil war, the last of our wars with an equal antagonist. Our military experience meanwhile had been confined to Indian fighting on the western frontier by professional soldiers, and a new generation had grown up which knew nothing of war except from history and tradition.

This parallel as to the duration of peace produced in each case the same hunger for war, and the same vainglorious confidence. Just as we felt before hostilities opened, that we could sweep the earth with any enemy who would give us a chance to fight him, so England expected, with France for an ally, to overwhelm the Russians. War was welcomed by peace-wearied Englishmen, nearly 40 years after Waterloo, as it was by the personally and nationally ambitious among us, 33 years after Appomattox.

And the opening campaign of the Crimean war was singularly like our Santiago campaign. The allies invaded the Crimea as we invaded Santiago province, carrying troops in transports across the Black sea as we carried them into the Caribbean. But the allies were not under the same compulsion to go to sea to attack a point of no importance. Our invasion of Santiago was forced upon us by Cervera's running his fleet into Santiago harbor; but the allies deliberately chose the Crimea as the vital spot of the Russian military system. The parallel renews itself, however, after this break. As the Spanish withdrew from the shore upon the arrival of our troops, when by making a stand in their strong position on the hills they might have effectually prevented a landing, so did the Russians allow the allies to get a foothold unopposed in the Crimea. The Russians retired to the heights beyond the Alma, as the Spanish did to the heights beyond the San Juan, there to await the attack of the invading force. And the attack itself was so nearly the same in general character, in the one war as in the other, that, with but slight verbal alteration, Justin McCarthy's summary of the European battle might pass for a summary of that in the West Indies. Hear him:

> The attack was made with desperate courage on the part of the allies, but without any great skill of leadership or tenacity of discipline. It was rather a pell mell sort of fight, in which the headlong courage and the indomitable obstinacy of the English and French troops carried all before them at last. A study of the battle is of little profit to the ordinary reader. It was an heroic scramble. But there was happily an almost total absence of generalship on the part of the Russians. The soldiers of the czar fought stoutly and stubbornly, as they have always done; but they could not stand up against the blended vehemence and obstinacy of the English and French. . . . On all sides the battle was fought without generalship. On all sides the bravery of the officers and men was worthy of any general. Our men were the luckiest. They saw the heights; they saw the enemy there; they made for him; they got at him; they would not go back; and so he had to give way. That was the history of the day. The big scramble was all over in a few hours. The first field was fought and we had won.

Substitute in that account of the battle of the Alma, "American" for "English" and "French," and "Spain" for "Russia" and "the czar," and you have a fairly good description in outline of the battle of Santiago.

The blunder of not following up the routed and demoralized Russians, of which the allies of Alma were guilty, came near being matched at Santiago by the withdrawal of our troops from the ground they had won. Gen. Wheeler appears to have saved us that humiliation.

But if so striking a parallel be lacking, its absence is quite offset by the similarity of important events which followed. While England was insane with delight over the victory at Alma, news of another kind came to chill the popular enthusiasm. It was learned that cholera had begun to fight for the Russians, and was thinning the ranks of the allies. At Santiago, it was yellow fever instead of cholera. What was worse in the Crimea than the appearance of cholera, evidence accumulated of the inefficiency of the provision the English had made to meet that scourge. Here again McCarthy's account of the plight in which the English government had put the English soldiery in the Crimea, is almost prophetic of

the plight in which the government at Washington put the American troops in Cuba. He says:

> The hospitals were in a wretchedly disorganized condition. Stores of medicines and strengthening food were decaying in places where no one wanted them or could get at them, while men were dying in hundreds among our tents in the Crimea for lack of them. The system of clothing, of transports, of feeding, of nursing — everything, had broken down. Ample provisions had been got together and paid for; and when they came to be needed no one knew where to get at them. . . . Exultation began to give way to a feeling of dismay. The patriotic anger against the Russians was changed for a mood of deep indignation against our own authorities and our own war administration.

What with a rendezvous in Florida selected by our secretary of war, with reference not to military convenience, to which it was not at all adapted, but to the interests of a millionaire partner in monopolistic schemes, to which it seems to have been admirably adapted; what with northern clothing furnished for a southern campaign; what with food for a polar expedition provided for sick and wounded soldiers in the tropics; what with artillery taken apart and shipped piecemeal, so that when needed at the San Juan some pieces were still on transports, different parts of the same field piece being on different ships, while some were on the beach at Baiquiri and some at Tampa; what with such management of the medical stores that when they were needed it was found that they had been left on board the transports—what with this and much other inexcusable department blundering of like character, McCarthy's account of the management of affairs in the Crimea under the coalition ministry only mildly describes the management of affairs before Santiago under the McKinley administration.

One event of importance before Santiago had no parallel in the Crimea. The English did not insult their allies. And a highly important event in connection with the Crimean war has yet to find its parallel in connection with our Spanish war. The coalition ministry of Great Brtain, under which the blunders of the Crimea were perpetrated, was ignominiously turned out of power.

THE ETHICS OF REPUDIATION.

Repudiation of public contracts is so persistently associated with the idea of dishonesty that the subject calls for unprejudiced consideration, for which there could be no better time than now. When the public mind is excited with burning political issues, which directly or indirectly, actually or possibly, involve the principle of repudiation, demagogues distract attention from vital points by indiscriminately denouncing all such repudiation as dishonest. But in the absence or temporary subsidence of public excitement over those issues, which is the condition at present, the subject may lend itself to calm and unprejudiced discussion.

To identify repudiation absolutely with dishonesty, two wide chasms in thought must be bridged. It must be assumed, in the first place, that government has the moral right to bind future generations by contract; and, in the second, that all contracts are morally inviolable. If the government has not the right to bind future generations by contract, then future generations have the moral right, when they come upon the stage of action, to repudiate ancient government contracts which do assume to bind them; and if all contracts are not morally inviolable, then, even though government might morally bind future generations by contract, it could not do so by all kinds of contracts, and illegitimate government contracts might be repudiated without dishonesty. It is incumbent, therefore, upon those who undertake to argue that the principle of repudiation is dishonest, to prove, first, that government can morally bind future generations by contract; and, second, that repudiation of contracts is necessarily dishonest. But so far from being able to prove both these propositions, they can prove neither.

Government cannot morally bind future generations. To permit it to do so would contravene the root principle of self-government. This principle that it is the right of every people to govern themselves, has for a corollary the principle that it is the right of every generation to govern itself. In principle, it is as intolerable that dead and gone generations should govern living generations, as that one nation should govern another. In degree it is worse. Government by generations that have passed away is that most oppressive of all tyrannies—the tyranny of "the dead hand."

To no function of government is this observation so pertinent as to taxation. It is by means of taxation that peoples are most effectually enslaved. Whoever controls the purse strings of a nation, governs the nation. To a keen appreciation of that truth by the pioneers of English freedom, we are indebted for the familiar constitutional principle that revenue bills must originate in the popular branch of the legislature. It was early seen that if the people would govern themselves, they must tax themselves.

And it is the taxing function that is operated when one generation assumes to bind future generations by contract. The right of government to deal with funds in its own hands, funds and other property which belong to it, is not denied. Neither is it denied that government may make contracts to be fully executed, performed, completed and done with within such reasonable time in the future as to make it clear that they do not constitute evasive attempts to govern future generations. What is denied is that government has the right to give morally binding force to contracts requiring future generations to submit to taxation, either in character or amount, without their own consent. Such contracts are in their essence legislative, not contractual; and it is a clear principle, not only of political philosophy but of jurisprudence, that any exercise of legislative functions is at all times, so far as relates to its future operations, subject to repudiation.

This alone is sufficient to dispose of the notion that repudiation is necessarily dishonest. But even if the point that government cannot contract away the rights of future generations were waived, and it were assumed that government has that right, the point would still remain that contracts, though authoritatively made, are not necessarily inviolable.

While it is indubitably true that repudiation of public contracts may

be dishonest, it is not true that it is necessarily so. Whether the repudiation of a contract be dishonest or not depends not upon the fact of a contract, but upon its character. There are such things as unconscionable contracts; and repudiation of unconscionable contracts is not dishonest; it is rather their enforcement that is dishonest.

We here touch upon a principle which is aptly illustrated in the legal history of private contracts. At one time it was held by the courts that private contracts must be performed according to their terms. A leading case had to do with one of those practical jokes in geometrical progression with which we still astonish our children. To get his horse shod a farmer had contracted with a blacksmith to pay one barley corn for the first nail, two for the second, four for the third, and so on, each succeeding nail to be paid for with twice as much barley as the one before it. Notwithstanding the enormous amount of barley which the blacksmith claimed under his contract, the court decided, as anti-repudiationists now contend, that a contract is binding no matter how it affects the parties to it, and gave a ruinous judgment against the farmer accordingly. The principle of that decision was followed by the courts for a long time, but at length a more enlightened and honest view prevailed. It was seen that grossly oppressive contracts are unconscionable, and as a matter of good morals, as well as sound policy, the courts stopped enforcing them. No one now would think of stigmatizing repudiation of such private contracts as dishonest.

The principle applies as well to contracts by government. If they are unconscionable, honesty demands not that they be enforced, but that they be repudiated.

What would constitute an unconscionable public contract must depend, of course, as in the case of private contracts, upon the circumstances—not merely the circumstances in which the contract originates, but also the circumstances in which it operates. Though it be made in good faith, yet if it operate unconscionably, it is a fit subject for repudiation.

Without undertaking to enumerate the kinds of public contracts that ought thus in honesty to be repudiated, we may suggest two by way of illustration. Public debts that extend over generation after generation, sucking taxes in the name of interest from people born long after the principal has been expended for purposes that do not concern them, clearly belong in the category of repudiable public contracts. Permanent public debts are dishonest. The second example is franchise privileges. Franchises created by a dead and buried generation, by whose favor and upon whose authority the beneficiaries levy tribute upon people who had no voice in creating the franchises or in fixing their duration, may be repudiated without dishonesty. It is dishonest not to repudiate them.

Repudiation is a sacred right of the people. It is a right which must not be dishonestly exercised, to be sure; but likewise it is a right which must not be dishonestly neglected. Whoever couples this right with breach of public faith, as if the terms were interchangeable, gives aid and comfort to the worst class of enemies the people ever had. So does he who invokes it frivolously. The right of repudiation is a reserved right which the people should learn to respect; and one which, that it may command respect, should never be identified in speech with what is immoral, or be invoked for the redress of trivial or doubtful grievances. As the queen's arm of the old frontiersman hung upon its pegs above the hearth, never taken down for wanton attack but always ready and effective for defense, so should the reserved right of repudiation be cherished. It is the old queen's arm of a free people, menaced on all sides by aggressive and merciless legalized monopolies. If it be not cherished, the freedom of posterity will be bargained away, and the nation's destinies will fall under the sway of "the dead hand."

NEWS

Peace negotiations are nearing a favorable end. It was the 26th of last month when the French ambassador, acting in behalf of Spain, formally presented peace proposals to President McKinley; and on the 2d of the present month, President McKinley in response officially posted the terms offered by him. These terms, as stated last week, required the unconditional relinquishment of Cuba, the cession of all other West Indian islands, the concession of one of the Ladrone islands, immediate evacuations, and the occupation by the United States of Manila pending a treaty to determine the final disposition of the Philippines. On the 7th, Spain forwarded her reply to Paris, to be there translated and put into cipher for cabling to the French ambassador at Washington. The reply began to reach him in cipher on the 8th, but it was not until late in the afternoon of the 9th that it was delivered to President McKinley. Spain accepts the conditions of peace exacted by the United States, but couples her acceptance with suggestions as to the details of the treaty, the character of which suggestions has not yet been officially divulged. Her reply is said to have contained some 1,200 words.

At a meeting of the cabinet, which was called at once to consider Spain's reply, it was decided to prepare a protocol, the diplomatic name for the preliminary draft of a treaty, as the basis for terminating hostilities; and on the 10th Secretary Day communicated the text of one which he had prepared. Upon the signing of this protocol by the French ambassador, under the authorization of the Spanish government, the war will end.

That the Spanish government regards the war as already practically at an end is evident from a recent proclamation of Gen. Blanco, the Spanish captain general of Cuba, which announced that Spain had sued for peace and that there would be no further use for soldiers. Gen. Blanco explained the situation by saying in his proclamation that Spain was forced to seek peace by the European powers. She could not go to war with all countries at once, he said, and so was compelled to act under their dictation.

No halt, however, has been made by the United States in the movements under Gen. Miles in Puerto Rico. Last week the main body of our army in Puerto Rico was within six miles of Coamo, on the military road leading to San Juan, and a battle was expected in the passes farther north, near Aibonito. As yet that

battle has not taken place, nor is it likely to. Gen. Miles's strategy contemplates a flanking movement. Part of his force is to pass Aibonito to the east and part to the west, abandoning the military road and thus avoiding the disadvantage of meeting the enemy on that road near Aibonito. Pursuant to this plan the town of Guayama, far to the east of Ponce, and about six miles inland from Arroyo, was captured on the 5th by the troops under Gen. Brooke. Four Americans were wounded in the action, but none were killed. From Guayama, Gen. Brooke was to advance to Cayey, which lies to the east of the military road not far from Aibonito, and thence north to the military road beyond the Spanish defenses at Aibonito, his objective being San Juan. Gen. Wilson, commanding the center, was to go through Coamo along the military road nearly to Aibonito and then diverging to the east to join Gen. Brooke at Cayey, and proceed with him to San Juan. On the left, Gen. Henry was to march due north from Ponce on the south coast, to Arecibo on the north coast, a point more than 30 miles west of San Juan; while Gen. Swan, marching from Ponce westward along the southern, and then north along the western coast, through Guayanilla, Yauco, Mayaguez and Aguadilla, was to turn eastward from the latter place and join Gen. Henry at Arecibo. This plan seems to have been conceived after the method of an Australian rabbit hunt, in which the hunters move in a wide but ever narrowing crescent until they corral their game. San Juan is in this case the corral, and the Spanish garrisons throughout the island the game.

Upon the plan outlined above, the entire American army in Puerto Rico, 14,000 men, began to move on the 7th. The advance was slow, it being Gen. Miles's purpose to avoid fighting on the way if possible. Coamo was taken early on the 9th, by the centre, under Gen. Wilson, after a fight lasting 30 minutes, in which the American loss was six wounded. The Spanish lost their commander—a major—along with two captains and nine privates, all killed, and 35 wounded. The Spanish prisoners taken numbered 180. The right column, under Gen. Brooke, encountered an ambuscade five miles beyond Guayama, which involved and came near destroying a reconnoitering force; but the Spanish were driven off with a dynamite gun, and the American loss was confined to five wounded. At last reports all the American troops were in motion, in the four columns contemplated by the plan described above.

And now the Philippines have furnished a scene of battle between American and Spanish troops. News of this event did not reach the United States until the 9th, though the battle began on the 31st of July. The American troops were entrenched west of old Manila, which lies on the west bank of the Pasig river. The entrenchments extended north and south, at right angles to Manila bay, the left flank of the troops resting upon the bay, the right flank being covered by insurgent troops. Gen. Francis V. Greene, formerly of the 71st New York, was in command. On the 31st, Sunday, the insurgent left flank had withdrawn, the day being a feast day which the natives are accustomed to observe. This exposed the American right flank, and during the middle of the night, while a tropical storm was raging, wind sweeping the camp and rain falling in torrents, 3,000 Spaniards attacked the exposed American flank. They drove in the pickets easily, but were met by the 10th Pennsylvania, which checked them with three volleys. Still, in overwhelming numbers, they were almost into the American trenches, when the 1st California, part of the 3d artillery, armed with rifles, and the Utah battery came up to the support of the Pennsylvanians. The Spanish were then driven back in disorder. On the following night, August 1st, they renewed the attack, but at long range with heavy artillery, which was silenced by the Utah battery. On the 2d, just before midnight a third attack was made, again without success. The American loss was in killed 13, in seriously wounded 10, and in slightly wounded 38. The Spanish lost 350 killed and 900 wounded.

Reflections upon the good faith to the Americans of Aguinaldo, president of the Philippine republic, has drawn from him a letter in reply to the United States consul general at Hongkong, Mr. Wildman, who had brought the subject to Aguinaldo's attention. In this letter, which bears date July 30, Aguinaldo says:

I have read that I am getting the "big head" and not behaving as I promised you. In reply I ask, why should America expect me to outline my policy, present and future, and fight blindly for her interests, when America will not be frank with me? Tell me this: Am I fighting for annexation, protection or independence? It is for America to say, not me. I can take Manila, as I have defeated the Spanish everywhere, but what would be the use? If America takes Manila I can save my men and arms for what the future has in store for me. Now, good friend, believe me, I am not both fool and rogue. The interests of my people are as sacred to me as are the interests of your people to you.

Mr. Wildman has answered Aguinaldo as follows:

Trust to the honor and justice of the United States and let nothing interfere with the first task of throwing off the Spanish yoke. I believe in you. Do not disappoint me.

In Cuba the war has, indeed, practically ceased, with the Americans holding all they have conquered. This is exceedingly fortunate, for the health of the American troops is such that it has become necessary to hurry them home. Though it had been known that our troops were suffering from sickness, the seriousness of the danger was not appreciated until the 5th. Then the country was shocked by the publication of a letter from Col. Roosevelt to Gen. Shafter, and of another to him from all the general officers at Santiago. The letters were given to the Associated press for publication, by Gen. Shafter himself. They showed the army to be in immediate danger of destruction by disease.

Col. Roosevelt's letter represented that while yellow fever cases were as yet few, the whole command was so weakened and shattered by malarial fever as "to be ripe for dying like rotten sheep" when the yellow fever epidemic should come. He added that if the army were kept there it was the estimate of the surgeons that over half would die. The other letter, which was signed by Gens. Kent, Bates, Chaffee, Summer, Ludlow, Ames and Wood, and by Col. Roosevelt, declared it to be the unanimous opinion of the signers that the army should be at once taken out of the Island of Cuba and sent to a northern sea coast; and represented that owing to malarial fever the efficiency of the army was already destroyed, and that the army was in a condition "to be practically destroyed by an epidemic of yellow fever," which was "sure to come in the near future." The letter

protested against the attempt proposed by the war department to move the army into the interior of Cuba, both for lack of transportation facilities, and because with the equipment it had it "could not live in the interior during the rainy season without losses from malarial fever, which is almost as deadly as yellow fever." In conclusion the letter asserted that "the army must be moved or perish; and gave warning that any person preventing its removal north would be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives." The opinions of the officers signing this letter were based, as they said, on the unanimous opinion of the medical officers with the army.

The foregoing letters to Shafter having been forwarded to Washington, produced an instantaneous effect. On the 4th an order from Washington was received at Santiago commanding Gen. Shafter to prepare the troops for immediate embarkation. The place selected for their retirement was Montauk Point, at the eastern extremity of Long Island. The first troops to embark sailed on the 7th. More left on the 8th and still more on the 9th and 10th. Some of the invalid soldiers already in the north have been taken to Montauk Point, and they complain bitterly of lack of food and water there.

The returning troops are to have their places in Santiago supplied by regiments of yellow fever immunes. Among these are the 8th Illinois volunteers, a regiment of colored men. The immune troops are now on their way to Cuba.

The publication of the letters to Shafter regarding the danger to the army of allowing it to remain at Santiago, was regarded by the war department as a reflection upon its efficiency. To remove that impression, the secretary of war posted an official bulletin on the 5th in which the action of the department was explained. According to this bulletin it had been supposed at the department that yellow fever was epidemic at Santiago. For that reason the troops had been detained there. But Gen. Shafter was notified on the 28th of July that as soon as the fever subsided his men were to be brought north; and that Montauk Point had been already selected for the purpose. When, however, it was learned that yellow fever was not yet epidemic, transports were sent to Cuba, and Gen. Shafter was ordered to move his command north as rapidly as possible. All this was done, so the bulletin asserted, before the communication signed by the generals was received and before Col. Roosevelt's letter was published. From that bulletin and the publication by the secretary of war of a private letter from Col. Roosevelt, with a reply rebuking him, it is evident that a good deal of ill-feeling is involved in the circumstances attending the removal of the troops.

This feeling may not be altogether foreign to a difficulty between Gen. Shafter and Surgeon General Sternberg, relative to the medical service at Santiago. In the course of an investigation which the administration is carrying on, Gen. Shafter was asked to explain why sick transports were sent away from Santiago overcrowded with sick and wounded soldiers and without an adequate supply of medicines, doctors and nurses. Gen. Shafter denied responsibility, placing it upon the medical department. He admitted not detailing nurses to the sick transports, but said he had ordered that the stronger convalescents be used as nurses. For the lack of water on the sick transports, he held the medical department accountable, saying that as water had not been asked for, he supposed the ships were supplied. Gen. Shafter added that if the army had been properly provided with medical supplies it would have been possible to check the spread of disease. To this, Surgeon General Sternberg replies that he provided nurses, doctors and medicines sufficient for an army of 50,000 men, and declares that the lack of supplies can be traced directly to Gen. Shafter's negligence in allowing not only medicines but food and other necessaries to remain on board transports. Transports which returned to New York and Tampa, were found, he says, to have never been unloaded of either food or medical supplies. Surgeon General Sternberg's charges of neglect on Gen. Shafter's part are corroborated by the official report of Assistant Surgeon Munson, who gives details tending to show that the lack of medical supplies was due to their having been left on the transports, and to Gen. Shafter's indifference to the efforts of the medical corps to secure facilities for landing them.

The total sick at Santiago had decreased from 4,290 on the 2d, to 2,830 on the 9th; and the total of fevers had decreased from 3,038 on the 2d to 2,043 on the 9th. The number of deaths among the troops was 15 on the 4th; 2 on the 5th; 7 on the 6th; 11 on the 7th; 12 on the 8th, and 14 on the 9th—a total since our last issue, of 61.

Coincidently with the departure from Santiago of the American troops, the deportation of the Spanish prisoners has begun. The first of these to go aboard ship were the sick and wounded from the military hospital. They were carried on the 9th, by steam lighter, to the Spanish hospital ship, Alicante, the only transport for the Spanish that had yet arrived, and on the same day, to the number of 1,000, they began their voyage home. The work was done under the actual supervision of Spanish officers, though American officers directed it nominally.

Since our last report the president has created a military district in Cuba to be known as the Department of Santiago, and to consist of "all that part of the island of Cuba and the islands and keys adjacent and belonging thereto as have or may hereafter come under the control of the United States." The headquarters of the department is established at the city of Santiago, and Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton has been assigned to the command.

Though the war between Spain and the United States is practically at an end, that which the Cubans began three years and more ago they are still prosecuting. Most of the news of their operations, however, is indefinite and all of it is unauthoritative; yet such as it is, it indicates that they are making successful fights. Among other things it is reported that after a hard fight Garcia has gained a victory over the Spanish at Mayari, and previous reports of his capture of Gibara are confirmed. It is also reported that he has invested Holguin, and that the Spaniards are negotiating for the surrender of that stronghold to him. Along with this news from Garcia in the east, comes a report from Gomez in the west, that he has won the largest and most important battle ever fought in the western part of the island. He attempted with 3,000 men to force the

trocha between Las Villas and Camaguey, and to establish himself in the latter city. The trocha at this point had never been broken, and was then guarded by 4,000 Spaniards. Gen. Gomez led the attack in person, and after a battle in which he lost 130 killed and the Spanish 300, he marched without further opposition to Camaguey.

The president of the Cuban republic, Bartelome Masso, has forwarded to President McKinley an important communication bearing on the relations of the Cubans to the United States. It was delivered to President McKinley on the 5th, and is as follows:

I am anxious only to bring about peace and a feeling of satisfaction which will be gratifying both to the Cubans and to the United States. To further that end, if deemed best, I would gladly resign my position as president of the provisional government at any moment. I have lived, labored and fought for my country all my life, and my greatest desire is to see her in a condition of peace, security and prosperity before I die.

The expulsion of the Spanish with the assistance of the army and navy of the United States is now practically an established fact, for which we can perhaps never repay our benefactors.

We fully realize and are delighted in the fact that we are in the hands of the people of the United States, for in them and their government we have the most implicit confidence. The slightest friction or misunderstanding at Washington would give us unbounded pain.

I know that the question is seriously asked whether the Cubans are capable of governing themselves; can they be trusted to govern? I can only answer by saying that we have a population entirely different from that of other Latin-American countries, and that no spot on earth can be found where peace and freedom from strife of all kinds is more desired than in the island of Cuba. Once the Spanish people leave this soil, it will be a most serious occasion indeed that could bring about an armed resistance.

The vast majority of the population of Cuba are agriculturists, and possess neither ambition nor the desire to hold office. To be left alone to the cultivation of the soil and the enjoyment of their home life is all they ask.

These people comprise seven-eighths of our population. Of the remainder, our leaders, political and military, many were educated in the United States.

There they have imbibed the spirit of liberty, and learned the meaning of a true republican form of government. In their knowledge, ability and integrity we place our trust, and under the guidance and protection of the United States I can see for Cuba a future of brightness.

It is true that the temper of our people is peculiarly sensitive, with a tendency to distrust toward all who attempt to rule or govern. This is but the natural result of our long period of subjection and oppression at the hands of Spain. But it is equally true that our people are responsive and eager to grasp the hand of friendship. This has been extended to us by the United States in a most generous and self-sacrificing manner, and no true Cuban will ever forget it.

If the right men are chosen to govern the task will be easy; the people will govern themselves. If through misinformation the wrong men are secured for office the problem of reconstruction may be incumbered with more than one difficulty.

Our first step, with the approval of the United States government, will be to call a new assembly, which will represent as far as possible every section of territory and condition of people. This assembly will elect a new provisional government that will possess more powers than the present one, which is of necessity a government of revolution.

But the result of the new assembly will be to form a government which will still be limited in power and whose most important work will be the establishment of a permanent and complete government, founded on the lines of that of the United States, and one which we hope and have every reason to believe will be satisfactory to the United States and Cuba.

The strained relations which have existed for three years or more between England and Russia, regarding their conflicting interests in China, are bringing on a crisis. War was regarded last week as imminent, and nothing has since occurred to alter the situation. On the contrary, the tension has if anything been increased. The fundamental issue is the conflicting policies of "open door" or "closed door." It is the English policy to open all ports she controls, to the commerce and general intercourse of the world. This is the policy of the open door. Russia on the other hand aspires to shut out the rest of the world from the territory she acquires, with a view to exploiting it, commercially and politically, for her own purposes. In China, Russia has now acquired such a foothold as to enable her soon to appropriate to herself, excluding the trade of all other nations, the whole northern part of the empire. This the English resent.

The immediate surface issue, however, which now strains Anglo-Russian relations, is over a railroad concession. The Chinese diplomacy of Russia indicates her intention upon the completion of the trans-Siberian railway which she is building, to continue the line into the very heart of China, by means of a long spur extending from New Chwang—at the base of the peninsula on which Port Arthur lies—around the northwest shore of the Gulf of Leao-ton to Tien-tsin, and thence to Hankow, on the Yangtse-Kiang river. A glance at the map of eastern China will make it clear that this railroad system, sweeping through Russia, Siberia and northern China, from St. Petersburg to the Yellow sea, and then reaching from the Yellow sea down into the Yangtse valley, all under Russian control, would make Russia with her "closed door" policy, the political and commercial master of eastern Asia. Railroads which are expected to become part of this system are now in process of construction from Tien-tsin southward to the Yangtse-Kiang, and northward toward New Chwang. But English capitalists have disturbed Russian calculations by offering to provide the capital necessary for the erection of a line from Tien-tsin, by way of Chin-Kiang, on the west coast of Leaotong, to New Chwang. This railroad would be a link in the system to the control of which Russia looks forward, and would seriously interfere with Russian influence and power in China if under British control. For that reason, so it is explained, Russian diplomacy has been brought to bear upon the Chinese authorities to induce them to reject the British loan. Presumably, Russia would provide the capital if the British loan were rejected. Latest accounts from London were to the effect that the British government was firm; from which it is to be inferred that Russia must stop interfering, or England will fight. The British admiralty has made preparations for quickly mobilizing the fleet, and the whole naval force has been notified to be in readiness for service at an hour's notice. That the notice will soon be given is probable if a report of the 10th from Pekin turns out to be true. That report is to the effect that the Chinese government has assented to all the conditions imposed by the czar relative to the New Chwang railway. One of these conditions is that the line

shall not be mortgaged as security, and that foreign (implying British) control or interference of any description shall not be permitted.

Italy's little war with the Republic of Colombia, for the enforcement of President McKinley's award on the Cerruti claim, is still in abeyance. Italian war ships remain in Colombian waters, but the admiral recognizes the embarrassment of the Colombian government in the matter, and so forbears to execute his threat to bombard Cartagena. The government of Colombia is willing to settle the claim at once, but public opinion opposes the payment, bitterly denouncing President Cleveland for having made the award. There is danger of a revolutionary movement if the government makes a settlement, and the Italian admiral is permitting delay to enable the plans of the revolutionists to be frustrated. A late report has it that the matter has been adjusted, the Colombian congress having appropriated the money and directed the president to settle the claim.

Liberia, the negro republic of Africa, which was established by the old anti-slavery colonizing movement of the United States, is also engaging in military enterprise. An expedition was sent on the 25th of June, from Monrovia, the capital, into the interior, to enforce payment by the natives of a house tax. Serious resistance was encountered, and reenforcements were sent for. There are no advices yet as to the result of the expedition.

The strike of the wire nail workers at Cleveland against reductions in wages, which began last week, has since extended. An attempt was made this week by the state board of arbitration to adjust the strike, but the employers absolutely refused to entertain the suggestion of arbitration.

NEWS NOTES.

—Adolph Sutro, the millionaire ex-mayor of San Francisco, died on the 8th.

—The war department has ordered the removal of troops in southern camps to points farther north.

—A great fire occurred in Bismarck, N. D., on the 8th which threatened the city. The total loss was $700,000.

—Gov. F. A. Briggs, of North Dakota, died on the 9th. He is succeeded by Lieutenant Governor J. M. Devine.

—Four negroes, charged with murder, were taken from jail on the 10th and hanged by a mob at Clarendon, Ark.

—The republicans of Nebraska nominated a state ticket on the 10th with M. L. Hayward as the candidate for governor.

—The Earl of Minto (Sir Gilbert John Elliot Murray) has been appointed governor general of Canada to succeed Lord Aberdeen.

—Senators Cullom and Morgan and Congressman Hitt, commissioners to Hawaii, left Chicago for Honolulu on the 4th, upon their mission.

—On the 4th the city of Skaguay, Alaska, was threatened with destruction by fire. More than a dozen houses were then blazing. No word has been received since.

—George Ebers, the Egyptologist, who has written several novels to illustrate social life among the ancients, chiefly the ancient Egyptians, died in Bavaria on the 8th.

—The president has promoted both Sampson and Schley to the grade of rear admiral, with Sampson as senior to Schley. Sampson he advanced eight points and Schley six.

—Rt. Hon. George Nathaniel Curzon, British under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, and son-in-law of Leiter, the Chicago millionaire, has been appointed viceroy of India.

—Fears are felt in the west that a party of Utes, who have left their reservation heavily armed, are bent on revenging the killing of fellow tribesmen by Colorado game wardens last fall.

—Capt. Clark, who commanded the Oregon on her trip around the Horn and in the battle with Cervera, is to be retired for physical incapacity due to mental strain. It is feared that his career is ended.

—The Turkish government has replied to the American demand for compensation to American citizens for losses sustained in the Armenian massacres, that Turkey has no responsibility in the matter.

—The democratic convention of Missouri on the 10th adopted a platform favoring territorial expansion, under the leadership of ex-Gov. Stone and against the opposition of Congressman Bland.

—Alexander Campbell, a friend of Lincoln and father of the greenback party, who in 1874 was elected to congress from Illinois, as a greenbacker, died at La Salle, Ill., on the 8th. He was 84 years old.

—Eleven electric light companies of Chicago have been absorbed by the Chicago Edison company, thus placing all the electric light franchises of that city, save one, under the control of the Edison company.

—The war department indicates its intention to bring home the bodies of American soldiers buried at Santiago, and to ship them directly to friends. Those that are unclaimed by friends are to be taken to the National cemetery at Arlington, Va.

—Congressman Lewis, of Washington, who is serving on Gen. Grant's staff, and has been detailed to duty as inspector of camps and transportation, has incurred the enmity of contractors and won the praises of the soldiers, by condemning large quantities of unwholesome food.

—President McKinley has approved the plan of two Cincinnati boys for collecting from boys the cost of building a battleship to be called the American Boy. A young woman of Chicago, inspired by this, has started an endless chain to collect from girls the cost of another battleship to be called the American Girl.

—The transport Morgan City, of the third Manila expedition, caught fire at sea when three days out from Hawaii. To avoid a panic the fact was concealed from the troops, while the sailors worked night and day to prevent a conflagration. The fire was not put out until after the arrival of the vessel at Manila with the rest of the fleet.

—Prof. Mauthner, of the Vienna University, the greatest chemical authority of Austria, vouches for the discovery of a method of manufacturing albumen, though he says that further experiment is necessary to determine whether artificial albumen will have the same effect as the natural product on the human system. If it will, ravaging disease may be overcome in many cases by sub-cutaneous injections.

—State Senator James R. Garfield, son of the late President Garfield, lost the nomination for congress which he sought at the republican convention of the Twentieth Ohio district. He was Senator Hanna's candidate, and was opposed by Mayor McKisson, of Cleveland, who put forward H. G. Rossiter. McKisson, finding he could not nominate Rossiter, brought forward F. O. Phillips as a dark horse and scored a victory.

—The United States war department has forbidden passenger transporters to land any persons at the St. Michaels military reservation in Alaska who do not give abundant proof of their ability to support themselves for one year, or of their intention to proceed at once beyond the international boundary. The object is to prevent the setting down of impecunious gold seekers where the government is obliged to take care of them.

—Rev. Father Anthony Kozlowski, of All Saints' Polish Catholic Church, Chicago, who has been placed under the "major excommunication" of the

Catholic church, which cuts him off from all communication with Catholics, social and business as well as religious, threatens to sue Archbishop Feehan, who promulgated the excommunication, on the ground that the major excommunication is a relic of the middle ages and boycotts away his rights as an American citizen.

MISCELLANY

THE HOUSE BY THE SIDE OF THE ROAD.

"He lived in a house by the side of the road, and was a friend to man."—Homer.

There are hermit souls that live withdrawn
In the place of their self-content,
There are souls, like stars, that dwell apart
In a fellowless firmament,
There are pioneer souls that blaze their paths
Where highways never ran;
But let me live by the side of the road,
And be a friend to man.

Let me live by the side of the road,
Where the race of men go by—
The men who are good and the men who are bad,
As good and bad as I.
I would not sit in the scorner's seat,
Nor hurl the cynic's ban;
Let me live by the side of the road,
And be a friend to man.

I know there are brook-gladdened meadows ahead
And mountains of wearisome height,
That the road passes on through the long afternoon
And stretches away to the night;
But still I rejoice when the travelers rejoice,
And weep with the strangers that moan,
Nor live in my house by the side of the road
Like a man who dwells alone.

Let me live in my house by the side of the road,
Where the race of men go by;
They are good, they are bad, they are weak, they are strong,
Wise, foolish; and so am I.
Then why should I sit in the scorner's seat,
Or hurl the cynic's ban?
Let me live in my house by the side of the road,
And be a friend to man.

—Sam Walter Foss.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WAR.

. . . It is fair to assume that this war is the result of conscientious motives. The great mass of Americans, who by the sheer force of public opinion compelled our government to go into an aggressive war, are in reality devout lovers of peace. And had not their better natures been stirred by strong sympathy for the little band of Cubans struggling against overwhelming odds for freedom, and had they not conceived the intensest commiseration for the sufferings of the wretched victims of Spanish misrule, this war would never have been. Its contemplation, even, would not for a moment have been countenanced. Indeed, unworthy or base motives for our country's action are not prominent, if they exist. Even the war cry adopted by our sailors and soldiers, "Remember the Maine," is more expressive of protest against cowardly treachery than desire for revenge. . . .

Surely we must rejoice more at the evidence of improvement in the character of national motive than over any victories that may be won by our men-at-arms.

For a nation, the majority of whose citizens are ready to respond to the moral responsibility which rests upon the strong to defend the weak and upon the prosperous to succor the distressed, there is surely radiant hope. Such a nation is far advanced on the way toward a full recognition of the fundamental principles of justice and equity.

A nation that will voluntarily take the field to win freedom for a neighboring people must, it would seem, by the very impetus of its own action, be carried along toward securing greater freedom to its own citizens.—L. E. Wilmarth, in The New Earth.

THE MISERY IN ITALY.

Extract from an article by Rene Bazin in Les Annales, translated for The Living Age, and condensed for Public Opinion.

What a charming sight, after the gloomy Mount Cenis, is the broad Lombardy plain! Here we have an astonishing problem repeated almost everywhere throughout Italy; passing from one city to another, even without stopping or questioning, one cannot help perceiving the contrast between the soil which gives everything—or might give everything—and the peasant, too often miserably indigent; wasted by the pellagra, as in Lombardy, or forced to emigrate, as in Calabria. The villages along our route have nothing of the clean and cheerful air of those of France or Switzerland. I have been to many of them—the least known, the most medieval—and, on the spot, they proved to be so sad, so absolutely miserable, that the impression of their picturesqueness, for a moment all-powerful, faded and disappeared, leaving only pity for the inhabitants. For this mass of poor human beings is a mass of plodding toilers. I know nothing more erroneous than the prejudice which insists on misrepresenting the Italians as a race of lazzaroni, sprawling in the sun, clothed in brilliant rags and begging of each passing stranger. Look at them—those who are digging the trenches in the rice fields and along the roadside—those who are breaking the clods of the fallow-field where to-morrow they will sow the winter wheat—those who, in bands of twenty, men and women together, are hanging to the outer joists of the farmhouse the tawny ears of maize, the gran turco of which they make polekta. Do they ever stop work? Do they look like stage peasants? I have met bands of them on the great estates at the base of the Apenines, I have found them again in the Roman Campagna, about Naples, at Reggio de Calabria. In Sicily, a Frenchman, foreman of the Duke d'Aumale's vineyards, has assured me that they were more laborious, more patient, readier to work, than the French. . . . The principal reason for this distress is the crushing taxation which weighs upon the country. "Is it not lamentable?" said a farmer of north Italy. "What prosperity, what spirit of enterprise, what progress can you expect in a country whose soil is taxed thirty-three per cent. of its net revenue? And I am not speaking of our dwellings, on which, thanks to the fantastic valuation of the treasury, we sometimes pay fifty or even sixty per cent. on the sum invested in them." Count Iacini could indeed say with truth that the provincial and communal governments did not so much lay a burden on the soil, as literally strip it bare.

THE HOME OF THE SPANIARD.

Extracts from an article on "The Resources and Industries of Spain," by Edward D. Jones, published in The North American Review of July.

Though Spain forms a peninsula of Europe it is most effectively separated from the rest of the continent by the Pyrenees; an impassable chain of mountains which for one hundred and eighty miles is not even pierced by a wagon road. It is not without reason, therefore, that the inhabitants betray the characteristics of an insular civilization. It is true that the peninsula formation opens the land to the sea, and gives Spain one mile of shore for every seventy-two square miles of area. It is also true that the sea has been called "the road to freedom" and the "highway of commerce." But to develop commerce a coast-line is not sufficient. There must be a productive interior region and its highways must lead naturally outward and down to the sea. The interior of Spain is an elevated plateau, walled in by rugged mountains in such a manner that communication between the inland plains and the harbors on the coast is difficult to maintain. . . .

The impression which one obtains from a view of the outlines of Spain is that of massiveness. As has often been said by geographers, the country seems to repeat, in miniature, the interior highlands and compact outlines of the continent of Africa. It is a common saying in France that Africa begins with the Pyrenees. There is a lack of that delicate articulation of parts which is shown by Greece, and of the slender and symmetrical structure found in Italy.

As Irving years ago said: "Many are apt to picture Spain in their imagination as a soft southern region decked out with all the luxuriant charms of voluptuous Italy. On the contrary, though there are exceptions in some of the maritime provinces, yet, for the greater part, it is a stern, melancholy country, with rugged mountains and long, naked, sweeping plains, destitute of trees, and invariably silent and lonesome, partaking of the savage and solitary character of Africa."

The general slope of the country is toward the southwest. The main rivers rise in the east and flow in long courses toward the west. Spain turns her back upon Europe and the Mediterranean, and looks toward Africa, whence came her first permanent civilization, and toward the countries west of the Atlantic, where she has dreamed her dream of empire. . . .

In the extent of its mineral resources Spain ranks as the first country of Europe. . . . Spain is rich in iron, copper, lead, zinc, antimony and silver, yet she exports all except the last two in the form of ore, to be smelted and manufactured elsewhere. In true coal Spain is not well supplied, but she has an abundance of peat and lignite, and means have now been discovered of producing excellent charcoal from these substances. Until within recent years mining was discouraged by taxes which were designed to promote the exploitation of colonial mines, from the product of which the crown was able to claim a liberal share. At present the mining industry is abundantly fostered and protected by law, but it is chiefly carried on by French and English capital. . . .

A map of the density of population in Spain shows that the regions of greatest density are along the coast. The peninsula shows a fringe of fertile and prosperous country. The nation camps upon its borders, and presents to the outside world hardly more than a shell, having its political head and directing center suspended within it in a capital which is nowhere in close connection with the living tissue of the race and nation. Of the rule of the central region Mr. Webster has said: "It is one of the misfortunes of Spain that from the advantage of their elevated, central position, the Castilians, as warriors and statesmen, at all times among the least civilized of her peoples, have been able to rule and control the more civilized and more advanced communities of the seaboard. It is a want of discernment of this fact which makes so many of the picturesque histories of Spain utterly fail in explaining the origin and the progressive causes of her present condition." The maritime populations were held together to expel the Moors. But when not under intense pressure, they have easily perceived that their interests differ widely from those of the central region. Thus the rule of Castile has been looked upon in many districts as foreign and hostile. The political history has been marked by civil dissensions. Barcelona has been federalistic and revolutionary, and has played the same role that Marseilles has taken in France. The Atlantic coast has been Girondist, as in France, while the center has been the stronghold of conservatism and royalism. This lukewarm patriotism, springing from the lack of proper economic and social bonds to knit the nation into a whole, explains the political corruption that has long been rife and the hesitancy and inefficiency of the central government. The political life of Madrid is, in a way, analogous to its economic life. The city is in a region that can do little towads its support. It stands on sandy hills in the midst of a treeless, infertile plain. Vegetables and fruits for the population must be brought from distant Valencia. Wheat comes from across the Guadarrama mountains, while manufactured goods are brought from Catalonia or are imported from abroad. The local industries are chiefly for the purpose of providing articles of luxury demanded by the royal household and a large official and military class. The economic life of the city is artificial; it is not rooted into the soil on which it stands.

THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL DUTY.

Extracts from a baccalaureate sermon, delivered June 5, before the class of 1898 of the Kansas State Agricultural College, by the President, Thomas Elmer Will.

I would point you to the social cellar, to the pictures of how the other half lives, to statistics of business failures, of suicides and insane, to the army of drunkards and drunkards' wives and children; and would remind you that while reconcentradoes famish in Cuban cities, our own brethren starve in American cities, and I would bid you hearken to the weeping of the children in our factories and to the bitter cry of those who tread the winepress of our civilization.

Say not this is no concern of yours; that were Cain's reply. Man is his brother's keeper. In the name of him who sought not his own, who went about doing good, who came to bring deliverance to the captives, to set at liberty them that are bound, and to preach the good news to the poor—in the name of him who, careless of power and place, and of the praise or blame of men, spent his life for others, and gave it up for the interest of the larger, nobler, holier life for every child of earth, I beseech you that you give yourselves not over to this hardness of heart, to this dry rot of our civilization. . . .

However unquestioning may be one's acceptance of traditional creeds, and however punctual his attendance upon the means of grace, if he love not his brother, if he withhold his compassion and assistance from those in need, if his sympathies go not out to classes whose lives are embittered by hard bondage, and if his indignation burn not at the injustice which would exalt the strong and debase the weak, protect the oppressor and enslave the toiler, that man's religion is vain.

The Christian is a follower of Christ; and Christ stood not for theological technicalities, not for tithes of mint, anise and cummin, not for holy days and rites and ceremonies—against all of these things he rebelled, denouncing the priestly class who laid upon the staggering shoulders of the people this burden of sacerdotalism. Jesus was the iconoclast of his time. On the Sabbath day he healed the sick, and rubbed wheat heads in his hands; he ate with unwashen hands; he associated with the lower classes, to whom, by trade, he belonged; he rebuked the clergy, condemning their deeds and impugning their motives; he trampled boldly on the conventionalities and the proprieties of his day; but he went to the heart of things in his simple talks to the common people, workingmen, shopkeepers, farmers and fishermen who gathered around him in the streets, on the vacant lots and by the water front. For later generations of theologians it was left to spin the webs of doctrine and announce what form and shade of intellectual belief admitted man to Heaven and excluded him therefrom. To him all such mental gymnastics were beside the point; the fundamentals were

not creeds and formularies, but spirit and life.

Love the good, and labor to make it prevail; abhor evil, and force it out of the world by crowding more and more of good into the world. Look not upon self, its ease, comfort and satisfaction, as the supreme concern; rather deny self, lose self, in helping others. Lose life if need be—for what is one's earthly life with eternity stretching out before him! Shun not to attack evil, to expose corruption and unmask the sins even of respectable sinners, but show kindness, help the helpless, minister to the diseased, arouse the slumbering self-respect of the outcast and abandoned; give to men new ideals and ambitions and labor to make this world more habitable and life more noble—such as I read it in the four Gospels, is the Christianity of Christ; and he who maintains such a faith and who seeks to live such a life is, I submit, a Christian, whatever may be his intellectual conceptions of God and sin and future life, and whatever may be his relation to established ecclesiastical institutions.

WHAT SHALL WE DO WITH OUR ISLANDS?

Extracts from an article with the above title, by Edwin Burritt Smith, Esq., published in The Chicago Record of August 4.

The crisis which we face calls upon us to remember not merely the purpose with which we entered upon the war, but also the character of our institutions, the counsels of the fathers and the experience of a century in pursuance of those counsels. It also requires us to consider our unique position and the tremendous responsibilities which are already ours. It is too late to inquire whether we should have entered upon the war. The step was taken somewhat jauntily and without serious inquiry as to its necessity, but it is irrevocable. That it commits us to serious responsibilities, from which there is no escape, is obvious. The question now is whether we shall discharge these responsibilities with the least possible deflection from our true course, or whether we shall in their discharge enter upon a policy of "imperialism."

Those who now wish to depart from our traditional policy may be classed as jingoes and crusaders. Their motives are diverse, but they are united in support of a policy of extension by the United States of its jurisdiction whenever and wherever possible in all parts of the world. They are also united in the belief that it has suddenly become "a world power," and must henceforth share in "the work of the world," and in their impatience with every suggestion that the vast material interests of our people are of first importance and that the cost of a national policy is to be counted even though it be for conquest or philanthropy. They also agree in a desire to escape from our national "isolation." This policy means to the jingoes a great army and navy and an indefinite multiplication of public places and contracts—in a word, spoils. To those who favor it in the interest of a vague philanthropy it means "a growing consciousness of the solidarity of the race," an "enlargement of liberty," an extension of "justice, honor, humanity." While these are somewhat vague as specifications, they seem to imply that our country has heretofore failed to perform its duty to others, and that because of its "isolation" it has not shared in "the work of the world." This view does not accord with the facts. The time has come for something more specific. Those who complain of our "isolation" should furnish a bill of particulars. We should be advised what "imperialism" is, so that we may decide if we want it. If "a full line of islands" is desirable, we shall not have a better chance to commence their acquisition. If we are to embark on an imperial career, we should improve our rare opportunity to acquire Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, the Ladrones and the Carolines. If islands are vital to our welfare, let us throw off the mask, abandon the squeamishness about broken pledges and self-government and take every island in sight. If "we have a right to expect a tangible return for our efforts and our victories," as Prof. Judson assumes, why not abandon all pretense of unselfish benevolence, make further efforts, secure other victories and include the Canaries and the Balearics in our haul? If a war begun for humanity is to be converted into a war for conquest, why not make the most of it? Why confine ourselves to islands? Cadiz and Cartagena would make good coaling stations and might help our "trade interests" in the Mediterranean. The question is one of principle. If we may take one island merely because we want it and have the power, what we want and can take is the measure of our rights. This doctrine, even when clothed in fine phrases, presents nothing novel or mysterious. It has long been supposed, however, that we had left it behind. . . .

Having voluntarily assumed terrible responsibilities in respect to these islands, we must discharge them so as to promote the peace and welfare of the world. In their control we should avoid a colonial policy from which we revolted in 1776 and from which we profess to have rescued them. We have immense and growing interests in the great policy of "the open door," for which England everywhere stands. We shall best show our appreciation of her friendship and promote general international harmony by the adoption of this enlightened policy for these islands. Every friend of civilization rejoiced to see its prompt application by the president at Santiago. We may then conclude, in respect to Cuba and Puerto Rico, that, having attained all and more than that for which the war was begun, we should not continue it for even one hour for ulterior purposes. Let us assume the grave responsibilities to which we are committed for their government solely in a spirit of humanity. Let us adopt the enlightened policy of "the open door" for their commerce, and in our provisions for their government do the least possible violence to the principles of free government for which we stand. . . . .

Our government is formed "to establish justice, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Its duty lies entirely within these purposes. The presumption is great that we shall still, as in Washington's day, best promote justice and the general welfare by cultivating "peace and harmony with all nations," and by "diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing." In what we do and what we omit in both the Atlantic and Pacific we should have regard to our commanding position and the mighty responsibilities which are already ours. We should, as to all these islands, insist upon "the open door" and as to none of them assume any unnecessary governmental responsibility. A nation which is committed to the position that all men are of inalienable right equal before the law can make no provision beneath its flag for subject peoples. Taxation without representation is still tyranny. Government by force is still despotism. Force, even when touched with philanthropy, cannot be employed as a chief instrument of free government.

A lawyer in a Boston court the other day after a close cross-examination of a witness, an illiterate Irish woman,

in reference to the position of the doors and windows, etc., in her house, asked the following question: "And now, my good woman, tell the court how the stairs run in your house," to which the good woman replied: "How do the sthairs run? Shure, whin I'm oop sthairs they run down, and whin I'm down they run oop."—N. Y. Tribune.

THE NONSENSE OF IT.

Short Answers to Common Objections Against Woman Suffrage.

1. "I have all the rights I want." Have you the right, if a married woman, to control your own earnings? Have you the right to make a will? Have you the right to your own child, if left a widow, supposing that your deceased husband, in some fit of ill-temper, bequeathed your child to the guardianship of someone else? Have you the right to the guardianship of your child, at any rate, if you have married a second husband? In many states of the union, women have not these rights; and you ought to be ashamed of yourself, if, not having them, you do not "want" them. Again, do you not want a right to vote on the expenditure of your own tax-money; on school laws, on temperance laws? You have no right to shut yourself within the circle of your own interests, and to say that you do not "want" such rights as these.

2. "If the laws are wrong, they are being corrected without women's voting." Aye, but not without the demand of women to vote, and the consequent agitation of the subject. That is what is changing the laws. The common law of England (which Lord Brougham called "a disgrace to any heathen nation," so far as it related to woman) prevailed almost everywhere in the United States, until the "Woman's Rights" agitation began. It was not till women began to talk about the ballot that any changes began to be made in the laws; and they have no security against the repeal of those improved laws, except the ballot in their hands.

3. "The polls are not decent places for women." No place is decent from which women are excluded. Women do not refuse to travel by rail because the smoking-car is apt to be a dirty place. They rightly demand that some other car shall be put on which shall be clean. It will be the same in politics. So soon as school suffrage for women became the law in Massachusetts, the legislature passed, almost without opposition, a statute to prohibit smoking and drinking at all voting places.

4. "Politics are necessarily corrupting." Then why not advise good men, as well as good women, to quit voting?

5. "If women voted, it would divide families." But families and nations have quarreled twice as much over religion as over politics, ever since the world began. If you allow women to choose their own religion, why not their own party?

6. "Women would only vote as their husbands or fathers do." Many women have no husbands and no living fathers. If they have, and vote as these men do, there will be no quarrel. If they vote differently—as they are very likely to do on questions of temperance, religion, and the right to control their own property or their own children,—then this objection falls to the ground.

7. "The best women will not vote." Will they not? Then they are not truly the best women. Women who are really conscientious will not shirk their duties when the time comes, depend upon it. The complaint has been, in Massachusetts, under the school suffrage law, that only the best women have voted. It is very hard to satisfy one's opponents.

8. "The most refined women will not vote." Many of the most refined women whom the land has produced have gone as missionaries to foreign lands, taught schools for freemen, visited the Five Points in New York, entered barrooms to save their husbands, or tended hospitals during the war. Will those same women shrink from dropping a piece of paper into a ballot box when the time comes? Refinement that takes the place of conscience is not worth much.

9. "Bad women will vote." They may and will vote, and so will bad men. But bad women will not vote openly as bad women; for vice in women, by instinct and policy, conceals itself and passes under another name.

10. "I should not like to hear my wife speak in town meeting." But you are often willing to pay other men's wives to sing in public, and if a woman may properly uplift her voice to sing nonsense, why not to speak sense?

11. "It will turn women into men." Happily you cannot do that. It is because women, after all, are different from men that they deny the right of men to represent them, make laws for them, judge them in court, and spend their tax money. If they are the same with men, they have the same rights; if they are distinct from men, they need the ballot to help make laws for themselves. Take which view you please, it comes to the same thing.

12. "Women are too busy to vote." Why not say, "Men are too busy to vote?" Men are apt to claim that their own day's work is harder than that of their wives.

13. "Women do not know enough to vote." That is always the excuse for excluding a disfranchised class. Bancroft says that the original charter of Delaware put the government into the hands of a royal council, on the ground that "politics lie beyond the profession of merchants." So the agents who came out with Sir Edward Andros to take away the liberties of the New England colonies wrote back, in great contempt: "It is pleasant to behold poor cobblers and pitiful mechanies, who have neither house nor land, strutting and making no mean figure at their elections." Now, the merchants and mechanics have the ballot and it is only women against whom the same old objection is brought up!

14. "Women do not want to vote." How can you tell, till you give them the opportunity? We gave the ballot to the freedmen, because we knew they needed it, whether they knew it or not. The more intelligent among them knew it, at any rate; and so the more intelligent women—the leading authoresses and philanthropists, for instance—know and say that they need the right of suffrage, whatever the thoughtless and frivolous may say.

15. "It will lead to a dangerous intimacy between the sexes." In an oriental country, a physician can only prescribe for a woman by feeling the pulse in an arm thrust from behind a curtain. But as no political intimacy would exceed that which already exists in this country between the physician and his patients, the clergyman and his parishioners, the school superintendent and his teachers, the merchant and his bookkeepers, the mill owner and his operatives—the objection is idle. If you honestly prefer Turkish institutions, go and live where they prevail; but if the American system is the best, let it be made consistent with itself.

16. "Women cannot fight, so they should not vote." Formerly women were refused permission to hold real estate, on the same ground. "When fiefs implied military service," wrote Dr. Johnson, in 1776, "it is easily discerned why females could not inherit them, but the reason is at an end. As manners make laws, manners likewise repeal them." The same reasoning applies now to voting.

Besides, the objection proves too

much. It appears by the published record of United States military statistics that out of men examined for military duty during the rebellion, more than a quarter were found unfit; but that this varied with different professions. Of journalists 740 in every 1,000 were disqualified, of preachers 974, of physicians 670, of lawyers 544. The majority of all these classes are as useless for warlike purposes as women; far more useless than the fighting women of Dahomey. Are these classes therefore to be disfranchised, like women? On the other hand, of all unskilled laborers only 348 in 1,000 are disqualified; of tanners 216, of ironworkers 189. Is the voting power to be taken away from lawyers and journalists, and to be concentrated on iron workers and tanners? We should do that to be consistent.

In the Prussian army, the most powerful in the world, Gen. McClellan tells us that all men are enrolled, and those unfit for field service are employed as military tailors or nurses. Once apply this principle to women and you may draft them for military duty as much as you please.

The amount of it all is, that woman must be enfranchised. It is a mere question of time. She must be a slave or an equal; there is no middle ground. Admit, in the slightest degree, her title to property or education, and she must have the ballot to protect the one and use the other. And there are no objections to this, except such as would equally hold against the whole theory of republican government.—Thomas Wentworth Higginson.

"HONOR."

To the practical American mind there is something comical, yet sad, about the constant flaunting before the world by the Spaniards of their "honor." What could be more grotesque, for instance, than a speech of a member of the cortes, we believe he was, who thanked God that while the Yankee pigs "might blockade their ports they could not blockade their honor." How wholly mediaeval their conception of honor is! Surely Spain to-day needs a new Cervantes, to expose with his sarcastic pen the utter emptiness, as far as anything good and useful to themselves or others is concerned, of Spanish "honor." It seems to be little, if any, better than the "honor" of the brawling duelist, exposed to the vulgar gaze and attack of every passer by. At best it is close akin to the honor of the brute whose rage and hatred of its stronger opponent lead it to seek self-destruction. What a poor silly kind of honor it is that knocks its brains out against a stone wall rather than climb it.

Spanish "honor," as depicted by themselves, seems to be something inherent in them, something quite aside from any useful thing they do. And what could be more vapory and fantastic than honor of this kind. Men and nations, apart from what they do, are empty nothings. The kind of life they give expression to by their words and deeds is all there is to them.

What wonder, then, that a nation that relies upon a shadowy "honor" is utterly unable to stand before one that, with all its shortcomings, is still a nation of workers, of men who do things.—The New Earth.

SEEN AND HEARD IN CHICAGO STREETS.

Here in brief are the principles of that business which is called "modern" by the pessimist, but of whose aging and passing the optimist already sees signs.

I frequently buy fruit at one of the down-town sidewalk fruitstands. It is managed by a young and intelligent Italian, assisted by an older man who speaks less English.

In the absence of the younger man the other day I purchased some green grapes marked "sweet," which proved to be quite otherwise. A couple of days later, while purchasing other fruit, I gently rebuked the young man for having had the sign "sweet" over such very acidulous grapes. He looked ashamed, but managed to get his defense into words:

"Business man have do dat."

And then bethinking himself that it was not he who had sold me the grapes, he added:

"I not sell you dem, no. I sell dem idiots."

"Idiots" was evidently a happy word, and he repeated his statement with much satisfaction, probably not noticing the implication that the older man must have mistaken me for an idiot.

Again I gently remonstrated in behalf of good morals, urging that such discrimination was unfair, that all should be treated alike. But having vindicated himself of any intention of misbehavior toward me, with an air of superior business knowledge he smilingly replied to my statement of principle:

"Not pay, not pay."

ALICE THACHER POST.

It may be asserted in the broadest possible terms that it is the natural right of every man to employ his talents and industry . . . in the manner which he considers to be most for his own advantage. . . . A law that seeks to check the course of this "free exchange" is inherently wrong. . . . If a person forcibly takes away a part of his property from another person, without any equivalent, it is simply robbery.—"A Policy of Free Exchange. Essays by Various Writers." John Murray, London, 1894.

"I don't understand it. When I gave my lawyer the facts in the case he decided it in five minutes."

"Well?"

"Well, when it got into the courts it took the judges three weeks to decide the same points, and they decided the other way."—Puck.

First Spaniard—The creature, ah, so magnificent! Who is it?

Second Spaniard—You do not know? That is Gen. Shaveter, the commandant of the forces American.

First Spaniard—Ah, ah! Ees he not well fed?—Cleveland Plain Dealer.

"This room is very close," remarked the guest to the head waiter; "can I have a little fresh air?" The well-drilled automaton raised his voice to the highest pitch. "One air!" he yelled; after a pause, adding; "and let it be fresh!"—Tit-Bits.

If drunk with sight of power, we loose
Wild tongues that have not thee in awe—
Such boasting as the Gentiles use
Or lesser breeds without the Law—
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget—lest we forget!
—Rudyard Kipling.

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