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Dr. HJ Woodhouse
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A recent press dispatch from Manila shows that the American censor is still at work there. One sentence in the dispatch is cut off with this explanation: "Suppressed by the censor." If we are at peace in the Philippines, may we not ask of what use is a censor? There can be no military secrets in time of peace. Is he there, then, to protect political secrets from getting to the American people?

Col. Hall, for several months stationed in Puerto Rico, thinks it will take a generation to bring the Puerto Ricans around to the American way of managing public affairs, because "they believe that a public office should be administered for the financial benefit of the incumbent." And pray when did the Americans stop believing that "public office is a private snap?" What manner of men are these Americans, anyhow, that they assume to teach the Puerto Ricans in so delicate a matter? Ask the Cubans, who are looking on in amazement at the kindergarten study in postal fund ethics which the Americans are now exhibiting at Havana for their enlightenment.

Violent labor strikes are again called to general attention by events of the past few days in St. Louis. Complete operation of the street car system there has been suspended for want of men to take the place of strikers, and such partial operation as might have been possible has been prevented by mobs. The violence of the mobs has in turn been met with violence by the authorities. And

properly so. Rioting cannot be tolerated, however great the aggravation. We may sympathize with rioters—and as a rule the rioter, angered beyond endurance by some vague sense of wrong, deserves our sympathy more than the cool and calculating person who angers him—but rioting must be stopped. Thus far we are in agreement with those who clamor for "law and order." There must be law and there must be order.

But we are not blind to the fact that labor riots are not deliberately criminal. They are spontaneous outbursts of lawlessness and disorder in reckless protest against more subtle disorder and more infamous lawlessness. It is doubtful if in the world's history there is a single exception. It is not the riots, therefore, that should command our attention beyond the necessity of putting them down. It is the provocation. That "peace and order" man whose indignation at lawlessness and disorder spends its force upon labor rioters, and finds no object of virtuous wrath in the legalized industrial conditions that breed labor riots as a bog breeds mosquitoes, is morally more responsible for labor riots than the rioters themselves.

It appears that the state of California does not exempt church property from taxation. This fact having been brought to the attention of the Methodist general conference now in session at Chicago, that body has adopted a resolution favoring an amendment to the California constitution exempting buildings and sites used exclusively for religious worship. If the resolution had favored exemption of church buildings, it would be above criticism. To tax church buildings is to tax church worship. But an exemption of sites would have the effect

of favoring the congregations that secure the more valuable locations.

There is a difference, let it be noted, between a church building and a church site. The building is erected by the congregation. No one else has any right whatever in it or to it. It would never have existed but for the energy of the congregation which causes it to be erected. To tax the church building, therefore, is to put a burden upon church building. It is to discourage the erection of churches. And if the tax be in proportion to the value of the building it has a tendency to discourage the erection of good buildings. Unpainted sheds will come to be used for churches where handsome church buildings would be erected if it were not for the tax. It is different with church sites. These are not made by the congregation. The veriest atheist in a community has as much moral right as the holiest church man to the site of a church and the profit it will yield. Both have an equal right to share in the value not only of church sites, but of all other sites. For sites upon the earth were made for neither Jew nor Gentile, Christian nor heretic, but for all. It does not burden any congregation, therefore, to tax the site it has appropriated to itself. On the contrary, such a tax is only compensation to the rest of the community, in greater or less degree, for being excluded from that particular part of the common inheritance. So it is that exemption from taxes on church sites enables the churches to rob the rest of the community, while taxes upon church buildings enable the rest of the community to rob the churches. The obvious moral of which is clear. Out of respect for the eighth commandment, tax all church sites and exempt all church buildings.

In nominating Charles A. Towne for vice president the populists have chosen a most excellent man to stand in the gap of an impossible situation. It is politically out of the question for the democratic party to indorse him. Not alone is this because he is a republican. It is also because his nomination comes to the democrats as an ill-advised challenge. Should the democrats now nominate Bryan and Towne, they would be plausibly chargeable with having quit politics on their own account and merely indorsed the whole populist ticket. Their only way of avoiding this appearance is to nominate some other person than Towne as the democratic candidate to run with Bryan.

Had the circumstances been such as to enable the populists to force their nominations for both offices upon the democrats, the move would have been an excellent bit of tactics. The populists would thereby have placed themselves in the lead. Theirs would have been the opposition party, and the democrats would have had no alternative but to fall in line. But these circumstances do not exist. The democrats not only cannot be forced, but they cannot afford to appear to be forced. So ill-adapted are the circumstances to such tactics that the democrats could not indorse the populist ticket even if both candidates were democratic possibilities. Though the democrats would not fall in line behind the populists by nominating Bryan, since he was not only the democratic candidate four years ago, but his renomination by them was assured long before the populists convened at Sioux Falls, yet if the populists had named with Bryan either Williams or Lentz or Sulzer, or any other democrat whom the party might fairly choose, it would be impossible for the democrats to nominate the same man. To do so would give them the appearance of taking second place to the populists. Much more emphatic would that appearance be were the democrats to nominate a republican at the dictation of the populists.

A very large proportion of the delegates at Sioux Falls evidently foresaw this. Among them were such able and incorruptible men as Gen. Weaver and Jerry Simpson. They advocated a conference with the democrats and the silver republicans, the nomination for vice president to be left open meanwhile. It is not to be inferred, however, that the leading men against them, and who in spite of their advice carried the plan of nominating a vice presidential candidate, were without ability and probity. These men had a problem of their own which they could not ignore. Coming from states where the populists distrust the democrats, it was necessary for them and for the perpetuation of the populist party at home, that a full ticket should be nominated. Not to have nominated would have been, in the estimation of their constituents, equivalent to disbanding in favor of the hated democrats. It was important, moreover, and for similar reasons, that after nominating Bryan for president, their candidate for vice president should not be a democrat. A republican like Towne would be much more acceptable to the populists of those states than a democrat, though equally advanced in the direction of populism. This condition, probably, more than any intention on the part of the populists to get a tactical advantage over the democrats, influenced Towne's nomination.

It is to be regretted that so many populists are attached so much more closely to their party organization than to the principles it professedly espouses. It ought to make very little difference to a populist whether populist candidates are in the field. They would have no chance of election. But it ought to make much difference whether an opportunity to populize the democratic party is allowed to go by default. Within the democratic party at this moment a struggle between plutocracy and the essential principles of populism is going on, and every diversion like

that of the populists counts for the plutocracy in that struggle. Every Jeffersonian democrat drawn away in a wild goose chase for the dubious spoils, the empty honors and the more than doubtful educational advantages of a third party campaign is so much gain for the Whitneys who seek again to climb into the saddles of democratic leadership and dictation. These are times in politics when good sense is quite as important as good motive.

The decision of the federal supreme court in the inheritance tax cases, should it be accepted by that court in subsequent cases as having established the principles upon which it rests, may prove to be little short of revolutionary. For one thing, it holds that the federal government can tax privileges which are created by the states and are peculiarly subject to state jurisdiction. The privilege in question was that of inheritance. This may now be regarded as fully exposed to federal taxation. But other state privileges, too, would be within the principle; and if a populist congress and president were once elected the supreme court would doubtless be afforded an opportunity of saying whether some of them were not constitutionally also within the law.

This decision, furthermore, gives a severe wrench to the income tax decision, which was procured through the intellectual agility of one judge who changed his opinion "over night." But its most important bearing is upon the question of progressive taxation. It holds on this point that congress may tax heirs whose inheritance is larger at a higher rate than those whose inheritance is less. A wide open but rational construction is here made of the first paragraph of section 8, article 1 of the constitution, which requires that taxes of this character shall be "uniform throughout the United States." The court decides that the kind of uniformity thus required is not personal but

geographical. If, therefore, such a tax operates uniformly throughout the United States, it need not operate uniformly among the taxpayers. So long as congress makes progressive taxation apply throughout the country, it may, under this decision, discriminate against the rich.

We must not infer, however, that the decision is a precedent in favor of the adoption of progressive taxation by state legislatures. Some state constitutions require taxes to be "equal and uniform," and in those states the legislature cannot discriminate. But in states where that restriction does not exist the decision we have been discussing is a precedent, and in federal legislation it is an absolute authority, for levying taxes in proportion to ability to pay.

DOCUMENTARY OUTLINE OF THE PHILIPPINE CASE.

In his classic oration on Toussaint L'Ouverture, Wendell Phillips makes much of the fact that our knowledge of this negro hero and statesman of San Domingo is derived altogether from his enemies. While Cromwell, Napoleon, Washington, are characterized by friendly historians of their own race, only the unsympathetic records of hostile aliens reveal the greatness of Toussaint. In that particular, at least, this black leader of a century ago was like the Filipinos of to-day. Their tragic history, too, must be gathered as yet from the records of their enemies. In its more recent developments, this history of theirs is to be sought for in a tangled mass of American official documents, and upon the testimony of these we purpose to try the Philippine case.

I.

Without recurring to their long succession of revolts against Spanish oppression, we find the Filipinos engaged in the summer of 1896 in what they call "the great insurrection." It is briefly described by an American general, F. V. Greene, at page 421 of what is now familiarly known as "senate document No. 62," of the third session of the Fifty-fifth congress—an exceedingly valuable official publication which may be had free upon

application to any congressman or senator. According to Gen. Greene, their "great insurrection" against Spain, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, continued with varying success on both sides from August, 1896, until December (Gen. Greene probably meant September), 1897, when it was terminated by an agreement with the Spanish governor general.

But it soon revived. Spanish officials denied this at the time, and American officials now assert that there was no revival until after Dewey's famous victory. American official documents, however, prove that it was again in full activity more than two months earlier.

At page 319 of "senate document 62" is an official dispatch from Oscar F. Williams, American consul at Manila, written two months and ten days before Dewey's victory, in which Mr. Williams says:

Peace was proclaimed, and since my coming festivities therefor were held; but there is no peace, and has been none for about two years. Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists, battles are of almost daily occurrence, ambulances bring in many wounded, and hospitals are full. Prisoners are brought here and shot without trial, and Manila is under martial law. The crown forces have not been able to dislodge a rebel army within ten miles of Manila, and last Saturday, February 19, a battle was there fought and five dead left on the field.

A month later, and still six weeks before Dewey's victory, Consul Williams again reported. This dispatch, printed at page 320 of "document 62," advised our state department that the—

insurrection is rampant; many killed, wounded, and made prisoners on both sides. A battleship, the Don Juan de Austria, sent this week to the northern part of Luzon to cooperate with a land force of 2,000 dispatched to succor local forces, overwhelmed by rebels. Last night special squad of mounted police were scattered at danger points to save Manila. . . . Rebellion never more threatening to Spain.

Another of his dispatches, written a full month before Dewey's victory and printed on page 321, says:

Cuban conditions exist here possibly in aggravated form. Spanish soldiers are killed and wounded daily, despite claimed pacification, and the hospitals are kept full.

We find, then, upon the authority

of American official documents, that the Filipinos had for nearly two years been waging a formidable and growing insurrection against Spanish sovereignty at the time when Dewey's fleet appeared upon the scene. It was not an incident of that event, as some Americans now assert.

II.

We shall next find that Aguinaldo, though in exile, was still the acknowledged leader, and that he and Commodore Dewey formed a military alliance.

On the question of an alliance Admiral Dewey's letter to Senator Lodge comes first, for it serves the double purpose of putting in authoritative form the denial that there was an alliance, while proving that one actually existed. We quote from it as printed at page 1397 of the Congressional Record for February 1, 1900:

I never treated him as an ally, except to make use of him and the natives to assist me in my operations against the Spaniards.

Extended comment would be superfluous. The admiral's denial of an alliance with Aguinaldo is swept away by his admission that he did "make use of him and the natives to assist" the American fleet in its operations against Spain. That, under the circumstances, was treating Aguinaldo as an ally in the only sense in which it is claimed that there was an alliance. In any more binding sense an alliance would have required joint action on the part of the president and the senate by means of a formal treaty. There was of course nothing of that kind. But Admiral Dewey's letter, despite the denial, shows that there was a military alliance for the purpose of operating against a common enemy.

Nor is Dewey's contradictory letter the only evidence of this. When congress declared war with Spain the Asiatic squadron of the American navy, under command of Commodore Dewey, was about to sail from Hongkong for the purpose of attacking the Asiatic squadron of the Spanish; and the thought came to the American consul general at Singapore, E. Spencer Pratt, that Dewey might like the assistance of Aguinaldo, then in exile at Singapore. So he sought Aguinaldo out. His motives and subsequent action he reported to the state department in a dispatch of

April 28, 1898, printed at page 341 of "document 62," as follows:

Being aware of the great prestige of Gen. Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them the same influence and control that he could, I determined at once to see him, and, at my request, a secret interview was accordingly arranged. . . . After learning from Gen. Aguinaldo the state of and object sought to be obtained by the present insurrectionary movement, which, though absent from the Philippines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself, whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the government, to point out the danger of continuing independent action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the expediency of cooperating with our fleet, then at Hongkong, and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire, I telegraphed the commodore on the same day. . . .

Mr. Pratt's telegram to Dewey and the latter's reply are printed at page 342. The former, addressed to the American consul at Hongkong, was in these words, except as to the explanatory words which we insert in brackets:

Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, [is] here. [He] will come [to] Hongkong [to] arrange with Commodore [Dewey] for general cooperation [with the] insurgents [at] Manila if desired. Telegraph.

Dewey himself replied:

Tell Aguinaldo [to] come [as] soon as possible.

Pratt promptly communicated with Aguinaldo, and on the 26th succeeded in getting him, with his aid-de-camp and private secretary, off to Hongkong. Having done so, he reported his success to the state department in the mail dispatch already quoted from. He also reported by cable (page 341):

Gen. Aguinaldo gone [at] my instance [to] Hongkong [to] arrange with Dewey [for] cooperation [with] insurgents [at] Manila.

No attention was paid by the state department to Mr. Pratt's cable message. But six weeks afterward, in answer to his mail dispatch, the secretary of state enjoined upon him by cable (page 353) to—

avoid unauthorized negotiations with Philippine insurgents.

And on the same day the secretary mailed an elaborate dispatch, printed at page 354, in which he said:

It is assumed that you did not attempt to commit this government to any alliance with the Philippine insurgents. To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of Gen. Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to gratify. . . . If in the course of your conferences with Aguinaldo, you acted upon the assumption that this government would cooperate with him for the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting his cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he may put forward, your action was unauthorized and cannot be approved.

How the department could consistently assume that Mr. Pratt did not attempt to commit this government to an alliance with the Philippine insurgents, while approving his act in obtaining "the unconditional personal assistance of Gen. Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila," is incomprehensible. Mr. Pratt had been quite explicit in the dispatch to which this was the reply. He had described Aguinaldo's great prestige with the insurgents as the reason for seeking him out, had solicited a secret interview with him as their leader, had pointed out the danger of continuing independent action at this time, and had "convinced him of the expediency of cooperating with our fleet." That was no solicitation of Aguinaldo's "personal assistance." What Pratt clearly told the department that he had sought was not alone Aguinaldo's personal assistance; it was his assistance as the trusted leader of the Philippine insurrection. Pratt reiterates this in his reply to the cautionary cable dispatch of the secretary. He says distinctly at page 355:

It was not only on account of the material aid I was confident he could lend us that I regarded the cooperation of Gen. Aguinaldo as so desirable, but also because, as the recognized leader of the insurgents, he was, I considered, the one best able to direct and influence them. . . .

The real purpose of the department's cautionary dispatches was evidently not to prevent a military alliance, but to make a record against an anticipated claim by Aguinaldo to political recognition. This is indicated by the last part of the mail dispatch, which repudiates any "political claims" that Pratt may have inspired; and it is emphasized by a department dispatch of June 25 to Pratt

(page 356), in which he is advised that—

the department is pleased to learn that you did not make any political pledges to Aguinaldo.

But no one claims that there was a political alliance. Even the president could not have committed the government to that without the consent of the senate. What is claimed is that there was a military alliance between the commanders of two armed forces to operate against a common enemy. To such an alliance the state department's dispatches to Pratt made no objection.

Even if they had done so, they were too late. The whole matter had been out of Pratt's hands for six weeks. It was Dewey that the administration should have cautioned if it really objected to a military alliance. And it should have done so six weeks earlier. The alliance had almost accomplished its purpose of defeating the common enemy before the government at Washington went through the empty form of cautioning Pratt.

Reverting now to that point in the narrative where Pratt, in response to Dewey's telegraphed request, had got Aguinaldo, with his aid-de-camp and private secretary, off to Hongkong, April 26, 1898, we are to see that Aguinaldo reached Hongkong too late to join the American fleet, but that Dewey had him brought to Manila. Says Gen. Greene at page 421 of "document 62":

When the "McCulloch" went to Hongkong early in May to carry the news of Admiral Dewey's victory, it took Aguinaldo and seventeen other revolutionary chiefs on board and brought them to Manila bay. They soon after landed at Cavite, and the admiral allowed them to take such guns, ammunition, and stores as he did not require for himself.

Gen. Greene's account does not essentially differ from that of the Hongkong Free Press of June 1, 1898, given in a message of May 25 from its correspondent at Manila, which told how Aguinaldo had arrived at Manila—

on the 19th instant, and was received with great enthusiasm by the natives. Admiral Dewey was very much pleased with him, and has turned over to him two modern field pieces and 300 rifles, with plenty of ammunition.

This newspaper report appears at page 347 of "document 62," along with a dispatch from Consul Pratt transmitting it.

Aguinaldo lost no time in making his alliance useful to Dewey. Though he did not arrive until May 19, he had driven the Spanish forces into Manila and bottled them up there by June 16. This information is derived from a dispatch to the department sent by our former consul at Manila, Oscar F. Williams, who wrote on June 16 from the "Baltimore," then in Manila bay. We quote from Mr. Williams at page 329 of "document 62":

I have the honor to report that since our squadron destroyed the Spanish fleet on May 1, the insurgent forces have been most active and almost uniformly successful in their many encounters with the crown forces of Spain. . . . The insurgents have defeated the Spaniards at all points except at fort near Matate, and hold not only North Luzon to the suburbs of Manila, but Batanyes province also and the bay coast entire, save the city of Manila. . . . Manila is hemmed in.

A military alliance between Dewey and Aguinaldo in successful operation is now completely proved by American documents. One more quotation will go far to prove that it was an alliance of a kind to create a moral obligation from this government to the people that Aguinaldo represented. We refer to pages 488 and 489 of "document 62." At a session of the United States peace commissioners at Paris, October 14, 1898, R. B. Bradford, a commander in the United States navy and chief of the bureau of equipment in the navy department, was under examination as an expert witness with reference, among other things, to the rules of war and morals in their application to the war with Spain, when Senator Frye, one of the commissioners, asked him:

I would like to ask just one question in that line. Suppose the United States in the progress of that war found the leader of the present Philippine rebellion an exile from his country in Hongkong and sent for him and brought him to the islands in an American ship, and then furnished him 4,000 or 5,000 stands of arms, and allowed him to purchase as many more stands of arms in Hongkong, and accepted his aid in conquering Luzon, what kind of a nation, in the eyes of the world, we would appear to be to surrender Aguinaldo and his insurgents to Spain to be dealt with as they please.

And this American expert answered:

We become responsible for everything he has done, he is our ally, and we are bound to protect him.

The object of this question and

answer, both examiner and witness being favorable to Philippine annexation, was to show that the alliance was such as to impose an obligation upon us to protect Aguinaldo from Spain. But if it did that, did it not also obligate us to protect him from ourselves?

III.

Let us here diverge for a moment from the main line of our narrative to consider the character of this Philippine leader whose alliance with us raised a moral obligation in his behalf. To minimize that obligation his personal character and capabilities have been impugned, and it is in some respects important that the truth about him be known.

The only specific accusation is a charge of bribery. It refers to the settlement of "the great insurrection." The facts about this settlement are given briefly by Gen. Greene at page 421 of "document 62", where this witness says:

The governor general, Primo de Rivera, entered into written agreement with Aguinaldo. . . . In brief, it required that Aguinaldo and the other insurgent leaders should leave the country, the government agreeing to pay them \$800,000 in silver and promising to introduce numerous reforms, including representation in the Spanish cortes, freedom of the press, general amnesty for all insurgents, and the expulsion or secularization of the monastic orders. Aguinaldo and his associates went to Hongkong and Singapore. A portion of the money, \$400,000, was deposited in banks at Hongkong, and a lawsuit soon arose between Aguinaldo and one of his subordinate chiefs named Artacho, which is interesting on account of the very honorable position taken by Aguinaldo. Artacho sued for a division of the money among the insurgents according to rank. Aguinaldo claimed that the money was a trust fund, and was to remain on deposit until it was seen whether the Spaniards would carry out their promised reforms, and if they failed to do so, it was to be used to defray the expenses of a new insurrection.

Aguinaldo received only \$400,000. The balance has never been paid. This is proved by an official dispatch from Rounseville Wildman, the American consul at Hongkong, which is printed at page 337. Mr. Wildman writes:

I was in Hongkong September, 1897, when Aguinaldo and his leaders arrived under contract with the Spanish government. They waited until the 1st of November for the payment of the promised money and the fulfill-

ment of the promised reforms. Only \$400,000, Mexican, was ever placed to their credit in the banks.

As no steps were taken by the Spanish to carry out their promised reforms (a statement for which Gen. Greene, at page 421 of "document 62," is authority), the insurrection was revived; and Aguinaldo devoted the so-called bribe to the purposes of the trust for which he had claimed to hold it. Consul Williams testifies to this in an official dispatch from Manila bay, at page 328 of "document 62," where he writes:

To-day I executed a power of attorney whereby Gen. Aguinaldo releases to his attorneys in fact \$400,000, now in bank in Hongkong, so that money therefrom can pay for 3,000 stand of arms bought there and expected here to-morrow.

These quotations refute the slander of Aguinaldo's character. As to his purity of motive, his ability, and the confidence of his people in him, American documentary testimony is unexpectedly impressive. Maj. Bell, in officially reporting Philippine conditions to Gen. Merritt at page 379 of "document 62," describes Aguinaldo at page 381 as—

honest, sincere, and poor, not well educated, but a natural leader of men, with considerable shrewdness and ability; has the power of creating among the people confidence in himself, and is undoubtedly a very popular man, highly respected by all. . . .

Consul Pratt had the same high regard for the Filipino leader, for in his official dispatch, printed at page 347, he wrote:

No close observer of what had transpired in the Philippines during the past four years could have failed to recognize that Gen. Aguinaldo enjoyed above all others the confidence of the Filipino insurgents and the respect alike of Spaniards and foreigners in the islands, all of whom vouched for his high sense of justice and honor.

Aguinaldo made a similar impression upon Consul Wildman, who, in a dispatch printed at page 336, described him and two of his associates as—

men who would all be leaders in their separate departments in any country.

IV.

To resume the thread of our story. Two points have been proved. We have shown, in the first place, that Aguinaldo's insurrection against the Spanish, so far from having been

stirred up as an incident of the American invasion of the Philippines, had then been under way nearly two years; and that it had never been so dangerous to Spain as during the two months immediately preceding Dewey's naval victory. In the second place, we have shown that Dewey contracted with Aguinaldo a useful military alliance. We are yet to show that after American troops had been landed and placed in strong positions, thus making Aguinaldo's further assistance unnecessary, he was systematically humiliated, his confidence was shamefully betrayed, and his government was at last ceremoniously threatened with extinction by military force.

American troops did not begin to arrive in the Philippines until June 30, 1898; and no force of importance was landed until several days thereafter. That Aguinaldo then held Manila on the land side, cooperating with Dewey, who held it on the water side, we have already been told by Consul Williams, whose dispatch at page 329 of "document 62" reports, on June 16, that "Manila is hemmed in." This is confirmed by Gen. Greene, though with somewhat characteristic carelessness as to dates, at page 420, where he says that Aguinaldo's force had—invested Manila early in July so completely that all supplies were cut off. Even Gen. Otis may be quoted to the same effect with emphasis. In his report of "military operations and civil affairs in the Philippine islands" for 1899 (to be had of any congressman) he writes, at page 13:

For three and one-half months Admiral Dewey with his squadron and the insurgents on land had kept Manila tightly bottled.

Meanwhile Aguinaldo had begun to organize a civil government. Gen. Greene gives its chronology at page 422 of "document 62," where he says:

On the 18th of June Aguinaldo issued a proclamation from Cavite establishing a dictatorial government with himself as dictator. . . . This was followed on June 20 by a decree giving more detailed instructions in regard to the elections. On June 23 another decree followed changing the title of the government from dictatorial to revolutionary, and of the chief officer from dictator to president. . . . On the same date a manifesto was issued to the world explaining the reasons and purposes of the revolution. On June 27 another decree was issued containing in-

structions in regard to elections. On August 6 an address was issued to foreign governments stating that the revolutionary government was in operation and control in 15 provinces, and that in response to the petition of the duly elected chiefs of these provinces an appeal is made for recognition of belligerency and independence.

Gen. Greene's dates are in this instance correct, being verified by copies of the original documents which he attaches to his statement.

With reference to the dictatorial character of the first form of government enumerated by Gen. Greene, the American consul at Hong-kong, Rounseville Wildman, declares that it was absolutely necessary to the success of the alliance. Writing to the state department on this point, he says, at page 337 of "document 62":

He, of course, organized a government of which he was dictator, an absolutely necessary step if he hoped to maintain control over the natives, and from that date until the present time [July 18] he has been uninterruptedly successful in the field and dignified and just as the head of his government.

And Aguinaldo's government had a territory to govern. According to an article in the North American Review for February, 1900, written by Gen. Anderson, the first American commander in the Philippines, it ruled over nearly all the archipelago. Gen. Anderson says in that article at page 281, referring to the period of the surrender of Manila:

We held Manila and Cavite. The rest of the island was held not by the Spaniards, but by the Filipinos. On the other islands the Spaniards were confined to two or three fortified towns.

Not only did Aguinaldo's government have a territory to govern, but its authority was peaceably acknowledged by the inhabitants. To this Leonard R. Sargent testifies. He was a naval cadet, who, with Paymaster W. B. Wilcox of the American navy, spent the months of October and November, 1898, investigating the interior of Luzon: and in telling of their trip in the Outlook for September 2, 1899, at page 17, he declares of Aguinaldo's government that—

it cannot be denied that, in a region occupied by many millions of inhabitants, for nearly six months it stood alone between anarchy and order. . . . We traveled more than 600 miles in a very comprehensive circuit through the northern part of the island of Luzon, traversing a character-

istic and important district. In this way we visited seven provinces. . . . As a tribute to the efficiency of Aguinaldo's government and to the law-abiding character of his subjects, I offer the fact that Mr. Wilcox and I pursued our journey throughout in perfect security, and returned to Manila with only the most pleasing recollections of the quiet and orderly life which we found the natives to be leading under the new regime.

Here, then, was what is known to international law as a government de facto; a government which, though not yet recognized by other governments, is recognized and obeyed by the inhabitants.

That was the situation when Gen. Anderson appeared in the bay with the first installment of American troops. He at once communicated with Aguinaldo, as appears at page 390 of "document 62," expressing American sympathy and a—

desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people cooperate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces.

The reply of Aguinaldo (page 390), granting requests made by Gen. Anderson in that letter, was equally courteous and friendly, though one of the requests involved the occupation by the Americans, as a base of operations, of Cavite, then held by Aguinaldo. In occupying Cavite, however, Gen. Anderson said in his letter (page 390):

I do not wish to interfere with your residence here, and the exercise by yourself and other native citizens of all functions and privileges not inconsistent with military rule.

There appears, indeed, to have been no friction between Aguinaldo and Anderson. The latter formally addressed the former as "commanding general Philippine forces," and in other respects conceded to him the dignity of a military ally.

On one occasion only did Gen. Anderson even intimate to Aguinaldo that the Americans observed his de facto government with an unfriendly eye. He did not do this until July 22, after he had been at Cavite some three weeks, and then he did it with extreme caution. Said he (page 394 of "document 62"):

Happy as I am to see you fighting so bravely and successfully against a common enemy, I cannot, without orders, recognize your civil authority.

This evoked from Aguinaldo a dignified response in protest. But his

response was never officially noticed otherwise than by a bare acknowledgment.

There was sinister significance in that silence, though Aguinaldo did not then detect it. The truth is that the time was not ripe for making a decisive issue with Aguinaldo's government. American troops were as yet in no position to invite a conflict. This is not a surmise. It is plainly declared by Gen. Merritt, who superseded Gen. Anderson late in July or early in August, 1898. The declaration will be found in Gen. Merritt's report at page 40 of Maj. Gen. Miles's report for 1898, in these words:

As Gen. Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the president fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that "the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants," I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority, in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.

The neglect of Aguinaldo to visit Gen. Merritt may be accounted for by the fact that he was ignorant of Merritt's having assumed command. For as late as August 13 Aguinaldo was still sending his letters to Gen. Anderson; and not until the 20th—seven days after the surrender of Manila—does he appear to have been officially notified of Merritt's having taken command.

But the important consideration is Gen. Merritt's controlling reason for wishing to avoid direct communication with Aguinaldo. Whatever other reasons he gives, it is clear from the above quotation that his controlling one was the fact that until he should be in possession of Manila he would not be in a position to enforce his instructions from the president to make his occupancy of the islands supreme.

This fully accounts for the friendly exterior that was presented to Aguinaldo by the American authorities until about the time of the surrender of Manila. They were not in position to coerce him. But when their position had been improved, then they began to reveal their hos-

tility without regard to whether, to use Gen. Merritt's phrase, "his pretensions should clash with their designs." And these manifestations became increasingly more unrestrained until they culminated in January in the issuing by Gen. Otis of the very proclamation of supreme authority which Gen. Merritt had thought it imprudent to issue in July.

The first distinctly unfriendly act was the refusal to allow Aguinaldo's forces to participate in the ceremonies attending the surrender of Manila—the city which, in conjunction with Dewey, they had "completely invested," "hemmed in" and "tightly bottled," when Dewey had no other support on the land side. This was followed a week after by a demand that Aguinaldo withdraw his forces from certain suburbs of Manila which they had taken from the Spaniards. And then, a few days later, he was peremptorily ordered, under threats of force, to withdraw from all the suburbs of Manila, notwithstanding that every place he held he had wrested from Spain in battle.

This peremptory order, issued September 8 by Gen. Otis, is printed in his letter to Aguinaldo of that date at page 9 of his report, as follows:

I hereby serve notice on you that unless your troops are withdrawn beyond the line of the city's defenses before Thursday, the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible action, and that my government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate consequences which may ensue. . . . I have conferred freely with Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this communication, and am delegated by him to state that he fully approves of the same in all respects; that the commands of our government compel us to act as herein indicated, and that between our respective forces there will be unanimity and complete concert of action.

There was no reserve about that order. Evidently the necessity for keeping Aguinaldo in the dark as to the unfriendly intentions of the American government was believed to exist no longer.

But even this disclosure did not arouse Aguinaldo's suspicions. Though his compliance with the order was reluctant, he does not appear to have suspected the Americans of intending to make a permanent conquest. What disturbed him was a fear that in arranging our treaty of

peace with Spain we might restore to Spain the territory from which we were now crowding him. He exhibited this fear several days before the order, in a letter of August 27 to Gen. Merritt, printed in Otis's report at page 5, wherein he said:

Permit me to insist, if you will, upon the restitution of the positions that we now are going to leave, if in the treaty of peace to be celebrated between Spain and the United States they acknowledge the dominion of Spain in the Philippines.

The response to this request, conveyed by Otis in the same letter with the peremptory removal order, was a flat refusal. So the Filipino leader was compelled, under a threat of military and naval assault, to withdraw his people from territory they had wrested from the Spanish, and to do so without any guarantee that the United States would not in the treaty of peace restore that very territory to Spain.

But the fear that this might be done soon gave way to a fear more portentous. Gen. Otis tells of the change, at page 53 of his report:

The formerly expressed fear that Spain would return had given way to the statement that it was the intention of the United States to replace her in the odious domination which she had exercised for centuries.

This new and appalling fear was probably inspired by the refusal of the American authorities at Washington and the American peace commissioners at Paris to treat with Filipino representatives. However that may have been, it was completely confirmed by the peculiar terms of the Spanish-American treaty of peace, when that document became public. While these terms provided as to sovereignty over and title to Cuba (article 1 of treaty, on page 3 of "document 62") that—

Spain relinquishes all claim—

they provided as to the Philippines (article 3 of treaty, on page 4 of "document 62"), that—

Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago.

Between "relinquishing" and "ceding" there is a world of difference, the ominous significance of which could not escape attention. Cuba was to be set free; the Philippines were to be sold. And in conformity with this purpose regarding the Philippines, the treaty presumed (article 9, on page 9) to vest in the

American congress absolute power to determine "the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants." Nor was that all. In the eighth article, page 7, the treaty provided that the cession should—

not in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of ecclesiastical bodies.

That provision stung. For in all their suffering the Filipinos had been exasperated less by political tyranny than by that of the friars, who owned more than half the productive land, both in the country and in the cities, and, backed by the government, ruled mercilessly. These oppressions had been the chief cause of the insurrection of 1896. And now the United States was arranging with Spain, the common enemy, not only to buy the Filipinos of her, and to govern them as subjects, but also to take Spain's place in legally recognizing and forcibly maintaining the baleful power of the land-monopoly friars!

Had anything more been needed to convince the Filipinos that their confidence had been betrayed, and that their late military ally from the occident would indeed replace Spain in what Gen. Otis describes as "the odious domination which she had exercised for centuries," it was supplied by President McKinley's "benevolent assimilation" proclamation. So well calculated was that document to excite hostility that Gen. Otis attempted to suppress it. His reasons for this are given in his report at page 66, where he says:

After fully considering the president's proclamation and the temper of the Tagalos with whom I was daily discussing political problems and the friendly intentions of the United States government toward them. I concluded that there were certain words and expressions therein, such as "sovereignty," "right of cession," and those which directed immediate occupation, etc., though most admirably employed and tersely expressive of actual conditions, might be advantageously used by the Tagalo war party to incite widespread hostilities among the natives. The ignorant classes had been taught to believe that certain words, as "sovereignty," "protection," etc., had peculiar meaning disastrous to their welfare and significant of future political domination, like that from which they had recently been freed.

So Gen. Otis substituted a proclamation of his own. By a misunderstanding, however, the president's proclamation was published in full by Gen. Miller. It found its way to the Filipino authorities, and, as may be supposed, assisted them not a little in interpreting the substitute put forth by Otis.

But it is with Otis's substitute that we have to deal. It was issued January 4, 1899, and is published at pages 68 and 69 of his report. Describing himself in that document as "military governor of the Philippine islands," and opening with many flattering promises, Gen. Otis warned the inhabitants, quoting this warning from the president's suppressed proclamation, that—

"there will be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority to repress disturbance, and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine islands."

This, in essence, was the proclamation which Gen. Merritt had in July deemed it imprudent to issue, because he was not then in position to enforce his authority had Aguinaldo's "pretensions" clashed with his "designs." Asserting supreme authority for the United States over the islands, and indicating by the convenient term "disturbance" the anticipated resistance of Aguinaldo's government to that design, it threatened to repress that government by the "strong arm of authority." The proclamation was in effect a declaration of war.

And its character as such had been emphasized not only by the president's proclamation which Gen. Otis prudently tried to suppress, but also by the fact that only a few days before an American warship loaded with soldiers had been dispatched to Iloilo, and was even then menacing the Filipino government there.

Morally all this was a gross act of aggression. It was without authority even in law. For the United States had not yet acquired legal title to Spain's right to the islands, such as that right might be. Title temporarily to Manila had been acquired by the protocol, and the treaty assumed to give title to all the islands. But, though signed, the treaty had not yet been ratified, and was therefore without legal effect. Outside of Manila, consequently, the United

States had acquired no legal claim to sovereignty, even upon the supposition that Spain possessed sovereignty to convey. Spain had in fact, however, lost her sovereignty, as we have already seen, and the de facto government of Aguinaldo had acquired it.

The effect of Otis's usurping proclamation was electrical. Properly regarding it as a declaration of war, Aguinaldo at once responded with an address to the civilized powers (Otis's report, page 76), explaining this rupture of amicable relations, and with an address to the Filipino people. In the latter (Otis's report, page 78) he referred especially to Otis's proclamation, saying:

Gen. Otis called himself in the said proclamation military governor of the Philippine islands. I protest one and a thousand times, with all the energy of my soul, against such authority. As in Gen. Otis's proclamation he alluded to some instructions edited by his excellency the president of the United States, referring to the administration of the matters in the Philippine islands, I in the name of God, the root and the fountain of all justice, and that of all the right which has been visibly granted to me to direct my dear brothers in the difficult work of our regeneration, protest most solemnly against this intrusion of the United States government on the sovereignty of these islands.

"The unmistakable intention of Aguinaldo," says Gen. Otis at page 79 of his report, "as shown in these proclamations was ample notice to the troops to prepare for hostile demonstrations on the part of the insurgent army." In this interpretation Gen. Otis is right. But equally the unmistakable intention of Gen. Otis, as shown in his proclamation, was ample notice to Aguinaldo's government to prepare for hostile demonstrations on the part of the Americans. And Gen. Otis's notice came on the 4th of January, while Aguinaldo's came only in response and on the 5th. Aguinaldo had merely accepted the gage which Otis threw down. In behalf of the United States, Otis had given public notice of their intention to suppress by military force the Filipino republic and assume the government of the territory over which it was then exercising peaceable jurisdiction; and in behalf of that republic, Aguinaldo had in effect replied that it would fight for its life.

These proclamations, then, mark

the beginning of the war. After they appeared, it could make no difference who fired the first shot. In fact, the Americans did it just one month later, thereby opening the initial battle, of which Gen. Otis says, at page 96 of his report, that it—

was one strictly defensive on the part of the insurgents and of vigorous attack by our forces.

But this is of no moment with reference to the question of responsibility for making war. That responsibility was fixed on the 4th of January, when Gen. Otis officially proclaimed the United States to be in open and deadly hostility to the sovereignty of the Filipino republic.

That fateful proclamation, however, was no inconsiderate act of a bellicose military officer. It was a clumsy effort at modifying a still more pronounced proclamation of the president, which had been designed as the culmination of a consistent plan of subjugation. This plan dates back to May 28, 1898. For that was the time (see Gen. Merritt's report at page 39 of Gen. Miles's report for 1898) when Gen. Merritt received from President McKinley those instructions which, as he says on page 40, "fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces and stated that 'the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants.'" Since, therefore, the time at which the Philippine war began was January 4, 1899, and its all-sufficient cause was Gen. Otis's proclamation of sovereignty, the responsible person is William McKinley, who had long designed and finally ordered Otis's action.

V.

We are now quite prepared for the most important question of all. Having seen that the Filipinos under Aguinaldo's leadership had for two years been in open insurrection against Spain when Commodore Dewey steamed into Manila bay; having uncovered Dewey's relations with Aguinaldo, and learned that their respective forces became military allies; having seen that although the military occupation of the islands was contemplated by the Americans from the beginning, they treated Aguinaldo as an ally until they felt strong enough to overwhelm him; having noted the development of this plan from the arrival of Gen. Merritt in

the summer of 1898 down to Otis's hostile proclamation of January 4, 1899, which asserted American sovereignty over the islands and threatened the republic with extermination by military force—having done so much, we are now to discover, also from American documents, that Aguinaldo was intentionally deceived by the Americans as to their intentions regarding Filipino independence.

That he and his people supposed the military alliance was to culminate in independence is an incontrovertible fact. Yet President McKinley's Philippine commission, like Admiral Dewey with reference to the alliance, has had the temerity to deny it. In its report, referring at page 172 to the arrival of Gen. Anderson at Cavite, it says:

Now for the first time arose the idea of national independence.

That is an astonishing statement, when tested by the documentary proof which must have been known to the commissioners.

The period referred to is about July 4, 1898. It must have been after June 30, for Gen. Anderson did not arrive in the bay until then. "The first expeditionary force," says he in his report at page 54 of Gen. Miles's report for 1898, "reached Manila bay June 30." Yet the Washington state department had before that time been abundantly advised of the aspirations of Aguinaldo and his people for the independence of their country.

In his letter of April 30, 1898, to the secretary of state, printed on page 342 of "document 62," Consul Pratt writes of Aguinaldo at page 343:

The general further stated that he hoped the United States would assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their own.

Then came from Consul Pratt a letter of May 5 (page 343), transmitting a Singapore newspaper article about the alliance with Aguinaldo and calling special attention to it. From page 345 we quote this from the newspaper article:

Gen. Aguinaldo's policy embraces the independence of the Philippines. . .

In a letter of May 20, printed at page 345, Mr. Pratt forwarded to the secretary of state copies of a proclamation which had been issued at

Hongkong by the Filipino leaders there. It had been sent to the Philippines in advance of the American fleet, to urge the natives to refuse to fight for Spain against the Americans when they came. This proclamation, which is printed at page 346, began thus:

Compatriots: Divine providence is about to place independence within our reach.

On the 24th of May, soon after Aguinaldo's arrival in the Philippines, he issued a proclamation, printed at page 431, which began in these terms:

Filipinos: The great nation North America, cradle of true liberty, and friendly on that account to the liberty of our people, oppressed and subjugated by the tyranny and despotism of those who have governed us, has come to manifest even here a protection which is decisive as well as disinterested toward us, considering us endowed with sufficient civilization to govern by ourselves this our unhappy land.

Next comes a letter addressed by Aguinaldo on the 10th of June to President McKinley. It is printed on page 360, and closes with this reference, on page 361, to the Filipinos as—

a people which trusts blindly in you not to abandon it to the tyranny of Spain, but to leave it free and independent, even if you make peace with Spain.

This is followed by Aguinaldo's proclamation to the "Philippine republic," establishing the dictatorial government. It is dated at Cavite, June 18, and printed at page 432. Here Aguinaldo says:

I have proclaimed in the face of the whole world that the aspiration of my whole life, the final object of all my efforts and strength, is nothing else, but your independence, for I am firmly convinced that that constitutes your constant desire, and that independence signifies for us redemption from slavery and tyranny, regaining our liberty, and entrance into the concert of civilized nations.

In a message dated at Cavite, June 23, and printed at page 437, he makes this declaration about the revolution:

Now it is not limited to asking assimilation to the Spanish political constitution, but it asks a definite separation from it. It struggles for its independence in the firm belief that the time has arrived in which it can and ought to govern itself.

All these pronouncements were made in rapid succession, as the dates

show, before Gen. Anderson appeared in Manila. Most of them were widely published in the Philippines, all of them were early brought to the attention of the American state department, and each of them is a conclusive refutation of the assertion of the American Philippine commission.

Clearly, Aguinaldo and his people aspired to independence long before the time the president's Philippine commission says they did. It was no afterthought with them. Clearly, too, they understood at the outset that the alliance they were making had independence for one of its purposes. Clearly, also, the American officials, up to the highest in the land, knew that this was their understanding.

But no attempt was made to disabuse the minds of these confiding people until after their services as allies could be safely dispensed with. Consuls were warned not to promise independence, and military commanders were similarly instructed. But Aguinaldo was kept in the dark. He was given no intimation that the apparent friendliness of American officials to his independence was secretly disapproved. For instance, when the Filipinos formed their provisional government on the 12th of June, Consul Williams was urged in a friendly way by them to attend. He declined. But he gives no indication in his dispatch that he put his Filipino friends on their guard by so much as intimating any reason of an unfriendly character to their new government. What he says to the department when reporting this invitation (page 329) is that it had been his "effort to maintain harmony with insurgents in order to exercise greater influence hereafter when we reorganize government." And for this the state department commends him in a dispatch of August 4 (page 330), saying:

Your course, while maintaining amicable relations with the insurgents, in abstaining from any participation in the adoption of their so-called provisional government, is approved.

Gen. Anderson appears to have been the only American official who in any way at all gave Aguinaldo reason to suspect unfriendliness toward his civil government. Anderson wrote on the 22d of July (page 394 of "document 62"), warning Aguinaldo that in the absence of orders he could not recognize his civil authority, though

happy to see him fighting so bravely and successfully against a common enemy. This is the letter in which Gen. Anderson observed:

So far as I can ascertain your independent status has not been recognized by any foreign power.

Aguinaldo's reply, dated July 24, 1898, (page 394 of "document 62") not only shows that up to this time he had confided in the apparent intention of the Americans to recognize their Asiatic allies as an independent nation, but it is one of the pathetic documents of history. In it Aguinaldo rebukes his American friends more pointedly than he could then have supposed. These are his words:

. . . . It is true that my government has not been acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we expected that the great North American nation, which struggled first for its independence, and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon it with greater benevolence than any other nation.

There the matter dropped. Aguinaldo's hopes were allowed to revive, until the time should be ripe for crushing them and his government together.

Aside from Gen. Anderson's cautious warning, with its ignored reply, nothing whatever was done by the American authorities to indicate to Aguinaldo that his notorious proceedings and proclamations for the establishment of a Filipino government were to be treated as the playthings of a barbarian. He thought his military alliance was to culminate in a formal recognition of independence; and the circumstances justified his expectations. Our government knew he thought so; but, ally though he was, it allowed him to act upon that belief until its military forces had got into position to defy him. Then, and not before, it began to display a hostile purpose. And when the time seemed fully ripe it openly, but still with an awkward attempt at deceptive suppression of the truth, proclaimed its own sovereignty over the islands, and thereby declared war upon the infant government.

By the testimony, then, of its own records, the American nation is convicted in this Philippine case of deliberately deceiving its trusting allies, and barbarously suppressing a well-ordered and peaceable government

whose independence it was morally bound by every consideration of good faith to recognize.

NEWS

When our report of the South African war closed last week the left of Lord Roberts's line was at Smaldeel and the right at Thaba N'Chu. This was on the 9th. Lord Roberts had advanced the left of his line on the 10th as far north as the Zand river, the passage of which he forced on that day after a severe engagement. On the 12th he entered Kroonstad, the temporary capital of the Orange Free State, about 150 miles north of Bloemfontein and possibly the same distance south of Pretoria. No resistance was made at Kroonstad, the Boers having withdrawn as the British approached. The temporary capital of the Orange Free State is now at Heilbron, about 50 miles northeast of Kroonstad; and the Boer force has retreated to the Vaal river, which marks the boundary between the Orange Free State and the South African republic. At latest reports Lord Roberts was resting at Kroonstad.

The right of Lord Roberts's long line, under Gen. Rundle, has hardly advanced beyond Thaba N'Chu, where it is still confronted by a large force of Boers. They refuse to give battle, however, their apparent purpose being to prevent Rundle from moving north to the support of Roberts, by exciting fears of a rear attack.

There is no further news from the far western division of the British army, under Gen. Hunter, which appeared in our report of last week to be advancing to the relief of Mafeking; but a mysterious flying column of 3,000 is reported from Vryburg as having reached there on the 10th on its way to relieve Mafeking. From Mafeking itself there is no news except that the beleaguered garrison can hold out until the 10th of June.

From the far east, however, in Natal, there is now definite news of an advance by Gen. Buller. The probability of this was indicated in our report of last week. It was then understood that he had been ordered to move on Biggarsberg. He got in motion on the 10th, going east from Ladysmith toward Helpmakaar and

thence west to Dundee. The Boers withdrew from Helpmakaar after only slight resistance, and on the 14th Buller had taken Dundee as easily. From Dundee the Boers withdrew to the railroad junction at Glencoe, where they took trains to the north. On the 16th, Buller occupied Glencoe.

The American war in the Philippines is naturally associated as matter of news with that of the British in South Africa. Despite the repeated reports of peace in the Philippines there is no peace there. This is evident from the regular censored news reports of the week, which tell of a fight near Legaspi, in the province of Albay, Luzon, on the 10th; of another near San Jacinto, province of Pangasinan, on the 7th; of a third near Bulan on April 26, and of a fourth on the same day near Ormoc, in the island of Leyte. But the uncensored mail dispatches which courageous correspondents occasionally get through make the warlike condition of affairs in the Philippines doubly plain. One of these correspondents, John T. McCutcheon, of the Chicago Record, who has especially proved his sense of responsibility as a correspondent at Manila, throws a brilliant light upon the situation in a letter of February 10, published in the Record of May 16. Mr. McCutcheon says that in the 40 days following January 1, 1900, when it was announced that the war was at an end, the American forces—

lost more men, more arms, and more supplies in the so-called pacified districts than during any previous period of like length since the insurrection began. In the first three months of fighting we lost more men by death and wounds, but the number of men captured, arms taken, and supplies that have fallen into the insurgents' hands have been far greater in the last month than ever before. . . . More Americans have been taken prisoners than ever before, and more Krag-Jorgensen rifles have been lost since January 1 than during the entire period of fighting previous to that date.

To fully appreciate the import of Mr. McCutcheon's belated letter it must be remembered that the censored cable dispatches show a far worse condition since its date than before, and indicate that the condition will be still worse when the rainy season comes on.

American casualties in the Philippines since July 1, 1898, inclusive

of all current official reports given out at Washington to May 16, 1900, are as follows:

Killed	498
Died of wounds, disease and accidents	1,281
Plus number of deaths required to make these reports tally with the corrected official returns from July 1, 1898, to April 27, 1900	68
Total deaths since July 1, 1898.....	1,847
Wounded	2,128
Less number of wounded required to make these reports tally with the corrected official returns from July 1, 1898, to April 27, 1900	2 2,126
Total loss since July 1, 1898.....	3,973
Total loss reported last week from August 16, 1898.....	3,822
Total deaths reported last week, from August 6, 1898.....	1,719

In Cuba American embarrassments of a different order are cropping up. They are connected with a heavy defalcation on the part of American postal officials there, in consequence of which the American postmaster at Havana has been arrested. One of the chief offenders, of the name of Neely, is in the United States, where extradition proceedings have been instituted to remove him to Cuba for trial. Some vexing legal questions are expected to grow out of these proceedings. Since Cuba is a foreign country, the state authorities of New York cannot extradite Neely; for the New York court of appeals has decided that this is one of the powers which the state surrendered to the general government. And as the United States has no extradition treaty with Cuba, nor any laws empowering extradition without treaty, the question arises whether any federal official can deliver him over. Incidentally, the present anomalous relation of our government to Cuba is likely to be judicially overhauled. This is the most embarrassing thing about the matter, though the embezzlement itself has given the Cubans a welcome opportunity to sneer at the Americans for their assumptions of superior civic virtue.

In American politics, in the party sense, the leading event of the week was the nomination of Bryan and Towne by the populist convention at Sioux Falls. The assembling of this convention was noted last week. It

occurred on the 9th. At that time no business had been done beyond the election of P. M. Ringdell, of Minnesota, as temporary chairman. On the 10th, at the first session of the day, T. M. Patterson, of Colorado, was elected to the permanent chairmanship. At the second session the platform was adopted, and William J. Bryan was nominated for president by acclamation. The question of naming a candidate for vice president did not come to a vote until late in the evening. It turned upon a motion by Jerry Simpson, supported by Gen. Weaver, that the convention make no nomination but empower the national committee to make it after conference with the democratic and the silver republican conventions at Kansas City. Opposition to this motion was led by Senators Butler and Pettigrew. It was lost by a vote of 492 to 262. A motion was then made that five names be selected by ballot for submission to the Kansas City conventions from which to select a fusion candidate for vice president; but this also was lost, the vote being 526 to 270. Several nominations for vice president were then offered. All were withdrawn, however, except that of Charles A. Towne, of Minnesota, who was chosen by acclamation. Senator Butler, of North Carolina, was made chairman of the national committee.

The platform of this convention, reported by Jerry Simpson as chairman of the committee on resolutions, reaffirms prior national platforms, offers cooperation with its "allies in the struggle for financial and economic freedom," denounces the gold standard act of the present congress, and demands bimetallism at the ratio of sixteen to one. It also demands a graduated income and inheritance tax, postal savings banks, public ownership and operation of railroads, the initiative and referendum, Philippine independence, election of senators by popular vote, and home rule in the territories and the District of Columbia. Declaring with Thomas Jefferson that "the land, including all natural sources of wealth," is "the inalienable heritage of the people," it urges government to "so act as to secure homes for the people and prevent land monopoly." And on the subject of trusts it propounds ownership and control by the people of money, transportation and the transmission of information as the one remedy, and recommends the abolition of all tariffs

on goods controlled by trusts. The imposition of tariff duties on Puerto Rican commerce are denounced, as are the efforts of the administration to substitute a standing army for citizen soldiery, and its use of the military to abridge the civil rights of the citizens of Idaho in the Cour d'Alene district. Government by injunction is condemned and laws for its suppression demanded.

The convention of the middle-of-the-road or nonfusion populists, the opening of which also on the 9th we reported last week, made nominations on the 10th. Wharton Barker, of Pennsylvania, was chosen as the candidate for president, with Ignatius Donnelly, of Minnesota, for vice president. Jo A. Parker is chairman of the national committee. The platform demands the initiative and referendum; public ownership of railroads, telegraphs, telephones, and coal mines; and the reclamation of all lands held by corporations in excess of their actual needs, and of all lands held by aliens, to be applied to the needs of actual settlers. It advocates also a "scientific and absolute paper money, based upon the entire wealth and population of the nation, not redeemable in any specific commodity, but made a full legal tender for all debts and receivable for all taxes and public dues, and issued by the government only, without the intervention of banks, and in sufficient quantity to meet the demands of commerce;" but until such a money system can be secured it approves "the free and unlimited coinage of both silver and gold at the legal ratio of sixteen to one." This platform demands also a graduated income and inheritance tax and the election of president, vice president, federal judges and federal senators by direct popular vote. Denouncing trusts, it specifies public ownership of public utilities as the only method of solving the trust question.

The only conventions for the election of national delegates, held since our last report, were republican, those of Iowa and Colorado being held on the 10th, and those of Kansas and Missouri on the 16th. Minnesota republicans, who also met on this day, instructed for ex-Senator Washburn for vice president.

News of congressional politics yields an extraordinary sensation in the action of Senator Clark, of Mon-

tana, who seems to have made a play which will secure him his seat in the federal senate, notwithstanding the committee report recommending that he be unseated for having obtained his election by bribery of the Montana legislature. Just as the report against him was about to be brought before the senate for consideration, Senator Clark arose and announced that he had sent his resignation as senator to the governor of Montana. His name was accordingly dropped from the list of senators. A little later it transpired that upon receipt of his resignation the lieutenant governor of Montana, a Clark partisan, had, in the absence from the state of the governor, an anti-Clark partisan (the legislature not being in session), appointed Mr. Clark to fill the vacancy. His credentials are now on their way to Washington.

We may cross from America to France without changing our subject. The political pot there has been boiling. Last week we gave the result of the municipal elections of the 6th, which pointed to a triumph of the nationalist or military party in Paris; but in 30 districts no candidate had received a full majority and second elections were necessary. These were held on the 13th, and resulted in a greater triumph of the nationalists than at the regular elections. Of the 30 seats the nationalists won 18, thus giving them a total of 48 seats in the municipal council of Paris—a clear majority of the council.

In Spain anti-tax riots have risen almost to the dignity of civil war. The facts are difficult to obtain, owing to the Spanish censorship, and such as get cabled to this side are meager and confusing. It is evident, however, that most serious conditions exist. As a protest against taxation the stores appear to have been closed in all the larger towns of the kingdom. Barcelona was declared on the 11th to be in a state of siege, after two days of rioting; and in Valencia the *gendarmes* fired upon the mob. The whole province of Valencia is under martial law. In Seville the troops were called out before the mob would disperse. Aside from these few details of disorder, reports from Spain simply intimate that revolution is imminent.

Italian parliamentary troubles were renewed on the 15th. Their origin was briefly described in these columns

in No. 105 at page 6. At the session of the chamber then reported rules were passed cutting off debate on the question of approving a ministerial decree in restraint of public meetings and the freedom of the press, and the chamber adjourned on May 15. Upon reassembling on that day a member of the opposition moved a suspension of the rules mentioned above, and the prime minister, Gen. Pelloux, declared that these rules could not now be questioned. Thereupon the chamber was thrown into a turmoil by the opposition, and the confusion became so great that the president was obliged to dissolve the meeting by withdrawing. The opposition declared that they would continue this policy of disorder and obstruction unless the rules cutting off debate were abandoned. On the 16th King Humbert issued a decree adjourning parliament indefinitely.

The only other political matter of moment in Europe is British. It bears upon the question of Australian federation. As we explained at page 10 of this volume, the Australian colonies have proposed a federation act or constitution to the British parliament enabling them to form a commonwealth, in which act it is provided that there shall be no appeal from the Australian supreme court in matters affecting the interpretation of the act or of the constitutions of the several states of the commonwealth. This is objected to by the British ministry as calculated to dismember the empire by making Australia virtually an independent nation. For several weeks the British ministry and the Australian commissioners now in London have tried to come to an agreement; but as the commissioners disclaimed any authority to agree to an alteration of the plan adopted in Australia by popular vote in the different colonies the matter has now been brought before parliament. On the 14th Mr. Chamberlain, colonial secretary, introduced the Australian enabling act in the house of commons with a request to the house to so amend it as to preserve rights of appeal from the Australian supreme court. The plan he proposes contemplates an appellate court of the empire, to be composed of the British privy council and a representative each from Canada, South Africa, Australia and India. The Australian bill passed the first reading on the 14th, and May 21 was fixed for the second reading.

The violence of the street car strike in St. Louis, the beginning of which we reported at page 71, does not abate. An attempt to settle it by arbitration was made on the 10th by Gov. Stephens, but failed through the refusal of the companies to submit their case to arbitrators. They insisted that "there is nothing to arbitrate." Thereupon the mobs grew in size and the violence on both sides increased. On the 11th the police scattered the mobs with sabers and pistols. Asserting that the mobs were not composed of strikers but of their sympathizers, the strikers offered to provide special deputy sheriffs to protect the property of the companies, but their offer was ignored. Owing to the business depression caused by the complete tie-up a committee of business men asked the mayor to force the company to arbitrate, urging that their franchise be abrogated if they refuse. Several switches were shattered with dynamite on the 12th and a considerable length of track was torn up. Another effort to arbitrate was this day frustrated by the companies. On the 13th Gov. Stephens notified the police commissioners that order must be maintained, and that if they lacked the power he would exercise his full authority to assist them. Not a single car was run on that day, except mail cars. On the 14th the suburban line agreed to arbitrate, and the men on that line began to return to their places. It was announced on the 15th that 1,000 men would be imported from other cities to man the cars; and on that day indictments were found by the grand jury charging men with obstructing the operation of cars. On the 16th a conference was held by a committee of the strikers and the St. Louis company, at which it was agreed to end the strike. The executive committee of the strikers' union decided, however, to reject the agreement, because the union had not received sufficient recognition.

A similar strike broke out on the 11th in Kansas City. The company having refused to recognize the union and make a uniform scale of wages, the men voted to strike. The strike began on the morning of the 12th, and immediately an injunction was procured from the federal court. It was granted by Judge William C. Hook, of Leavenworth, Kan. This injunction is said by the news dispatches to be the most sweeping strike injunction yet issued by a United States court. The strike ap-

pears to have fallen flat. According to the street car officials, unemployed labor was so abundant that they had two applications for employment for every man who struck work.

NEWS NOTES.

—Siberian exile without trial has been abolished by the Russian government.

—In a prize fight on the 11th at Coney Island, New York, James J. Jeffries, the champion, defeated James J. Corbett, an ex-champion.

—A decision of the Nebraska supreme court, on the 16th, sustained the constitutionality of the Nebraska anti-trust law in an action of that state brought to debar the Standard Oil company from doing business there.

—The Ashanti rebellion, mentioned on page 71, is daily growing more serious. Sir Francis Hodgson, the governor, is still closely besieged in Koomasie. The Ashantis have 50,000 warriors to draw on and seem determined to end English rule.

—The Boer peace envoys. Messrs. Wolmarens, Fischer and Wessels, arrived in New York on the 15th, where they were given an enthusiastic welcome and escorted to their hotel by a reception committee of prominent citizens and municipal officials. They left for Washington on the 17th, where elaborate plans for their reception have been made.

IN CONGRESS.

This report is an abstract of the Congressional Record, and closes with the last issue of that publication at hand upon going to press.

May 8-12, 1900.

Senate.

On the 8th, consideration of the naval appropriation bill was resumed and continued on the 9th, when the senate went into secret session during which time Senator Tillman spoke on the armor plate question. On this day also a bill was passed carrying an appropriation of \$4,000 for the erection, in one of Washington's parks, of a statue to Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. Pensions and other private bills occupied the greater part of the session of the 10th, when it was agreed that the resolution relative to the seating of W. A. Clark, as senator from Montana, should be considered on Tuesday, May 15th. The naval bill was again taken up on the 11th and carried over into the 12th, when amendments of Senators Tillman and Pettus, printed on pages 5890-91, authorizing the construction of a government armor plate plant, were rejected by narrow majorities.

House.

On the 8th consideration of private bills occupied the entire day. The North Carolina contested election case of Pearson vs. Crawford was taken up on the 9th and its consideration continued on the 10th when the republican majority seated

Pearson, the republican claimant, by a vote of 129 to 127. On the 11th pension bills occupied the attention of the house to the exclusion of all other business; and on Saturday, the 12th, the house was not in session.

MISCELLANY

THE MAN WITH THE PULL.

For The Public.

Bowed with the weight of luxury, he leans
Upon his friends, and gazes on the ground,
The craftiness of ages in his face,
And on his back the burden of his spoils.
What made him dead to honor and to worth?

A Thing that toils not and that never
spins,

Olly and sleek, a brother to the snake?
What loosened and relaxed those smiling
lips?

Whose was the hand that came down with
the stuff?

What was it closed the mouth of inquiry?

Is this the Thing the Lord God made, and
gave

To have dominion over bird and beast;
To win from earth and wring from ocean's
depths

In sweat and blood, the merited reward?
Is this the Dream He dreamed who shaped
the plan

Of government and pillared it on Truth?
Down all the steeps of crime to its last
gulf

There is no cheat more unctuous than
this—

More flexible, more sly, more plausible—
More filled with wind and suave sophistry—

More fraught with menace to humanity.

What gulfs between him and the patriot,
Slave of the wheel of Fortune, what to him
Are Warren, Henry, Franklin, Washing-
ton?

What the grand swell of Freedom's song
sublime,

The voice of Truth, the light of Liberty?
Through this puffed shape the aoidid ages
look.

Man's fall is mirrored in that cringing bow.
Humanity by this foul varlet stripped,
Plundered, profaned and disinherited,
Cries protest to the spirit of the times,
A protest that is also prophecy.

O, masters, lords and rulers of our land,
Is this the handiwork of politics,
This pampered thing, degraded and soul-
quenched?

How will you straighten out its crooked-
ness,

Give back the upward look of innocence,
Rebuild in it the music and the dream,
Grace it again with manly dignity,
Explain its unforgotten infamies,
Perfidious deeds, insufferable crimes?

O, masters and manipulators, all,
How will the Future reckon with this man?
How will you answer for him in that hour
When whirlwinds of resentment shake the
land?

How will it be with grafters and with
grafts—

With all the prurient horde of conjurers—
When the whole people's dander is aroused,
After a silence, even now too long?

ROBERT W. MORROW.

Jefferson City, Mo., April 26, 1900.

THAT WONDERFUL RIVER.

It is with an increasing sense of awe and wonder that the Chicago public will learn of the latest casualty in proof of the dread fatality which hangs over the Chicago river. Recent events in its history have tended to lift that classic stream far above the level of the ordinary rivers of commerce and give it a new and individual character. Only a few days ago it startled its admirers by the melodramatic feat of catching fire and very nearly burning up. Monday it still further distinguished itself by being struck by lightning, the shock causing it to writhe and tremble on its oozy bed. With only these instances in the public mind, to say nothing of the various collisions which the stream sometimes experiences with toppling bridges or falling trolley cars, it is impossible to say what extraordinary developments may not be forthcoming in future. It will not be at all astonishing to hear that the surprising stream has been held up by highwaymen or looted by porch-climbers, or that it has been carried off bodily by a cyclone. It may be dynamited or it may collapse and fall in upon itself. It is liable to get shot or tangled up in a coal-hole accident or be crushed in a grandstand disaster or a falling-elevator horror.

Evidently there is no sure way of securing protection for it against the fantastic caprices of its destiny. The only thing is to fit it up properly with fire-escapes, lightning rods, cork life-preservers and safety cogs, plaster it over with accident policies and wait in suspense for the next thrilling developments.—The Chicago Record.

ANTI-IMPERIALIST ECHOES FROM ENGLAND.

Letters published in London Morning Leader of Mar. 15.

A PRO-BOER.

Sir:—Your readers may be interested in this conversation:

First Speaker—Well, and what may be your opinion of this war?

Second Speaker—All I say about the war is this: God defend the right.

First Speaker—Ah! I see. You are a pro-Boer.

Yours, etc.,

NEW LEADERITE.

New Southgate.

IMPERIALISM.

Sir:—May I report two current aspects of imperialism? First, the raw material, popularly voiced:

There ain't another nation as can

touch us! France couldn't come nigh us; let her try, she'd get one! Nor Germany neither; we'd give Germany something if she interfered. And as for the Boers, look how cruel they've been to a lot of our poor fellows. But there won't be one of them left soon, I tell ye!

The polished version taught by the lady mother to her child:

And so, darling, one nation after another becomes English in order that they may enjoy the blessings of our civilization and religion. Even the Boers, who are so very cruel to the natives, will be good and happy when they are properly ruled by us.—Yes, mother, we shall make them Christians if we fight long enough!

Both these are from the life.—Yours, etc.,

C. E. PLAYNE.

27 Church-row, Hampstead, N. W.

MOB LAW.

Sir: In view of the promise made by Mr. Balfour, of consultation with the home secretary concerning the reign of mob law in England, it might be of interest to your readers if you were to print the following brief statement as to the nature and extent of the outrages against liberty which have been committed in England and Scotland in the last few weeks.

Paddington.—Attack on Liberal club, where peace meeting was being held. Windows wrecked.

Sheffield.—Private meeting abandoned owing to newspaper incitements to violence.

York.—Meeting abandoned owing to threats of violence.

West Bromwich.—Meeting broken up by rowdy mob.

*Canterbury.—Smashing of a Northgate tradesman's windows.

*Ramsgate.—Smashing of a local tradesman's windows.

Exeter Hall.—Abortive attempt to break up ticket meeting. Stewards assaulted.

*Midhurst.—Attacks on houses of local residents. Windows broken.

Gloucester.—Lecture in Cooperative hall. Promoters of meeting assaulted. Windows of two houses smashed.

Gloucester.—Member of "Stop the War" committee mobbed. Windows of house in which he took refuge broken.

*Weston-super-Mare.—Attacks on houses of alleged pro-Boers. Windows smashed.

Alveston.—Meeting of conciliation committee abandoned owing to disturbance in hall.

Highbury.—Open-air meeting broken up and dispersed by police.

Northampton.—Meeting at town hall prevented by violence. Speakers assaulted.

New-Cross.—Lecture by Dr. Clark abandoned owing to threatened rowdyism.

*Peterhead.—Attacks on houses of two residents; windows broken.

*Stratford-on-Avon.—Windows of two anti-war tradesmen smashed, and other damage done.

*Redruth.—A prominent opponent of the war tarred in the public street.

Leicester.—Ticket meeting broken up owing to violence of mob, who obtained admittance by forged tickets.

*Brierley Hill.—House of local preacher broken into.

Dundee.—Meeting at Gilfillan hall broken up by mob. Attack on house of Rev. W. Walsh; windows broken.

Edinburgh.—Ticket meeting broken up and speakers brutally assaulted.

Glasgow.—Organized attempt to break up a public meeting foiled by physical force of stewards. Windows of "Labor Leader" afterwards smashed by mob.

Gateshead.—Ticket meeting abandoned by advice of police, who had to protect Dr. Watson's house from violence.

Derby.—Conference abandoned owing to printed incitements to violence.

*Norwich.—Firing into house of local resident.

Scarborough.—Private meeting in cafe attacked. Rowntree's cafe wrecked. Other premises smashed, soldiers called out. Ticket meeting abandoned.

Reading.—Ticket meeting abandoned under threat of violence.

At those places marked with an asterisk the attacks on person and property were not provoked by any meeting, public or private.

From this list it will be seen that the organized outrages upon the members of the minority have not been provoked by any attempt to challenge public opinion, with one exception; and at Glasgow, which was an open meeting, thanks to the precautions taken by the stewards, the efforts of the mob were futile, notwithstanding the strange inaction of the police. In all the other cases the meetings were either ticket meetings or private assemblies.

If this is persisted in, it will inevitably result in civil war. Englishmen, although in a minority, will not long submit to the rabbling of their premises and the suppression of the right of free speech without making resistance, which in the first case will take the form of free fights, rapidly developing into bloody riot. Yours, etc,

W. T. STEAD.

THE FILIPINO ASPIRATIONS.

Extracts from an article in the February North American Review, on "Our Rule in the Philippines," by Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Anderson, U. S. A., late major general, U. S. V., in command of the first expeditionary land force from the United States to the Philippine Islands.

On the 1st of July, 1898, I called on Aguinaldo with Admiral Dewey. He asked me at once whether "the United States of the north" either had recognized or would recognize his government. I am not quite sure as to the form of his question, whether it was "had" or "would." In either form it was embarrassing. My orders were, in

substance, to effect a landing, establish a base, not to go beyond the zone of naval cooperation, to consult Admiral Dewey and to wait for Merritt. Aguinaldo had proclaimed his government only a few days before (June 28), and Admiral Dewey had no instructions as to that assumption. The facts as to the situation at that time I believe to be these: Consul Williams states in one of his letters to the state department that several thousand Tagals were in open insurrection before our declaration of war with Spain. I do not know as to the number, yet I believe the statement has foundation in fact. Whether Admiral Dewey and Consul Pratt, Wildman and Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, probably inferring this from their acts rather than from their statements. If an incipient rebellion was already in progress, what could be inferred from the fact that Aguinaldo and 13 other banished Tagals were brought down on a naval vessel and landed in Cavite? Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did subsequently, at his request. They were permitted to gather up a lot of arms which the Spaniards had thrown into the bay; and, with the 4,000 rifles taken from Spanish prisoners and 2,000 purchased in Hong-Kong, they proceeded to organize three brigades and also to arm a small steamer they had captured. I was the first to tell Admiral Dewey that there was any disposition on the part of the American people to hold the Filipinos, if they were captured. The current of opinion was setting that way when the first expeditionary force left San Francisco, but this the admiral had no reason to surmise. But to return to our interview with Aguinaldo.

I told him I was acting only in a military capacity; that I had no authority to recognize his government; that we had come to whip the Spaniards, and that, if we were successful, the indirect effect would be to free them from Spanish tyranny. I added that, as we were fighting a common enemy, I hoped we would get along amicably together. He did not seem pleased with this answer. The fact is, he hoped and expected to take Manila with Admiral Dewey's assistance, and he was bitterly disappointed when our soldiers landed at Cavite. . . .

The origin of our controversies and conflicts with the Filipinos can, as already explained, be traced back to our refusal to recognize the political au-

thority of Aguinaldo. Our first serious break with them arose from our refusal to let them cooperate with us. About nine o'clock on the evening of August 12, I received from Gen. Merritt an order to notify Aguinaldo to forbid the Filipino insurgents under his command from entering Manila. This notification was delivered to him at twenty minutes past ten that night. The Filipinos had made every preparation to assail the Spanish lines in their front. Certainly, they would not have given up part of their line to us unless they thought they were to fight with us. They, therefore, received Gen. Merritt's interdict with anger and indignation. They considered the war as their war, and Manila as their capital, and Luzon as their country. . . .

There is a great diversity of opinion as to whether a conflict with the Filipinos could not have been avoided if a more conciliatory course had been followed in dealing with them. I believe we came to a parting of the ways when we refused their request to leave their military force in a good strategic position on the contingency of our making peace with Spain without a guarantee of their independence. From what was known of the situation, our government was justified in not recognizing Aguinaldo's authority as a de facto government. For, even if it had been determined to recognize an independent Filipino government, it did not follow that we should recognize a self-appointed junta as constituting a government. On the other hand, the dicta of international law that, in war, the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political conditions of the inhabitants—which the president made the basis of his instructions to Gen. Merritt—could only be made to apply to the Philippines by a very liberal construction.

Was Luzon a conquered country? We held Manila and Cavite. The rest of the island was held not by the Spaniards, but by the Filipinos. On the other islands, the Spaniards were confined to two or three fortified towns. At the time referred to, we could not claim to hold by purchase, for we had not then received Spain's quit-claim deed to the archipelago. Making allowance for difference of time, we took Manila, almost to the hour when the peace preliminaries were signed in Washington. . . .

To return to the question of conciliation, one of Aguinaldo's commission, who was subsequently a member of his cabinet, said to me: "Either we have a de facto government or we have not.

If we have, why not recognize the fact? If not, why have you recognized us at all?" This last remark referred to Gen. Merritt's conceding them the control of the Manila water-works, and to Gen. Otis's attempts to negotiate with them without committing himself.

There were other causes of antagonism. Our soldiers, to get what they considered trophies, did a good deal of what the Filipinos considered looting. A number made debts which they did not find it convenient to pay. They called the natives "niggers," and often treated them with a good-natured condescension which exasperated the natives all the more because they feared to resent it.

Thus it happened that the common people, from at first hailing us as deliverers, got to regarding us as enemies.

THE MAN WITH HIS EAR TO THE GROUND.

For The Public.

Bowed by the weight of policy he bends
One ear unto the ground, to note the hoarse
Vox populi, or what he thinks is that.

The other ear he holds aloft to catch
The faintest coolings of the subtle Trusts.
The willness of ages in his face,
And in his back a double curvature.

Who made him numb to sense of right and
wrong,

An apt time-server, skillful caterer,
Crafty and cunning, a brother to the fox?
Ye gods and fish, mark well that attitude!
Who put the limpness in that spine,
That he doth face two ways at once,
And still more ways, if policy demands?

O, emperors, kings, and rulers in all lands,
This is th' American you long have sought
And mourned because you found him not.
Your wish would never straighten up this
shape,

But keep it thus through all eternity,
A stranger to the music and the dreams,
The inspirations of the patriot dead.

O people, only sovereigns of these States,
Is this the pilot Nature-formed to guide,
Whose hand unsteady on the helm,
And mind alert to catch the passing whim?
How fares the Ship of State in storm-
vexed times?

Will this gyrating Thing lead safely past
The shoals and breakers, into quiet seas?

X. C. DINGPOOR.

BOOK NOTICES.

"The Land Question from Various Points of View," published by C. L. Taylor, 1520 Chestnut street, Philadelphia, Pa.), contains an interesting collection of essays on this subject from the pens of different writers. On the title page the collection is described as "a study in search of the highest truth and best policy and not a propaganda print." The opening essay, by C. L. Taylor, gives briefly a history of land tenures and titles, and makes suggestions for land tenure reform. This is followed by an account of the distribution of land in various countries; while ex-Congressman Davis, of Kansas, contributes a paper on alien landlordism in America. The American system of distributing the public

lands is criticised by J. L. McCreery; and the religion of the land question is discussed by Ernest H. Crosby. Newton M. Taylor, of the Indiana bar, criticises the single tax, and Edward D. Burling, of the Philadelphia Single Tax club, replies. A supplementary reply is contributed by Edward T. Peters, of Washington. A compilation and discussion of the constitutions of the United States and the various states with reference to the land question, together with a paper on forestry, two parables by Bolton Hall, and an outline of John Stuart Mill's plan of land reform, completes the volume.

The May number of "Why," (Cedar Rapids, Ia.: Frank Vierth), will be especially welcome to admirers of the late Henry George, for it contains his article, long since out of print, on the rum power. Mr. George was neither a prohibitionist nor a high license man, but one who believed that both these policies, so far from lessening the evils of the liquor traffic, tend to multiply them. The same number of "Why" that contains this powerful defense of free trade in liquor as the one natural and effective way of destroying the evils of the saloon, contains also short articles by William Lloyd Garrison and Joseph Leggett.

Financial Philosophy, or the Principles of the Science of Money (Chicago: Donohue, Henneberry & Co.), by George Wilson, is a plea for gold and silver money exclusively, as the only scientific money. The author would abolish paper money in all its forms and relegate banking to its legitimate function of deposits and discounts.

ATTORNEYS.

Chicago.

CHARLES A. BUTLER,
ATTORNEY AT LAW,
Suite 616, Ashland Block, CHICAGO.
Telephone, Main 2711.

HARRIS F. WILLIAMS,
ATTORNEY AT LAW,
806 Chamber of Commerce Building,
CHICAGO.

JOHNSON, McGRATH & WAAGE,
ALFRED T. JOHNSON,
JOHAN WAAGE. JAMES E. McGRATH.
LAWYERS,
SUITE 906 TACOMA BLDG. Telephone Main 3644.

NELLIE CARLIN,
ATTORNEY AT LAW,
1202 Ashland Block, Chicago.
Telephone Central 925.

Houston.

EWING & RING,
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS,
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