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Mark Hanna may not be mentally demoralized by his discovery of unpromising political conditions in Chicago, but both upon the platform and in interviews he talks as if he were.

Another vicious assault upon Dowie missionaries in Mansfield, O., adds to the infamy which that town has already achieved through the lawless efforts of some of its inhabitants to interfere with freedom of speech and of worship. Whether any considerable number of law-abiding people are left in Mansfield is becoming a serious question.

The return to this country of Mrs. Blatch, the accomplished daughter of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, for the purpose of devoting her excellent oratorical talents to the support of Bryan, is in obedience to no new impulse. Mrs. Blatch has long been a democrat of the Jeffersonian kind. As an advocate of woman suffrage, she never treats the question as one of class or sex rights, but always as one of human rights—of democracy.

Gen. Gobin, the commander of the Pennsylvania state troops in the anthracite coal region, would make a better impression upon impartial observers if he conferred with the great coal land monopolists less and with the strike leaders somewhat. The strike leaders are just as anxious to preserve the peace as are the coal land monopolists—probably more anxious. It is to their interest that peace be maintained; but to the coal monopolists, an outbreak furnishing a good

excuse for military interference would be a godsend.

Because "every progressive nation of Europe to-day is seeking lands to colonize and governments to administer," therefore the great American republic should do the same, is the point of Senator Beveridge's Chicago speech for McKinley. Senator Beveridge evidently knows that the president's policy is imperial, he himself obviously believes in imperialism, and with unusual candor for a McKinleyite he openly declares for it. The only thing about imperialism that he shies at is the name.

Senator Beveridge even more plainly disclosed the imperialistic ambitions of his party when he told his Chicago audience that it was a mistake to promise Cuba independence, and made no secret of his disposition to break the promise. He was discreet enough to explain that he spoke upon his own responsibility alone; but his view regarding Cuba is also Senator Lodge's view, and Lodge was permanent chairman of the Hanna convention, while Beveridge himself is officially put forward as a star in the McKinley galaxy. When men like these so openly advocate a policy of imperialism, it is the part of prudence for Lincoln republicans to refrain from voting for the candidates they support.

In one of his extraordinary campaign speeches in Chicago, after the outbreak of the coal strike, Mr. Hanna wished that he could "bring together all the striking miners and convince them that there is something more important than the mere matter of wages." Yet he had only a few days before the strike assured the country that the only issue in this

campaign is the dinner pail issue. Mr. Hanna's conversion from the dinner pail issue to "something higher and something more important" was sudden, and the strike did it.

President McKinley has improved upon his plan of suppressing state papers until they can be used as campaign documents and then publishing them. His last act of this character was not only to suppress the paper until he thought it would serve him as a candidate for reelection, but actually to have concocted it for that purpose originally. On the 17th of August last he ordered the Philippine commission "to report by cable the views of the commission on the general condition of the islands as to peace and industry." There was no reason of state for any report from it. Congress was not in session. The commission had not completed its work. The president, as president, wanted no information. And if any report had been required for state purposes, it would have been a report of facts and not of "views." It would have been a report, moreover, which would have required deliberation and time to prepare and could have been sent by mail; not one which could be dashed off and must be cabled. But while Mr. McKinley did not want any report as president, he did want one as candidate for reelection. And for that purpose he needed it at once. He was about to prepare a letter of acceptance as presidential candidate in which he wished to quote "views" of the Philippine commissioners; and he expected Bryan to give out a letter of acceptance the effect of which he wished to modify by publishing an "official" report of the Philippine commission's "views." So he cabled to it, as stated above, to send its "views" by cable. This

it did at an expense to the public of \$9,000. Being McKinley partisans to the core, enjoying good salaries through his favor out of the public purse for nondescript services, not averse to holding on, and being withal quick to take a political hint, the commissioners' "views" as cabled were put together so as to make a campaign document of no mean value apparently. It was as good a document as if it had been prepared at the Auditorium Annex; and better only because it bore the Manila instead of the Chicago date mark. From this precious document, which came on the 21st of August and was suppressed for a month, Mr. McKinley, in his letter of acceptance, quoted when he told of the rich mineral deposits in Luzon "a mile high."

But the best use of Mr. McKinley's \$9,000 official campaign document from Manila was reserved until Mr. Bryan's letter had appeared. Then McKinley gave his document to the public, to let them see that according to the "views" of his campaign document-makers in Manila almost everything in Luzon was "lovely and the goose hung high." Unfortunately for Mr. McKinley, however, in the same newspapers in which this document appeared there appeared also a news dispatch from Manila telling of one of the worst battles of the Philippine war, fought right in the neighborhood of Manila. An American captain and lieutenant and 22 men were killed in the battle, while 19 were wounded, five were captured, and apparently the Americans were defeated. Nor was it any little irresponsible guerrilla band that had wrought this havoc. It was a force of 800 men, organized, officered, entrenched, and acting in accordance with the rules of civilized warfare. No wonder Mr. McKinley was "heart-broken," as one Washington correspondent put it. Another attempt to use his office for campaign purposes had been frustrated by the unfriendly geni he himself had unbot-tled.

It is no less interesting than important to note in this connection that John Foreman, the Englishman whose familiarity with the Philippines led to his employment by the peace commissioners at Paris as an expert, has come out in a flat repudiation of McKinley's Philippine policy and an indorsement in principle of Bryan's. His article may be found in the September number of the London National Review. Mr. Foreman does not weigh these policies as those of McKinley and Bryan respectively. He does not so much as consider the relations to the question of either candidate. He writes merely as an expert giving his own views without reference to their political bearing. His advice to the United States is that she ought to extricate herself from the Philippine dilemma, and that she can do it by authorizing the governor general to—

inform the representative Filipinos that the United States' policy is to gradually but conditionally relinquish control over the islands.

That was a wise reflection of the American Machinist, the leading trade paper of the country in its field, when in its issue of September 13th it warned the coal operators that by refusing to confer with their employes they had not only assumed a heavy responsibility but had perhaps hastened—

the time when it will be generally regarded as absurd that private individuals owning mines and railroads should dictate the terms upon which this bounty of nature shall be used by the human family.

One of the comicalities of the campaign is Carroll D. Wright's attempt to show statistically that trusts have both raised wages and increased the number of employes. The joke is a grim one, of course, to employes who have been thrown out of a job, but even they might smile at Mr. Wright's simplicity in putting forth officially as facts to prove the beneficence of trusts the statements made to him by trust managers. Do not all criminals plead "not guilty?" This is, indeed, an instance regarding which Mr.

Wright should be reminded, as Senator Avery, of Cleveland, reminded him regarding another of his statistical exploits, that "the value of figures, like the value of sausages, depends upon who makes them."

In references in these columns to "senate document 62" of the Fifty-fifth congress third session—the collection of official documents on the Philippine question—we have frequently said that copies can be had of the government printing office for 35 cents each. Unfortunately this is no longer true. From readers who have tried to procure copies, we learn that the supply has been exhausted.

DOCUMENTARY OUTLINE OF THE TRANSVAAL CASE.

In the pending presidential campaign in the United States, both the great political parties call attention to the British conquest of the South African republics. The platform of the democratic party would place our government in the same sympathetic attitude toward them that it held toward Greece in the days of Marco Bozaris, while the republican platform is coldly indifferent to their fate. The issue thus presented is one of direction of sympathy. So far as this issue goes, therefore, a vote for Bryan is a vote of sympathy for the still struggling republics, and a vote for McKinley is a vote of sympathy with the British tory ministry. It is consequently important that the American voter, whether native born or naturalized, if he intends to allow the Boer question to affect his vote, should grasp the merits of the South African war.

I.

The great primary fact in the matter is this: Whatever claims of authority Great Britain sets up over the Transvaal Boers—whether sound or unsound, good, bad, plausible, or absurd—rest upon conquest. Let us prove that at the outset.

On the 17th of January, 1852, the Transvaal became an independent state. Great Britain had previously asserted jurisdiction over its inhabitants on the ground that as natives of Cape Colony they continued to be British subjects wherever found—an application of the doctrine, now abandoned, of "once a British subject

always a British subject." But the Transvaal Boers resisted this assertion and Great Britain finally receded from it by recognizing them as independent.

She did so through "the Sand River Convention"—a copy of which we find in a collection of British "blue books" upon Transvaal affairs. These "blue books" are official publications. Printed for the queen by Eyre and Spotteswoode, 32 Abingdon street, Westminster, S. W., London, they may be purchased either of the printers, or of John Menzies & Co., 12 Hanover street, Edinburgh, or Hodges, Figgis & Co., Limited, 104 Grafton street, Dublin, and should be found in any good reference library in this country. The Sand River "convention" contained nothing whatever in conflict with or modification of its principal clause acknowledging the independence of the Transvaal, which we give in full:

The assistant commissioners guarantee in the fullest manner, on the part of the British government, to the emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal river, the right to manage their own affairs, and to govern themselves, without any interference on the part of her majesty the queen's government, and that no encroachments shall be made by the said government on the territory beyond to the north of the Vaal river, with the further assurance that the warmest wish of the British government is to promote peace, free trade, and friendly intercourse with the emigrant farmers now inhabiting or who hereafter may inhabit their country, it being understood that this system of non-interference is binding upon both parties.

In virtue of that "convention," the Transvaal became and for 25 years thereafter remained an independent nation. About this there neither is nor can be any dispute. But in 1877 it lost its independence and was annexed to Great Britain.

Now, a nation once independent can cease to be so in only one of two ways. It may lose its independence either by conquest, or by voluntary relinquishment. There is no other way. Consequently, if the Transvaal lost its independence without voluntarily relinquishing it, it must have lost it through conquest.

That its independence was ever voluntarily relinquished cannot be affirmed. A claim is made that the annexation in 1877 was informally requested by the people; but if that

were true—and the Boers deny it strenuously—it would not prove a voluntary relinquishment. The independence of a nation is too sacred a trust to be relinquished informally. Once acquired it can be voluntarily relinquished only by some formal national act in testimony of the national design and purpose. And no one pretends that there was any such act. The very utmost that can be reasonably claimed is that irresponsible individuals in the Transvaal besought a British military officer to run up the British flag and proclaim British sovereignty, and that without physical resistance he did so. There was no voluntary relinquishment of independence, no voluntary cession of sovereignty, by any authoritative action. There can be no escape, then, from the conclusion that when the Transvaal lost her sovereignty in 1877 she lost it not by relinquishment, but by British conquest.

And that is the testimony of the most famous British writer who tells the story of the period. In his world-famed "History of Our Own Times," chapter lxvi, Justin McCarthy describes the British conquest of the Transvaal in 1877 by Sir Theophilus Shepstone. After picturing the Transvaal republic as bankrupt in its treasury while waging a losing war against a powerful neighboring chief named Secocoeni, Mr. McCarthy proceeds:

There seemed hardly any chance of maintaining order within its frontier, and the prospect appeared at the time to be that its South African enemies would overrun the whole of the republic; would thus come up to the borders of the English states, and possibly might soon involve the English settlers themselves in war. Under these conditions a certain number of disappointed or alarmed inhabitants of the Transvaal made some kind of indirect proposition to England that the republic should be annexed to English territory. Sir Theophilus Shepstone was sent out by England to ascertain whether this offer was genuine and national. He seems to have been entirely mistaken in his appreciation of the condition of things. Acting under the impression that the Boers were willing to accept English authority, he boldly, one might say lawlessly, declared the republic a portion of the dominions of Great Britain.

To characterize such an event as a voluntary relinquishment or cession of its sovereignty by the Transvaal republic would be the veriest trifling

with honest language. Mr. McCarthy indicates the true character of the annexation when he describes it as bold and lawless.

With the sin of conquest, then, every claim which the British make to authority in the Transvaal is tainted. Even reservations of authority in subsequent treaties rest upon a conquest but for which Great Britain would have possessed no authority to reserve. This primary and all-pervading fact of conquest should be kept constantly in mind.

II.

The British conquest of 1877 did not rest lightly upon the Transvaal Boers. They had a history of resistance to super-imposed government as glorious as that of the English themselves. Going far back into the marvelous story of the Netherlands, it came down to the memory of living men. Even their Boer ancestors in South Africa had left a record of bitter struggle for independence extending back more than 200 years. Having in the seventeenth century "trekked" across wastes of ocean waters to find at the Cape of Good Hope security from European persecution, and like our American ancestors having cleared their new country of wild beasts and enraged savages, they had in the nineteenth century "trekked" across South African veldts to escape the conquering power of Great Britain. From Cape Colony in 1835 to Natal, from there in 1843 to the Orange river country, and then across the Vaal, they had made their exodus. When they settled in Natal and established a republic, Great Britain made a successful war of conquest against them, claiming them as British subjects. When they abandoned their "Republic of Natalia" for the Orange river country, Great Britain pursued them and drove them across the Vaal. The struggle lasted 16 years. Not until they passed the Vaal were they left in peace. Then their independence was conceded by the Sand river "convention" of 1852 from which we have already quoted. Such a people could not submit supinely to Sir Theophilus Shepstone's conquest, and they did not.

When he boldly and lawlessly proclaimed their territory part of the British dominions, they were unable to resist. A native war and a depleted treasury made resistance at that time impossible. But three years later, they had regained enough national strength to fight for the recovery of their independence, and about

the end of the year 1880 they took up arms. After a series of guerrilla battles, culminating in the famous victory at Majuba Hill, they got back in part what they had lost. Great Britain receded from the Shepstone conquest and with certain reservations restored to them their independence.

This was done by the "convention for the settlement of the Transvaal territory," made August 3, 1881. In the series of British "blue books" it is distinguished as "C.—2998," which may be purchased of the firms in London, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dublin already mentioned, or examined in American reference libraries. This new "convention" fixed the name of the Transvaal as the "Transvaal State," and undertook and guaranteed on behalf of Great Britain that— from and after the 8th day of August, 1881, complete self-government, subject to the suzerainty of her majesty, her heirs and successors, will be accorded to the inhabitants of the Transvaal territory, upon the following terms, etc.

The only important condition of this restoration of self-government, other than the suzerainty mentioned in the clause quoted above, was a reservation by Great Britain of the right to control and carry on all the diplomatic intercourse of the Transvaal with foreign powers.

The "convention" of 1881 fell so far short of revoking the conquest of 1877 and restoring to the Transvaal Boers their original independence, that they soon solicited modifications. A third "convention" was consequently adopted at London on the 27th of February, 1884. It is distinguished in the British "blue books" as "C.—3914."

Apologists for British imperialism argue that the "convention" of 1884 did not abrogate that of 1881, but only modified it in some particulars, and that except as specifically so modified the convention of 1881 was still in force at the outbreak of the present war. For instance, as the "convention" of 1884 says nothing of British "suzerainty," these apologists insist upon the continued vitality of the British suzerainty reserved in 1881. The groundlessness of their plea is obvious upon reference to the preamble of the convention of 1884, which declares that—

the following articles of a new convention, signed on behalf of her majesty by [here follow the names and

titles of the British commissioners], and on behalf of the Transvaal state, (which shall hereafter be called the South African Republic) [here follow the names of the Boer commissioners], shall, when ratified by the volksraad of the South African republic, be substituted for the articles embodied in the convention of 3d August, 1881; which latter, pending such ratification, shall continue in full force and effect.

Since the articles of this treaty of 1884 were to be "substituted for the articles" of the treaty of 1881, the latter remaining in force only until the former had been ratified, it is simply childish to contend that a single article or letter of the treaty of 1881 could remain in force for an instant after the ratification of the treaty of 1884. The latter was a complete substitute for the former.

The treaty of 1884, then, formed the legal basis for all the relations between Great Britain and the South African republic down to the outbreak of hostilities. Let us outline it.

In the first place, as already noted, it changed the name of the Transvaal from "Transvaal State" to the "South African republic." Furthermore, it substituted for the right to maintain a "British resident" the right to maintain an ordinary consular officer. There were also clauses such as are usual in commercial treaties, securing the right of foreigners to travel through or reside in the republic, to possess property and to do business there, and to be free from taxes discriminating against them as foreigners. And while it recognized the independence of the Transvaal it did so with the reservation, as to the treaty making power, that the republic should make no treaties with any nation except the Orange Free State nor with any of the native tribes to the east or west, without the approval of the British government.

Technically, therefore, full sovereignty was still withheld. For one of the technical attributes of sovereignty is unqualified freedom with reference to all foreign relations; and the Transvaal's authority in this respect was by the "convention" of 1884 distinctly limited. The right to limit it, let us not forget, rested upon the conquest of 1877, and upon that alone; but as conquest, however abhorrent to every instinct of justice, is nevertheless a legal method of acquiring territory, this limitation had the legal effect of denying to the

Transvaal its former legal standing as a sovereign among the nations.

Yet the treaty completed the restoration of full sovereignty over all domestic concerns. As to them, Great Britain surrendered every legal right she had previously acquired by her conquest. She had no more right thenceforth, even technically, to interfere with the internal affairs of the South African republic than she would have at this moment to interfere with those of the limited sovereignty of the state of Illinois. We call special attention to this consideration because, as we shall see farther on, the South African war grew out of the persistent efforts of the tory ministry of Great Britain to interfere with the domestic government of the Transvaal.

Such was the relation of the South African republic to Great Britain at the time of the first overt act in the series of events that culminated in the South African war. We allude to what is known as the "Jameson raid."

III.

So far as can be gathered from the British "blue books," the Jameson raid, though made by British public servants, was without the authority and against the orders of the British government. But it was not less authoritative than the Shepstone annexation of 1877, and if it had succeeded there is little doubt that it would have received similar confirmation. At any rate, the Boers believed with good reason that if the Jameson raid had succeeded Great Britain would have claimed a second conquest of their country.

The story of that raid may be dug out of the blue books distinguished as "C. — 7933" and "C. — 8063," which were presented to parliament in February and April, 1896, respectively. The raid had taken place during the holiday week of 1895-96.

A South African company, organized under a British charter, and possessing governmental as well as business powers, occupied a large territory to the west and north of the Transvaal. Cecil Rhodes, the premier of Cape Colony and a plutocrat of enormous interests and powers, was the manager of this company, his confidential agent and the administrator under him of the affairs of the company being Dr. Jameson. Complaints of misgovernment having been abundant from aliens resid-

ing in Johannesburg, one of the Transvaal cities, and a rebellion against the Boer authorities having been organized by them in the fall and early winter of 1895, Dr. Jameson got together a force of 700 men in the British country west of the Transvaal, and crossing into the South African republic advanced upon Johannesburg with the design of cooperating with rebellious aliens of that city. His force consisted of British subjects, most if not all of them in semi-military service under British control. It was largely officered by British army officers. And it carried the British flag. Upon learning of this invasion, the British government tried, according to the blue books, to stop it but without success; and on the 2d of January it was attacked near Krugersdorp by a body of 1,500 Boers under Gen. Cronje, and after a deadly engagement it surrendered.

The prisoners, as is well known, were subsequently delivered to the British government for trial, and after conviction at London of a minor offense were subjected to brief terms of imprisonment.

Feeling naturally enough, in the light of this experience, that they had barely escaped a second British conquest, the Boers began to make elaborate preparations for military defense. This action came to the ears of Mr. Chamberlain, the British secretary for the colonies, who, on the 26th of March, 1896 (blue book, "C.—8063," page 15), questioned Sir Hercules Robinson, then governor general of Cape Colony and British high commissioner for South Africa, in these terms:

Alarming reports arrived by cable from several private sources as to attitude of burghers, of which we have heard nothing from you or DeWet. It is stated that they are determined to proclaim independence and cancel convention, and that military preparations are going on in Transvaal, Orange Free State, and Cape Colony. Should any weight be given to these statements? Is there any truth in report of new defensive and offensive alliances between Transvaal and Orange Free State?

To those inquiries Sir Hercules Robinson made this reply (blue book "C.—8063," page 17):

Transvaal republic and Orange Free State burghers are making military preparations, and I learn that Boers residing on the borders of Cape Colony and Natal are also arming;

but the movement, so far as I can gather, is defensive and not offensive. Boers generally believe that the recent raid was, if not instigated, at all events connived at by her majesty's government, and that an attack upon their independence will be renewed on the first favorable opportunity. I believe, however, from information received, that there is no truth in the statement to which you refer as to their intention to proclaim independence and cancel London convention. In my opinion, our best policy is to sit still, as military preparations on our side would only confirm the burghers in their unfounded suspicions and distrust. I can learn nothing as to report of a new defensive and offensive alliance between Transvaal republic and Orange Free State. By existing treaty, they are bound to assist each other in the event of attack from outside.

This correspondence between Chamberlain and Robinson has several important bearings. It shows, for one thing, that the extraordinary military preparations by the Boers began after the alarming Jameson raid and not before. For another, it shows that a general belief prevailed among the Boers that Jameson's raid was to have been in its results a repetition of Shepstone's. A third, and especially important point, is the evidence it furnishes that the military activity of the Boers was not offensive as against Great Britain, but defensive.

IV.

As indicated above, the professed object of the Jameson raid was to serve the aliens (or "uitlanders" as aliens are called by the Boers) who lived in Johannesburg and by whom complaints of local misgovernment were continually made. Immediately after the Jameson raid these complaints became the engrossing subject of diplomatic intercourse between Great Britain and the South African republic down almost to the outbreak of the war.

Whether or not the complaints were meritorious is immaterial. Some of them probably were, and some as certainly were not. When we of this country consider the outrages of which we are guilty against our "uitlanders"—the Chinese, for instance—we should not be surprised if peasant Dutch people in the heart of South Africa, excited by well grounded fears of conquest, were unjust to the alien immigrants whom the gold fever had brought into their pastoral country and who were swamping their civilization and threatening their

government with extinction. But meritorious or not, none of these complaints would have justified Great Britain in making war upon the South African republic. She would not have been justified in doing so upon the ground that she had been wronged by the republic as an independent nation. Similar complaints coming from British subjects in the United States, for illustration, could not possibly be considered as furnishing cause for war. Neither did they furnish grounds for British interference under her treaty with the South African republic of 1884. They related altogether to the domestic concerns of the latter, over which, as we have already shown, Great Britain had no more jurisdiction than she has over the domestic affairs of Illinois. For the treaty of 1884 limited British jurisdiction to the right to revise Transvaal treaties with foreign powers. Mr. Chamberlain recognized all this early in the correspondence, as appear from his frequent protests that Great Britain proposed no domestic interference but only offered friendly suggestions.

It is true that if the Boers had violated their treaty pledges with reference to the rights and privileges of aliens among them, Great Britain would have had the same grounds of complaint that any other nation to whom the Boers were under treaty obligations would have had. But Great Britain made no claim of any violation by the Boers of treaty obligations. She had none to make. The Boers appear to have been extremely cautious not to violate treaty obligations and swift to repair any actual or seeming breach. Though hints of violation of the treaty are thrown out by the British in the official correspondence published in the blue books, never once was any such issue joined. Great Britain rested her case not upon any grievance under the treaty of 1884, but wholly upon her asserted but unfounded authority as a suzerain power to supervise internal affairs of the South African republic.

So the one issue between Great Britain and the South African republic was the question of the latter's independence of British authority in domestic concerns. It began to take definite shape immediately after the Jameson raid.

As early as January 23, 1896 (blue book "C.—8063," pages 1 and 2), Mr. Chamberlain threw out a feeler

with a view to securing a personal conference with Kruger in London, on condition that the fourth article of the treaty of 1884—that restricting the treaty making power of the South African republic—should be excluded from discussion. Indicating in two communications his desire to accept (same reference, pages 4 and 7), Kruger suggested a general line of discussion for the proposed interview and expressed his hope that the restrictive clause of the treaty might also be considered. The line of discussion he suggested looked to a substitution for the treaty of 1884 of a treaty of peace, friendship and commerce—in other words, recognition of unrestricted sovereignty. To these communications Mr. Chamberlain replied, March 5, 1896 (same reference, page 9), expressing his willingness to make a new treaty provided the restrictive clause, article 4 of the treaty of 1884, were incorporated in it. But this did not suit Mr. Kruger, who, thereupon (same reference, pages 11 and 22), declined the British invitation; and on the 27th of April, 1896 (same reference, page 23), Mr. Chamberlain withdrew the invitation. Meantime Mr. Chamberlain had been in correspondence with Sir Hercules Robinson, and the latter with the South African republic, as to the general situation. In a dispatch to Robinson dated February 6, 1896 (“C.—8063,” page 2), Chamberlain outlined an internal policy for the South African republic with reference to alien residents; and in reply (page 4) the South African republic declared that it could not tolerate any interference in its internal affairs.

Throughout the foregoing correspondence the republic made it clear, as it expressly announced (“C.—8063,” page 22), that it was “at all times prepared to receive in a friendly spirit any private suggestions” which Great Britain might offer, but that “the decision as to what measures are best calculated to promote the peace and prosperity of the inhabitants, and the determination whether legitimate causes of discontent exist rest solely with the executive and legislature” of the republic. At this time the republic was evidently sparring for a recognition of more perfect independence, and Great Britain was as evidently sparring for recovery of the suzerainty which had been abrogated in 1884.

V.

We come now to the events imme-

diately preceding and leading up to the war. They began with the Bloemfontein conference in May and June, 1899.

Considerable correspondence upon various points relating to the internal affairs of the South African republic had taken place between the British and the Boer authorities, all of which revolved about the same vital issue of independence or suzerainty, when Mr. Chamberlain on the 10th of May, 1899 (blue book “C.—9345,” page 226, 231), proposed a conference between President Kruger, of the South African republic, and Sir Alfred Milner, who had succeeded Sir Hercules Robinson as governor of Cape Colony and British high commissioner for South Africa. Mr. Chamberlain’s proposal had been evoked (same reference, page 226) by a petition of 21,684 British subjects resident in the republic. This petition (printed in full in blue book “C.—9345,” pages 185-89) enumerated the grievances of the signers. It asserted that the great majority of the population were British subjects, and that the alien population possessed a large proportion of the land and represented the intellect, wealth and energy of the state; that nevertheless these aliens had no share in the government; that petitions to the government respecting grievances had failed of effect and been scornfully rejected; that the consequent discontent had culminated in an armed insurrection—the uprising at Johannesburg of which the Jameson raid was the demonstration from across the British border—which, however, failed of its object; that promises of reforms had been made and broken; that taxes burdensome to the aliens had been imposed; that the independence of the judiciary had been destroyed by law; that hostility to Great Britain had been shown by the construction of forts not only about Pretoria but overlooking Johannesburg, which were a source of constant menace and irritation to British subjects; that aliens were not put on the police force; that trial by jury was only nominal and justice miscarried; and that alien meetings were notoriously disturbed without interference by the authorities. A counter petition signed by British, American, German, French, Dutch and other aliens to the number of 23,000 (blue book “C.—9345,” pages 212, 238) denying the statements of the British petition and asserting that it had originated with

capitalists and not with the public, was also brought to the attention of the British government. The proposed conference was finally arranged for the 31st of May at Bloemfontein (same reference, page 242), Kruger in his acceptance letter making the reservation that (same reference, page 241) his acceptance was based upon the proviso “that the independence of this republic is not impugned.”

After this arrangement had been made, but before going to the conference, Milner asked instructions from Chamberlain, himself suggesting (same reference, page 242) the following line of discussion:

It is my own inclination to put in foreground question of uitlanders’ grievance, treating it as broadly as possible, and insisting that it is necessary, in order to relieve situation, that the uitlanders should obtain some substantial degree of representation by legislation to be passed this session. Following would be general line—franchise after six years [this was an error in cabling; it should have been five years. See blue book “C.—9404,” page 60], retrospective, and at least seven members for the rand; present number of volksraad South African republic being 28, this would make one-fifth of it uitlander members. If president South African republic will not agree to anything like this, I should try municipal government for the whole rand as an alternative, with wide powers, including control of police. If he rejects this too, I do not see much use in discussing various outstanding questions between two governments in detail, such as dynamite, violations Zululand boundary, “Critic” case, war tax, Cape boys and Indians, though it would be desirable to allude to them in the course of discussion, and point out gravity of having so many subjects of dispute unsettled. If president South African republic inclined on the other hand to listen, even to the extent of undertaking to submit to volksraad reasonable concessions for uitlanders, I should try then to arrive at basis for the settlement of the other questions.

Mr. Chamberlain, in his reply to that note (same reference, page 243) said:

It is not my intention to give you any formal instructions for conference; I wish to leave you as free as possible a hand. I think personally that you should lay all the stress on the question of franchise in first instance. Other reforms are less pressing and will come in time, if this can be arranged satisfactorily and form

of oath modified. Redistribution is reasonable and important, but you might accept a moderate concession. If fair terms on franchise are refused by president, it appears hardly worth while to bring forward other matters, such as aliens, colored people, education, dynamite, etc., at the conference, and the whole situation must be reconsidered. You should not, however, lose sight of possible alternative in shape of full municipal rights for populous mining district and Johannesburg. This I still think a feasible solution, if president fears that independence will be endangered by concession of general franchise.

From these two dispatches it may be seen that the whole stress of the British solicitations at the conference was to be laid upon distinctive domestic affairs—the enfranchisement of uitlanders and the distribution of seats in the legislature. The number of seats in the legislature from the Rand (the mining districts of the Witwatersrand) was then two in a legislature of 28, and the British high commissioner was to solicit an increase so as to make 7 out of 35. At a later time, but still before the war, the Boers offered even more than this in order to prevent war. With reference to the enfranchisement, the British government was to solicit an amendment of the voting law so that aliens might vote after five years' residence instead of 14, and to make the amendment retrospective so that aliens who had already lived there five years might enjoy its benefits. This also was finally offered by the Boers to prevent war. It is obvious that these concessions, though they might be solicited in a friendly way by one government of another, were so clearly domestic in character that no government could demand them of another without thereby asserting rights of suzerainty. Yet Sir Alfred Milner made them the sine qua non of the British government when he came to meet Kruger at Bloemfontein.

The official report of the proceedings of the conference at Bloemfontein is published in blue book "C.—9404." It shows that the conference was an intellectual duel between a polished diplomat confident of the power of the nation behind him, and an uncouth and suspicious head of a peasant republic fearful of being outwitted. The same sparring that had characterized all negotiations since the Jameson raid was renewed. Great Britain sparred for an advantageous position as suzerain; the

republic sparred to gain a further point in the direction of absolute independence. Milner laid all stress upon the franchise question; Kruger evaded his proposals at every turn. Milner sought the voting franchise at once for a body of aliens numerous enough to swamp the republic—protesting, however, with courtly assurance, that by no means would he urge any concession that might swamp it; and Kruger maneuvered to avoid the plotting against his country's independence of which he suspected Great Britain. After much of this sparring, Kruger brought matters to an issue by making a definite proposal regarding the franchise. Though loaded down with detail it was calculated to give to all aliens partial suffrage after two years' residence and complete suffrage five years later. Mr. Milner characterized the proposal as inadequate and the conference broke up without having accomplished anything.

Promptly upon the breaking up of the Bloemfontein conference the legislature of the South African republic (blue book "C.—9415," page 8) approved the franchise proposal that Kruger had made, and proceeded to enact it into law. The text of this law appears at page 41 of blue book "C.—9518." Mr. Chamberlain refers to it in his official letter to Milner of July 27, 1899, published in blue book "C.—9518," at page 10, where he says:

The volksraad has now agreed to a measure intended to give the franchise immediately to those who have been resident in the country for seven years, as well as to those who may in the future complete this period of residence. This proposal is an advance on previous concessions and leaves only a difference of two years between yourself and President Kruger so far as the franchise is concerned.

In a subsequent letter dated the 31st of July (same reference, page 29), Mr. Chamberlain directed Milner to invite Kruger to appoint delegates—to discuss with ours question whether reforms which volksraad has passed, will give immediate and substantial representation of uitlanders, and if not what additions and alterations will be necessary in order to secure this result.

An invitation to Kruger was accordingly sent (blue book "C.—9518," page 30); but the Boers were

no more inclined than any other state would have been to submit to a joint inquiry with a foreign nation into the effect of their domestic legislation. Yet they feared the British power, and on the 15th of August, 1899 (blue book "C.—9521," page 46), they offered all the British had asked for, making the following proposal as a substitute for the suggested inquiry:

1. The government are willing to recommend to the volksraad and the people a five years' retrospective franchise as proposed by his excellency, the high commissioner, on the 1st of June, 1899.

2. The government are further willing to recommend to the volksraad that eight new seats in the first volksraad, and if necessary, also in the second volksraad, be given to the population of the Witwatersrand, thus with the two sitting members for the gold fields giving to the population thereof ten representatives in a raad of 36, and in future the representation of the gold fields of this republic shall not fall below the proportion of one-fourth of the total.

3. The new burghers shall equally with the old burghers be entitled to vote at the election for the state president and commandant general.

4. This government will always be prepared to take into consideration such friendly suggestions regarding the details of the franchise law as her majesty's government, through the British agent, may wish to convey to it.

By reference to Milner's letter to Chamberlain asking instructions, and Chamberlain's reply (both are quoted above), it may be seen that this proposal by the Boers was an offer of all and more than the British had set out to claim with reference to the suffrage and to legislative representation. It was intended, however, to end all controversy, and for that purpose a judicious condition was attached, namely:

In putting forward the above proposals, the government of the South African republic assumes—

(a) That her majesty's government will agree that the present intervention shall not form a precedent for future similar action and that in the future no interference in the internal affairs of the republic will take place.

(b) That her majesty's government will not further insist on the assertion of the suzerainty, the controversy on that subject being allowed tacitly to drop.

(c) That arbitration (from which foreign element other than Orange Free State is to be excluded) will be

conceded as soon as the franchise scheme has become a law.

Inasmuch as the mention here of the exclusion of "foreign element" from the scheme of arbitration meant that the arbitration tribunal should be composed of British subjects and Transvaal or Free State Boers—foreign powers to be excluded—which had been required by Great Britain as a condition of arbitration (See blue book, "C.—9518," pages 11, 29, 30, and "C.—9521," pages 47 and 49), the matter was now in shape for amicable adjustment. Great Britain had insisted on a five years' retrospective franchise. It was granted. She had proposed a gold-fields representation in the volksraad of one-fifth. More than one-fourth was granted—10 in 36. She required that any arbitration tribunal should—excepting the Orange Free State (See blue book "C.—9521," pages 47, 49)—have no foreign representation upon it. The condition was accepted. Thus Great Britain's demands as to the uitlander franchise and representation were complied with, and she was invited to submit other demands to an arbitration tribunal of the kind she herself had designated. Nothing now stood in the way of a peaceable outcome except Mr. Chamberlain's unwarranted claim of British suzerainty. The whole quarrel was reduced to that one issue. But to that issue Chamberlain clung, and upon that issue he finally forced the war.

In his official dispatch of August 28, published in blue book "C.—9521," at pages 49 and 50, Mr. Chamberlain rejected the Boer proposal. He wrote:

First, as regards intervention: Her majesty's government hope that the fulfillment of the promises made and the just treatment of the uitlanders in future will render unnecessary any further intervention on their behalf, but her majesty's government cannot of course debar themselves from their rights under the conventions nor divest themselves of the ordinary obligations of a civilized power to protect its subjects in a foreign country from injustice.

Secondly, with regard to suzerainty her majesty's government would refer the government of the South African republic to the second paragraph of my dispatch of the 13th of July.

The dispatch of July 13, so referred to, is found in blue book "C.—9507,"

at page 33. It declares in the second paragraph that in behalf of the British government the—

contention that the South African republic is a sovereign international state is not, in their opinion, warranted either by law or history, and is wholly inadmissible.

Chamberlain's behavior was evasive. The Boers had not asked him to abandon any rights under the "convention" of 1884—the only "convention" then in force, as we have already shown. Neither had they claimed to be a sovereign international state in the full legal sense. As to the latter point, what they had claimed, and claimed truly, was that the republic was a sovereign state as to its domestic concerns. His manifest disingenuousness prompting the Boers to regard his rejection of the conditions of their proposal as a rejection of the proposal itself, they withdrew it. This was done on the 2d of September, 1899 (blue book "C.—9521," page 52). Replying on the 8th (blue book "C.—9521," pages 64, 65) to the Boer notice of withdrawal of their proposal, Mr. Chamberlain reiterated his oblique claim to suzerainty, and in closing his dispatch became belligerent. He gave warning that if the republic did not stand by its proposal without the conditions, the British government must—

reserve to themselves the right to reconsider the situation *de novo*, and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement.

The republic refused to submit (blue book "C.—9530," page 11) to Chamberlain's peremptory demand of the 8th, and on the 22d (same reference, page 16) Chamberlain wrote that in the opinion of the British government—

no conditions less comprehensive than those contained in their offer

of 8th September—that is, complete and unconditional acceptance of the British demands as to suffrage and legislative representation—could be entertained, and added—

The refusal of the government of the South African republic to entertain the offer thus made, coming as it does at the end of nearly four months of protracted negotiation, themselves the climax of an agitation extending over a period of more than five years, makes it useless to further pursue a discussion on the lines hitherto followed, and her majesty's government are now compelled to consider the situation afresh, and to formulate their own proposals for a

final settlement of the issues which have been created in South Africa by the policy constantly followed for many years by the government of the South African republic.

"Her majesty's government are now compelled to consider the situation afresh, and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement!" This was the nub of that dispatch. This was the threat which precipitated the war. "Final settlement!" How? By force, by military invasion. The threat could have meant nothing else. And Great Britain had been making preparations all through the summer to enforce it in that way, as we shall now see.

VI.

As soon as the Bloemfontein conference had ended, the British jingo public and British jingo ministers began talking freely of war upon the Transvaal, a fact of which the London newspapers of that period furnish ample evidence. Take for example the following editorial extract from the London Times, the most moderate as well as the most influential of all the tory press. The extract we quote may be found in the third column of the ninth page of the Times of June 23, 1899:

If Mr. Kruger has any real friends, they cannot too promptly and too earnestly set themselves to work to disabuse his mind of the notion that this country is divided into a peace party and a war party, of which the peace party is the stronger.

The Times wished it to be clearly understood that there was no peace party, but that England was for war. The same threatening attitude toward the Transvaal was shown three days later by Mr. Chamberlain himself. In a speech on the 26th of June, 1899, at the annual meeting of the grand committee of the Birmingham Liberal Unionist association, a report of which was published in the London Times of June 27, on page 10, in column 4, Mr. Chamberlain said:

I agree that moral pressure should be exhausted before any man talks of anything else. I agree that patience is a virtue which becomes the strong, but there is, I imagine, no responsible person who will pretend that after successive governments have recognized the danger of the position and have made persistent requests, the position can be allowed indefinitely to remain as it is at present. Every man of sense must see that there comes a time when patience can hardly be distinguished from weakness, and when moral pres-

sure becomes a farce which cannot be continued without loss of self respect.

What could Mr. Chamberlain have meant by that if he did not mean that if the Transvaal persisted in its refusal to acquiesce in the British demands it must be forced to acquiesce—must submit to invasion by a British army? He could have meant nothing else, and he was at the time understood to mean nothing else. The whole British public was looking forward to aggressive war, and the jingo public was looking forward to it with enthusiasm. In jingo circles Mr. Chamberlain's bellicose speech was hailed with delight. There were British circles, however, in which the speech was repulsive, and which responded with peace meetings. As early as July 11, the Times told (on page 11, in column 6) of a meeting in London to protest against attempts of the press and certain members of the British government—to force this country into a war with the Transvaal.

If the idea of war was not in the air, why that meeting? And in September a meeting in Trafalgar square, reported in the Times of September 25, page 8, column 5, called to "protest against war with the Transvaal," was broken up by a mob, which threw missiles at the speakers, hooted so as to prevent their being heard, and assaulted their persons. The continual cry of this mob was one of revenge—"Remember Majuba Hill!"

Meanwhile active preparations for aggressive war were under way in England, as the following abstracts and quotations from the London Times during the summer of 1899 sufficiently indicate:

Army headquarters at Simla, India, besieged with applications of officers for service in Transvaal in event of dispatch of troops from India.—June 19, p. 7, col. 1.

The military authorities at Cape Town, South Africa, are taking preliminary steps to insure a proper supply of horses, should they be required. They are also making precautionary inquiries regarding coast transport.—June 26, page 7, col. 1.

The object of the steps taken by the military authorities up to now, has been to increase the efficiency and mobility of the forces in South Africa for defensive purposes, and to insure the security of our frontier. With that intention two companies of engineers and departmental corps have lately been dispatched to South

Africa and reserves of supplies and ammunition have been sent out. Additional special service officers are likely to be sent out during the next few days. "The commander in chief has been engaged in completing the organization and composition of the larger force which it will be necessary to dispatch to South Africa in the event of the negotiations at present in progress with the government of the Transvaal proving unsuccessful."—July 7, page 8, col. 8.

The British government thanks Queensland for offer of troops for service in the Transvaal, hoping "that the occasion will not arise, but if it should," etc.—July 1, 13 page 5, col. 1.

The military authorities have recently been purchasing horses, mules, harness and wagons, and preparing to forward supplies to Kimberly.—July 14, page 5, col. 2.

A move was made in the Canadian parliament to offer a regiment for service in South Africa.—July 14, page 5, col. 2.

The military commandant in Victoria, Australia, "in view of the fact that troops in all the colonies have volunteered for service in the Transvaal," suggests a combined Australian contingent.—July 15, page 7, col. 1.

More officers and men left England on the 15th for special service in South Africa.—July 17, page 9, col. 1. Liverpool regiment ordered from Cape Town to Natal, and a battalion of the Manchester regiment ordered from Gibraltar to the Cape.—Aug. 7, page 7, col. 1.

First battalion Liverpool regiment arrived at Durban and dispatched to Ladysmith. Rest to follow.—Aug. 15, page 4, col. 4.

Recruiting for local forces carried on actively at Cape Town.—Aug. 17, page 4, col. 2.

Further account of recruiting at Capetown supplemented with the statement that "contingents are leaving daily for the north."—Aug. 19, page 3, col. 5.

A detachment of volunteers left Cape Town on 18th, amid a scene of great enthusiasm.—Aug. 21, page 4, col. 3.

Report of mobilization at Mafeking as proceeding rapidly, with statement that "several hundred recruits have arrived, and after being equipped have joined Col. Vivian's camp, and every train brings fresh recruits."—Aug. 24, page 4, col. 2.

Report from Gibraltar that "the Manchester regiment, over 1,000 strong, left for the Cape to-day (Aug. 24).—Aug. 25, page 4, col. 4.

"Every train is bringing additional men" to Mafeking.—Aug. 29, page 3, col. 1.

Report from Cape Town that "it is understood that a detachment of

the Cape Town garrison is proceeding to Mafeking within 14 hours, and that a strong force is also being sent from Pietermaritzburg to Laing's Nek to await developments."—Aug. 30, page 3, col. 1.

Volunteers being drilled in Durban, Natal, nightly, and 1,000,000 cartridges have been forwarded to Pietermaritzburg and Ladysmith.—Sept. 6, page 3, col. 3.

At Pietermaritzburg arrangements being made for safe telegraphic and postal communications with Cape Colony "in case of war."—Sept. 6, page 3, col. 3.

While Great Britain was thus increasing her force in South Africa, until it reached an aggregate of about 13,000, without considering the colonial recruiting, and was placing detachments in strategic positions upon or near to the Transvaal frontier, the Transvaal was also mobilizing forces. Upon the basis of this fact, it has since been urged that the British military movements were for the purpose of defending British territory from a Boer invasion. That explanation was advanced by the British high commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, who in replying to a request of the Transvaal government to know why British troops were being mobilized on the frontier, said, as reported in the London Times of September 8 (p. 3, col. 1) that it was—

for guarding British interests and preparing against contingencies.

In the light of subsequent events that explanation may be assumed to have been intentionally ambiguous. "Guarding British interests" and "preparing against contingencies," may have meant either offensive or defensive preparations. A more candid explanation was made in a news dispatch from the Cape published in the Times of September 14. It said that—

the warlike preparations which are being made by the Transvaal and imperial governments do not necessarily imply that war is inevitable. The Transvaal, it is urged, was obliged as a matter of precaution to make every preparation for war, while the imperial government on their side were bound to increase their forces in South Africa in order to enable Sir Alfred Milner to take up a strong attitude towards the Transvaal in the event of an unsatisfactory reply to the British demands.

Mr. Chamberlain was quite as candid and more menacing in a speech he delivered at his home in High-

bury (Birmingham) August 25, from which we quote as it appeared in the London Times of August 26, page 6, column 4:

The knot must be loosened, to use Mr. Balfour's words, or else we shall have to find other ways of untying it, and if we do that, if we are forced to that, then I would repeat now the warning that was given by Lord Salisbury in the house of lords, and I would say, if we are forced to make further preparations, and if this delay continues much longer, we shall not hold ourselves limited by what we have already offered, but, having taken this matter in hand, we will not let it go until we have secured conditions which once for all shall establish which is the paramount power in South Africa," etc.

The knot mentioned by Mr. Chamberlain, as will appear by reference to the story of the negotiations already told, was the refusal of the Transvaal to grant, unconditionally, the British demands relative to the domestic question of voting rights and representation. If the Boers persisted in their refusal, Mr. Chamberlain proposed to use force, and having resorted to force to go still farther with his demands and secure at once and directly by armed might the concessions he had been endeavoring to secure piecemeal through the indirections of diplomacy. His ultimate object was evidently the subjugation of the Transvaal, and it was that object he alluded to when he spoke of determining the question of paramount power in South Africa. Point had been given to this threat by the movements of troops, clearly not for defense against military aggressions by the Transvaal, but in preparation for attacking. The movement of troops continued after Chamberlain's speech, as these further abstracts and quotations from the London Times go to show:

Dispatch from Simla, India, enumerates the British regiments that had on September 17 been formally warned to prepare to leave their stations at the shortest notice for service in South Africa.—Sept. 8, page 3, col. 1.

A cabinet council decides to send 10,000 troops to Natal and Cape Colony from England and India "to protect frontiers," thus raising the South African force to 23,000.—Sept. 9, page 7, col. 3.

Wives and children of British soldiers instructed to leave Ladysmith before October 10, arrangements having been made to transport them to England.—Sept. 15, page 3, col. 1.

Troops going out to South Africa are to be placed on the line of communication from Durban to Laing's Nek.—Sept. 15, page 7, col. 7.

First battalion of Manchester regiment landed at Cape Town and departed for Natal.—Sept. 6, page 5, col. 2.

Thrilling account of departure of first installment of 10,000 troops from South Hampton for Natal.—Sept. 18, page 5, col. 1.

Report from Ladysmith that army service corps is "buying up all the available oxen for transport purposes."—Sept. 20, page 3, col. 3.

Imperial sanction given to the formation of a mounted corps of 500 at Pietermaritzburg.—Sept. 21, page 3, col. 1.

Dispatch of imperial troops from Cape Town to Kimberley, and account of sailing of troops from Bombay.—Sept. 21, page 3, col. 2.

This was the condition of things when Mr. Chamberlain sent his peremptory message of September 22, quoted above from blue book "C.—9530," page 16, in which he warned the Transvaal government that the British government were—

now compelled to consider the situation afresh, and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement, etc.

VII.

We now approach the Boer ultimatum, to which the apologists for the British ministry refer as conclusive proof that the Boers became the aggressors and began the war. Before proceeding, however, let us recapitulate.

The Transvaal was originally a sovereign state, so recognized by Great Britain herself in 1852. It remained a sovereign state until 1877, when the British abrogated its independence by conquest. In 1881, after a short war to hold its people in subjection, Great Britain relinquished her conquest in part, restoring to the Transvaal a certain degree of autonomy subject to British suzerainty. In 1884 the suzerainty also was relinquished and the Transvaal declared to be the South African Republic, Great Britain reserving no authority except that of vetoing treaties with foreign powers other than the Orange Free State. An attempt was made in 1895-96 by British officers and troops, under the British flag, to make a conquest of the country a second time, but it failed; and in 1899, upon complaints of British subjects, Great Britain sought to regulate the domestic laws of the republic with refer-

ence to the acquisition by aliens of the right to vote. A conference at Bloemfontein over the matter came to nothing. Later the British government rejected the conditions of a proposal offering all she had demanded, upon condition that she should abandon her already relinquished claim to suzerainty, that she should not regard the proposal as a precedent, and that she should arbitrate other differences. Upon the rejection of these conditions by the British ministry, the Transvaal withdrew the proposal, whereupon the British ministry demanded that the Transvaal stand by its proposal without the conditions, or submit to terms to be prescribed by Great Britain. That was on the 8th of September. Meantime Great Britain had been making war-like demonstrations. Officially she declared that these were for purposes of defense against apprehended attacks by the Boers; but her jingo public, her leading newspaper, and her cabinet minister who had the negotiations in charge, made no secret of the fact that the real object of the military movements was not to resist an apprehended invasion of British territory by the Boers, but was to compel them to agree to the British terms of settlement. The Transvaal refusing to stand by its proposals without the conditions, Mr. Chamberlain, on the 22d of September, formally warned the Transvaal that the British government would "formulate their own proposals for a final settlement"—in other words, would make demands which the Transvaal must accept or be overwhelmed by a military assault.

From that time until October 9, there was no intercourse between the two governments, except that on the 1st of October (blue book "C.—9530," page 42) Mr. Chamberlain, in response to a request for information as to the new proposals, said that they were being prepared but would not be ready for some days. So the Transvaal government waited in silence and in vain. The demands were not formulated. But British military preparations to enforce the demands when they should be formulated were continued. On that point note the following abstracts and quotations from the London Times:

Imperial troops arrive at Kimberley.—Sept. 22, p. 3, col. 3.

Preparations to provide an army

corps with complete equipment for field service.—Sept. 23, p. 5.

Movements of troops.—Sept. 25, p. 3.

Movements of troops.—Sept. 26.

Departure of troops from Birkenhead witnessed by a cheering crowd of 40,000.—Sept. 27, p. 7, col. 1.

Movement of troops.—Sept. 28, p. 8, col. 1.

Movement of troops.—Oct. 2, p. 3.

While these hostile military preparations were in progress, the Transvaal being kept meanwhile in ignorance of the terms to be proposed by Great Britain and which the Transvaal had been warned on the 22d that it must accept, the London Times took occasion editorially to indicate the purpose of the British government, since formally consummated, of annulling the independence of the Transvaal and subjecting it a second time to conquest. In the issue of September 26 (page 7, column 3) it said that—

the settlement we shall now enforce must be of such a nature as to secure us a "clear slate" for the future.

And during the same interval, Mr. Balfour, another member of the British cabinet, in a speech at Dundee on the 28th of September, took occasion to remove all possible doubt as to the real object of the military activity. From his speech it is clear beyond dispute that the purpose of the cabinet was not defense of British frontiers, but an aggressive war to compel the Transvaal to regulate its domestic affairs in obedience to British commands. As reported in the London Times of September 29 (page 7, column 1), Mr. Balfour declared that England had offered the least she would take, and would go to war to enforce her demands, putting the responsibility for the war upon the Transvaal if she would not yield without war. To quote his own language, he said:

We have now got to a point where, if I am judging aright, those responsible for the policy of the Dutch republic refuse to give way on a point on which we cannot and will not give way.

That point, let it be remembered, was this: Great Britain demanded full rights of suffrage for aliens after five years' residence in the Transvaal, together with a certain ratio of representation for the gold mining districts; the Transvaal conceded these demands fully, but on condition that the concession should not be used as a precedent for further demands, that the British should not

again claim the suzerainty which they had relinquished by the substitution of the articles of the treaty of 1884 for those of 1881, and that all other differences should be arbitrated by a tribunal such as the British ministry had already indicated their satisfaction with. But Great Britain refused the conditions, demanding unconditional submission. That was the point upon which, according to Mr. Balfour, Great Britain could not and would not give way.

So matters went on until the 7th of October, the Transvaal not yet knowing what terms the British government intended to impose as final. Great Britain withheld her terms pending her military preparations. It was the evident object of the ministry not to reveal the terms until they could be accompanied with sufficient force to compel acquiescence. But on the 7th of October the military preparations had proceeded far enough to warrant the ministry in showing its hand, and it did so. It then disclosed its purpose of invasion so clearly that the Transvaal government would have been derelict had it not promptly responded as it did. By reference to the London Times of October 9th (page 9, column 1), it will be seen that on the 7th of October, at a privy council at Balmoral, the queen signed two proclamations prepared for her by the ministry. One ordered out the army reserve for permanent service; the other called parliament to assemble in special session.

What these proclamations meant we need not explain. The London Times of October 9, 1899, the day on which it published the news of the proclamations, has saved all necessity for explanation. In an editorial it said that they were—

a pledge to the British people and a warning to the Dutch republics that her majesty's government will carry through without wavering and at all costs, the policy in South Africa that they have laid down.

Aggressive war, and nothing short of it, was what the proclamations meant to the Times; and that is what they meant to all well-informed men. Nor did the government waste any time. On the very day on which the belligerent proclamations were issued, the British war department ordered 25,000 reserve men to join their colors, so says the Times of October 9, and directed "the immediate mob-

ilization of a field force for service in South Africa."

Then for the first time the Transvaal government took emphatic aggressive measures. Not until this manifest act of unfriendliness, if not distinctive act of war, had been committed by Great Britain did the Transvaal issue the ultimatum which British apologists have now, the effrontery to bring forward in justification of the ministry. The ultimatum in question is printed in British blue book "C.—9530," at pages 65, 66 and 67. It bears date October 9, two days after the queen had called out the reserves and assembled parliament as "a pledge to the British people," according to the London Times, and "a warning to the Dutch republics" that "Great Britain would without wavering and at all costs" enforce her will upon the internal government of the Transvaal. After describing the situation, in a long preamble, the ultimatum calls upon the British government for these assurances:

(a) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by the friendly course of arbitration or by whatever amicable way may be agreed upon by this government with her majesty's government.

(b) That the troops on the borders of this republic shall be instantly withdrawn.

(c) That all reenforcements of troops which have arrived in South Africa since the 1st of June, 1899, shall be removed from South Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon with this government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee on the part of this government that no attack upon or hostilities against any portion of the possessions of the British government shall be made by the republic during further negotiations within a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the governments, and this government will, on compliance therewith, be prepared to withdraw the armed burghers of this republic from the borders.

(d) That her majesty's troops which are now on the high seas shall not be landed in any part of South Africa.

This government must press for an immediate affirmative answer to these four questions, and earnestly requests her majesty's government to return such an answer before or upon Wednesday, the 11th of October, 1899, not later than five o'clock p. m.; and it desires further to add that in the event of unexpectedly no satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval it will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of

her majesty's government as a formal declaration of war, and will not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and that in the event of any further movements of troops taking place within the above mentioned time in the nearer directions of our borders this government will be compelled to regard that also as a formal declaration of war.

What else, under the circumstances, was there for the South African Republic to do? In view of the aggressive movement of 23,000 British troops toward its borders, of the ordering out of 25,000 more for service in the same region, and of the unconcealed purpose of using these troops to compel the republic to agree to submit its domestic affairs to foreign domination, what else could it have done but meekly submit to the aggression? Nothing else. It faced the alternative of bowing to a foreign power or defending its independence. And in what manner could it have indicated peaceable designs better than in the terms of its ultimatum? Nothing was required of Great Britain but that she should agree to arbitration, and that meantime she should withdraw her troops from their menacing positions. Nor was that a device to put Great Britain at a military disadvantage. The Boers offered to withdraw their own troops from the British borders if the British would withdraw their troops from Transvaal borders. This ultimatum, blunt though it was in form, as might be expected from the representatives of a rugged peasant people, was not unfriendly and was distinctly defensive. But the British refused even to consider it. In the British blue book "C.—9530," page 68, Mr. Chamberlain's curt dispatch in reply may be read. It announced that the conditions demanded by the Transvaal's ultimatum could not possibly be discussed.

So at the expiration of the time fixed, the Transvaal troops advanced upon the British in Natal. They were supported by the Orange Free State, which was under treaty obligations to assist the Transvaal in resisting foreign attacks upon its independence. This is called an invasion by British apologists. In one sense it was an invasion. The Boers did pass over into British territory and attack British troops. But it was not an invasion for the purpose of conquest. It was an invasion for advantage of position, in a war which the British themselves had provoked by sending some 40,000 troops,

and preparing to send an army corps more, into South Africa for the purpose of invading the Transvaal. Great Britain's invasion was to have been offensive, to subject the domestic legislation of an independent people to her dictation; the Transvaal's invasion was defensive, for the purpose of preventing that aggression.

As the war went on the object of Great Britain in having provoked it became more and more apparent, finally revealing itself in all its nakedness by the refusal of the British ministry to end the war without conquest, and its annexation of the republics to the British crown.

When the British had taken the capital of the Orange Free State, about the middle of last March, the presidents of both republics proposed peace on the basis of their continued independence. To this proposal the British ministry replied that it was not prepared to assent to the independence of the South African republic or the Orange Free State.

This refusal was put upon the ground that "the British empire had been compelled to confront an invasion," and that this great calamity of war had been the penalty Great Britain had "suffered for having of recent years acquiesced in the existence of the two republics." Both reasons were disingenuous. The so-called invasion of the British empire had been a strategical movement to prevent a distinctly threatened British invasion of the Transvaal. The two republics had not disturbed Great Britain until Great Britain meddled with the domestic affairs of the Transvaal and threatened to regulate them by military force. So the reasons given by the British ministry for assassinating the two Dutch republics were like that of the dog in the fable which killed the cat because the cat scratched him when he was trying to kill her.

In accordance with the determination of the British to put an end to the republics which had so unfortunately been permitted to exist "of recent years," the Orange Free State was proclaimed British territory first, and now the Transvaal has been added to the spoil. The original object of the interference has thus, in form at least, been accomplished. The independence of the Dutch republics in South Africa is abrogated. Majuba hill is avenged, and the British

tories have at last consummated, but with awful slaughter, their long premeditated renewal of Shepstone's conquest.

VIII.

This is the tragedy upon which the McKinley administration has looked with neutral complacency. How impressive at such a time must the spirit of Wendell Phillips's definition of neutrality as "sneering at freedom and sending arms to tyrants," rise up in the American imagination. How significant is Bryan's indictment: "When a king dies the president of the United States sends a message of condolence, but two republics die and no republican weeps because of it." The administration, we are told, did tender its friendly offices in the interest of peace: but the administration indicates no regret that its overtures were rejected and the two republics are subjugated. Is it because the republican spirit is dying out in this country, or was the Englishman right who said that America cannot find voice to intercede for the Boers because her mouth is full of Filipino blood?

NEWS

The second week of the great anthracite coal strike began on the 24th, with over 90 per cent. of the miners among the strikers—130,000 out of 142,000. Beyond this increase of strikers and the fact that the strike has since grown more determined, there is no important strike news at the hour of writing except with reference to the concentration of a strong militia force in the anthracite region.

The occasion for concentrating troops was an affray which occurred in Shenandoah on the 21st. Late in the afternoon the sheriff, with a squad of deputies, escorting a party of nonstriking miners from their work to their homes, encountered a crowd lining both sides of Center street and consisting of Poles, Slavs and Hungarians, men, women and children, some of whom had picked up sticks and stones and were acting in a threatening manner. Reports of what followed are conflicting. The sheriff's version is that the crowd threw sticks and stones at his deputies, hitting some of them, whereupon he ordered a charge, but was forced back and several of his deputies were knocked down. He then ordered his

deputies to use their revolvers. Their first volley, fired in the air, was replied to by shots from the crowd, in consequence of which the sheriff ordered his deputies to shoot low, and they obeyed. The other side of the story is to the effect that the first demonstration was a shot, not from the crowd, but from a saloon; that this was followed by a shower of stones from the same source; that the sheriff, without first ordering the crowd to disperse, then ordered his deputies to fire, which they did with deadly effect; and that the crowd thereupon, enraged by the slaughter, pursued the sheriff's posse to a hotel, where it took refuge. Three deputies were wounded—one with a brick and two with stones. Of the crowd, the volley from the deputies killed one man and wounded seven, besides almost if not quite fatally wounding one little girl. She was at first reported to have been killed. This event was the sheriff's reason for his call upon the governor for troops, in response to which on midnight of the 21st three infantry regiments, the governor's troop and a battery were ordered out under command of Gen. Gobin. They arrived at Shenandoah on the 22d.

Gen. Gobin promptly held a long conference with the mine owners, who decided in consequence of this interview to reopen their mines on the 24th. They attempted to do so on that day, but contrary to their expectations the presence of the troops failed to weaken the strike. By holding another long conference with the mine owners on the 25th, Gen. Gobin has not unnaturally excited a suspicion that he aims less at impartially keeping the peace than at serving special interests of the great operators.

Next in importance to the strike is the situation in China. Our last report (page 378), closed with the German note to the other powers proposing that the powers demand the surrender of the undoubted leaders in the Boxer outrages as a preliminary to peace negotiations. Replies agreeing without reserve to Germany's proposal have been made by Italy, Austria and France; but the United States refused acquiescence, in a note made on the 21st, over the signature of David J. Hill, secretary of state, as follows:

The government of the United

States has from the outset proclaimed its purpose to hold to the uttermost accountability the responsible authors of any wrongs done in China to citizens of the United States and their interests, as was stated in the government's circular communication to the powers of July 3 last. These wrongs have been committed not alone in Peking, but in many parts of the empire, and their punishment is believed to be an essential element of any effective settlement which shall prevent a recurrence of such outrages and bring about permanent safety and peace in China. It is thought, however, that no punitive measures can be so effective by way of reparation for wrongs suffered and as deterrent examples for the future as the degradation and punishment of the responsible authors by the supreme imperial authority itself, and it seems only just to China that she should be afforded in the first instance an opportunity to do this and thus rehabilitate herself before the world. Believing thus, and without abating in any wise its deliberate purpose to exact the fullest accountability from the responsible authors of the wrongs we have suffered in China, the government of the United States is not disposed, as a preliminary condition to entering into diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese government, to join in a demand that the Chinese government surrender to the powers such persons as, according to the determination of the powers themselves, may be held to be the first and real perpetrators of those wrongs. On the other hand, this government is disposed to hold that the punishment of the high responsible authors of these wrongs not only in Peking, but throughout China, is essentially a condition to be embraced and provided for in the negotiations for a final settlement. It is the purpose of this government, at the earliest practicable moment, to name its plenipotentiaries for negotiating a settlement with China, and in the meantime to authorize its minister in Peking to enter forthwith in the conference with the duly authorized representatives of the Chinese government, with a view to bringing about a preliminary agreement whereby the full exercise of the imperial power for the preservation of order and the protection of foreign life and property throughout China, pending final negotiations with the powers, shall be assured.

Relative to the appointment of Li Hung Chang as envoy plenipotentiary, regarding the acceptance of which the American government had been in doubt (page 360-61), that government now accepts his authority, together with that of his colleague, Prince Ching, of whose appointment it

was also notified by the Chinese minister. This was done on the 21st by means of a memorandum from Acting Secretary Hill to the Chinese minister at Washington, in which the former said:

The government of the United States accepts the plenipotentiary authority of Earl Li Hung Chang and Prince Ching as prima facie sufficient for the preliminary negotiations looking toward the return of the imperial Chinese government and to the resumption of its authority at Peking and toward the negotiation of a complete settlement by the only appointed plenipotentiaries of the powers and of China. To these ends the United States minister in Peking will be authorized to enter into relations with Earl Li and Prince Ching as the immediate representatives of the Chinese emperor.

In communicating the fact of this recognition to Russia, which had made inquiries upon the subject, the American government also answered an inquiry as to Russia's proposal that the legations withdraw from Peking to Tientsin (pages 334, 360), by saying that—

the government of the United States has not any present intention to withdraw its legation from Peking.

In view of these pacific diplomatic proceedings, and of the fact that the reason for invading China—to save the legations—had been satisfied, a report of the 20th to the effect that the allied forces, including the Americans, had attacked the Peitang and Lutai forts and captured them with great loss was startling. The report has been neither confirmed nor disputed. It was closely followed by orders from the naval department to strengthen our Asiatic fleet, which is to comprise two first-class battleships, one armored cruiser, and two protected cruisers, two turreted monitors, and 30 gunboats, besides supply ships, etc. An explanation is made, however, that this strengthening of the fleet is intended not as a menace to China but to command consideration for American interests in the final settlement of Chinese affairs by the allies. Yet, at the same time orders have been given through the war department to reduce the American military forces in China to a legation guard of one infantry regiment and four cavalry troops. The remainder of the force in China is ordered to Manila. Gen. Chaffee, in command of the American forces in China, is reported upon trustworthy authority to have expressed his opin-

ion that "recalling the army at this time is simply an outrageous desertion of immense mercantile and missionary interests in north China."

It has been surmised that the withdrawal of American troops from China to Manila is not wholly unconnected with the growing necessity for reenforcing the American army in the Philippines. Our last week's report of the situation in the Philippines told of the problem of insufficient troops, and also of one of the worst battles of the war. This battle was fought near Siniloan, on the eastern shore of the lake that lies a few miles east of Manila. The report of last week gave the American casualties as 12 killed, 26 wounded and five missing; but the official report received since puts the wounded at 19 and the killed at 24. The number of Americans engaged was 130, and that of the Filipinos 800, of whom 20 are reported to have been wounded and ten killed. Besides this battle, there have been numerous other fights of which no definite reports are made, but which must have been serious since the American casualties in killed, wounded and missing during the ten days preceding the 23d are reported to have numbered almost 100.

Aguinaldo has been heard from in a communication to Buencamino, who has been endeavoring to induce him and other Filipinos to accept the terms of the 90-day amnesty proclamation of President McKinley (see page 313). He replies definitely to Buencamino declining the overtures.

American casualties since July 1, 1898, inclusive of all current official reports given out in detail at Washington to September 26, 1900, are as follows:

Deaths to May 16, 1900 (see page 91)	1,847
Killed reported since May 16, 1900	79
Deaths from wounds, disease and accidents reported since May 16, 1900	409
<hr/>	
Total deaths since July 1, 1898...	2,335
Wounded	2,274
Captured	10
<hr/>	
Total casualties since July 1, 1898...	4,619
Total casualties reported last.....	4,576
Total deaths reported last.....	2,311

In the Transvaal, resistance to invasion is not so promising. At latest

accounts last week fighting was in progress at Komatipoort, but on the 23d the British had entered the town without opposition. Some 3,000 Boers retreated before the British advance; and under date of the 19th Lord Roberts reported that 700 of these had sought refuge in Portuguese territory while others had deserted in various directions, the remainder having crossed the Komati river and occupied spurs of the Lobompo mountains. This is regarded by the British correspondents as the collapse of the Boer armies and the end of further resistance to British occupation. The Transvaal postmaster general, the assistant secretary of state, and the state treasurer sailed from Lourenzo Marques for Europe on the 26th.

On the 25th, in accordance with the arrangements reported last week, the British parliament was dissolved and writs were issued for the election of new members of the house of commons. Voting is to begin on the 1st of October and to continue until the 15th. The campaign is consequently already in full swing, and contrary to expectations the liberals are electioneering vigorously. There are 644 constituencies, all told, and 670 members to be elected—some of the constituencies being entitled to two members each.

NEWS NOTES.

—An international socialist congress is in session at Paris.

—Campos, the Spanish general who was succeeded in Cuba by Weyler, died on the 23d.

—Tolstoi has been excommunicated by the holy synod of the Greek church, as an enemy of the church.

—The fourteenth national meeting of the United Typothetae, the employing printers' union, began at Kansas City on the 25th.

—Felix Marchand, the premier of the province of Quebec and one of the most distinguished Canadians, died at Montreal on the 25th.

—Gen. John M. Palmer, formerly United States senator from Illinois, and presidential candidate of the gold democracy in 1896, died at Springfield, Ill., on the 25th aged 83.

—The record of trotting horses was reduced half a second on the 25th at Terre Haute by "Abbot," a seven-year-old, who made his mile in 2.03¼. The lowest previous record was 2.03¼.

—Prof. George D. Herron, who has recently returned from a long tour of

travel for study in Egypt, Palestine and Europe, spoke on the 18th at a large meeting in Plymouth county, Mass., in endorsement of Eugene V. Debs, the social-democratic candidate for president, and is announced to speak at a Debs meeting at Central Music hall, Chicago, on the 29th.

—The second annual conference of the Missouri single tax league is to be held in Reform Headquarters hall, 312 North Twelfth street, St. Louis, on the 5th, opening at ten a. m. The league announces that John S. Crosby, the Rev. Herbert S. Bigelow and Tom L. Johnson will make public addresses at the exposition building on the 6th.

—On the 26th, at Frankfort, Ky., James Howard was convicted of the actual murder of Goebel, and his punishment fixed by the jury at death. The jury was composed of nine democrats, two anti-Goebel democrats and one republican. It reached its verdict on the first ballot. Howard's conviction is one of the culminating events of the Kentucky political imbroglio to which references have been made on pages 314, 153, 136 and 10.

—The American Transvaal league was permanently organized at a national convention of delegates held at Chicago on the 25th. The national officers are Judge H. D. Peck, of Cincinnati, president; Judge E. L. Dunne, of Chicago, vice president; Herman Vanderploeg, of Chicago, secretary, and Peter Van Vlissingen, of Chicago, treasurer. A national committee of 100 was formed, inclusive of the following executive committee: S. Wessellus, M. H. Walker, H. B. DeBey, Louis F. Post, Prof. Frederick Starr, Dr. D. Berkhoff, R. O'S. Burke and Judge George M. van Hoeseu.

MISCELLANY

DO WE NOT UNDERSTAND?

For The Public.
 Is this our nation's watchword—our newer trumpet cry?
 "Let empires live and flourish, but let republics die!
 Seek out your subject peoples and rule with iron hand?"
 Lo! we are sons of freemen—do we not understand?
 What is it that hath blinded the sons of Bunker Hill?
 Have Lexington and Yorktown no potent memories still?
 Have we exchanged the fathers for him, the last and worst,
 Our country's first apostate and freedom's last accurst?
 Lo, we are not an empire, and not a land of kings;
 We move to freedom's music, and faith shall lend us wings;
 And on the heights we master, to which our feet shall climb,

We'll light the lamp of freedom for all the coming time.

We were betrayed with falsehood, with thongs our feet were tied;

The lips that lied to freedom were not our lips that lied.

We'll keep the faith of freemen with men of every land—

Lo! we are sons of Yorktown—do we not understand?

JOSEPH DANA MILLER.

THE ANNOYING PARALLEL.

For The Public.

1815.

1900.

NapoleonNapoleon

WellingtonWellington

Helped by the Germans.....

.....Helped by the Germans

WaterlooWaterloo

G. T. E.

THEY UNDERSTOOD THE PHILIPPINE PROBLEM 350 YEARS AGO.

Our situation in regard to the Philippines closely resembles one described by Sir Thomas More. The story is of a kingdom that a prince had conquered, and to which he had some pretension by an ancient alliance, and runs as follows:

This they (the people of the prince) conquered, but found that the trouble of keeping it was equal to that by which it was gained; that the conquered people were always either in rebellion or exposed to foreign invasion, while they were obliged to be incessantly at war, either for or against them, and consequently could never disband their army; that in the meantime they were oppressed with taxes, their money went out of the kingdom, their blood was spilt for the glory of their king, without procuring the least advantage to the people, who received not the smallest benefit from it, even in time of peace; and that their manners being corrupted by a long war, robbery and murders everywhere prevailed, and their laws fell into contempt; while their king, distracted with the care of two kingdoms, was the less able to apply his mind to the interests of either. When they saw this, and that there would be no end to these evils, they by joint councils made a humble address to their king, desiring him to choose which of the two kingdoms he had the greatest mind to keep, since he could not hold both; for they were too great a people to be governed by one king.—“Utopia,” Book 1.

W. W. STEVENS.

THE BALANCE OF TRADE.

In his address to the Hamilton club Marcus A. Hanna said:

For the first 100 years of our government the net balance of trade in our favor was \$366,000,000. The balance of trade for the last four years is \$1,500,000,000. If this is commercialism, then I am in favor of commercialism.

Now, Senator Hanna would have us believe that a balance of trade in our favor of \$1,500,000,000 the last four years has made us richer to that amount, but such is not the case. In fact, it has made us that much poorer.

In striking an international trade

balance all specie imported or exported is included with merchandise, so that if \$1,500,000,000 more merchandise and specie is sent out of the country than is brought in we are poorer to that extent.

What becomes of this enormous amount of wealth which goes abroad to stay in such increasing amounts?

It is estimated that \$50,000,000 per year is drawn from the country and spent by Americans abroad or gambled away by the titled husbands of our American heiresses, and the balance goes to pay interest, rents, profits and dividends on foreign capital invested in this country.

O. P. Austin, chief of the bureau of statistics, in his report on commerce and navigation for 1898, said:

One interesting fact shown by the table covering the imports and exports by years since 1789, whether of merchandise or of merchandise and specie combined, is that prior to 1876 the inflow of imports almost constantly exceeded the outflow of exports, while since that time the outflow has almost constantly exceeded the inflow.

This is probably accounted for by the fact that in the earlier years money was borrowed abroad for use in construction of railroads, development of farms and establishment of factories and that in the later years the excess of exports has been devoted to payments of interest and a part of the principal, as well as the larger expenditure of our citizens abroad.

Under Mr. McKinley's administration the trusts and great moneyed interests, a great part of which is foreign capital, have prospered beyond their fondest hopes, and heavy dividend payments have been sent abroad.

To those like Mr. Hanna, who cannot understand how we can export without causing gold to come our way, I will submit the following illustration:

Let us assume that a capitalist in London has \$100,000 invested in bonds of the Union Pacific railroad drawing interest at the rate of five per cent. When an interest payment comes due the treasurer of the road would go to some bank and buy a bill of exchange on London for \$5,000 and send the bit of paper to the English investor. At the same time an exporter ships a consignment of wheat to London valued at \$5,000, and the British buyer of the wheat goes to a bank there and buys the exchange that had been received in payment of interest by the investor and sends it back to America to pay for the wheat.

The exporter presents it at the bank and draws out the money that the railroad treasurer paid in, while the London investor gets his interest in English sovereigns, which the buy-

er of the wheat pays for the exchange on New York. Now, the transaction shows that the United States exported wheat to the value of \$5,000, while only a bit of paper went across the water and returned and no coin was sent either way. The interest on the investor's bonds was paid indirectly with American wheat.

For more than 200 years England's balance of trade has apparently been against her, and in 1897 her excess of imports over exports was \$784,000,000, yet this represents her profits on international trade and interest and dividends from abroad. It meant that the wealth of the Indies—of the world—was pouring into her lap.

We would inform Mr. Hanna and Mr. McKinley that we do not care to congratulate ourselves so much on our ability to pay this enormous drain of interest and profits as we regret that we have it to pay, for which the republican party is largely responsible.—Frank H. Wilcox, in Chicago Chronicle.

THREE EASY STEPS DOWNHILL.

“We're jingoes.” How they love the flag! And here's a jingo song:
“That flag is right in any fight;
Our country, right or wrong.”

“We're partisans.” They're lower still, And here's the party song:
“When at the polls, you have no souls;
Our party, right or wrong.”

“We're boodlers.” Down another step, And here's the boodler's song:
“We take no bluff; we want the stuff;
Our pockets, right or wrong.”
—James J. Dooling.

Bullet—You seem to be surprised that the English are conquering the Boers?

Bullham—Oh, no, not at all. I am surprised that the English are boasting of it.

G. T. E.

No president can tell us what the destiny of a nation is. Nations make it themselves. It is not a question of what this nation can do, but what it ought to do.—Hon. Wm. Jennings Bryan.

Swellout—If we had not occupied the Philippines with our troops it would be impossible, even now, to have our soldiers in China.

Squeezer—Well, what of it? We wouldn't be troubled with the problem of how to get them out.

G. T. E.

Old Lady (pointing to elevated railroad)—Where do them cars go to?

City Man (hurriedly)—Almost anywhere you want, ma'm.

Old Lady—Land sakes! I thought

they had to stay on the rails.—N. Y. Weekly.

BOOK NOTICES.

"The Liberty Bell" (Chicago: The Trusty Publishing Co., 418 Roanoke building. Price, crepe, 25 cents; cloth, 75 cents), contains a collection of some of the stirring political poems of Dr. Howard S. Taylor, beginning with "The Liberty Bell," from which the volume takes its name, and including "Jackson's Day," "The Creed of the Flag," "The Man with the Musket," "The Poor Man's Burden," "The Gold Standard," "America to the Boers," "The Soldier of Peace," and so on. Dr. Taylor's are among the best contributions of verse that the new struggle for democracy has called out.

The August number of "Sound Currency" (New York: Sound Currency Committee of Reform Club, 52 Williams St. Price five cents), is devoted to a classification of the more important countries of the world with reference to their money standards, and contains incidentally a great volume and variety of financial information.

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