

company were corruptly procured, thought it none of their business to protest against what everybody in the town knew to be colossal robbery, have at last found their tongues. Not all will be able to forget very soon. But disgust and remorse are not repentance, and without the latter there is no more salvation for the city than for the individual. If the individual must come to himself, no less must the city. If it be true that he who ruleth his own heart is better than he who taketh a city, no less true is it that the city must own itself and run itself if it is ever to attain to the goal of justifiable self-satisfaction. These truths are beginning to percolate and find lodgment. Nevertheless, it is not because of social repentance, general enlightenment and devotion to tardily recognized but eternal and unchanging principles of right, that those in a position to know declare such another strike to be utterly improbable here. No. But because "it is money that talks," and the million or so of dollars which the strike has cost the Transit company—to say nothing of the losses borne by the large retail establishments—will cause the holders of public franchises to think long and hard before they permit a self-seeking and ambitious general manager to involve them in such an expensive experiment. This view gains weight from the fact, quite generally recognized and admitted, that the fight was won by the men who made it and from well-nigh unavoidable conviction that victory belongs to unionism, now and in the future.

The strike was a blow for unionism—all statements to the contrary notwithstanding. It was not superinduced from without by the wiles and machinations of "professional agitators"—those naughty men from elsewhere. It was home sown and home grown on soil specially prepared for it by the good citizens of St. Louis. It was, to change the figure, a turning of the worm against the heel of a combine more distinctly devoid of soul than any of the smaller corporations which preceded and were absorbed in it. It was the quoad hoc of suffering labor—that ultimate as inevitable as death. For, deny it, as we may, and conduct business and found empires on the denial, as we do, the truth remains that things were made for man, not man for things; and "God's still in His Heaven."

There is, after all, much sense packed into that somewhat over-worked phrase: "Soulless corpora-

tions." A case in point is that of a St. Louis mercantile house, having a continental reputation. Time was when its founder was its head and heart, when his individuality permeated the whole concern. It was then a happy place in which to work and dishonesty was practically unknown. It grew and became a corporation or stock company. The head retired; and his successor in authority having but one idea, viz.: the indefinite increase of this year's dividends over those of last year, deterioration of the personnel at once set in and proceeded until now the relations between employer and employed and between the employes themselves are such as to give the house the local soubriquet of "a hell on earth." This is practically what took place in the case of the railway business and was the radical cause of the strike. Before the consolidation the condition of the employes may not have been—indeed was not—ideal. But the relations between them and the superintendents of the various lines were sufficiently human to have prevented anything like what has recently occurred. It is the independent testimony of individual strikers, that had they been working under their old managers, they would have told the strike movers to go to grass, sooner than follow them. Consolidation, brought about by political jobbery and accompanied by immense watering of stock, meant elimination of soul and degradation of the human. Blind as it doubtless was and absurdly extravagant as the demands with which it opened may have been, the protest made by the strike was natural, human and just.

In his "Story of the Strike," published on June 14, the editor of the *Mirror* said: "The strikers were identified with lawlessness chiefly through the incapacity of chicanery or ambition of small politicians. The disgrace of union labor, as of the city of St. Louis and state of Missouri, is due to bad government. Bad government is due to the bad citizenship of good citizens," and he closed with this question: "When will we all leave off politics and choose our leaders for character, for calmness, for principle, for common sense?"

His statements are unquestionably true. The most deplorable thing about the whole wretched business, worse than the killings and maimings and the denuding of women—worse because less excusable—was that same "bad citizenship of good citizens" which lay at the bottom of all else

and out of which the whole thing grew. To it is to be traced not merely bad government—government indescribably bad because unfaithful and inefficient, from the occupant of the gubernatorial chair down to the collector of the garbage at the area gate—but also that upon which bad government thrives and propagates itself, viz., the unnatural and irrational connection between public utilities and private corporations, the prostitution of the civic service.

If democracy is not an illusion, things are as they are simply and solely because those who know and care are so vastly outnumbered by those who neither know nor care, and conditions will remain unchanged for the better until those who know care enough to sacrifice themselves upon the altar of social service. As Stephen and Mary Maybell have so well put it:

There must be a repentance, a renunciation of the social crime, a turning of the spirit of each one from using into serving society—from living and working for self, unto living and working for society.

We shall elect decent, capable and honorable men to office just so soon as we ourselves are decent and honorable enough to be ready and eager to serve in any capacity for which we are fitted. Not before.

The self-styled Son of Man said he came not to be waited on but to wait on others. He made himself a servant of servants. We call ourselves Christians. Wherein is our right to the name?

GUSTAVUS TUCKERMAN.

#### A SOCRATIC DIALOGUE.

"I think I got some capacity for cross-examining witnesses, which was very useful to me afterwards, from reading Plato's dialogues and getting familiar with Socrates's method of reducing a sophist ad absurdum."—Senator George F. Hoar in his *Scribner* article on "Harvard College Fifty-Eight Years Ago."

Socrates Redivivus—Well met, Gorgias. I have been anxious to hear you explain, as your friends tell me you can with an unrivaled mastery of the rhetor's art, a passage in your oration to the Ephors which puzzled my poor understanding.

Gorgias Hodiernus—What passage was that, Socrates?

Socrates—The one where you said that it "was due to Mr. Bryan, more than to any other man," that the treaty of Paris was not defeated, or at least amended so as to put the Philippines on the same basis as Cuba.

Gorgias—It is true, Socrates, I made that statement to the Ephors, and by

Ammon, the god of Cyrene, I will defend and maintain it in all places.

Socrates—Then you will say that a man who does not defeat an evil deed is more guilty than the man who plans and carries it through by all the means in his power?

Gorgias—What do you mean, Socrates? What I said is clear and certain. If Mr. Bryan had not persuaded the democratic Ephors, the treaty would have been rejected or amended. Therefore the guilt is on his head.

Socrates—Well, let us follow the argument, Gorgias. Who is the real housebreaker, the man who plots a violent entry for robbery, or the man who fails to eject him?

Gorgias—It would be the former, Socrates.

Socrates—And you would say the same of political robbers?

Gorgias—I do not know what you mean, Socrates.

Socrates—Well, I will ask you what you would say if a Spartan general should agree with a Persian satrap to corrupt the Lacedaemonian state by introducing Persian customs—whom would you blame, that general or a private citizen who weakly acquiesced in his plot?

Gorgias—The general would be the man, Socrates.

Socrates—That is, you distinguish between the principal and the accessory?

Gorgias—All men do, Socrates.

Socrates—Then, by the dog of Egypt, tell me who was the principal in the matter of the Paris treaty. Was it Mr. Bryan?

Gorgias—No, but he "frustrated" the attempt to defeat it.

Socrates—But President McKinley might have frustrated the treaty itself, might he not? He negotiated it, did he not? When you were opposing its ratification, he was urging it, night and day, was he not?

Gorgias—I cannot deny it.

Socrates—Then, in the name of Zeus and Athene at once, how can you, who denounce the accessory, praise the principal? How can you say that the man who is chiefly responsible for what you describe as an attempt to "change our republic into an empire," is the "best beloved president who ever sat in the chair of Washington?"

Gorgias—But I expressly said that I had never questioned the honesty of purpose of President McKinley.

Socrates—Yet you question Mr. Bryan's honesty, Gorgias.

Gorgias—How so, Socrates?

Socrates—You said you thought he wanted the treaty ratified so as to

"keep the question for an issue in the campaign."

Gorgias—Yes, I said that, Socrates. Socrates—But how could the deed of an honest and beloved president be an issue in the campaign?

Gorgias—It might seem, nevertheless, bad for the state.

Socrates—Then an honest and beloved man might ruin the republic?

Gorgias—That is so, Socrates.

Socrates—A dishonest and hated man might save it.

Gorgias—It would seem so.

Socrates—Then it is better to be right than to be beloved?

Gorgias—Better in a public man, I admit. Mr. Bryan, however, was both wrong and disliked. He was for ratifying the treaty, and that meant a continuation of the war.

Socrates—Yet he said he wanted to end the war, did he not?

Gorgias—He did.

Socrates—And he urged his friends to vote for the joint resolution putting the Philippines on the same footing as Cuba?

Gorgias—Even so, Socrates.

Socrates—And they did so?

Gorgias—They did.

Socrates—You voted for it yourself?

Gorgias—Assuredly, Socrates.

Socrates—And it would have ended the war, if adopted, and prevented the republic from becoming an empire?

Gorgias—I have no doubt of it.

Socrates—Yet McKinley was against it? All his friends among the Ephors voted against it? It was defeated only by the casting-vote of the vice president? Are not all these things so?

Gorgias—They are.

Socrates—Then must you not admit that Bryan and his friends wanted to end the war and save the republic, and that McKinley and his friends were really the ones who prolonged the war and threaten now to convert our state into an empire?

Gorgias—No, Socrates, I do not admit it. By Here, I never will admit that!

Socrates—But why not, if truth and argument compel you?

Gorgias—Because I am a republican, Socrates.

Socrates—Exactly. I merely wanted to know if it was the truth you were in search of, or an excuse for supporting your party. Well, good by, Gorgias. Send me word if the entrails indicate that you will be chosen Ephor again.—N. Y. Nation of July 12.

It is as much a theft to steal with a long head as with a long arm.—John Ruskin.

RATIFY THE TREATY—DECLARE THE NATION'S POLICY.

An article written by William Jennings Bryan and published in the New York Journal at the time when the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain was pending in the United States senate. It is to this article that Mr. Bryan's adversaries (including Senator Hoar) allude when they charge him with being responsible for the ratification of that treaty, without amendment, and the consequent purchase of the Philippines.

I gladly avail myself of the columns of the Journal to suggest a few reasons why the opponents of a colonial policy should make their fight in support of a resolution declaring the nation's purpose rather than against the ratification of the treaty.

The conflict between the doctrine of self-government and the doctrine of alien government supported by external force has been thrust upon the American people as a result of the war. It is so important a conflict that it cannot be avoided, and, since it deals with a question now before congress, it must be considered immediately. It is useless to ask what effect this new issue will have upon other issues. Issues must be met as they arise; they cannot be moved about at will as pawns upon a chessboard.

The opponents of imperialism have an opportunity to choose the ground upon which the battle is to be fought. Why not oppose the ratification of the treaty?

First, because a victory won against the treaty would prove only temporary if the people really favor a colonial policy.

That a victory won against the treaty would depend for its value entirely upon the sentiment of the people is evident. A minority can obstruct action for a time, but a minority, so long as it remains a minority, can only delay action and enforce reflection; it cannot commit the nation to a policy.

When there seemed to be some probability of the rejection of the treaty the friends of the administration began to suggest the propriety of withholding the treaty until the new senate could be convened in extra session. As soon as the new senate will have a considerable republican majority it would be quite certain to ratify the treaty. Thus an effort to prevent the ratification of the treaty would be likely to fail in the very beginning. But let us suppose it possible to defeat ratification in both the present and next senate—what would be the result?

Would the imperialists abandon the hope of annexing the Philippines so long as they could claim the support of