

If, however, it be granted that our original classification was properly open to the criticism summarized above, the expenditure of common funds for the prosecution of the present war may be justified upon the additional principle which our Philadelphia friend interposes. He agrees that war for defense may at times be necessary. Ideal anarchists would agree to the same thing. But where he may properly claim to part company with the ideal anarchist is as to the use of common funds. He admits that for the maintenance of a war for defense, common funds may be used against the will of the minority. He does this upon the ground that the minority have a common interest with the majority in being defended. But what constitutes defense? Are invasions of foreign territory always incompatible with it? Must we wait until the enemy gives us a death blow before we strike in self-defense? Suppose continental Europe, led on by autocratic Russia, should deliberately set out to subjugate comparatively democratic England, and a majority of the American people believed that if England were thus subjugated our own country would be the next victim, would not a majority of our citizens then have a right to spend our common funds in defense of England? Would not such a war on our part be a war for defense as truly as if the subjugating armies of Europe were already landing troops upon our shores? The illustration is pertinent. Whoever reads the story of our neighbors in Cuba during the past three years must feel that the continuance of Spanish government there is hostile to the democratic governments of this hemisphere, our own included, and that our expulsion of Spain is legitimately within the limits of self-defense. This feeling may be a mistaken one, yet if it has impelled a majority of the people of this country to make war for Spain's expulsion, they have a right, upon the self-defense principle which our critic concedes, to expend common funds in prosecuting that war.

In a speech delivered two weeks ago before the Merchants' association of Fitchburg, Mass., C. B. Fillebrown, a prominent merchant of Boston, spoke hopefully of the early adoption by the state of Massachusetts of the principle of local option in taxation—that is, of allowing counties and municipalities to select their own methods. This principle is evidently meeting with great favor throughout the country, as it should do, for it is both just and sensible, and is in conformity with the American idea of home rule. Under local option in taxation each county and municipality might levy all its taxes upon personal property if the voters preferred that method, or upon real estate, or upon land values according to the Henry George plan, exempting personal property and improvements, or upon all three kinds of property—personalty, landed improvements, and land. It would be a question of local choice, as such matters ought to be. How the choice would be exercised in country places it is not difficult to infer when some of the figures which Mr. Fillebrown presented to his audience are considered. He showed that under the land value tax of Henry George, cities would pay higher taxes and country places lower ones than now. The figures on this point are interesting as well as instructive. It appears from them that 32 Massachusetts cities which now pay less than 67 per cent. of the state taxation, would, under the land value tax, pay almost 78 per cent.; while 50 country towns or townships now paying over 13 per cent. would pay less than 8, and 253 other country towns or townships now paying over 16 per cent. would pay less than 10. These figures should be studied by those befooled farmers who imagine that a tax on land values would make tax burdens lighter on cities and heavier on country places.

President McKinley's proclamation of reciprocity between the United States and France, which went into operation on the 1st, gives to these two countries a small measure of mu-

tual free trade. More accurately, perhaps, it is a small measure of freer trade. Yet reciprocity is a protection decree! It proceeds upon the upside-down theory that the impulse to trade comes from the seller instead of the buyer. This theory is upside down because no man really buys in order to sell; he sells in order to buy. The desire to buy lies beneath and supports all trade. Yet reciprocityites, like territorial expansionists, assume that what lies beneath trade is the desire to sell. Accordingly, if we use our relations with France for illustration, American reciprocityites first make a tariff to prevent Frenchmen from selling in this country, while Frenchmen of the same ilk make a tariff to prevent our selling in France; and then each side, relying upon the false notion that the primary impulse of mankind is not to buy but to sell, hopes by these restrictions to force the other to lessen the obstacles that he has erected against selling. Neither gives any consideration whatever to the desire to buy. France agrees, for instance, that if we will allow her manufacturers of brandy to sell it a little more freely here, she will allow our manufacturers of canned meats to sell them a little more freely there. That is reciprocity. It is an upside-down, hind side before, inside out sort of system.

Since mankind's desire to sell takes its rise in their desire to buy, without which it would not exist at all, the true way of stimulating trade is for each country to make it easier for its own people to buy, instead of trying to induce the other country to make it easier for them to sell. If they could buy easily they could sell easily. Of course, reciprocity with France, for example, does make it easier for our people to buy from France. But that is only an incidental result of reciprocity, the object of which is not to help our people to buy, but to help them to sell. It aims at freer trade, but does so as some variety performers aim at a mark—with their backs toward it and by means of a looking