

sioned as privateers a strong naval power might have us at its mercy.

Nevertheless, the United States recognized the essentially piratical character of privateering, and offered to unite in the Declaration of Paris upon condition that the clause condemning privateering should be so remodelled as to prevent its operating to the disadvantage of nations with small navies. What this country therefore proposed was that all private property not contraband of war should be exempt from seizure upon the high seas, not only by privateers but also by war vessels. In other words, the United States was willing to agree to the declaration abolishing privateering, provided all other captures of innocent property were also abolished. But this condition the great naval powers rejected. For that reason the United States refused to become a party to the Declaration of Paris. Privateering, therefore, is still a right of the United States, as well as of Spain, which also withheld acquiescence in the Paris declaration and has at the outset of the present war declared her intention if need be of commissioning privateers. But, so far as this war is concerned, the United States, unlike Spain, has made a declaration purporting to renounce privateering rights. In his proclamation of April 26, President McKinley confirmed a previous announcement that, in the language of the proclamation, "the policy of this government will be not to resort to privateering but to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris." As this proclamation was made after the Spanish decree, and consequently with full knowledge of Spain's reservation of privateering rights, it might be urged that the United States would not now be justified in resorting to privateering even if Spain should exercise the right. There is no force in that objection. The right to issue letters of marque and reprisal is vested by the constitution, not in the president, but in congress. Congress alone can renounce this right, the president having no other function in the matter than the legislative one of a veto subject to the constitutional two-thirds majority. The United States is not bound, therefore, by the president's declaration

renouncing privateering rights. The only question is what we ought to do irrespective of that declaration.

Upon general principles, the United States was undoubtedly right when in 1856 it refused to abolish privateering unless the other nations would at the same time abolish all other captures of non-combatant property, and to that position it ought to cling. Privateering is indeed a dependence of nations with small navies, unless the big naval machines now being tried may have made it obsolete. To abolish privateering while it is an effective method of reprisal is either to put nations like ours at a disadvantage relatively to nations with large navies, or to force us also to maintain a large navy at all times. As a peaceably disposed country, then, we ought not to renounce privateering while privateers may be effective in war, until the nations of powerful navies accede to our condition that privateering and naval captures of private and peaceful vessels and merchandise shall be abolished together.

This consideration suggests the course we should pursue in the present war, if Spain does resort to privateering. So long as she does not, we should be governed by the president's declaration of April 26. But if she lets loose upon our private vessels a swarm of privateers from her own merchant marine and that of neutral nations, thus forcing our navy to turn its attention to sinking privateers instead of fighting battle-ships or blockading and bombarding stubborn cities, no reasonable considerations demand that we allow her that advantage. On the contrary, every reasonable consideration demands that we avoid setting ourselves a precedent which might be used against us in some future war with a strong naval power. Worse still, such a precedent might be argued from at the close of this war, by our own jingo element, which will assuredly ignore nothing that may tell for their design of making this nation one of the great aggressive naval powers. If the jingoes could say that we had in the estimation of other nations agreed unconditionally to the abolition of privateering, they would score a point in favor of perpetually maintaining

a strong navy. So long then as Spain refrains from resorting to privateering we also must refrain from this mode of piracy. But if she resorts to it, we must do the same. Under no circumstances should the United States recede from its position in respect to the Declaration of Paris, that privateering rights must be maintained by non-aggressive nations, until all other rights of capture as to merchant vessels are relinquished by the aggressive nations.

#### AFTER THE WAR, WHAT?

Men who imagine that the war with Spain will cast economic and social questions into the background can hardly have considered the significance of some of the suggestions the anti-democratic press are tentatively putting forward already. Of these a recent editorial of the Chicago Tribune affords a fair example. Discussing that clause in the congressional resolutions against Spain in which all intention to exercise control over Cuba except for pacification is disclaimed, and the determination of this country to leave the government and control of the island to its people is asserted, the Tribune says: "It is far from being the intention of the American government or people to drive out the Spanish devil and then allow the devils of disorder, misrule and anarchy to govern Cuba."

What is here meant by the "devils of disorder, misrule and anarchy" is to be inferred from another part of the same article which asserts that "when a people who have been despotically ruled are freed, it takes them some time to learn to govern themselves," and that "the conditions which have prevailed at different times in Hayti and Santo Domingo will not be permitted to obtain in Cuba," even though an "American protectorate once established in Cuba may not end until the children or grandchildren of those who help to free the island have passed off the stage."

If these quotations were not enough to expose the intentions of American plutocracy, as represented by the Tribune, we should be somewhat enlightened by the remark of Thomas R. Dawley, Jr., who begins an

approved interview in the New York Evening Post with the remark that "it would certainly be a great pity to drive Spain out of Cuba only to turn the island into another Hayti." But the most specific explanation of the motive and purpose of the sentiment which the Chicago Tribune phrases was given to the president early in the month of April, by Dr. Klopsch, editor of the Christian Herald, upon his return from Cuba. Dr. Klopsch said that "the better class of people in Cuba are in favor of autonomy; that they would consider independence a terrible calamity, and that the majority of the Cubans believe this and admit their own incapacity for self-government."

What all this means is that with the expulsion of Spain from Cuba an effort is to be made under the sanction of the United States to prevent in some way the establishment of self-government among the Cubans. Whether a protectorate, or a sort of autonomy under the control of the planters, or a syndicate, shall be resorted to for this purpose is matter of detail. The essential thing is that the Cubans shall not be allowed to govern themselves, lest the majority put an end to some of the wicked privileges of what Dr. Klopsch calls "the better class of people," that is to say, of the people who live in the sweat of the faces of the lower classes.

No one will deny that local self-government in Cuba may at first result in disorder and misrule. But so would government which is not self-government. That in itself would be disorder and misrule. It might be "stable," to use the president's ominous expression. It might preserve order in the sense of maintaining peace. But it would be the peace of the prison, the peace of liberty in shackles. The disorder and misrule of an autocratic government are premeditated, and grow worse as the government grows older. But the disorder and misrule of self-government among a people who have recently escaped from tyranny is only a lingering reminder of the old disorder—part of the pain of a healing wound.

It is perfectly true, as the Tribune says, that "when a people who have been despotically ruled are freed it

takes them some time to learn to govern themselves." But the Tribune's cure, which so many people thoughtlessly adopt, is worse than the disease. The only true remedy was prescribed by Macaulay in his essay on Milton. He said:

There is only one cure for the evils which newly acquired freedom produces; and that cure is freedom. When a prisoner first leaves his cell he cannot bear the light of day; he is unable to discriminate colors, or to recognize faces. But the remedy is not to remand him into his dungeon, but to accustom him to the rays of the sun. The blaze of truth and liberty may at first dazzle and bewilder nations which have become half blind in the house of bondage. But let them gaze on and they will soon be able to bear it.

This is the cure which the United States ought to apply to Cuba. Not only have the Cubans the natural right to govern themselves, but the only way in which they can ever become self-governing is by making a beginning. Self-government in nations, like self-government with individuals, can reach perfection only through experience. As no man can teach another to govern himself, so no nation can teach another to govern itself. If Cuba would be disorderly now, upon throwing off the yoke of Spain, unless held in subjection by the United States, the time would never come when the United States could relax control. Under repression, the people of Cuba could not learn to govern themselves.

And would the disorder incident to newly-acquired freedom be so deplorable after all? Hayti is mentioned by Dawley, from whom we have already quoted, as having been changed from a "thrifty commercial settlement, lawful and orderly, into a community little above the level of barbarism." This "lawful" and "orderly" commercial settlement was a settlement of slave owners and slaves. Is such a settlement preferable to what Dawley calls "the level of barbarism"? By the masters, living upon their plundered slaves, perhaps so; but how about the slaves? Would not any man rather live in freedom near the "level of barbarism," than as a slave in a "thrifty," "orderly" and "lawful" commercial settlement? Would it not also be bet-

ter for him, and better for the masters?

The insurrections in Hayti are a legitimate inheritance from the kind of "law," and the kind of "order" and "thrift" which prevailed when that country ignored the natural rights of the majority of its population. And those insurrections, do they prove that Hayti is unfit for self-government, any more than our civil war proved our unfitness? Why should Haytian insurrections prove that Hayti is unfit to govern herself, while the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines prove that Spain has been fit to govern there?

The truth is, that at bottom this is not a question in the minds of those who raise it of the ability of Cuba to maintain order through self-government. Order, in the true sense not only of peace but also of harmony with natural law, is not what they are thinking of. They are thinking of maintaining the power of the classes over the masses. That power they will maintain, if possible, by the strong American arm.

It will remain to be seen, when the war shall have ended, whether on this issue the plutocratic or the democratic spirit of this country will prevail. That there will be a contest over the issue, however, there can be no doubt; and through that contest social and economic questions will become more pressing than ever. And of all social questions the land question will be uppermost. For in connection with Cuba the contest will relate most directly to the rights relatively of the landed and the landless. The sentiment to which we have referred, and which has found such pronounced expression in the Chicago Tribune, has its origin in a determination to maintain landlordism in Cuba, and to back it with American law when Spanish law can no longer protect it.

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## NEWS

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Though no official news from Commodore Dewey's movement upon the Philippines, reported on page 7 last week, has been received at this writing, it is evident from other sources of information that he penetrated into Manila Bay on the morning of the 1st, and fought a great battle and