The president has carried his Spanish treaty through the senate, but by a narrow margin. The change of two votes would have produced a different result. And that change might easily have been made. Not all who are recorded in the affirmative really approved the terms of the treaty. Senator Mason had made a strong speech against its disposition of Philippine sovereignty, but fell into line for party reasons. Senator Perkins also was opposed to that part of the treaty, but voted against his convictions because he regarded a resolution of instructions from the legislature of his state as binding upon his conscience. Besides these two republicans, whose votes alone if cast against the treaty would have prevented its ratification at the present session, 11 democrats and two populists, most of them opposed to imperialism, voted—for one reason or another, but mainly because the ratification of the treaty was necessary to conclude a peace—with the majority. What enabled the president to carry his treaty through, was a feeling among both democratic and republican senators, that it would be impolitic to defeat a treaty of peace.

The event has proved that Wm. J. Bryan was right. Recognizing the difficulty of defeating a peace treaty even at the present session, and the certainty that a decision against the treaty now would be reversed by the new senate at a special session in the spring, he proposed to make the decisive battle against imperialism, not upon the ratification of the treaty, but upon the question of disposing of the territory which by the treaty Spain would surrender. To those who opposed Bryan's policy on the ground that the ratification of the treaty would be decisive of that question, the ratification now made must seem like the final triumph of imperialism. For if the treaty binds us as these objects have maintained, to a future policy at variance with our traditions, at war with our principles of government, and destructive of our national ideals, then the fight against American imperialism is ended. But to those who are in accord with Bryan, that fight has only begun.

It has been suggested by friends of the treaty that the battle with the Filipinos at Manila came just in the nick of time to secure its ratification. They certainly made the most of this sad event, to influence votes. But it is inconceivable that any senator would have changed his vote upon a question involving the fundamental principles of his government, merely because the newspapers were publishing alarming dispatches received through channels under the control of a censor. These dispatches might properly enough have suggested a postponement of the vote upon ratification. In that behalf it could have been reasonably urged that the senate should know the true and complete facts about the situation at Manila before acting finally upon the treaty. And incidentally it could have been argued that no harm would come from the delay, inasmuch as the treaty before becoming operative must be ratified by the Spanish cortes, which do not convene until the 20th—two weeks in the future. But the suggestion that the ratification was secured through the influence of the censored dispatches, reflects severely upon the mental balance and self control of senators who went over to the majority side. We are disposed to credit them with better judgment and a clearer conception of their official responsibilities.

The truth about the battle at Manila is not known even now. According to the dispatches, the Filipinos made an unprovoked attack upon the Americans. But of this there is no certainty yet, for the press dispatches were censored at Manila, and the official dispatches are subject to emasculation at Washington. One of the press dispatches, in a paragraph which seems to have escaped the censor's scrutiny, somewhat discredits the story that the Filipinos were the aggressors. It came to our notice in the news reports of the Chicago Record. This paragraph indicated that American sentries precipitated the Filipino attack by firing upon Filipinos. Another respect in which the dispatches may be reasonably doubted is as to the casualties. The Filipino loss in killed and wounded is given at 3,500, the American loss being put at first at only 20 wounded. American losses, however, have been growing since the first report, and are now admitted to exceed 50 killed, with more than 150 wounded. But even this is out of all proportion to the reported loss of 3,500 on the other side. We are likely to learn in time, either that the Filipino loss was much less than that now reported, or that the American loss was much greater. In still another respect are the censored dispatches to be doubted. They tell of a decisive victory. But reputable persons whose familiarity with the Filipinos and the nature of the ground about Manila enable them to weigh the censored reports, dispute the probability of a decisive victory for the Americans, upon the facts so far divulged. We must wait for
news until the president removes his
cable censorship at Manila, or full
reports come from Hong-Kong. Till
then it will be impossible to de-
cide with any confidence, not only as
to the results of the fight but also as
to the immediate responsibility for it.

Although we cannot yet fix the re-
ponsibility for beginning the Manila
fight, there is no difficulty in plac-
ing the blame for the conditions that
really produced it. And that is more
important. It makes little difference
who actually began the fighting. The
vital question is who provoked it.
The blame for that rests primarily
upon the president and his im-
perialistic advisers, and secondarily
upon those republicans in the senate
and the house who, though deploiring
his revolutionary policy, have in their
weakness aided and abetted him in
promoting it. The history of the past
year puts the responsibility there so
securely that it cannot be evaded.

Let that history be candidly in-
terrogated. One year ago the Philip-
ine islands were unknown to Am-
ericans except as an archipelago in their
geographies. Then came the war with
Spain. This was begun in defense of
local self government. If that was
not its purpose, not only was it with-
out justification, but it was contrary
to our most solemn professions. We
at least pretended that our purpose in
going to war was to free Cuba from the
cruel tyranny of an imperial na-
tion across the sea; and over the peo-
ple of that long suffering island we
expressly and officially disclaimed
"any disposition or intention to ex-
ercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or con-
tral" except for pacification, promis-
ing that when that was accom-
plished we would "leave the gov-
ernment and control of the island to
its people." Such was the solemn de-
claration of congress in a joint reso-
novation to which President McKinley
affixed his signature. And President
McKinley himself, in his message to
congress, scouted the possibility of
what he called "forcible annexation."
"That," he said, "by our code of mor-
ality, would be criminal aggression."

This was the first stage in the histor-
ical development of our relations to
the Philippines. It is replete with
testimony to our hearty recognition,
as a nation, of the American principle
of local self-government. Though we
recognized it directly in its applica-
tion to Cuba, we did so as of a prin-
ciple of universal application. It was
not merely the forcible annexation of
Cuba that our president officially de-
nounced as criminal aggression, but
the principle of forcible annexation
itself.

The second stage in the historical
development of our relations to the
Philippines began with the destruc-
tion by Dewey's fleet of the Spanish
fleet in the Bay of Manila. That was
in the beginning of May—less than
ten months ago. Then, for the first
time, did the American people come
to realize the Philippine archipelago
as part of the living world. Of the
propriety of sending Dewey there with
his fleet there is no question. We
were at war with Spain. A Spanish
fleet rode the Pacific with the Phil-
ippines for a base. It was our right as
a public enemy of Spain, our privilege
in defense of our own coast and com-
merce, to destroy that fleet. It was
our right and privilege, also, as an act
of war for the weakening of our en-
emy, to capture any one or all of the
Philippine islands if we could. But in
this second stage we did no more than
to destroy the fleet and take possession
of Manila bay.

It is difficult now to see why we
should have retained possession even
of the bay. As events have proved, its
destruction of the Spanish fleet ex-
hausted the usefulness of the Manila
expedition, as an act of war against
Spain. But the events of the war had
not all transpired then, and justice
demands that criticism should now
be silent as to Dewey's detention at
Manila. It may have been necessary
to hold the bay against the possible
fitting out of another Spanish fleet
for the Pacific. We did not then
know so much of the weakness of
Spain as we do now. And since it
may have been necessary to hold the
bay, so it may have been necessary to
effect a landing for the purpose of
establishing a base of supplies for the
fleet, and desirable for the purpose of
attacking and capturing enemy's
territory. Against the shipment,
therefore, of troops to Manila and
their landing there in force—the
third stage in the historical develop-
ment of our relations to the Philip-
pines,—no lay criticism can justly lie.
Thus far, only military questions
arise.

But the fourth stage brings politi-
ical questions, fundamental political
questions, into view. This began when
Spain sued for peace. At that time
we had her in our power. Two of her
three fleets were destroyed, the third
was demoralized, eastern Cuba and
Porto Rico were in our possession, and
we held a secure base for our fleet in
the Pacific. Nothing remained but to
dictate terms of peace. This we did
in a general way, arranging for com-
missions to formulate a final treaty.
At the time of the signing of the proto-
col by which that was done, the
natives of the Philippine islands had
established a government of their
own. At intervals for many years
they had been in rebellion against
Spain, struggling for independence.
One rebellion had but recently been
put down, and another was in progress
throughout the archipelago when
Dewey's fleet sailed into Manila bay.
Gaining strength daily, the rebels
finally drove the Spanish from the
open field into their fortifications at
Manila, on the Island of Luzon, and
at Iloilo, on the island of Panay.
Elsewhere, with but few and unim-
portant exceptions, the rebels were in
possession of all the islands, main-
taining both the form and substance of
civilized government. At the actual
time of the signing of the peace pro-
tocol, the Spanish were still in pos-
session of Manila, but about six hours
afterward they terminated a battle
by surrendering to the Americans.
So the Americans, at the cessation of
hostilities between Spain and the
United States, were to all intents and purposes in possession of Manila and Manilla bay, while the Spanish retained possession of Iloilo and perhaps some unimportant points besides, and the Filipino republic held the remainder of the archipelago.

By the terms of the peace protocol, the treaty of peace was to "determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines." This clause, like pretty much everything that President McKinley dictates, was susceptible of as many interpretations as there were parties in interest. To describe it as having only a double meaning would be inadequate. But the Filipinos understood, and they had a right to understand, that it contemplated a complete surrender of the islands to their republic. For a time following the protocol, therefore, they maintained a peaceable attitude, not only toward the Americans, whom they regarded as allies, but also toward the Spanish, whom they regarded as enemies. Anticipating the transfer of undisputed possession of their native land to their own government, they suspended military operations and devoted themselves to civil affairs. But soon the fifth stage of the development of our Philippine question began. Reports from Paris indicated that the Americans were demanding the archipelago for themselves. Naturally, the Filipinos, then became suspicious and restless. Would Americans have been confiding and patient in similar circumstances? And when the treaty appeared, these reports were fully confirmed. While Cuba was to be relinquished by Spain, but not ceded to the United States, the Philippines were to be ceded. Meantime, disturbed by the rumors as to the American policy of conquest,—rumors that the treaty when it appeared confirmed—the Filipinos resumed military operations against Spain. It was clearly their object to make their sovereignty as complete as possible, to the end that Spain might have nothing outside of Manila to cede. In that they were wise. They thus gave evidence of the possession of at least one of the qualifications for self-government. And they so far succeeded in their enterprise as to take possession of Iloilo, where ever since the latter part of last year they have administered civilized government.

The sixth stage of the Philippine question more directly concerns the conduct of our own government, which has been in these respects under the arbitrary control of the president. He has assumed to be both the republican party and the American nation incarnate. To oppose his will is freely denounced as disloyalty to party and treasonable to country. It was President McKinley's insistence that the treaty provided for the cession of the Philippines to us, instead of their mere relinquishment by Spain as in the case of Cuba. President McKinley, in a public speech, asked significantly who would haul down the American flag from any place over which it had been raised. President McKinley ordered troops from Manila to Iloilo, to forestall the native republicans—a purpose which was happily frustrated by their superior administrative alertness. President McKinley sent a message to Manila threatening the Filipinos with severe discipline unless they would submit to American subjugation under the euphemism of "benevolent assimilation." President McKinley sent reinforcements by the thousand to the Philippines, when all necessity for troops in the Spanish war had ceased, and their mission could only have been to subjugate the natives and overthrow their republic. President McKinley placed all political communication between the Philippine archipelago and the United States under censorship, when no military purpose in the war with Spain was to be served thereby. President McKinley refused to receive an agent from the Philippine republic, who sought an opportunity to enable the president to ascertain and intelligently consider the propositions the new republic had to offer. President McKinley ignored the written communications of this agent which reached him through the state department. President McKinley scorned the Filipino commissioners—men of high intellectual grade—who had come here to confer with the American government. President McKinley has persistently refused to indicate either to the Filipinos, the American public, or to congress the policy he has in view for the future of the Philippines in their relations to the United States—whether to help them establish their republic, as the Filipinos desire, or to reduce them to the condition of a subject colony, as his imperialist supporters are urging. President McKinley used all his powerful influence as president, to prevent any declaration of policy in this respect by congress, in explanation of the treaty. In a word, President McKinley has deliberately placed this country in a position toward the Filipino republic which would have justified that republic in resorting to arms.

Whether the immediate aggressors at Manila this week were the Filipinos or the Americans makes no difference in principle. The aggressor all through the latter part of the fall and the whole of the winter, has been the American government, personified by President McKinley. Only savages or cowards would not have resented it. Writing a few days before the Filipinos, according to the reports, did resent it, the Springfield Republican truly declared:

The American revolutionists had not a tenth part the moral justification for waging war on their king that the Filipino people would have in drawing the sword against a foreign government which had proclaimed sovereignty over them. King George, whatever his sins, did not attempt to sell our ancestors and their country to some foreign power. Samuel Adams, James Otis and Patrick Henry were not suddenly confronted with a claim of sovereignty by France, Russia or Spain. The state of civilization among the Filipinos does not affect their moral right to contest a sudden claim of sovereignty over them by the United States, any more than the lack of Parisian manners among the American colonists would justify the right to rebel against the king of France had he claimed their allegiance after nine months acquaintance.
But the responsibility of the present attitude of the Filipinos cannot be shaken from the shoulders of William McKinley. Not only has he negotiated a treaty which transfers their country for $20,000,000 to the United States, in spite of their most emphatic and long-continued protest, but he has publicly proclaimed to the world his purpose of "assimilation." If he now persists in imitating the blundering old British king in refusing to adopt a more moderate policy, and thus drives the Filipinos to a struggle against foreign conquerors, his administration will have earned a terrible retribution at the hands of the American people.

Yet in spite of our long series of aggressions, one definite word from President McKinley would have prevented the slaughter that has just occurred. He had only to address Congress in a brief but candid message of advice as to the Philippine question, a message such as presidents have before this addressed to congress, such as President McKinley himself addressed to congress on the subject of Cuba less than a year ago. If ever a president was called upon to reveal his purposes in that manner, President McKinley has been called upon to do so from the first day on which congress convened for the present session. He owed it to his country, to the Filipinos, to the civilized world to make it plain that "forcible annexation" of the Philippines is no part of the American policy, so far at least as he could control that policy as president. His neglect—nay his deliberate refusal—to give even unofficial assurances, coupled with the dispatch of troops to Manila, would amply justify and account for Aguinaldo's declaration of war.

President McKinley was warned in time of the possibilities of such an event, by an able and far seeing member of his own party—Congressman Johnson, of Indiana. Upon the floor of the house on the 25th of last month—long enough ago to have enabled the president to act in time—Mr. Johnson, whose speech is reported on page 1278 of the Congressional Record of January 28, said:

Let the president of the United States open his mouth to-day or to-morrow—that mouth that he has kept closed in dogged silence ever since his Atlanta speech, in which he inquired who would pull down our flag—and say to the people of the Philippines that it is not his desire to force a government upon them against their will; that their rights and privileges shall continue unharmed and unimpaired, and we can in 24 hours disarm all of our volunteer soldiers and let them return to their homes.

And Senator Hale, also of the president's own party, has just given out an interview regarding the Manila fight in which he says:

I am not surprised at the occurrence. If the treaty had been made as it ought to have been made, putting the Philippines on the same basis as Cuba, no trouble would have arisen; or if the managers of the treaty had consented to an amendment on this line there would have been no trouble of this kind. Or, still further, if they had agreed to the passage of a joint resolution declaring that congress did not expect permanent occupation, trouble would have been avoided. But the truth is that underneath the expansion newspapers and back of the movements of the leaders of the expansion cause lies the determination to be content with nothing but permanent occupation.

This means a protracted war of subjugation against the people of the Philippine islands. The ratification of the treaty means, not peace, but immediate war. We must send more troops and more ships to Manila, and must undertake the immense job of conquering the people we have decided to establish a government of their own.

Some of us have warned the expansionists against this from the beginning, and we have foreseen the consequence of refusal to accept the warning. I am sorry that the trouble has come about, but it was inevitable from the day that our commissioners to the Paris conference demanded of Spain the cession of the Philippines to the United States, instead of asking her to abandon her own sovereignty and leave the matter of the government of these islands to the inhabitants of them, as in the case of Cuba.

The blood of our soldiers in the far away Philippines, bravely shed in an ignoble cause, is not upon Aguinaldo's men. His men fought for their native country as we should fight for ours, and for the liberty that is no less dear to them than it is to us. They fought as our own fathers fought, against colonial subjugation and for the independence to which all men are entitled but which no men are accorded unless they do fight. That they fought bravely, even if ineffectively, our own newspapers testify. And they fought as patriots if ever men did. Not upon their heads is the blood of our outraged and slaughtered soldiers, whose enlistment to put down one tyrant is being taken advantage of to make them instruments in setting up another. This black deed is attributable not to them, but to President McKinley. He and the hungry land-grabbers who advise him in his imperial policy are the men to blame. They it is who have wantonly brought terrible sorrow and wrenching anxiety to many an American home, and made the blood of every true lover of this country—of every one, that is to say, who loves it for its noble ideals, and the advances it has heretofore made toward them—to tingle with shame. A war upon which we entered in behalf of humanity and for the promotion of liberty, has through them been degraded into a war of sordid conquest—a war which, according to our own code of morals as defined by Mr. McKinley himself, is "criminal aggression."

Though this view of the terrible slaughter at Manila may now not find ready acceptance, we believe it to be the true view, and that the time is already near when it will be the view of civilized mankind. How, indeed, could it be otherwise? "Shall a people armed and in revolt for their freedom," says Charles M. Sturgess, in his open letter of congratulation to Senator Hoar, "be pacified by a change of masters? Disclaiming to wear the collar of one dictator beyond the seas, shall they take laws and control from another? Is there in the Tagal tongue no speech—if there be not, is there in the Tagal heart no unarticulated aspiration—which, being interpreted, shall say: 'My country, right or wrong'? Hearing on his own shores 'the clash of resounding arms' shall no Malayan Patrick Henry highlily declare in council with his countrymen: 'As for me, give me liberty, or give me death'? Shall no Philippine
The river and harbor bill has passed the lower house of congress by a vote of 160 to 7. Though stuffed full of wild cat appropriations, and carrying $30,000,000 in all, it was railroaded through without a roll call. Everybody, almost, voted for it, and those who did were determined not to go upon record as having done so. All this is easily explained. The river and harbor bill is the great local corruption bill. Congressmen who can't get into this bill an allowance from Uncle Sam for their constituents, are labeled "no good" at home. Consequently most congressmen log roll, one with another, each seeking public money for his constituents, until the bill grows into a large mosaic of larceny. That is the reason it passes by an overwhelming majority. It is the reason also that demands for the "ayes" and "noes" are voted down. One may vote for a public steal, but he doesn't like to "go to the country" upon it.

The minority report of the house committee on Mark Hannah's ship bounty bill is worth reading and thinking about. It was prepared by Congressman Handy, of Delaware. Here is the explanation of the reason why the bill is "satisfactory."

"This bill is one that was prepared and brought to congress by a voluntary committee of ship owners and shipbuilders representing the gentlemen who will receive the bounty which the bill proposes to give from the public treasury. The bill as it is reported to the house is in almost the exact form and grants to a penny the bounties demanded by the gentlemen who are to receive them. The bill is therefore naturally and entirely satisfactory to the "interests" which have organized this movement to secure the vast sums carried in the bill as a gratuity to be used in carrying on their private business and enlarging the profit thereof.

As estimated by the report, the bounties provided for would amount to $165,000,000. The viciousness of the bill is thus summed up:

It is manifestly unequal and unjust to tax the farmers, carpenters, blacksmiths, masons, merchants, railroad men, miners and woodsmen of the country to pay a bounty to shippers who for every mile they sail upon the sea. The bill is the offspring of mere bounty beggars and should be repudiated by representatives of both political parties. It is vicious in principle.

Baltimore has the honor of having organized a "Future Voters' association." Its founder is F. C. Hall, 1005 North Stricker street, Baltimore, Md. The objects of the association are to inculcate a knowledge of the meaning of good government, to make clear the trade relations of countries, to study the subject of money, and generally to educate future voters into an understanding of the obligations of a citizen instead of leaving them to cast their votes at random or in mere obedience to family tradition. A thoroughly good association of that kind would soon make a much needed impression upon American politics.

Tom L. Johnson's recent public declaration that he had withdrawn from business and intended hereafter to devote his life and fortune to the promotion of the single tax movement, has created a general sensation. Yet he has been devoting his life and fortune to that movement largely for more than a dozen years. There is nothing new about his recent declaration except that his business—that of a monopolist—will no longer claim any of his attention. This will deprive hypercritical opponents of one of their little clubs. They can no longer talk about Johnson's inconsistency. But that was a very little club. It was much like a stuffed club. Monopoly is a social institution, and no man is inconsistent who while benefitting by it tries to induce the people to abolish it.

In the midst of the satisfaction which Henry George's followers derive from the sensation that Johnson's announcement has created, they are saddened by news of the death of the Rev. Chas. E. Garst, another of their prominent men. Mr. Garst was a missionary of the Church of the Disciples (commonly called Campbellites), and was stationed at Japan, where he supplemented his religious work by making known to the Japanese, as he did widely, the philosophy of Henry George. He died at Tokio, on the 28th of December, of pneumonia. Wherever in the world the George agitation flourishes, Garst's name is known. He was a clear thinker and a man of sterling intellectual honesty, who was devoted to his calling and faithful to all his convictions.

THE STREET CAR QUESTION.

Some weeks ago, at the Sunset club in Chicago, Charles T. Yerkes spoke upon the street railroad question from the standpoint of a street railroad monopolist. Mr. Yerkes controls the Chicago street car system, and is besides a man of great bravery, not to say effrontery, in asserting the claims of franchise grabbers. No better representative, therefore, of the private monopoly side of the street car question could have been chosen for a debate upon the subject.

And Mr. Yerkes certainly did not allow the interests he represented to suffer for lack of dialectic art. Supplementing agility in argument with impudence and skill in the prompt distortion of facts, he proved a formidable antagonist to more scrupulous debaters.

When in the course of his speech he had occasion to reply to a suggestion that street cars could be run profitably upon a three-cent fare, if stocked and bonded only at actual cost, so as not to be under pressure to pay dividends upon water, Mr. Yerkes said, as officially reported in print by the Sunset club:

"No, nothing of the kind. And when the statement is made here that Detroit