

diers in war to that of bankers, in a way that tends to bring all bankers into contempt by force of association. After pointing out the futility of the pomp and circumstance of war without the means to sustain it, this modest Pharisee asked where a government could look for its means "but to the patriotic spirit of the bankers." And then, to illustrate how patriotic the bankers are, he told of a visit of the secretary of the treasury to New York before the issuance of the war bonds, and of his there meeting a body of bankers who "assured him of their patriotic desire to see a three per cent. loan floated at par." Furthermore, "to enable him to make it a popular loan, without fear of miscarriage, they agreed to take the whole or any part of \$200,000,000 at par." Wasn't that a magnificent exhibition of patriotism? But what did it really amount to? To an offer to take at par millions of three per cent. bonds which every banker knew at the time would go to a premium, and which in fact did go to a premium before they were issued! He who has the hardihood to describe that as "patriotism," and to liken it to the heroism of men who offered up their lives—many without hope or expectation of reward, most without even the possibility of promotion or distinction, and all without enough pay to keep them in decent food—would hardly see any incongruity in describing the robber of a mission fund as a self-sacrificing missionary. We find no fault with the bankers who offered to take the war bonds. If the people allow their public servants to tie up future generations with interest-bearing mortgages upon their labor, it is the people and not the bond buyers who are to be condemned. But let the bond-buyers take to themselves no fancy names. The transaction is "business," pure and simple "business;" let them not nauseate the public by calling it "patriotism."

Before the war began there was a persistent pressure to increase the standing army, which was then limit-

ed to 25,000 men. The motives for this pressure were numerous, some plausible and some not, some sentimentally patriotic and some sordid; but the inevitable effect would have been to prepare the way for the strong man on horseback. Congress resisted the pressure until the beginning of the war, when it consented to a temporary increase to 60,000 men, distinctly providing, however, that at the close of the war the old limit should be resumed. Whether this resumption will take place remains to be seen. The pressure to keep the regular army up to its war footing, and even to increase it by 40,000 or more, is strong. Not the least of the motives for territorial expansion is the excuse it would give for maintaining a large standing army. The most popular plea in this connection is a variety of the old argument that a large standing army is necessary for defense. But the utter weakness of that has been demonstrated by the war. As to soldiers, we were ready to fight before even the best equipped enemy could have disturbed us. Within a few days 200,000 selected volunteers were in the field. Within a few days more they were drilled for action. Within less than three months they had proved their efficiency in battle. Those that were criticised were blamed for what their equipments and not they themselves were responsible for. The rough riders, no better men than the other volunteers, but better equipped, proved as effective as the regulars; yet all of them were engaged in peaceful pursuits when the war broke out. The whole experience of the Santiago campaign, the Puerto Rico campaign, and the mobilization of troops at different points in this country, proves conclusively that we need no large standing army for purposes of defense. What we do need for those purposes, and all that we need, is a competent war department, and a president who makes army appointments for merit and not for favor.

Our army showed itself to be weak

not as to men, but as to supplies. For that weakness there was no excuse. The soldiers had not dropped down from the clouds so as to increase the number of people to be fed. They had been drawn from 70,000,000 who were already being fed. If there were supplies enough before the mobilization of troops, there must have been supplies enough afterwards. And so there were. Had the mobilization been of as many Christian Endeavorers, experienced hotel keepers would have provided for them amply and comfortably; but our war department could not provide for a small fraction of the army at a point within daily communication of one of the largest markets in the world, during a suspension of hostilities, and four months after the call for troops. This failure, and the same is true of all the others, was not because the country was short of supplies, but because the war department was long of incompetent favorites. Instead of a large standing army give us a competent and faithful war department, and in reliance upon volunteers in an emergency, our country will be as safe from invasion as if it were surrounded by an impenetrable, an un-climbable, and an un-shoot-over-able wall.

THE HUNGER SCOURGE.

Repeatedly since The Public first appeared, we have had occasion to chronicle some of the horrors of contemporary famine. Not famines like those of the old times, when crops failed and whole nations went hungry; but famines in the midst of abundance. For such is the character of the modern hunger scourge. Its victims jostle the well-fed, and even as they die of starvation inhale the odors of rich food preparing for their immune brethren.

This hunger scourge is universal. For several years it threatened India, pinching the people more and more as each season passed, until it culminated in famine widespread and ghastly. Men, women and children died like rotten sheep. They died of starvation. Yet not all the people died so, nor were all of them hungry. Many of the inhabitants of India have no