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It is impossible not to sympathize with the Canadians in their irritation over the decision (p. 445) of the Alaska boundary commission. Their feeling that they have been tricked by British-American diplomacy in the guise of judicial arbitration, finds much in the circumstances to excuse it.

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The question at issue concerns the patriotism of Canada deeply. It has concerned Great Britain but little or not at all. Canada has been at fever heat about it; Great Britain has been indifferent. In these circumstances Great Britain, as suzerain over Canada, made an arbitration treaty with the United States under which there was no reasonable probability of any award at all except one adverse to the Canadian claims.

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The matter came about in this wise. Canada dealt directly, at first, with the United States, through a joint commission organized for the purpose of agreeing upon a treaty which Great Britain and the United States might adopt. The Canadian commissioners proposed an arbitration tribunal consisting of three distinguished jurists—one to be chosen by Great Britain, another by the United States, and the third by the other two. This eminently fair proposal the United States rejected, proposing instead that the tribunal consist of six jurists, three to be chosen by each side. Such a tribunal could not come to an agreement unless at least one member were to defy his home sentiment and join the "enemy"—a contingency much more likely to result, in a doubtful case, from diplomatic influences or bargainings than from any judicial considerations. Apparently awakened to the absurdity of insisting upon a tribunal of that kind, the American commissioners finally offered to accept the Canadian proposal of three arbitrators, provided the third, who would really be umpire, should be selected from a South American republic. But the Canadians would not agree to this; they insisted upon a European umpire. Here again the Americans were less fair than the Canadians. For whereas any South American umpire might have been subject to diplomatic pressure from the United States, it would have been easy to choose a competent and absolutely independent jurist from France, Norway and Sweden, Holland or Switzerland. Upon this disagreement the commission broke up, and Great Britain negotiated an arbitration treaty without any preliminary agreement between the United States and Canada. In the light of what preceded this treaty, as noted above, and of what followed it, there is certainly room for reasonable suspicion that the treaty was agreed upon under a diplomatic arrangement for a decision adverse to Canada.

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The treaty provided for an arbitration tribunal of six jurists, three to be chosen by each country, and the majority to decide. This was the identical scheme which Canada had rejected as unfair, and properly so. Then came the selection of jurists, which was startlingly significant. Great Britain chose two Canadians and a distinguished English judge, recently attorney general. That was fair, at least upon the face of it; for it supplemented two partisans with a man approximating, apparently, as close to an impartial umpire as the treaty permitted. But the United States appointed three partisans. One of these, Senator Turner, who hails from the State of Washington, which is affected by the boundary question more, if possible, than any other State, might better have withdrawn from politics and gone into the business of rag-picking had he decided in favor of Canada. He certainly would thenceforth have been persona non grata in the State of Washington. His colleagues, Lodge and Root, were no better. They would have worked deadly harm to President Roosevelt's prospects of reelection had they decided in favor of Canada, and of course they knew it. It was humanly impossible for any one of these three men to decide otherwise than as American partisans so long as there was even an appearance of justice or of legal right to the American claims. So the arbitration tribunal was composed, under the most favorable view regarding its judicial character, of three American partisans, two Canadian partisans, and an impartial English umpire. The umpire might have made a deadlock had he favored Canada, but he could by no possibility have given the award to Canada without converting one of the American partisans.

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Inasmuch as the English judge decided against Canada, is it any any wonder that patriotic Canadians think of him now as a fourth American partisan, made so by some secret diplomatic arrangement — an "understanding between gentlemen," as Mr. Chamberlain would put it,—whereby Canada was to lose her case and Great Britain was to gain some advantage of another kind in exchange? Suspicious minds may indicate low motives, but it must not be overlooked that suspicious

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circumstances tend to make suspicious minds.

Nevertheless, whether there has been "an understanding between gentlemen" across the Atlantic or not, it is quite within the possibilities that the award against Canada was right in itself. It has been argued that this inference is completely refuted by the provision in the British-Russian treaty (p. 445) that the Prince of Wales' Island should belong wholly to Russia. Such a clause would have been unnecessary, so the argument runs, if it had been intended to run the boundary line 10 leagues into the interior of the mainland at all points; for in that case, no part of the island named could possibly have fallen on the British side of the line. This argument is plausible, but not more so than one of the counter arguments. We refer to the one that contends that the naming in the treaty of the summit of the mountain range as the boundary line, wherever the range summit was not more than 10 leagues from the coast, precludes the possibility of supposing that there was an intention of leaving any bays or other inlets within British jurisdiction. The fact apparently is that the geography of this coast was so poorly known at the time of the treaty as to make such expressions in the treaty as those named almost valueless for purposes of interpretation. The purpose of the treaty makers must be ascertained from other indications. This purpose seems to have been to give the coast territory to Russia, and what would now be called "the hinterland" to Great Britain. And such in substance is the award of the arbitration tribunal.

A Canadian journalist, E. W. Thompson, was quoted last week (p. 456) in support of this view. He had entered upon a minute study of the subject, thoroughly prejudiced in favor of the Canadian contention; but he emerged from that study with the conviction that—

> the purpose of the treaty was to give Russia a coast strip which would serve as an effectual barrier against the Hudson Bay company's fur trade along the coast north of latitude 54 degrees 40 minutes. Such a barrier could not have been erected, except by giving Russia possession of the fiords, inlets or "canals" up to their heads.

To the same effect is the testimony of another distinguished Canadian, Prof. Shortt, who occupies the chair of political economy at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. Prof. Shortt was reported on the 21st from Kingston as saying:

> About three years ago I was asked to write an article on the Alaskan boundary question. I agreed to do so, presuming from what I had read on the subject from the usual Canadian sources, that at least as good a case could be made out for the Canadian contention as for that of the United States. The result of my study was to convince me that the Russian claims, which were transferred to the United States, were so strongly supported by the documents that it was impossible to make out a valid case for the Canadian contention on the more important points at issue.

Another instance of heroism in peace (p. 452) is reported by the newspapers this week. The credit is due to Capt. Fisher and his crew of life-savers at Race-point, near Highland Light, Cape Cod. Capt. Fisher and his crew, seeing a fishing vessel in distress, her crew unable to escape through the surf, launched a surf boat through a tremendous sea that threatened to overturn it. They gained the side of the stranded vessel with difficulty and through danger, and nine of the shipwrecked crew jumped into the surf boat. After a perilous trip the rescued seamen were safely landed. Again Capt. Fisher headed the surf boat for the stranded ship, but two giant waves, the second larger than the first, swamped it, and, hurling the whole life-saving crew into the sea, threw them back helplessly upon the beach. The remainder of the shipwrecked crew were finally rescued by means of a mortar and breeches-buoy apparatus. Heroism of this kind may be too commonplace even for honorable mention. But it is worth while contrasting it with the heroisms of war. To save a score of human lives at the risk of one's own, may count in the records of the great Judgment Day; but if you want the plaudits of "our best people" and the rewards of valor now and here, you will get them more surely by killing a score—in strict accordance with the laws of war, of course, unless the killees are only tribesmen.

It is reported of the younger Mr. Rockefeller that when some of his Bible-class members recently suggested that certain modern methods of getting great fortunes could not be consistently practiced by Christians, he asked if the manner in which these men disposed of their wealth did not count for something to their advantage. This is the new doctrine of Christian plutocracy. Most of the velvety clergymen are preaching it. Not how you get your wealth, but what you do with it, is the test they are fond of applying. The doctrine is not new. It was practiced long ago by Jonathan Wild, Sixteen-String Jack, and Jack Sheppard. Perhaps the excellent Mr. Rockefeller doesn't know who these worthies were, being unfamiliar with low-bred literature. Let him understand, then, that they were highwaymen, who soothed their consciences for their un-Christian modes of getting wealth from its owners by their Christian habits of bestowing it upon others.

Senator Gorman is trying to carry the Maryland election for the Democratic party of that State by making a political issue of President Roosevelt's luncheon with Booker T. Washington. If this is what the Democratic party stands for, the sooner it is wiped out of existence as a weak imitator of the false Democracy of proslavery days, the better not only for the country, but for the Democratic spirit of the country. American Democrats want no reincarnation of Robert Toombs for their political leader in these days

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