

lays bare the new kind of lobby by which the people of this country are governed and plundered from Washington. This lobby is not a "third house," as the old lobbies were; it is composed of the members and senators themselves. Leslie describes it in a phrase: "Congress its own lobby."

Few disclosures of concealed facts are made in the Leslie article, but facts well known or reasonably suspected are so put together as to leave no doubt of their sinister significance. Quite correctly the editors of Leslie's assert that "the great curse of national legislation is the campaign contribution." Proceeding, they explain the new lobby as resulting from campaign contributions, saying:

In a Presidential or Congressional election the great corporations pick the candidates and the party to whom they feel they can look for favors; then they contribute enormous sums to carry the election. Frequently a definite bargain is made with the national committee that something shall be done or another one not done. It is a cold matter of business. Commercial Acumen which has built up vast fortunes in a generation or two, like those of "the Standard Oil crowd" or of Carnegie's coterie of young men, can usually pick a winner, or make a winner, in a national campaign. It did so in 1888, when it turned its back on Cleveland and contributed to the Harrison fund for M. S. Quay to spend. Again it did so in 1892, when it switched from Harrison back to Cleveland and gave the millions to William C. Whitney and Don M. Dickinson, with which they swept the country. It could not choose in 1896 and 1900 because William J. Bryan was running for President on a platform which made the corporations quake, so Commercial Acumen emptied a sum equal to a king's ransom at the feet of Marcus A. Hanna at the behest of such men as Cornelius N. Bliss, Senator Aldrich, Senator Allison and Senator Quay. The great interests which contributed in these four campaigns got what they paid for. Under Harrison they got the McKinley tariff law, with protective duties marked up sky high. Under Cleveland's second administration they got exactly the schedules they had bargained for in advance. Under McKinley they literally lived in clover—the richest man in the United States has quadrupled his fortune in the last seven years.

And then Leslie's goes on to prove its case with incontestable testimony.

It is a remarkable fact that two

of the corruptionists named in the Leslie editorial are manifestly to be arrayed against each other by the circumstances of this week's elections, for a gigantic struggle in the presidential campaign of 1904. They are Marcus A. Hanna, Republican, and Wm. C. Whitney, Democrat. As with the presidential elections named in that article, the one of 1904 is now almost certain to be a battle for and with a huge campaign fund. For the unexpectedly triumphant election of McClellan as Mayor of New York, through the management of Wm. C. Whitney and with Wall street funds collected by him, points to McClellan almost unerringly as the Democratic candidate for President. On the other hand, Hanna will probably be forced to accept Roosevelt. Nothing but a miracle in politics can relieve him of that burden. So Hanna will have to stand sponsor for Roosevelt in raising the campaign fund. But no king's ransom will drop at Hanna's feet this time, as when the trusts quaked at Bryan's nomination, or as they quaked when Johnson's broad shadow crept over their door sills. The situation will be like that of 1888 and of 1892, and not like that of 1896 and of 1900. This time there will be a competing bidder for the "king's ransom." Mr. Whitney will come into the field for McClellan, as in 1892 he came for Cleveland. And which of the two—Hanna or Whitney—will get the richest contributions? The one, of course, who can give the best assurances of his power to deliver the post-election goods which he offers for the pre-election campaign fund. This will give the bulk of the fund to Whitney. For Hanna will not be able to satisfy the great campaign contributors of Wall street that the erratic Roosevelt can always be depended upon to make Hanna's bargains good. The outlook for Democratic success in 1904 is certainly much more promising than it was the day before this week's election. It is not improbable that the Democratic Mr. Whitney, with his new presidential protege, will come into nation-

al power just in the nick of time (as with his protege of 1892) to make the Democratic party appear to have caused the business depression which is now about due.

By a vote of 41 to 22 the city council of Chicago has apparently sustained the suspicious behavior of one of its committees relative to negotiations with traction stock-jobbers for an extension of traction franchises. But hasty inferences should not be drawn from this vote. There is no certainty that all who voted with the majority are on the stock-jobbing side of the question. Questions of temporary expediency were involved in the motion voted on, and nothing decisive was at that time at stake. The sheep in the council, therefore, are not yet wholly separated from the goats. But the time is fast approaching when this separation will be made and an inventory of the people's stock of goats in the council can be taken.

To suggest corruption in the Chicago council, after so much has been so widely reported of the reformation of that body, may be startling. The suggestion may even be received incredulously. But there is no implication that those reports of reform are untrue. The Chicago council has probably been pretty completely purified of vulgar bribe-takers. But it has acquired in their place a collection of high-toned business "grafters"—men who make money not by taking bribes for ordinances, but through investments, directly or indirectly in the profits accruing from measures they vote for. For such men the traction question opens up rich and reputable opportunities. No matter how much money they may make out of traction franchises, they make it so strictly in conformity with conventional business methods that their social and business standing is improved rather than impaired thereby. The yeast of this kind of

"graft" is now actively fermenting in the Chicago council.

It is to be regretted that the Chicago Record-Herald is beginning to expose itself to distrust regarding the local traction question. No paper professing to favor municipal ownership can escape reasonable suspicion when it parrots traction lawyers' objections to which there is an apparently sound answer, unless it shows that the answer is in fact not sound. Yet the Record-Herald is beginning to parrot just such objections, knowing that there is an answer to them, but without even mentioning the answer, much less showing that it is unsound: On the 4th, for instance, it said editorially:

Suggestions for immediate municipal ownership are not at all helpful at the present time, but utterly impractical. The people who make them are misinformed or have not reflected upon the situation as they should. What will they do with the numerous grants that are now running for varying terms? Can they stop them all instanter and so devise a municipalized system? What will they do with the 99-year act and its promise of in-terminable litigation? Have they absolute power over the law and the courts, can they waive aside suits and injunctions? Evidently they fail to recognize a series of complications of the most puzzling description. Yet these complications exist, and they cannot be undone at a single stroke of a magical wand labeled municipal ownership. The process will be a slow one, by agreement and contract so made as to enable the city to venture upon municipal ownership when the times are propitious for the experiment.

The answer, apparently sound, is that "the Mueller act" does away with the necessity for "agreement and contract," by authorizing condemnation proceedings. Is that answer really sound, or is it not? If not, why not? If it is, why emphasize the necessity for "agreement and contract," which would only make further complications? In either case why ignore the answer?

Alderman Bennett, of the Chicago city council, is wisest when he speaks not. On several occasions his fatal facility of oral ex-

pression has exposed the animus of the council committee which is negotiating with the traction stock-jobbers (p. 468) and of which he is chairman. The latest instance of Mr. Bennett's fatal facility was in explanation of the suspiciously secret sessions of that committee. "It would be a mighty poor general," said he, on the floor of the council on the 2d, "who would give away his plans to the enemy; whenever we have held secret sessions it has been because we have not wanted to disclose our plans to the enemy." Thus does Alderman Bennett expose the attitude of his committee. For who is the "enemy" whom this committee would keep in ignorance of its proceedings? Not the traction stock-jobbers; for they are admitted to these secret sessions, along with their lawyers and their stenographer. The only persons excluded are the authorized representatives of the municipal ownership movement. So, according to Alderman Bennett, the council committee regards the traction stock-jobbers as its friends, and the municipal ownership voters—at least 143,000 of Chicago's voting citizens—as its enemy. If Alderman Bennett is "long" on effrontery, he is "short" on discretion.

In the line of "pure and unadulterated cussedness," nothing has occurred of late years to quite equal the conduct of the pluto-Democratic papers with reference to the late Mr. Bennett's bequest to William J. Bryan. Here is a case in which Mr. Bryan's nearest friend of considerable means, a man who believed in the same financial and political theories that Mr. Bryan believes in, who had for Bryan the affection of a friend and in Bryan's leadership the confidence of a co-worker in the same cause, has provided out of an ample estate a fund for Bryan's use in his own discretion. It was precisely what any man of sincere purposes and large fortune would desire to do for the acknowledged leader of a movement

to which both were devoted. There was no stinting of the widow. Mr. Bennett provided amply for his widow. He provided liberally for others not of his own household nor even relatives, and between whom and himself there were no such sacred ties of common thought and purpose as those that cemented his friendship with Mr. Bryan. Yet the bequest to Mr. Bryan is attacked as having been secured through undue influence! Attacked nominally by Mr. Bennett's widow, but really by a Grover Cleveland Democrat, a lawyer who had evidently gone into the contest in order that Bryan might be assailed with billingsgate through the Grover Cleveland newspapers. That this was the purpose is fairly well indicated by the facts. This lawyer has wantonly supplied the billingsgate; the local Cleveland organ, the New Haven Register, nominally Democratic, has acted as distributing agent. It gave four columns to this lawyer's speech in court, a legal argument in the course of which Bryan was viciously assailed, while it gave but half a column to Bryan's reply to the personal incriminations and hardly a line of the legal argument of Bryan's local counsel. The same spirit has been exhibited throughout the country. The motive is obvious. It is to discredit Bryan's political leadership by a libelous assault upon the integrity of his private character.

One of the grimly humorous features of this campaign of mud-throwing is the contrast that the scandal-mongers have drawn between Bryan and Henry George, with reference to George's conduct under circumstances which were in some respects like those in which Bryan is involved. George had been left a bequest, not personally as in the Bryan case, but as trustee. The widow of the maker of the will had been left nothing, whereas in Bryan's case the widow is a large beneficiary; the estate proved to be almost insolvent and the widow penniless, whereas in Bryan's