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Mayor Harrison loses sight, whether willfully or not, of the real issue with reference to his campaign pledges on the Chicago traction (p. 342) issue.

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The question is not whether he believes in compromising with the traction companies, nor whether he has always proclaimed that belief; but whether he is under campaign pledges to withhold his official approval from any extension ordinance until it has been approved by referendum vote.

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That he is under such pledges, is proved beyond possibility of dispute by the record. His platform so pledged him, his speeches so pledged him, and he so pledged himself over his own signature. But for those pledges he would have failed to attract the votes without which his narrow plurality would have faded away and he would have been defeated. Those pledges constitute his contract with the citizens who elected him.

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He is at perfect liberty to urge acceptance of the proposed compromise ordinance if he wishes to. No one can justly condemn him for that. But he is not at liberty to give legal vitality to this or any other ordinance extending franchises, until that ordinance has been approved by referendum vote. To that he is pledged, and by that pledge he is bound.

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Mayor Harrison and his friends should understand that he cannot evade his pledges with impunity. They should understand, moreover, that he cannot justify evasion by billingsgate attacks upon men who possess the public confidence in such eminent degree, both as citizens and judges, as do Judge Tuley and Judge Dunne. These accomplished jurists and public-spirited citizens are notable for greater faculties than the "lung" power with which alone Mayor Harrison spitefully credits Judge Dunne, and their opinions are accepted at a much higher value than "wind," which is the delicate tribute the Mayor pays to Judge Tuley's.

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Perhaps it may not be amiss to remark that the criticism of Judges Tuley and Dunne, by the Mayor and the newspapers and traction interests that support him, because these judges have stepped down from the bench to warn the people of Chicago of approaching danger, is extremely callow. Justice never suffers from judges who openly take the whole people into their confidence on public questions. The thing in judges from which justice suffers is not frank expressions of opinion on the platform as in the case of Judge Dunne, or through the press as in the case of Judge Tuley; the thing in judges from which justice suffers is their private hobnobbing with representatives of powerful interests in the seclusion of plutocratic clubs. It ill becomes men and newspapers that are indifferent to the latter practice to go into spasms of virtuous protest over the former refreshing variation.

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Only one reply to Judge Tuley's criticisms of the proposed ordinance has been made—only one that is dignified and thoughtful. It comes from Edwin Burritt Smith, the principal counsel for the city administration in connection with the traction litigation. In temper and tone this reply is all that Mayor Harrison's replies are not. Much better would it have been for the Mayor and the settlement he has become so anxious to consummate before the people can be heard from on referendum vote, if he had choked back his angry adjectives and given Mr. Smith a free hand to answer for him.

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But while Mr. Smith replies to Judge Tuley with unruffled temper and good grace, and considers the distinguished judge's criticisms with fairness, he is not likely to be regarded as having satisfactorily met them. His plea for this compromise is the plea of the cautious lawyer, who turns instinctively—often wisely, but not always—to any compromise that serves to gain something, in preference to incurring the risks of a litigation that may possibly lose something. Mr. Smith is no more urgent, no more earnest, no more obviously sincere in advocating a compromise on the basis of the present ordinance than he was in urging one on the basis of the worse ordinance for which this is the substitute. That there should be a compromise seems to appeal to him with greater force than that it should be a good one. But this is not the attitude that is needed in this case. While the compromising instinct is often serviceable in this world of complexity and controversy, there are issues which cannot with safety be lightly compromised, and Chicago now confronts one of them. The essence of the traction issue in Chicago is not good service, nor municipal ownership for its own sake; it is the issue of honest city government, which is impossible without municipal ownership. So long as we incline to yield to the monopolizers of our streets, so long will great financial interests tempt our public men, breed corruption in our public places, and make the campaign pledges of

candidates for office trifles light as air.

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It is to be said of Mr. Smith's reply, also, that it suggests an unnecessary solicitude lest vested interests in a crooked grant be in some degree confiscated. But those interests—so far as they are legal, and as to morality they have none—will be well enough guarded by the lawyers for their beneficiaries, and sufficiently protected by the courts; they stand in no need of any solicitous consideration on the part of counsel for the city. This solicitude seems to sound a false note in Mr. Smith's reply to Judge Tuley. So does his intimation that the Mayor's pledges regarding a referendum cannot be redeemed because there is "no authority of law" for passing the ordinance "with a proviso that it take effect only on approval by vote of the electors." That statement in that form is probably true. Such an ordinance might either be a nullity because of its proviso, or be at once effectual without the popular vote it called for. But is there anything in the law to prevent submission of the ordinance to the people under advisory referendum between its second reading and its third? Or, if there are no regular parliamentary stages in the Chicago Council, is there anything in the law to prevent the council from receiving the perfected ordinance from committee of the whole and then laying it on the table, or making action on it a special order for a time subsequent to the municipal election, providing meanwhile for a referendum on it, and then voting in accordance with the advice of that intermediate referendum if they wish to? If there is nothing in the law to prevent this procedure, then what is there to interfere with the redemption of those campaign pledges which the Mayor seeks to evade? This is something that Mr. Smith should explain. For, after all, the vital thing under present circumstances is not whether the proposed extension ordinance may properly be esteemed a good one, but whether, in view of the campaign pledges of the Mayor and his party convention, it can in good faith be enacted without a popular vote upon it.

Even the worst enemies of Thomas E. Watson will hardly withhold from him some tribute to the political shrewdness of his letter to Judge Parker on the race question. It is no doubt true, as he says, that the politicians of the South are availing themselves of anti-Negro prejudice to arouse Southern feeling against Roosevelt and thereby to keep the South solid for Parker. In these circumstances the questions Watson asks Parker are well calculated to disturb a certain equilibrium. Would Judge Parker "refuse to eat at the same table with Booker T. Washington?" Would "he refuse to appoint Negroes to office in the South?" Would he refuse to receive distinguished Negroes at the White House? And so on. Should Judge Parker answer these questions so as to please the South, he would lose Northern votes by shoals. Should he answer them so as to avoid damaging results at the North, he would have to take the same stand on the race question that has made Roosevelt unpopular at the South. "So there ye are," says Mr. Dooley. The only thing for Parker to do is to make no reply. But in that case Watson will rally the populists of the South with the cry that all this talk against Roosevelt on account of the "nigger" is humbug, designed to fool a "nigger-hating" South into voting for a Wall street candidate.

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It is a deplorable fact that the South has gone into a mad panic over the race question and thereby brought demoralization upon the national Democratic party. With her hundred-and-fifty-odd electoral votes, solid for this party whose traditions are slimy with the political ooze of chattel slavery, she has become a standing menace to the democracy of the party. Corrupted to the core by her railway and factory interests controlled by Wall street, her politicians and newspapers are for the most part ready to bargain away all their democracy to foster the race hatreds whereby they hold the panic-stricken whites together as a malleable voting mass. Never democratic on the race question, the South is fast losing her democracy on everything else. Her politicians apologize for tariff protection, they compromise with plutocratic corruption, they are cultivating monopoly investments, they offer anything and everything for the barbarous boon of being allowed to reestablish Negro slavery in new forms. Is there no dominant chivalry in the South to protect the weak and to cow her demoniacal mobs? Are there no great democrats there to protest against the base surrender of her people's birthright to Northern monopolists under the cover of factitious race passions?

President Roosevelt's puff for suppressing "graft" in the post office department, which has been constructed with admirable literary skill for the September McClure's, would have been tremendously more effective if the facile writer had been able to tell of the suppression of the equally notorious and corrupt and vastly more amplitudinous railroad "graft" which prevails in that department unquestioned even unto this day.

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, in his speech at Nantasket Point, Saturday, Aug. 27, said:

> There is not a newspaper in the country that doubts the opinion of Theodore Roosevelt as to the tariff.

"Political economists have pretty generally agreed that protection is vicious in theory and harmful in practice," said Theodore Roosevelt in his Life of Benton. Is this the "opinion" to which Senator Lodge alludes?

There is nothing startling in the report from Wisconsin that ex-Senator Vilas successfully opposed a demand by the Democratic convention for primary nominations. Between Vilas and