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There is some probability that the Chicago traction question (p. 376) may become further involved by the merging of the Chicago City Railway interests (local capitalists) with the Union Traction Company interests (Philadelphia and New York capitalists), and the consequent breaking up of all the compromise arrangements thus far tentatively effected. This consummation is very much to be desired. If the merger should have the further effect of releasing the city's servants from the spell which seems to have been cast over them by the magic potency of local financial interests, it will prove to be one of the best beloved mergers ever made.

Whether or not this expected merger shall come in to break up the pending compromise, there is reasonable certainty that the proposed ordinance is already as dead as Julius Caesar. The petition which the Mayor cynically demanded as a condition of recommending the postponement of the ordinance until after a referendum, is being signed so rapidly that there remains little doubt of its immediate success. In this work the value of the service provided by the Chicago Examiner and the American, the only local dailies not devoted to tying the hands of the city, is incalculable, and they are being cordially supported by such societies as the Turners and the Federation of Labor as well as by bodies more distinctly identified with the municipal ownership movement. We shall be surprised if the 100,000

signatures are not secured before the 3d of October. No other petition ever put out in Chicago has met with so little opposition and so ready and hearty a response from citizens approached for their signatures. Should it be fully signed even as late as November 15, the Mayor and at least two of the compromise newspapers will be obliged in consistency to advocate postponement. Of course the Council might nevertheless pass the ordinance. But they would have to do it over the Mayor's veto and in the face of public opinion clearly expressed. Should they indulge in this piece of "railroading," however, their reputations would be ruined even if their persons escaped discomfort. To defend the character of any man who should participate in so defiant a proceeding would be almost impossible. His action would be well-nigh incomprehensible upon any other theory than that of corruption.

Should the petition be fully signed and action on the proposed ordinance be in good faith deferred, the merits of the ordinance would come before the people for discussion. This would insure its defeat, for it cannot stand discussion. The representatives of the city have been outmaneuvered by the traction attorneys at every turn. A more interesting specimen of the bunco brick it would be hard to find even in the gripsack of the greenest Jonathan Wayback. The most urgent arguments for its adoption are precisely the same in substance and spirit, whether made by avowed believers in corporate control or by compromising advocates of city control. If this is not hypnotism, what is it? These arguments simmer down to the one proposition that without the proposed compromise Chicago will

have litigation and bad service for several years; whereas, with it, good service will begin at once and litigation will be avoided. Yet no one has yet shown how good service can be enforced under the compromise, or long litigation be prevented at its expiration.

Regarding the question of good service, for instance, the president of the Corn Exchange National Bank, Mr. Charles L. Hutchinson, rests his confidence not upon any coercive powers in the ordinance, but upon the good faith of the present administration of the company. "Under the former management of the company," he says, "it might well have been doubted whether the service would be good; under the administration of Mr. Hamilton and his associates, the prospects are excellent for good service." It is proper enough for Mr. Hutchinson to trust, for good service under the compromise, to the good faith of his chums; but the people should have better assurances before they consent to have the city shorn of its coercive possibilities.

On the question of quieting litigation and securing a peaceable adjustment, the compromisers are assertive but not demonstrative. Prof. Harry Pratt Judson, for example, asserts that the proposed ordinance "puts an end once for all to the present situation of doubt as to the respective rights of the city and the company, and to the interminable litigation in which the whole matter seems involved." Yet he absolutely refrains from indicating how the proposed ordinance would accomplish that happy result, notwithstanding that good lawyers, including both Judge Tuley and Judge Dunne, have definitely explained that it would not accomplish it.

The methods of all who have thus far come to the defense of the compromise ordinance are extremely unsatisfactory. Upon them rests the burden of showing that the ordinance would effect the results they claim for it. But instead of attempting this, they ignore and evade. It seems almost like a pre-arranged policy. They echo one another in asserting that the ordinance would secure good service, but shuffle away from the objection that it confers no powers to enforce good service, short of the drastic and therefore often impracticable one of forfeiture. They echo one another in asserting that the possibilities of litigation would be removed, but shuffle away from explanations that these possibilities would be augmented. Why don't they answer these objections frankly if their proposal is meritorious?

And why do they echo and re-echo the challenge to their critics either to stop criticising or to offer a counter-plan? Why do they do this while ignoring or sneering at every plan that does not contemplate compromise? Is it because they want compromise, or because compromise is necessary? If the latter, why don't they relieve the situation by explaining why? The issue now is compromise or no compromise; and this issue, as with every objection to their own plans, the promoters of compromise have so far refused to meet in any other spirit than that in which it is met by the traction interests. This cannot be in conservation of public interests. The people of Chicago have emphatically demanded municipal ownership without any intermediate compromise. Is that legally possible or isn't it? If it is, then the Mayor, the City Council, the corporation counsel, and the special counsel (all of whom are paid to find means for effectively realizing the people's will, not to hunt diligently for reasons for thwarting it), are under the most sacred kind of civic obligation to turn that possibility into a reality. If, however, it is in their best judg-

ment not legally possible—and this is the only honorable explanation of the policy they are pursuing—then they are under equally sacred civic obligations to take the people into their confidence and candidly explain why it is not possible. Their explanations thus far are of a kind which, if made by a lawyer to his client, could hardly have any other effect than to startle the client into a conviction that he had better get another lawyer—one who would be at least as considerate of his interests as of those of his adversary.

A very suggestive letter to the editor of the New York Evening Post appeared recently in the columns of that paper over the signature of Samuel H. Bishop. Its immediate reference was to the changes regarding civil service reform and class legislation that have come over Theodore Roosevelt since his accession to the Presidency; but its possible applications are many, from President down to city councilman. "When we study men as men," writes Mr. Bishop, "we know their opinions and where to find them; but when we study men as officials, we do not know their opinions and we do not know where to find them." With that apt phrasing of a thought that has floated at times in the minds of many of us, Mr. Bishop proceeds:

I remember that a great clergyman now dead once said to me: "I wonder if it would be possible for a bishop to be the same man in thought and policy that he was as a clergyman;" by which remark I supposed he meant that he was puzzled as I am puzzled to understand the change that comes over men who are put upon the apex of official positions. Let us grant that such men do become necessarily subject to the influence of motives which are not felt and cannot be understood by men not in those positions; that they are the subjects of wider laws and multiplex forces, which we who are not in those positions cannot understand; yet do we not need now some light to be thrown upon official exigencies and necessities, so that we can have at least some understanding of those exigencies and necessities, and can in some measure determine how far men ought to be changed in thought and policy

when they become executives either in church or state?

Having thus described the problem in terms which must appeal forcibly to all who have observed the phenomena of democracy, and pointed to Mr. Roosevelt as a type of the men who lose their ideals upon coming into high office; having, moreover, refused to accept the explanation that this deplorable transformation originates in bad motives, Mr. Bishop looks for "the deeper, the final effective cause." What he has to offer as the result of this inquiry is an impressive and as we believe a substantially true explanation of a very puzzling social riddle. He says:

I think it is the mental and moral perplexity involved in official positions, the sudden and overwhelming perception of a great new class of motives, exigencies and forces to which the official is now subject. The consciences of most men are so ill-trained that they cannot adapt and adjust themselves to this new multiplex system of motives and forces to which executive officials are subject. Indeed we are going through a time when the ordinary man—the business man, the director, the merchant, the clerk, men in every kind of occupation are unable to see what the strictly right thing is, or unable to adapt and adjust their consciences to the intricate and complex system of modern life; and so cannot act according to the stern dictates of the personal conscience.

Recurring to Mr. Roosevelt's case for a concrete illustration, Mr. Bishop continues:

I believe that the Republican policy, which is essentially a selfish and class policy, adds very greatly to the mental and moral perplexity of its executives and its politicians. Mr. Roosevelt is mentally and morally bound hand and foot by the selfish and class interests which really constitute Republican policy. He is not great enough (and I am one of those who think few men would be) to withstand the mighty force which presses upon him from the selfish interests involved in the continued subjugation of the Philippines, the class tariff and the other policies for which the Republican party stands.

Reflection upon Mr. Bishop's really profound observations might incline us all to be a little more charitable towards the motives of officials perplexed by conflicting social forces. Better yet, it might stimulate the officials them-