bulk in dress suit cases; but they say it was carried to Judge Gray's office in dress suit cases and distributed there. So far as this affair is concerned, then, Lawson appears to have made a prima facie case. It remains now for H. H. Rogers and the other silent ones to disprove or explain. Roger Foster has explained by asserting his right as the attorney for the petitioning creditor in the receivership proceedings to settle on his own terms and to assent to the discharge of the receiver. On the face of it that is a good explanation. But what of the receivers, who represented not one creditor but all interests? What of the judge who dissolved the receivership upon the mere request of the receiver and the petitioning creditor's lawyer? What of the participation of the Republican national committee? Why did it act as a mask for the Standard Oil "crowd" in the shady settlement of a shady lawsuit? And what of Judge Gray? Was he one of the lawyers who shared Foster's fee, and if so, whom did he represent, and for what? Or, if he had no connection with the matter, why was the "boodle" distributed in his office, as the distributor says it was? If his office was misused by a co-tenant, as is unauthoritatively stated, why does he not vouch for that statement himself? But, above all, what of the use of small currency instead of certified checks? If the affair was an honest one, why was the money distributed as thieves and blackmailers and corruptionists divide plunder? Why was it not distributed as honest men distribute legitimate funds of such magnitude — openly and with checks instead of secretly and with currency in five and ten dollar denominations?

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As to the charge that $5,000,000 was raised to defeat Bryan corruptly in 1896, Lawson has "made good" to a certain extent. He has named Rogers, the Standard Oil magnate, as having raised that huge sum and as having explained that it was raised to be corruptly used. He has also named the brokerage firm in which the work of raising and distributing the fund was said by Rogers to be centered. Unless satisfactory denials or explanations come from Rogers and the survivors of this firm, it must be taken as proved that the huge fund was raised, and raised for the purpose of corruptly reversing the tide that was then running against McKinley. How the money was actually expended, remains yet an open question. Lawson does not indicate whether he has more to tell or not. But whether with reference to its collection or its expenditure, the published denial of the treasurer of the Republican national committee is valueless. Corruption funds are not expended in political campaigns through respectable treasurers of national committees who keep books and use telltale checks. They are expended through confidential agents who use only currency and in denominations which tell no tales.

Outside of Colorado the revolutionary significance of the decision of the Supreme Court of that State, reported this week, escapes serious attention. Even in Colorado, except by a few observers, it is not appreciated. But one innocent-looking phrase of the reports should make its sinister significance clear—the phrase which describes the basis of the decision.

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The Colorado court, by a vote of two Republican judges to one Democratic judge, decide to throw out the entire vote of certain voting precincts. The basis on which this is done is not that the vote is tainted by fraud, as is commonly supposed; nor because the statutes authorize it, for they do not. It is solely because some acts were committed in those precincts in violation of an injunction which the two majority judges had issued.

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The acts in violation of the injunction happened to be frauds and in violation of election laws. The injunction had forbidden only such acts. But that makes no difference with reference to the vital point in the matter. As every lawyer knows, election statutes are one thing and an injunction another, whether they are parallel or not; and it is for violation of the injunction, not for violation of the statutes, that the court has thrown out all the votes of those precincts. If it could do that for violation of an injunction forbidding infractions of election statutes, it could do it for violation of an injunction forbidding any other acts which, as a "prerogative" court (p. 149), it might choose to forbid. The injunction, not the statute, is the thing in this case.

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As stated in our Denver letter (p. 547) this is "the longest stride yet in the direction of government by injunction." The integrity of elections in Colorado is by that decision removed from the protection prescribed by the election statutes; and the function of regulating the voting at elections and determining the results, is arbitrarily assumed by the Supreme Court, sitting simply as a court of equity. So sitting it makes no discrimination between honest and fraudulent voting, but throws out whole precincts upon learning that its injunction has been to any extent violated. In this way a legislature is packed by the Supreme Court; not in regular statutory proceedings, but in extraordinary injunction proceedings. If fear of popular outbreak does not deter them, even the governorship will probably be determined by these usurping judges through this wholesale throwing out of precincts in proceedings for contempt of a "prerogative" writ of injunction.

"I am thankful," writes a New York lawyer of middle age, "that I began to study law long enough ago to have the principles of free speech make a very strong impression upon my mind;" to which he adds: "The successful struggle for it was thought a great deal more of twenty years ago than it is now, when the danger has become great of grafting in the law