merely an amendment under which the changes wanted by the Chicago corporation interests can be secured without the possibility of any realization of those they don't want. Voters who favor a constitutional convention, so that all desirable constitutional changes may be made, will best promote their object in that respect by voting against the proposed charter amendment.

Among the sterling democratic Democrats who are candidates for useful offices of which they would be useful incumbents, is Frank Stephens, of Philadelphia. He is the Democratic candidate for State senator in the seventh senatorial district, his candidacy being under the management of Harold Sudell, 5030 Hazel avenue, Philadelphia. Mr. Stephens is making his campaign, which appears from Philadelphia papers to be a lively one, in the interest of honest taxation—not in the old and hackneyed sense, but in a very real sense. Impressed with the value of the New York system of distinguishing site value from improvement value, in the assessing of each parcel of real estate, and then publishing the tax list in detail, a system but recently adopted in New York (p. 451), Mr. Stephens is urging the adoption of this system in Philadelphia. It is a bad system for tax dodgers but a good one for tax payers. In making his campaign Mr. Stephens is supported by such papers as the Record, the Ledger and the North American, a fact which in itself is an encouraging sign of a developing public sentiment in the right direction on fiscal matters in the good old city of Philadelphia.

Entirely apart from all questions of equal suffrage, the intelligent women of this country are protesting against being classed by act of Congress, in express terms, with illiterates and felons. This classification is made in the bill, now pending in the Senate, for the admission into the Union as a State, of Oklahoma and the Indian Territory. That bill forbids the proposed State ever to restrict the suffrage "on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude, or on account of any other conditions or qualifications, save and except on account of illiteracy, minority, sex, conviction of felony, mental condition or residence." A committee of protest has been organized by eminent women, who invite immediate correspondence on the subject with Mrs. Harriet Taylor Upton, of Warren, Ohio. They demand that the word "sex" be struck out of the bill, not only as an open and flagrant insult, but also as making possible such an interpretation of this enabling act as not merely to excuse disfranchisement of women by the State but even to prohibit its enfranchising them.

Owing to the light registration of women in Chicago the usual inane comment upon woman suffrage is going the newspaper rounds—the comment, namely, that this proves indifference to voting rights on the part of the great mass of women. If masculine reasoning powers were to be graded by this test, masculine reputation for intelligence would fare ill. It might better adopt the traditional feminine syllogism—"because." For the Chicago registration of women is utterly without significance. Women are allowed to vote only for trustees of the State University, officers in whom there is no political interest, and for whom but few men would vote if they were not already at the polls to vote for something in which they are interested. Added to this is the fact that every woman who registers and votes is doing something out of the common, and doing it in the face of numerous discouragements—such as offensive polling places, impertinent election officers, and jostling and impudent crowds of men. Furthermore, no attempt is made to "bring out" the woman vote, and only by strict attention to election notices can any woman know that she has the right to vote; for not at all elections does this privilege recur, and newspapers make no display of the information when the time approaches. Of the women who are now registered voters in Chicago, it would be safe to say that they are a large proportion of those who knew in time that they had a right to vote; of the remainder of those who knew, it would be safe to add that a large proportion were prevented either by a reasonable timidity or by difficulties of time, place and circumstances. No inference can be drawn from a small registration of women under those conditions. Let the politicians nominate for University trustees some persons conspicuously obnoxious to women, and inferences might be drawn from a light registration. But in that case there would be no room for inferences. Women voters would outnumber the men. Voting is not wholly free from the influence of human nature, whether voters are men or women.

The Boston Herald has gone all the way to the Luchu islands to prove that communal land tenure is not productive of good results. In those islands it appears from the Herald to have been customary to re-allot land holdings at intervals of from five to thirty years, and in consequence land was not well improved. But now all this is changed. Individual ownership having been established, the Herald reports great industrial improvement. The sugar crop alone has increased more than 30 per cent. in volume, and other gains equally satisfactory have been made. But satisfactory to whom? Who enjoys the increase? That question is always overlooked by your touter for industrial progress.

Really, it was quite unnecessary to cite the Luchu islands to prove that communal land tenure, with frequent changes of occupiers, does not promote industry. History testifies to it and common sense suggests it. But it is only swapping evils to change from communal tenures to land monopoly. What is needed is security of tenure. This is not afforded by

the communal system, but it is afforded by permanent individual possession. Yet if permanent individual possession be allowed to carry with it ownership of the pecuniary advantages of site monopoly, the end of that community will be worse than its beginning. Its primitive conditions, with freedom and without the evil contrasts of wealth and poverty, will have been exchanged for civilized conditions with freedom and wealth for the few and poverty and some species of slavery for the many. The happy mean is a tenure which secures permanency of possession to the individual, and the differential values of different sites to the community. This can be secured, whether in the Luchu islands or here, by making individual possession continuously dependent upon individual compensation to all for the superior individual holdings of each.

Single taxers everywhere will be glad to learn that Judge Edward Osgood Brown, whose record as one of them dates back into the '80s, and who was elected to the Circuit Court bench in Chicago in June, 1903, has been assigned by the Supreme Court of Illinois to sit in the Appellate Court for the district which includes Chicago. The Appellate Courts of Illinois sit in review of Circuit Court decision in their respective districts, their own decisions in certain cases being reviewable by the Supreme Court of the State and in others being final.

THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM—MARRIAGE CEREMONIALS.

In their civil and social, as distinguished from their religious bearings, marriage problems hinge not upon the fact of marriage itself, but upon the marriage ceremonial. For it is by means of this that the marriage contract is declared, and with reference to it that all the civil obligations of marriage must be determined.

The particular form of ceremonial may be properly disregarded. Whether it be distinguished by lavish display or by severe simplicity, by church rituals or customs, by prescribed civil proceedings, or by mere informal announcement, makes no difference, for civil and social purposes. Church authorities may insist upon ecclesiastical formalities, and religious sentiment may reverently acquiesce; but civil society can properly demand nothing more than that there shall be a binding and exclusive contract, and that this contract shall in some form agreeable to the parties be publicly avowed.

That civil society can rightly demand nothing more than this regarding marriages, admits of no dispute without injecting ecclesiasticism into questions of civil government and thereby confusing the functions of church and state. It may be fairly questioned, however, whether civil society has the right to demand even so much. We are therefore confronted with the first three of the five questions (p. 452) heretofore reserved for consideration:

(1) May society properly exact binding contracts of marriage, and assume for social and civil purposes that if there be no contract of marriage there is no marriage?

(2) If so, has society the right to regulate marriage contracts so far as to inhibit the making of a second marriage contract while a previous one subsists between either party and a third person?

And in this inquiry the third of those question is incidentally involved, namely:

(3) If society has this right, has it also the complementary right to annul marriage contracts?

At the outset of our examination into those questions it may be conceded that the ceremonial contract of marriage is only a conventionality. No marriage is really made by the ceremonial contract. Quite irrespective of that conventionality (p. 405), the marriage either does exist or does not exist. Yet it by no means follows that civil society may properly dispense with or disregard the conventionality.

Doubtless there is plausibility in the argument against conventional marriage. Marriage concerns the parties so vitally, and in its more vital respects seems to affect them so exclusively, that the contention that civil society ought to "keep hands off" appears to have great force. Nor does this notion lose any of its apparent force when brought to the test of the highest ideals of marriage. Inasmuch as marriage itself is the real substance, and marriage conventionalities only a shadow or shape, the conclusion may seem to follow that civil society ought to ignore conventionality and refer the whole subject of marriage to the unrestrained jurisdiction of the only competent tribunal—the will and understanding of the parties in each case.

But that position is untenable. It rests upon the assumption that only the parties to a marriage are seriously concerned in its civil obligations, which is a manifest mistake; and it proceeds upon the theory that conventionalities are superfluities, which is erroneous, as reflection will show.

Conventionalities are not necessarily superfluous. Probably all persistent conventionalities, even the least important, are rooted in some useful purpose. Were we to take the trouble to understand them, we should probably learn to respect them more highly and to observe them more faithfully.

Occasions arise, of course, when even useful conventionalities are to be cast aside without hesitation or heartache. Such occasions are illustrated in a minor way by the familiar story of the gentleman who, upon observing at a public dinner that other guests were rudely smiling at the mistake of an unsophisticated diner in drinking from his finger bowl, rebuked the cultivated boors and put the stranger in countenance by himself using a finger bowl as a drinking cup. That defiance of a polite conventionality was an act of true politeness, one which probably demanded some degree of moral courage. Yet we should hardly say that it would be either polite or courageous to defy dining conventionalities by habitually drinking from finger bowls.

As a rule, conventionalities are to be respected for their probable usefulness. Little ones may have their little uses, larger ones their larger uses.

The little conventionalities are to brotherly association somewhat as rules to arithmetic. They save the labor of calculation. Abolish them, and we should be under the necessity of calculating