

is not due to the fact that they are intended for yellow fever districts.

It is the social objection to the negro, doubtless, that has fostered the contempt in official quarters for the Cuban republicans, many of whom are negroes, and given rise to the idea that they are incapable of self-government and at the end of the war must be compelled to abandon the republic they have fought for years to establish, and let the Spanish landlords set up a government in its place in harmony with their idea of making the masses of the people their slaves in one form if not another. This contempt of the Cuban republicans has found expression in various ways. More recently it has taken the shape of sneering allusions to the non-appearance of Cuban troops to assist the invading army, and to their having endangered their allies as much as the enemy with their wild shooting when they did appear. But it is turning out that the Cubans have really been most efficient allies of the Americans, and that even now they are making our invasion of Cuba possible. We may find, as the war approaches an end, that the conduct of the Cuban patriots will have so impressed the American troops that a strong soldier sentiment will hold in check any attempt to make this war a war for the conquest of Cuba instead of one for the liberation of the Cuban republic. American soldiers who have seen the stars and stripes flying in battle side by side with the flag of free Cuba, and become accustomed to a life and death comradeship with the Cuban patriots in a common cause, can hardly contemplate with patience any proposition to treat those patriots and their island as American spoil of war.

A marked change in public opinion is taking place regarding the future of the Philippines. When those islands were supposed to be inhabited by a race of savages who had been kept in order by the bloody methods of the Spanish government,

it was not difficult to create a feeling that whatever else might be done the Philippines ought not to be turned over to the government of the people inhabiting them. But Aguinaldo's military genius and his statesmanship, together with the confidence which Dewey, Wildman and Pratt have reposed in him and his fellow countrymen, have made uphill work for the expansionists. The more the American people learn of the merits of the Philippine rebellion, of the bloody regime of the Spanish there, and of the character of the natives, the less disposed will they be to tolerate either the return of the Philippine islands to the Spanish, or their occupation in perpetuity by the United States. There is that in the American spirit which makes it easy to excite the people with visions of national expansion, but there is also that in the American spirit which makes it practically impossible to set this nation upon a career of subjugation and conquest. As soon as expansion is understood to mean indifference to the rights of well-disposed peoples, the song for expansion will cease to charm.

American writers and public speakers should carefully note that while the war lasts American warships always "move majestically," while Spanish warships invariably "prowl."

FOR A GREAT NAVY.

The article on "Current Fallacies Upon Naval Subjects," by Capt. A. T. Mahan, of the United States navy, an authority of international reputation in his profession, which appears in Harper's for June, is a calm and impressive presentation of the best side of the argument for a powerful naval arm.

Among the fallacies which Capt. Mahan discusses is the familiar one that if the United States acquire outlying territory, it will need for its protection a navy larger than the largest now in the world. Another is the equally familiar one that advances in naval science make warships obsolete almost before they can be launched.

That these are fallacies, Capt. Mahan very clearly shows. To the first, he answers that a relatively small navy of tolerable strength, well placed, would be such a menace to the interests of even the most powerful nations that its mere existence would insure decent treatment without war; and to the second, that while naval improvement is continually going on, it is in the nature of modification rather than revolution, and the ships which it displaces from the first grades become effective reserves, relieving the newer ships from minor duties and often decisively reinforcing them in action.

But the most impressive as well as the most important point in Capt. Mahan's paper is his answer to the objections to a navy for any other purpose than defense.

He makes a distinction between defense in the political, and defense in the military sense. In the political sense a navy for defense only, means a navy that will not be used unless we are forced into a war to defend ourselves; but in the military sense it means one that even in the midst of war must await attack and only defend its own interests, leaving the enemy's interests free from danger and the enemy at liberty to choose his own time and manner of fighting. In the former sense, the political, Capt. Mahan regards the idea of a navy for defense alone as noble; in the latter, the military sense, he regards it as folly. "Among all the masters of the military art," he says, "it is a thoroughly accepted principle that mere defensive war means military ruin and therefore national disaster." He also notes argumentatively that the most beneficial use of a military force is not to wage war, however successfully, but to prevent war.

It would be evidence of weakness to deny the strength of Capt. Mahan's position. So long as the distinction between defense in the political and defense in the military sense is kept clear, the argument for a military force capable of attacking the enemy in his own vital interests, is persuasive. But after all, though we may in theory make this distinction clear, we cannot in practice maintain a powerful navy and prevent the military idea of defense from influencing the political