cided that the effect of annexation was to make Hawaii a part of the United States so far as to abrogate the treaty under which Hawaiian products were admitted free, but left it in the condition of a foreign country so far as to make those products subject to full Dingley rates.

Democratic platforms are being lifted this year to distinctly higher levels. Particular instances have already attracted our attention, and we are now able to point to the democratic platform of Michigan as in many respects a model of what at the present juncture a state platform should be. On the subject of taxation and franchises it demands—

> a specific tax upon the great mining interests of the state, levied in accordance with the value of their unearned stores of wealth, which ought never to have been given to private control. . . . . A tax upon existing franchises of a semipublic character commensurate with their earning power. . . . . The regulation of property taxes so as to prevent the shifting of the burden on to the shoulders of productive labor. . . . . The prohibition of the granting of further franchises by municipalities except by the direct vote of the people of the territory affected.

And on the subject of trusts this extraordinarily direct attack upon the source of their power harmonizes in principle with the other principal clauses of the platform:

> We look with apprehension on the progress of the trusts toward the industrial subjugation of the republic, and, recognizing that their power of oppression is founded on special privileges derived from the statutes, we pledge ourselves to repeal all laws by which special privileges are confirmed.

In this platform, then, are to be found the essential principles of sound taxation, of just land tenure, and of franchise regulation; and when the clause on trusts shall have become the accepted doctrine of the laws, trusts will be no more. Combination there will be. But combination for service is beneficial. There will be no combinations of special privileges, the only kind of combination that is harmful. For special privileges will have been abolished.

The soundest and most complete decision ever rendered by an appellate court upon the labor question is a recent one of the appellate division of the New York supreme court. It was rendered in an injunction case. Two labor organizations were at war. Both were composed of steam fitters. They were known respectively as the "National" and the "Enterprise." The latter warned employes in the building trade that if they continued to employ members of the "National" union the members of the "Enterprise" and of all allied unions would quit work. This threat had its effect. Employers were discharging such of their men as belonged to the "Nationals;" and in defense of their organization the "Nationals" procured an injunction. The injunction has now been dissolved. In deciding to dissolve it the appellate division reasoned that every workman has the right to say for whom and with whom he will work; that the exercise of this right is absolute and cannot be affected by any motive; that every employer has a corresponding absolute right to say whom he will employ; and that from all this it follows that an individual may legally refuse to work for the purpose of inducing his employer to discharge a fellow workman. Then comes the question of combination, which is the vital one. The court conclusively disposes of it by holding that a workman having this right as an individual—

> does not lose it when acting with others, clothed with an equal right, so that employers may continue to say they will not employ persons who are members of labor organizations, and laborers may continue to say they will not work for employers who engage any but members of labor organizations.

This decision goes to the root of the labor question in the law. It holds precisely what the courts should have held from the first, and what they would have held from the first had they not been class courts instead of courts of justice. That which all men have a right to do individually, all, or any number less than all, have a right to do together. Mere association or combination can make no act criminal if both the end and the means are lawful, unless it is declared to be so by express statute. But judges in the past, striving to serve one class by interfering with the rights of another, have strained statutes and disregarded principle in order to throttle labor organizations. All the sophistries of these judges have now been swept away by this single common sense decision of the New York court.

To be sure, the decision works in favor of employers as well as workingmen. But that does not alter the situation. It is long since employers' unions have been held to any judicial accountability analagous to that to which workmen's unions have been subjected. Were this otherwise, however, the decision of the New York court would be none the less commendable. It is sound doctrine that both employers and workingmen ought to be free to make their contracts. Any workingman ought to have the absolute right, individually or in combination with others, to refuse employment whenever the terms do not suit him. So any employer ought to have the absolute right, individually or in combination with others, to deny employment to any person to whom he objects. If it be urged that this privilege might work hardship through combinations for blacklisting, let it be observed that it is not the combination that would work the hardship. Mere combinations of competitive business agencies cannot work hardship. It is because the combining persons or combinations have legal monopolies which enable them arbitrarily to close all other doors of employment as well as their own. Abolish the legal monopolies, and no workman need have the slightest fear of a blacklist.

In a comment upon the McCann case, of which we published a lengthy account last week, the St. Louis Globe-Democrat of July 25th exhibits a curious flaw in its faculty for distinguishing differences. It defends the incarceration of McCann for re-