

not support the party policy, he is, by the same test, conspicuously not a Democrat.

It is not for the Chronicle, then, to criticize Bryan for proving that Cleveland does not come up to its own standard for a Democrat. It is rather for it, and for that matter for all other Cleveland papers, to stop making faces at Bryan and calling him names, long enough to explain away the following indictment which Bryan made against Cleveland as a Democrat, in one of the March issues of the Commoner, and to which there has been as yet no answer.

For four years he stood between the people and reform; for four years he made the White House the rendezvous of cunning and crafty representatives of predatory wealth; for four years the corporations and syndicates controlled his administration and forced him to veto Democratic measures and sign Republican measures. He refused to give sanction to the most important measure supported by the Democrats and bent all his energies toward securing legislation desired by the Republicans, even when he knew that he would divide his party by doing so.

He loaded tariff reform down with the blame that should have been borne by the gold standard, and not only did nothing for the country himself, but left a record that has hung like a millstone about the neck of the party ever since.

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN.

The rejoicings over the recognition at last of the Republic of Cuba are not altogether unmixed with regret.

On the part of a certain class, whose reactionary purposes have ingloriously dominated American policies for the past four years, it is regretted that Cuba has not been made a colonial dependency of the United States.

Some of these acknowledge that this could not have been done with any semblance or even a pretense of honor, in the face of the altruistic resolutions with which Congress declared the intentions of the American people in making war upon Spain, resolutions which they now choose to denounce as sentimental folly. Others, better equipped with the courage of their satanic convictions, would have had the American government throw

honor to the winds by ignoring those resolutions altogether. In imitation of the imperialist policy of Great Britain, they would have had us make of Cuba what the British call a "crown colony," as we have done with Porto Rico, and as, with cruelty so revolting that it shocks the humane sensibilities of mankind, we are trying to do with the Philippine islands.

The regrets of another class spring out of a different spirit.

They regret that our public servants have not been sufficiently sensitive to national honor, saying nothing of the simplest principles of morality, to execute the mandate of those congressional resolutions without modification, crooked interpretation or other manner of evasion.

The resolutions having declared that the people of Cuba then were and of right ought to be "free and independent;" that the United States, in expelling Spain from the island of Cuba, had no "disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof;" and that it was the determination of the United States, when pacification should be accomplished, "to leave the government and control of the island to its people"—such having been the guarantees of good faith and the altruistic aims which this government pledged in making war upon Spain, this class of persons would have had those guarantees observed with all honorable fidelity.

The island having been pacified they would have had the independence of Cuba recognized by their own country as fully as that of their own country is recognized by the rest of the world. Pacification in Cuba having been accomplished, as it long since has been, they would have had the United States make good its pledge "to leave the government and control of the island to its people," by wholly relinquishing, in form and in fact, all "sovereignty, jurisdiction and control" over it. They would not have imposed as conditions precedent to doing what they were already pledged to do, such limitations upon Cuban independence as Congress did impose a year ago.

But regrets of either kind no long-

er avail; and those of the better kind are likely to prove practically unimportant, so far as Cuba is concerned.

In the hearts of Americans who love their country, who cherish its honor, and who are devoted to its great ideals, there must always be a rankle of regret and a tingle of shame when they reflect upon this perfidious episode in its history. They must be conscious, also, of a resulting weakness of the nation in dealing with moral problems in the future. For they cannot but feel that whenever it may again assume to lead in a righteous cause, however sincerely, it must incur not only unfounded suspicions, but also sneering and deserved allusions to its "disinterested" intervention in behalf of Cuba. Notwithstanding this perfidy, however, Cuba's independence is virtually assured.

Though the conditions wrongly imposed by duress upon her constitutional convention remain of record, the circumstances now attending her recognition as a republic are of such a character that those conditions, insofar as they degrade her sovereignty, must gradually fall into innocuous desuetude. Whether President Roosevelt has deliberately designed the release of Cuba from the suzerainty in which the McKinley policy and the resolutions of a year ago placed her, as is to be earnestly hoped, or has blundered, as some of his party organs say, makes no difference to the result. By causing an American minister to be sent to Cuba, and arranging to recognize a Cuban minister at Washington, he has placed this country in the position of acknowledging the essential sovereignty of that republic. A suzerain nation does not station ministers at the capital of its dependencies, nor receive ministers from them. By her example, therefore, the United States does acknowledge the complete independence and sovereignty of Cuba. This example, whether a blunder or by design, will of course be followed by other nations. Great Britain has already acted. She was even represented by a minister at the inauguration of the Republic, while we had no diplomatic representation there at all. President Roosevelt had appointed a minister, but he was not yet confirmed. In time, all the nations will be

represented diplomatically at Havana, and Cuba will be represented diplomatically at all the capitals of the world. Having by example invited the establishment of these diplomatic relationships, it will no longer be diplomatically possible for us to insist upon suzerain claims in Cuba. The issue of right would be against us, and the issue of might would not then be all our way.

We might hold Cuba bound by treaty obligations, but we could not safely construe those obligations into pledges of fealty; and insofar as the obligations themselves are partial to American pretensions, they will grow weaker and weaker as Cuba's diplomatic relationships extend and her international interests ramify, until they finally disappear.

A new sovereign nation has therefore really come into existence; one which is not only distinct upon the maps and sovereign in outward form, but which despite all formal reservations, is also sovereign in fact.

It may be that Cuba will hereafter become part of American soil. It may be that she will raise aloft the flag of our Union, which, perverted and polluted though at times it has been, is for all that the truest symbol among the flags of nations of individual liberty and national independence. But if Cuba should do this, her act would be voluntary and her status that of a sovereign state in the American federation. She would be no victim of "criminal aggression," no mangled beneficiary of "benevolent assimilation," no mere creature of Destiny, no "crown colony," no dependency, no alien member of the American family attached to the house but not of the household. She would be a state like any of the other states.

And until she does come into our Union by her own voluntary act, in obedience to the free will of her people and ours, or similarly associate herself with some other American republic, whose people may be by race and language better adapted for fraternal as distinguished from benevolent assimilation—until she does in that way voluntarily yield some of her sovereignty in exchange for a larger national association, she will

remain, in spite of all the sordid intrigue which has darkened what might otherwise have been our glorious record in connection with her history, an independent republic. What Texas was she will continue to be, a sovereign nation, until she herself elects to become what Texas is, an equal member of a larger nation.

Surely this gives good cause for rejoicing. Even if our national record is besmirched we can rise above all vain regrets for that, to the high hope that yet in the progress of our national life we may atone for it and outlive it.

The one fact, however, that cannot be ignored, yet which brings discord into the song of rejoicing over Cuban independence, is the sad condition of the people of the Philippines. Our treatment of those people, whose claims upon our generosity, if, indeed that may not have ceased to be one of our national traits, have for four years been equal to the claims of the Cubans, is no closed record which can only be regretted vainly. It is a record still in the making. We cannot restore the thousands of innocent lives we have sacrificed. We cannot undo the slaughter, devastation and cruelty for the sake of conquest, which have turned the affection for us of a whole people into undying hatred, and provoked cynical mirth in every autocratic court of Europe. Thus far this record is closed and can only be a subject of vain regret. But we can reverse our policy. We can do for the Philippine islands even at this late hour what has been done for Cuba. We can revive the Filipino republic even as we have revived the Cuban republic. And as with Cuba this is our pledged duty.

When our nation declared that it had no intention of profiting in Cuba by making war upon Spain, the letter of the declaration did apply to Cuba alone. But no one then expected that the destiny of the Philippines would be involved in the war. If such an expectation had arisen, can it be for a moment supposed that our declaration of disinterestedness would have proposed annexing the Philippines? Does anyone imagine that we would have said it was our inten-

tion to remain in Cuba only to pacify it and this being done to get out, but that as to the Philippines we intended to "expand" by adding them to our dominions? What a laugh that would have evoked to grate upon our national nerves. We should have said nothing of the kind. Neither should we have been silent. Had we foreseen the expulsion of Spain from the Philippines, we should have made the same declaration regarding those islands that we did regarding Cuba. This would have been necessary not only to save our face in Europe; it would have been necessary also to preserve our self-respect and honor, for at that time the American people, hot though they may have been for war, chivalrous or vindictive, had no stomach for conquest. The pledge regarding Cuba applied, then, though not in letter yet incontestably in spirit, to the Philippines as well as to Cuba. And that pledge we have violated and are continuing to violate.

We found a revolution in progress against Spain in the Philippines as in Cuba.

We relied upon the revolutionists to drive the Spaniards on the islands into Manila and bottle them up there from the land side, while our fleet held them in check from the bay.

We saw them organize a republic and knew, as our public records prove, that they aspired to independence.

Our own naval commander certified that these people were as capable of self-government as the Cubans.

Our own naval officers of lower grade, sent into the interior on tours of investigation, reported that the authority of the new republic was recognized by the inhabitants and that it was maintaining order and peace—that it alone stood between order and anarchy, preserving the former and preventing the latter.

Against this republic we wantonly declared war. Six weeks before the actual outbreak at Manila, our President, without authority from Congress, but simply in his military capacity as commander in chief of the army and navy, proclaimed American sovereignty over all the territory which the Filipino republic had for six months effectively and peacefully governed. It was a notification to that government to dissolve. It was

a warning to its citizens that if they did not yield to the United States in preference to their own self-established government—the first republic of Asia—they would be violently dealt with by American troops and American warships. This was the first declaration, the first announcement, the official beginning of the American war of conquest in the Philippines. And under that proclamation we have crushed a republic modeled upon our own. We have made charred ruins of civilized cities and villages and laid the country waste; we have slaughtered the inhabitants by scores of thousands and have savagely broken the peace and disturbed the good order that our own officers reported as prevailing under the republic; and we now spread over the islands a pall of death and call it "pacification."

How different all this might have been. Had we as a nation remained true to the letter and spirit of our pledge regarding Cuba, a pledge which was but a concrete expression of the foundation principles of American democracy and applied no more to Cuba than to the Philippines, we might now rejoice over the advent, under our good offices, not alone of one republic in the West Indies, but of one there and of a greater one in the far Pacific. Had we done that, we might rejoice over the spread of republican ideals. Had we done that, we might rejoice over our exalted position as a world power ruling by the force, not of mere armaments, but of ideas, ideals and moral example.

It is true that in this case internal dissensions in the republics we fostered might at times make us grieve and possibly despair. They might be subject to the disorders of South America, of Haiti and of San Domingo, which are so often cited as instances of the failure of popular government among "inferior" peoples.

But sneers like these could be answered with a little intelligent reflection. Pray are the "superior" people of autocratic Russia free from internal commotions. Does England govern Ireland without a jar. Was Spain a model of harmony while her seceded colonies, turned republics, were in the throes of revolution? Was not our own

civil war sanguinary enough to offset several generations of civil war in Haiti or San Domingo or the republics of South America? Or, to come to the immediate point, what can the scoffer at republics of "inferior" peoples say for our administration in the Philippines? Is that "pacification" which we in our might have spread over those islands preferable to the peace and order our officers reported from the interior of Luzon under the Filipino republic? Is it preferable even to the commotions in Haiti?

And what if we are told that peace and order would prevail if the people there did not resist our benevolent designs? Why, that is the way the oligarchy of Russia explains disorder under the benevolent regime of the czar. It is the way tyrants always explain disorder under their rule. Disorder in republics may be an objection to the republican mode of government; but if it is, it is not an objection which can be urged either as an excuse or a justification for autocratic modes, whether benevolent or malevolent. No mode of government can preserve peace and order among a dissatisfied people.

But this point is quite incidental in connection with the Philippine question, for we have the evidence of a three-years' war, attested by the reports of our generals that the Filipino people are not contented with American rule; and we have the further evidence of our own officials that they were contented with the rule of their republic. So far, then, as the actual facts aid us, we are justified in the inference that if our government had fostered the Filipino republic, as the spirit of its Cuban pledge required, instead of proclaiming its suppression, as President McKinley did on the 21st of December, 1898, we might now be celebrating two of the greatest achievements of our history next to the establishment of our own independence and the emancipation of our slaves.

That is what might have been. And in this case as truly, but with importance infinitely greater than in that of Whittier's judge and his hayfield maid, those are the saddest of all sad words. No sadder are in-

scribed in the history of our nation, and they can never be wholly effaced.

But the rising hope is that our people, under the inspiration of an awakened public conscience and revived patriotism, will yet write beneath that doleful lament, and write in blazing letters which our public servants cannot fail to see, these words of atonement: "That which might have been shall be!"

NEWS

Cuban independence (p. 88) was formally established on the 20th.

Five days earlier, on the 15th, the Cuban senate and house of representatives met in joint session at Havana, and after examining the credentials of the presidential and senatorial electoral colleges, declared them correct and proclaimed Tomas Estrada Palma as president and Luiz Estevez as vice president. Gov. Gen. Wood was at once formally notified of this action, and on the next day President Palma appointed the following cabinet:

Secretary of government—Diego Tamayo (nationalist), formerly secretary of state under Gov. Gen. Wood; secretary of finance—Garcia Montes (republican); secretary of state and justice—Carlos Zaldo (republican-autonomist); secretary of public instruction—Eduardo Yero (nationalist); secretary of public works—Manuel Diaz (nationalist), and secretary of agriculture—Emilio Terry (independent).

Public festivities in celebration of the establishment of the new republic began on the 16th with a banquet in honor of Gov. Gen. Wood and the other American officers about to depart from Cuba. It was given by the veterans of the wars for Cuban independence, and Gen. Maximo Gomez, formerly commander-in-chief of the Cuban army, presided. At his right sat the principal guest, Gov. Gen. Wood, and at his left President Palma. William J. Bryan sat next to the President and spoke to the sentiment, "Patriotism." In closing he said he would rather see the stars and stripes live in the hearts of the Cuban people than float over the island. During Gov. Gen. Wood's speech, in which he congratulated the Cubans upon their triumph, thanked them for their cooperation, and in the name of the United States