

again acquires the pound-rate privilege at Washington, notwithstanding that it is still published "primarily for the purpose of advertising" its editor's ideas. No wonder the Republicans in Congress are so shy of an investigation of the Post Office Department.

When the New York Times tells its readers that the Democratic party "was sick unto death" for "four years, from 1896 to 1900," implying that it fell sick under the leadership of Bryan, having theretofore and under Cleveland's leadership been of sound and disposing mind and memory, the Times displays the same symptoms of malignant groverclevelanditis with which the Brooklyn Eagle suffers. If the editor of the Times were to examine his political almanacs he would find that the Democratic party fell deathly sick under the leadership of Cleveland. We have advised our readers of the affliction in this respect under which the Eagle suffers (vol. vi, p. 785); but the Eagle's symptoms were more localized than are those of the Times. The Eagle pointed only to Illinois, where it found Democracy in fine feather in 1892, but observed that it began to droop in 1896 and has continued to droop ever since. The Times, however, implies that Bryan demoralized the Democracy of the whole country in the years running from 1896 to 1900. Yet the fact is, and all political almanacs prove it, that the Democracy was demoralized in 1894 not only in Illinois but all over the country; not in 1896 under Bryan, mind you, but in 1894 under Cleveland.

After our disclosure of this fact with reference to Illinois and in answer to the Brooklyn Eagle, the daily Banner, of Nashville, Tenn., came to the Eagle's support. In its issue of April 2d it pointed out the unwisdom of relying upon political almanacs, and went behind the statistical returns to show that really it was not Cleveland's fault that the Democratic party became so sick in 1894. We

are very much at one with the Banner regarding statistics in general, although for election returns we have never been able to find a satisfactory substitute. But when the Banner undertakes to explain why its party collapsed in 1894, it begs the question; or, as it would doubtless prefer to express it (in keeping with its "suppressio veri" and "expressio falsi"), it is guilty of a "petitio principii." The point the Eagle made, the point the New York Times makes, the point Mr. Cleveland himself made in a public speech about a year ago, was this: that the Democratic party was in healthy condition until Mr. Bryan took it in hand in 1896, and that from that time on it has been sick. Our answer is that the Democratic party was sicker in 1894, under Cleveland, than in 1896 under Bryan. It is a transparent evasion to meet that answer, as the Banner assumes to do, with any explanation whatever, either good or bad, of why the fact was so. The issue is the fact itself, not the reason for it.

But the Banner's reasons are exceedingly poor. It explains the 1894 reverse in Illinois on the ground that under Altgeld the people of this State had become strongly antagonistic to Cleveland. But that couldn't have been so, let us remind the Banner, if Cleveland had commanded their confidence. Moreover, the collapse of 1894 was not confined to Illinois. It was general. Even New York and New Jersey voiced their condemnation of Cleveland in that fateful year. The Banner may amuse itself at explaining this; but the more it explains the plainer it makes it that it was Cleveland who demoralized the Democratic party.

Thus far the Nashville Banner shows no symptoms of groverclevelanditis. It honestly admits that the collapse did occur in 1894. But now some symptoms of the malady that has attacked the Eagle and the Times begin to appear in the Banner. Possibly this

may be attributed to its method of ignoring election statistics and roaming around its editor's brains for facts. That is convenient, no doubt; but with reference to reputation for veracity it is somewhat risky. Of 1896 the Banner says: "But as bad as the reverse of 1894 may have been, it was nothing compared with the crushing defeat of 1896, when Bryan had obtained full control of the Democratic party." The fact, however, is quite otherwise. We are obliged to go to election statistics to prove it, and therefore cannot hope to convince the Banner; yet the election statistics do testify most impressively that at the elections of 1896 the Democratic party regained to a considerable extent its Congressional losses of 1894. In the Congress elected in 1894, under Cleveland's leadership, the Democrats had only 93 Representatives; in the Congress elected in 1896, under Bryan's leadership, the Democrats had 130 Representatives. In the former, the Republican majority was 74; in the latter, it was only 24. And in the Congress elected in 1900, also under Bryan, the Democratic representation had risen to 153 and the Republican majority had fallen to 20. We fear that the Nashville Banner, like the Brooklyn Eagle and the New York Times, may indeed be suffering with an attack, temporary we trust, of groverclevelanditis.

#### DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT.

In considering the present situation in Democratic party politics, it is folly to deny the fact of an irrepressible conflict inside the party. Without entering at this time upon any discussion of the causes and merits of this conflict, we may say, with no possibility of a reasonable contradiction, that upon the whole Grover Cleveland personifies one side of it and William J. Bryan the other, and that it is absolutely irreconcilable.

In contrasting Cleveland and Bryan in that way we do not mean to be understood as intimating that the conflict is personal. It is in fact the least personal of any

factional fight in the history of party politics in the United States.

Doubtless Cleveland numbers among his ardent supporters many who are actuated primarily by personal friendship or admiration. Doubtless the same thing is true of Bryan. Probably, also, each entertains a personal dislike for the other; and certainly the friends of each entertain toward the other most cordial sentiments of personal animosity. It may be said, moreover, that among the personal supporters of both—those of Bryan especially at the South and those of Cleveland especially in the East—are many whose fundamental political views are at variance with the tendencies of Bryanism in the one case and of Clevelandism in the other.

But all that is only incidental to the conflict of opinion over the opposing party tendencies which the two men personify. These factional differences are at bottom differences as to political principle, and not as to preferences for public men. Nor do they relate to principle in the sense of mere party policy. They relate to principles that are vital.

It should be plain, therefore, that neither Cleveland nor Bryan can be nominated for President by the Democratic party without driving from their allegiance to it most of those Democrats who approve the tendency which the other personifies. It should be understood, also, that the nomination of either would tend to draw to the Democratic party from other parties the support of men who prefer the principles of Cleveland or of Bryan, as the case may be, to those of their own party.

For instance, it may be conceded, as Cleveland's friends put it, that Bryan's nomination would drive out wealthy and conservative Democrats, would keep out wealthy and conservative Republicans, and would bring in and keep in only Populists pure and simple, populist Republicans, populist Democrats, and the rag-tag-and-bobtail generally of American political life. But then the converse must also be true, namely—to change synonyms to suit the change in view-point—that Cleveland's nomination

would drive out democratic-Democrats, would keep out democratic-Republicans, and would bring in and keep in only plutocrats pure and simple, plutocratic Republicans, plutocratic Democrats, and wealthy parasites upon industry generally.

Should either Cleveland or Bryan be nominated, then, the Democratic party would gain in distinction, one way or the other—either as a contestant with the Republicans for the honors and comforts of conservatism, or as a representative of radicalism,—but it would certainly be defeated. Either side would be able to defeat the other at the polls, and no compromise could prevent it.

It is very doubtful if even a truce between Cleveland and Bryan themselves could hold the party together, were either nominated at this time, if such a truce were possible. But such a truce is not possible. Cleveland's friends make no concealment of their intention to bolt again if the convention goes Bryan's way; and Bryan, with all his personal popularity, could not stem the tide of defection were the convention to go Cleveland's way.

Those are the plain facts of the case, so far as the possibility of nominating Cleveland or Bryan comes into the question. At present, however, Cleveland and Bryan do not come into the question as nominees, except upon the possibility, which may occur, of a life and death struggle in the convention between the two party tendencies they respectively represent. In that case the final blows would doubtless be struck under the supreme leadership on either side. But, apart from that possibility, neither is to be considered as a candidate, for each has positively declared himself out of the running.

What, then, of other men?

Tom L. Johnson would have been far in the lead for the nomination—regardless of his own desires, which hold him to the municipal work to which he is devoted,—had he materially reduced the Republican majority in Ohio last Fall. But the large majority against him in his own State has ruled him out, according to the conventional tests of party availability. This is a stupid test, of

course. But that probably makes no practical difference; for the hostility to Mr. Johnson, viciously displayed by the organs of Mr. Cleveland's faction all over the country during his campaigns in Ohio, goes far to show that the controlling elements of the Cleveland faction would not harmonize upon Johnson as the national candidate.

Then there is Gen. Miles. He is a Democrat both in party affiliation and in democratic principle. He used to wear a military uniform and was accounted, somewhat vain of its decorative possibilities; but underneath the finery and flummery of his soldiers' coat he carried a democratic heart which beat for men regardless of race, and for peace instead of war.

Then there is Congressman Williams, of Mississippi, whose only offense is that he was born in the South,—an objection which is hollow unless we are to have a revival of the race issue.

Another worthy candidate is District Attorney Folk, of St. Louis, who has made a record for cleansing the Democratic party, by sending some of its powerful criminals to jail.

Gov. Garvin, of Rhode Island, is another. His ability and integrity have been proved by 20 years of service in public life, and he has twice carried his own State notwithstanding that it is normally Republican.

Edward M. Shepard is still another; and he would be as likely to carry New York—if that is what is wanted,—as any other candidate the party could name.

All these are good men personally. They are all Democrats of as pronounced national repute as anyone except Cleveland whom the conservative faction suggests. None of them is identified with Bryan personally; and none are in accord with him on the money question. On that question Shepard is positively opposed to him.

Yet we look in vain for any sign of approval of any of these men from the newspaper organs or other representatives of the Cleveland faction of the Democratic party. The indications are that all are opposed by that faction as positively as it opposes Bryan perennially and as it opposed Johnson in the Ohio campaign.

An exception might possibly be made in favor of Folk, because in national politics he seems to be colorless; or of Shepard on account of his business environment. But Shepard offended the Cleveland faction when he voted for Bryan in 1900, and has repeated his offense by publicly acknowledging Bryan's abilities and integrity. He has probably thus ruled himself out irrevocably.

The Cleveland leaders propose one candidate other than Cleveland himself. With some reluctance they are rallying to the support of Judge Parker, a man who is less known nationally than any of the persons we have so far named, except as he has recently been advertised by his local friends. He is a man whose political sentiments are a profound secret; he is one whose only recommendation for the nomination is that he once carried New York State by a large majority as a candidate on a bi-partisan ticket—a candidate without serious opposition; and he is one who has what the Southern Negro would call a "powerful weakness," in that he has become known as a special political protegee of David B. Hill.

As the matter stands, then, the two leading candidates are Judge Parker, urged as representing more or less correctly the party tendencies which Cleveland personifies, and known only through advertisements put out for him as a candidate; and William R. Hearst, who is announced by his friends as representing those which Bryan personifies, and who also is known chiefly through his advertisements as a candidate. Mr. Cleveland and Senator Gorman have now identified themselves, along with Mr. David B. Hill, with the Parker movement.

Whether or not Mr. Hearst really represents the Bryan tendencies in the Democratic party is of little importance to most people in that trend, as compared with the fact that his principal competitor, Judge Parker, is believed to represent the opposing tendencies. It is this that explains the disposition of so many active and representative men who belong on the Bryan side of the approaching contest, to come to the support of Hearst.

They do not like Hearst. They

realize that entirely apart from the personal charges against him—charges which it is due him to say that he denies, but which if they were proved in the campaign would precipitate complete and scandalous disaster—entirely apart from these charges, Bryan men realize that Hearst is upon the face of his own public record an imperialist, a militarist, and a protectionist. He is, therefore, not their choice. But they regard the proffered alternative of Clevelandism, whether with or without a Hill attachment, as worse; and in this view many democratic Democrats who are not Bryan men are at one with them. Regarding Hearst as the only serious opponent to Clevelandism now available, these men have joined the Hearst movement.

In point of strength it must be conceded that that movement is no longer to be ignored. It is a factor and one of growing importance in the Democratic problem. This is not to imply, however, that there is as yet a probability of Hearst's nomination. All sorts of unforeseen obstacles may loom up when the convention begins its work, and the probability is that both the Hearst movement and that which it opposes (probably the Parker movement), will fall to pieces after the first shock. Should that collapse occur, out of the wreck and ruin may come a nomination which the genuine Democrats in both parties may welcome.

For, let it not be supposed that all the men who are counted with Cleveland are in sympathy with what we of the other side regard as the plutocratic tendencies of Clevelandism. Many Democrats who are hostile to Bryan on the money question, and find themselves allied, loosely and protestingly allied, to the plutocratic supporters of Cleveland, are at heart as thoroughly democratic as the Bryan faction, and more so than many of that faction. They are hostile to plutocracy, but they do not fully realize that Clevelandism tends toward plutocracy. As is always the case in periods of political upheaval, the lines of cleavage in the Democratic party are not simple but complex. Consequently in both factions of that party, as in both the Democratic

and the Republican parties, there are democrats and plutocrats. So it may be that the preliminary clash between Hearst on one side and Parker or some one like him on the other, may help to reveal the democrats on both sides to one another, and thus bring about the nomination of some man who would truly and with dignity represent the democratic Democracy, and who, however objectionable to the plutocrats of all factions and parties, would be acceptable to all who are really opposed to plutocracy. In that view of the matter, there is not so much to deplore in the large radical support Hearst is now commanding as a Hobson's choice. It may turn out to be a saving remnant should the Hearst movement become strong enough to hold the plutocratic wing in check, but not strong enough to win.

#### EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

Washington, April 3.—How completely the law making branch of the government has abdicated its functions is shown in the action of the Republican leaders in reference to the consideration of the sundry civil appropriation bill. It is customary when such a bill is introduced for the chairman of the committee to make a more or less extended speech reviewing its provisions, indicating what general changes, if any, have been made as compared with previous years, and explaining more or less in detail its more important provisions, especially any new clauses. It is also customary to set apart two or three, or even several, days for what is known as "general debate." Under "general debate," members have the opportunity to review the general scope of the bill, not being confined to specific paragraphs. The wide latitude for debate also affords an opportunity for members to discuss any subject upon which they wish to voice their opinions, and it is under these circumstances that most of the political speeches which are subsequently distributed wholesale over the country by Congressional committees as well as by individual members, become part of the permanent record and are thus made "frankable."

Although the sundry civil bill related to hundreds of items and covered 148 printed pages, no explanation of its provisions was made on the floor by the chairman of the committee on appropriations. He contented himself with stating he would print his remarks thereon in the Record. Members, therefore, had no opportunity of questioning him as to the general scope of the bill. Instead of agreeing to three or five days