

continuous unorganized, helter-skelter, cut-throat struggle for those 9 jobs? Nothing.

And what of the employers? As wages fall, general purchasing power declines, for workingmen are great consumers, and by the time the workingmen are reduced to pauperism the employers, with an abundance of products spoiling on their hands, are ruined by sluggish trade.

The tendency thus briefly and candidly illustrated, is the inevitable tendency under prevailing industrial circumstances, of the "open shop" policy. If the illustration is imperfect in any determinative respect, we should be glad to have the defect pointed out.

III

But would not the result of a strictly maintained "closed shop" policy, under conditions similar to those of the above illustration, be the very reverse? Incontestably.

In those circumstances the "closed shop" policy, generally and strictly maintained, would raise the wages of the workingmen and maintain an active market for the employers, and this without lessening opportunities for employment of the non-unionist.

Since the non-unionist would be locked out of every job by the "closed shop" policy, he would have to join the union. This might be an infringement of his rights, it is true, but the concrete economic result to him, and it is that and not his abstract right that we are now considering, would be infinitely better than under the "open shop" system. When he had joined the union the 9 jobs would by trade union principles, be distributed so that in effect nine-tenths of each job would be done by one of the 9 men and one-tenth of each job by the 10th man. This would reduce wages below the natural standard, if every man wanted to work full time; but the reduction below that standard would be only one-tenth, whereas under the "open shop" it would be down to the lowest limit of subsistence.

Of course the 9 men might exclude the 10th man from membership. But that point is not involved. Trade union principles demand the admission of all workers.

Even competency is not a requisite. Suppose, however, that we consider the possibility.

Remember, we are not discussing natural rights. What we are discussing is industrial results.

Suppose, then, that the union arbitrarily refuses to admit the 10th man to membership, and consequently that he cannot get employment, the "closed shop" policy prevailing. What would result? Why, the 10th man would die. But now there being only 9 men for the 9 jobs, the employers could not coerce the men, nor could the men coerce the employers. Bargaining would be on equal terms, wages would consequently be at the level of the earnings of the workingmen, trade would be brisk, employers would prosper, and everybody would get what belonged to him,—except what the dragon exacted, and we are not now considering the dragon.

Considered simply with reference to industrial results, is it not evident that the "closed shop" policy is preferable to the "open shop" policy?

IV

Do we favor a "closed shop," then? Not at all.

While, under the circumstances supposed, which we believe illustrate fairly the industrial conditions of our time, we should prefer the "closed" to the "open" shop, simply as a matter of industrial results, we do not prefer it as a matter of just social relations. We object to the principle of the "closed shop." But we object to it totally—not only to its use by and for workingmen, but also to its use in subtler ways to the disadvantage and undoing of workingmen.

The greatest shop on this planet, the one with limitless jobs, with jobs so limitless that there could never be more men than jobs if it were not a "closed" shop, is the earth itself. Yet the earth has by law been made and is still maintained as a "closed" shop, the gates of which can be opened only with a golden key.

Break down those gates, which enclose mineral deposits, farm sites, building sites,—make this earth-shop with all its industrial possibilities, an "open" shop—and there would be continuously more jobs than men. As an industrial

result there would be limitless opportunity for employment in all legitimate vocations, full earnings for wages, brisk trade for employers, and no periods of stagnation. In these circumstances there would be no further contests over "open" or "closed" shops in any of the comparatively little shops regarding which these contests rage now. With the big shop "open" no shop could be "closed."

There would be no such contests then, because the demand for workers in all lines would be so much greater than the supply, all the time, that no workingman would wish to keep out another, and every workingman would be his own labor union.

When those employers and their spokesmen who now decry the "closed" shop which labor unions try so ineffectively to establish—when such men rise up with equal enthusiasm against the laws that make a "closed" shop of the earth, they may count us with them. So long as they only denounce the "closed" shop with which labor unions try to neutralize the industrial ill effects of the great "closed" shop which Nature freely offers as an "open" shop, they deserve neither support nor sympathy. While they maintain that attitude, they are not objecting to wrong things because they are wrong, they are only complaining because their own ox is gored.

NEWS NARRATIVE

Week ending Thursday, Aug. 31.

End of the Russian-Japanese war.

The Russian-Japanese war (p. 327) came virtually to an end on the 29th, when the envoys from the two countries, in conference at Portsmouth, N. H., agreed on the terms of a treaty of peace.

The story of this war may be read in the files of The Public, in continuous narrative, by means of the page references with which we habitually connect our items of news. Readers having access to these files and wishing to arrange the reports for narrative reading, should first insert a slip of paper or other book mark between the

leaves where this week's report appears. Let them then observe the page reference in the first paragraph of this report, and turn back in the file of the present year to the page so referred to, namely, page 327 of the current volume. At page 327, after inserting another book mark, turn back to the page there indicated, which is page 309 of the present volume. In this manner run back through the present volume to page 24, where the page reference is to the preceding volume, namely, volume vii at page 823, and then back through preceding volumes, to the last page reference, inserting a book mark at each report. The files will then be in readiness for consecutive reading. Beginning now with the earliest report and reading from that to the next, and so on, the whole story of the war, from the first manifestation of its causes down to the outbreak of hostilities, and thence to the settlement of peace terms on the 29th of this month, appears in continuous chronological narrative.

At the time of our last report (p. 327) the envoys of the two belligerent nations were at a deadlock, and this continued until the 29th. An authoritative announcement was then made that terms of peace had been agreed upon. On all but two points an agreement had been previously effected. The points of contest were Japan's demands for reimbursement of war expenses, and the disposition of the island of Sakhalin, which had come to Japan by conquest. Russia had refused to make any money payment, even to pay \$600,000,000 for the northern half of Sakhalin. Finally, however, as Mr. Sato, one of the secretaries to the Japanese envoys, officially explained on the 29th—

his majesty, the Emperor of Japan, responding to the dictates of humanity and civilization, in a spirit of perfect conciliation and in the interests of humanity, authorized his plenipotentiaries to waive the question of reimbursement of war expenses and consented to a division of Sakhalin upon terms mutually acceptable.

As finally agreed upon, the terms of peace are reported to be in substance as follows:

1. Russia recognizes Japan's "preponderant influence" in Corea, with her right to preserve order in the civil

administration and give military and financial advice to the Emperor of Corea, Japan binding herself to observe the territorial integrity of Corea and the policy of the "open door."

2. Mutual evacuation of Manchuria.

3. Chinese sovereignty and civil administration to be restored to Manchuria.

4. For mutual respect in the future "the territorial integrity and administrative entity" of China in Manchuria, and the principle of equal opportunity for the industry and commerce of all nations, to be maintained.

5. Cession by Japan of northern half of Sakhalin island to Russia. Japan to retain the southern half.

6. Surrender to Japan of the Russian leases of the Liaotung peninsula, including Port Arthur, Dalny, and the Blonde and Elliott islands.

7. Surrender to China, by arrangement with Japan, of the branch of the Chinese Eastern railroad running south from Harbin to Port Arthur and Newchwang, together with retrocession of all the privileges obtained under the concession of 1898.

8. The limitation of the Chinese concession obtained by Mr. Rothstein and Prince Ukhomsky in 1896, under which the "cut-off" through northern Manchuria was built to connect the Transiberian and the Ussuri railroads, so as to provide for the retention of the ownership and operation of the line by the Chinese Eastern, but with provision for the eventual substitution of Chinese imperial police for Russian "railroad guards."

9. Concession by Russia to the citizens of Japan of the right to fish in waters of the Russian littoral from Vladivostok north to Bering sea.

This settlement, the formal treaty for which is being now prepared by experts, is generally regarded as a surrender by Japan. Some explanations attribute it to Japan's humanity, while others account for it upon the theory that the Japanese "peace-at-any-price" party forced it upon the Japanese envoys, through Baron Kaneko, the Japanese financial agent in the United States, who reached the ear of the Emperor of Japan, over the head of the envoys and through the Japanese statesman Ito. According to the latter explanation the Japanese envoys are said to have waived an indemnity and surrendered the upper half of Sakhalin island against their own judgment and under imperative orders from their Emperor.

Congress of the Interparliamentary Union.

At Brussels on the 28th the con-

gress of the Interparliamentary Union, composed of members of the parliamentary bodies of the world, which met last year at St. Louis (vol. vii, p. 375), assembled with delegates representing practically all the leading national parliaments and congresses. The following message was ordered cabled to President Roosevelt:

The Interparliamentary Congress, at Brussels assembled, sends greetings and has the honor to advise you that it has passed resolutions expressing its high appreciation of your action in calling a second conference at The Hague in the interest of international peace, and its profound thanks for your noble efforts in the interests of humanity to terminate the Russo-Japanese war.

The principal subject of discussion was the American plan for a model arbitration treaty and a permanent congress of the nations, advocated by Richard Bartholdt, a member from Missouri of the Congress of the United States. The model treaty proposes that—

all differences growing out of the interpretation or enforcement of treaties which concern diplomatic or consular privileges, boundaries, rights of navigation, indemnities, pecuniary claims, violations of the right of person or property, or violations of recognized principles of international law, shall be tried by the international courts, established under this treaty and the treaty of The Hague. All other questions, of whatever character, shall be referred to a commission of inquiry, constituted according to the provisions of the treaty of The Hague, or to a court constituted as provided herein, and decided on appeal by a court of the permanent tribunal at The Hague, before resort to arms. Alleged violations of this clause shall be tried by the international courts. Upon filing of a statement of its contention in a case of the kind included, either Power may serve notice that it will be proper for its treaty-making power to accept or reject the decision, otherwise it will be considered that the decision of the courts shall be final. In case the treaty-making Power elects to reject a decision rendered, before commencement of hostilities the Powers concerned and the administrative council at The Hague shall agree upon and publish what shall be considered contraband, the rights and duties of neutrals, as understood by the belligerents, and the day for commencing and ending of hostilities—and the territory within which war may be waged. This being done, the question of war or peace shall be referred to the people of the