create a ground rent ranging from three dollars a front foot to $20 and $40 a front foot. To explain more fully: Bonus buildings are run up on plats of ground split up into lots 15x90, and a ground rent say of $6 per front foot is put on the lot, making $90 a year ground rent, which the buyer agrees to pay, and in his ground rent is a clause that he will also pay all taxes. This $90 is essentially a single tax. The agreement to pay it is exactly the same kind of a contract that is in vogue in Fairhope, Ala. With this extremely important exception, that whereas we in Baltimore bind ourselves to pay all the taxes, in Fairhope the company or lessor, agrees to pay all taxes. Talk of its being a disastrous failure! Not on your life. Ground rents are as scarce as hens' teeth, and can only be bought on a 3 per cent. basis. They command as good a price as government bonds, and it is estimated that $14,000,000 at least is raised in Baltimore alone from this source—nearly twice as much as the city and State taxes amount to. And what is this tax of $14,000,000 paid for? Why, merely for the privilege of living in the city of Baltimore. That's all the payers get for it. And the only kick we've got coming is that private individuals get that money instead of the city and State.

In comparison with the terrible brutality which distinguishes the heroisms of war, how inspiring is this simple newspaper report from New York on the 18th of one of the heroisms of peace:

While fire was destroying two floors of the tenement at 105 Division street to-day, six children and Rabbi Solomon Levin climbed through windows and stood on the fire escape. Extension ladders that quickly were raised fell six feet short of the imperiled group. Firemen stationed themselves on the top rounds below and then the Rabbi took the children and lifting them over the railing dropped them one by one to the firemen, who caught them and passed them on down. So intent upon the rescue and so thrilled by its heroism had been the crowd that it was not until the threatened children were safe that the wailings of a panic-stricken woman became intelligible. Her husband, Jacob Frank, she said, and her little daughter were on the top floor. Louis C. Beyer, a fireman, with his head covered with wet cloths, ran into the building to the top floor, described by Mrs. Frank. He stumbled into the place and falling to the floor for the little air left, crawled through one room after another until he came upon the prostrate form of a man. A comrade who had been waiting on the ladder took the unconscious man from Beyer and carried him to the street.

Courage like that, if devoted to taking human lives instead of saving them, would make every telegraph wire to vibrate and the headline types of the great newspapers to dance with delight, while the heroes would be flattered and promoted. If a neat bit of spying and a trifling flavor of forgery were mixed in with the heroism, it might win for the hero even a brigadier's shoulder straps and pay. But who are the denizens of a tenement house that firemen should be thought of as heroes for saving their lives? It was the fireman's business, anyhow; and no very noble business, either, as compared with killing men and other animals.

Now comes Senator Dubois, of Idaho, with a proposition to disfranchise the Mormons, not because they practice polygamy, but because of "their growing strength and political ambitions." It's the same old story. We try to make ourselves believe that we disfranchise people because they are inferior in race, as with Negroes in the South and Chinamen on the Pacific coast; or because they are immoral, as with the Mormons when they were polygamists. But the universal reason at bottom is that we want to govern them. It is our political ambition against theirs.

That such institutions as the Mormon church and Dowie's "Zion" are dangerous to free institutions is true. This might be true also of race influences such as prevail among the Negroes at the South and among Chinamen on the Coast. When races vote together as such, they are a menace to free institutions. So, when ecclesiastical organizations enter as such into politics, teaching their members that they must vote under ecclesiastical orders, they also are a menace to free institutions. But nothing of this kind is so great a menace to free institutions as disfranchisement. Let the ballot be general, and race animosities will die away. Let the ballot be general, and the most autocratic ecclesiastical organization will lose its influence in the political arena. But let any considerable body of people, linked by ties of race or religion, be held in subjection as ballotless people, and free institutions are not merely menaced, they are gone.

The Chicago city council has taken one important step in the direction of municipal ownership of railways. It has agreed unanimously to bring the acceptance of the Mueller act to popular vote at the city election in April. So much the municipal ownership advocates have accomplished. One thing more remains to be done. They must see to it that no traction franchise passes the city council, either absolutely or subject to submission to popular vote, until after the popular vote on the acceptance of the Mueller law. If they succeed in this, municipal ownership of the Chicago street car system will be but a few months farther off.

When the Rev. Dr. Henson describes John Alexander Dowie as a reincarnation of Balaam, he pays Dowie a compliment which he could not have intended and which apparently is not deserved. Balaam was a prophet who remained true to his high calling and delivered his message straight, though sorely tempted by the most seductive kind of bribery.

EX-PRESIDENT CLEVELAND'S CHICAGO SPEECH.

If the purpose of bringing Mr. Cleveland to Chicago to make a speech that might as well have been made in New York city or Princeton, New Jersey, was to start a presidential boom for him in the West (and, really, any other purpose is invisible to the naked eye), then his visit was a failure.

An easier approach to the few score rich men who honored him with the banquet at which he spoke, may have been established conveniently against the day for raising campaign funds; but rich men cannot make presidential booms, however potent they may be in marring them.

Some satisfaction may have been derived, moreover, from the popular reception at which 2,000

Western people are said to have shaken the ex-President by the hand, some of them expressing at the same time an earnest desire to see him in the White House again. But a hundred score admirers in a city of hundreds upon hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, falls short of a popular demonstration—even for Mr. Cleveland.

We would not be understood, of course, as implying that Mr. Cleveland couldn't command a much more demonstrative reception in Chicago. Were he to come here as a declared candidate for the presidential nomination—whether Democratic, Republican or Palmer-and-Buckner, according to his state of mind at the time—he would receive an ovation of sufficient magnitude to warrant no little display of head-line types in the New York Times, the Brooklyn Eagle, and the Princeton (N. J.) Casket. Coming as he did, the private guest of a business club, with widely advertised announcements of his intended appearances in public, his reception was a fairly generous mark of respect to the only living ex-President of the United States.

But if Mr. Cleveland's visit was a failure in the estimation of such of his admirers as had hoped to see it burst into a presidential boom, Mr. Cleveland's speech on "American Good Citizenship" was no failure. It was probably the best speech he has ever delivered, and one of the best on record on that subject by any speaker.

In general terms Mr. Cleveland outlined a theory of good citizenship which, were it lived up to by the American voter, the American office-holder, the American workman and the American business man, would give a lustre to the American name that no military achievements could confer, not even in the eyes of the most strenuous seeker after military glory.

His rebuke to negative patriotism, to self righteous contentment with things as they are, to the perfunctory performance of the occasional duties of citizenship, to a blind and lazy faith in the invulnerability of American institutions, to foolhardy optimism,—all this was sound in principle and formulated with an eloquence that was none the less impressive for being ponderous.

Only two or three false notes marred the performance.

While Mr. Cleveland spoke of a higher law than the law of political parties, of "a higher law under whose sanction all parties should be judged"—a most exalted sentiment and the true ideal of higher politics,—he fell into the error of implying that this higher law is inferior to legislative and judicial law. For he inculcated "respect for the law"—not "the higher law," but legislative law—"as the quality that cements the fabric of organized society and makes possible a government by the people."

This principle is a false principle. Not "respect for the law" which legislatures prescribe, but respect for the higher law of right and justice, is what makes government by the people possible. When legislation contravenes the higher law, it is no more worthy of respect than is a party platform that contravenes the higher law. For reasons of expediency, and for the sake of peace, we may obey such legislation until we can repeal it regularly. But respect it! Never. The fugitive slave law, for instance, was not entitled to respect, even by those who from a false sense of civic prudence or from personal cowardice obeyed it.

Not only was Mr. Cleveland in error in inculcating respect for legislative law (regardless of its harmony with the higher law), but he was inconsistent. He placed the higher law above party allegiance, which was right. But he had already placed legislation secured by party allegiance,—the fugitive slave law, for example—above the higher law.

It was doubtless this confusion of thought regarding the sanctity of legislation that influenced Mr. Cleveland when he placed not only legislation by legislatures but legislation by judges upon a pedestal.

"Querulous strictures concerning the action of our courts," said he, "tend to undermine popular faith in the cause of justice."

Mr. Cleveland is lawyer enough to know that the cause of justice is never injured by "querulous strictures" concerning the action of courts. Neither the defeated party to a lawsuit who querulously criticises the court, nor he who goes out into the woodshed and "cusses," has ever undermined popular faith in the judiciary. When the judiciary begins to lose its hold upon the confidence of the people, it is not due to "querulous strictures" by critics of the courts; it is due to some form of corruption in the courts themselves.

But these false notes are the only emphatic discords in an otherwise splendid democratic harmony.

So profoundly democratic was Mr. Cleveland's speech in some respects, that the mere reading of it may stir the enthusiasm of Henry George's followers as it has not been stirred with reference to Mr. Cleveland since his free trade message of 1887.

Take this extract, for instance:

> If love of country, equal opportunity, and genuine brotherhood in citizenship were worth the pains and trials that gave them birth, and if we still believe them to be worth preservation and that they have the inherent vigor and beneficence to make our republic lasting and our people happy, let us strongly hold them in love and devotion.

Also this apt contrast with the quotation above:

> Then it shall be given us to see plainly that nothing is more foreign or more unfriendly to the motives that underly our national edifice than the selfishness and cupidity that look upon freedom, and law and order, only as so many agencies in aid of their designs.

And this impressive comparison:

> We are told that the national splendor we have built upon the showy ventures of speculative wealth is a badge of our success. Unsharing contentment is enjoined upon the masses of our people, and they are invited, in the bare subsistence of their scanty homes, patriotically to rejoice in their country's prosperity. This is too unsubstantial an enjoyment of benefits to satisfy those who have been taught American equality.

Note in those extracts the dominant thought.

"Let us strongly hold them in love and devotion." Hold what "in love and devotion"? Not "love of country" alone. Not merely "love of country" and "genuine brotherhood in citizenship" to-

gether. But also "equal opportunity."

The day has passed when any American public man may retain his reputation for intelligence while interpreting all meaning out of "equal opportunity" by referring to equal voting opportunities and equal opportunity to be President. Mr. Cleveland fell into no such absurdity. His speech used the phrase "equal opportunity" in a sense which includes equal economic opportunity.

Else what did he mean when he declared that the "unsharing contentment" which is "enjoined upon the masses of our people" is "too unsubstantial an enjoyment of benefits to satisfy those who have been taught American equality"?

Whether Mr. Cleveland meant to do it or not, he has left himself no logical means of escape from Henry George's conclusions. "Equal opportunity" is an absolute impossibility in any country under whose laws (as under ours) its area may pass (as the area of our country is passing) into the hands of a few, and where the masses are consequently becoming increasingly landless.

The wonder is, as one reads Mr. Cleveland's Chicago speech, that the plutocratic banqueters before whom he delivered it—very types of "the selfishness and cupidity" which he contemptuously described as looking "upon freedom and law and order only as so many agencies in aid of their designs,"—the wonder is that they could receive the speech with favor and even with applause.

Had William J. Bryan, or the late Gov. Altgeld, or Tom L. Johnson delivered that speech before that plutocratic Chicago audience; had either of these men uttered sentiment for sentiment, aye, word for word, what Cleveland did—he would have been laughed at as a dreamer or denounced as a social disturber. The false notes regarding the sanctity of all legislation and the sacrosanctitude of judges, would never have saved Bryan or Altgeld or Johnson from the condemnation of that audience of millionaires for the rest of the speech. Yet the same audience applauded Cleveland. Why?

An old story may suggest the explanation. During the anti-Masonic excitement which followed the report that Morgan had been murdered by Free Masons for exposing their secrets, a number of anti-Masons were elected to the New York legislature. The demagogic leaders while at the State capital stopped at an expensive hotel on the hill—the "A House," let us call it,—and this hotel came consequently to be known as the anti-Masonic headquarters. But most of the anti-Masonic legislators, too poor to live at the "A House," stopped at a third or fourth rate hotel down near the river—the "X House." In the "X House" coterie was one anti-Masonic legislator who had lodged himself there not because he couldn't afford better accommodations but because he wanted to be "in touch" with the "common herd" of his party. Before the legislature closed, however, he moved up to the "A House." Mentioning his new address one day to an opposition member, the anti-Mason was asked by the latter—

"Don't you live down in the 'X'?"

"No," replied the anti-Mason; "I used to, but I've moved up to the 'A'."

"Why did you leave the 'X'?"

"Because it's so full of anti-Masons, and they talked for anti-Masonry so much that I got tired."

"But you are now at the anti-Masonic headquarters. Don't they talk for anti-Masonry?"

"Oh, yes; they talk for it, too. But them fellers down at the 'X,' they believed in it."

If the millionaire bankers were willing to applaud democratic generalities from Mr. Cleveland, which they would have denounced as "levelling" and "anarchistic" if uttered by a Bryan, an Altgeld or a Tom L. Johnson, it is a fair inference that they note the difference of background. It may be that their toleration of such generalities from Cleveland is not because they think he doesn't believe in them; but it is certain that their intolerance for the same generalities when uttered by a Bryan or a Johnson is because they know that Bryan and Johnson do believe in them.

And if they were to take these sentiments from Cleveland with much allowance for salt, they might find in Mr. Cleveland's public career quite enough to justify their confidence in his facility for distinguishing glittering generalities in ante-election declarations from concrete realities in post-election conduct.

Mr. Cleveland signalized his first term in the presidency with a tariff message which rang as true as does his Chicago speech. Upon the issue thus raised he was defeated for reelection. But four years later the same issue carried him back into the President's chair upon the crest of a veritable tidal wave of public sentiment in hostility to protection. The same wave gave him a Congress with 41 majority in the House and control in the Senate on the tariff question.

The obvious thing for him to do at once upon taking his seat was to assemble Congress in special session to carry out the mandate of the people. This was necessary in order to secure that result before jealousies over the distribution of official spoils could make an opening for the maneuvers of tariff beneficiaries in their efforts to thwart the popular will. Not only was this the obvious thing to do, but Mr. Cleveland was urged to do it by friends who supposed that he meant what he had said in his tariff message.

But in the interval of four years between his first term and his second, Mr. Cleveland had made acquaintances in the region of Wall street, where he had set up a law office. These acquaintances were of the same class, though higher up, with the banqueters whom Mr. Cleveland addressed in Chicago last week. They were financial friends. These financial friends were opposed to calling an extra session of Congress. They did not want the country disturbed with "premature legislation" of the kind the people had distinctly demanded. So Mr. Cleveland turned a deaf ear to his other friends, and refused to call a special session for the consideration of the tariff question. Like his financial friends he also feared to disturb the country with "premature legislation" on the subject upon which the people had rendered their verdict after five years of discussion.

But four months later, Mr.

Cleveland's financial friends were perfectly willing to risk disturbing the country with premature legislation upon a subject which had not been discussed before the people, and regarding which neither Mr. Cleveland nor Congress had received any popular mandate. So Mr. Cleveland called a special session for this purpose.

When that session closed Mr. Cleveland's party, united upon the tariff question and resistless in its power, had been wrenched asunder by a new and unrelated issue—the coinage question. The needed opening for tariff beneficiaries was thus effected. Mr. Cleveland's fine message on the tariff question was then incontinently thrown into the waste-paper basket of the sugar trust. Months were spent by Congress at the regular session, upon a tariff bill which, when it finally passed, was a wretched caricature of what the Cleveland administration was under bonds to the people to produce.

Is it any wonder if the privileged classes have confidence in Mr. Cleveland, no matter how much he menaces them with the glittering generalities of democracy?

On the other hand, is it any wonder that the unprivileged have learned to distrust his noblest utterances?

How could the people have done otherwise than bury his administration under an avalanche of adverse votes, as they did at the first opportunity? Popular revulsion was as sudden and pronounced as it was richly deserved. At the Congressional elections of 1894, the majority in the House was shifted from Democratic 41 to Republican 66. The complexion of the Senate also was changed for the worse. The popular vote against the Cleveland administration was enormous. In Ohio it ran up to a Republican majority of 137,000—a phenomenal figure.

With Mr. Cleveland's significant record on the tariff issue before them, the financiers at the Chicago banquet might well have listened with complacency and even approval to democratic generalities which, from other lips, would have excited their anger to the highest pitch and evoked from the billingsgate vocabulary of their susidized newspapers its most stinging epithets.

NEWS

Week ending Thursday, Oct. 22.

The Alaskan boundary commission in session at London (p. 361) has come to a decision, which was made public on the 20th. It is regarded as being almost if not wholly in favor of the United States and against the Canadian claims.

—

This controversy grew out of an interpretation of the treaty of 1825 between Great Britain and Russia. As that treaty defines the boundary between the Hudson's Bay Company and Russian America it governs the boundary between the Dominion of Canada, subsequently established by Great Britain over the Hudson's Bay Company's territory, and Alaska, which was purchased from Russia by the United States in 1867. The controversy consequently was more distinctly one of Canadian-American than of British-American interest; and the British outside of Canada have been notably indifferent.

—

The question at issue, which has long been pending (vol. i, No. 47, p. 9; vol. v, p. 680), relates to so much of the boundary as extends from the 56th parallel near the 130th meridian, northwesterly to the 141st meridian near the 60th parallel. As described by the British-Russian treaty of 1825, this boundary line begins at the southernmost point of Prince of Wales Island, which is defined as being "in the parallel of 54 degrees 40 minutes north latitude, and between the 131st and 133rd degree of west longitude (meridian of Greenwich)." The line is then described as ascending "to the north along the channel as far as the point of the continent where it strikes the 56th degree of north latitude." Over that part of the line there has been no controversy. It is the geographical vagueness of what follows that has caused the dispute. Having thus fixed a point where the channel known as "Dixon Entrance," which extends to the natural inlet called "Portland Canal," strikes the 56th degree of north latitude, the treaty proceeds:

> From this last mentioned point the line of demarcation shall follow the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the coast, as far as the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude (of the same meridian), and finally from the said point of intersection the said meridian line of the 141st degree in its prolongation as far as the frozen ocean.

The latter clause also has been free from dispute, the whole controversy turning upon so much of the boundary as runs from Portland Canal to the 141st meridian, the latter point being the summit of Mt. St. Elias. As to this part of the line, the issue hinged upon the interpretation of the following provision of the treaty:

> Article 4.—With reference to the line of demarcation laid down in the previous article, it is understood:
>
> 1st. That the island called Prince of Wales Island shall belong wholly to Russia.
>
> 2d. That whenever the summit of the mountains, which extend in a direction parallel to the coast from the 56th degree of north latitude to the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude, shall prove to be at a distance of more than 10 marine leagues from the ocean, the limit between the British possession and the line of coast which is to belong to Russia, as above mentioned, shall be formed by a line parallel to the windings of the coast, and which shall never exceed the distance of 10 marine leagues therefrom.

—

Until the discovery of gold in the Alaskan region this boundary question gave no trouble. But following upon that discovery difficulties constantly arose between American and Canadian prospectors and settlers, and these difficulties soon involved the two countries in the controversy which has just been decided by the boundary commission. The Canadians claimed that the 10-league clause must be interpreted to mean 10 leagues inland from the ocean line, whence the three-mile limit to the high seas is commonly measured; but the Americans insisted that it must be interpreted to mean 10 leagues inland from the actual shore line, following its sinuosities around inlets. Upon the Canadian contention but little of the mainland would have been left to the Americans. Lynn Canal and the American settlements at the head of that inlet—Dyea, Skagway and