

is affirmation and consequently life. Before condemning negations which consist in opposing things as wrong, we must first be sure that those things are not wrong. Opposition to wrong things is not negation, but affirmation; it is not pessimism, but optimism.

With its change of ownership on the 1st, the Chicago Evening Post appeared in a new and more acceptable form. It has reduced the size and increased the number of its pages, so as to approximate the book form of newspaper. All it needs now is to improve its printing and its politics.

THE EXALTATION OF A SPY.

By a curious coincidence the episode in Gen. Funston's career which has won for him an appointment as brigadier general in the regular army, is announced concurrently with a report from London of the discovery of the diary of Maj. Andre.

Readers of American history are familiar with Andre's exploit, and its tragic ending. He was a British officer who had in disguise crossed the line between the British and the continental armies, upon a secret errand from the British general at New York to Gen. Arnold, the American commandant at West Point. When almost within hail of the British sentries, on his return from this daring errand, Andre was arrested by three young countrymen, who found upon him papers that revealed a plot for the treacherous surrender of West Point, the key to the American position. Arnold was to be rewarded for his treason with a high commission in the British army, which he did in fact receive. Doubtless Andre would have been promoted for his dashing and dangerous part in the treacherous adventure, but his unhappy fate was already sealed. Having acted a lie by coming to the American lines in disguise, this British soldier was by the laws of war a spy; and, pursuant to the laws of war, Gen. Washington had him hanged. Even the British approved Washington's act, so plain was it that Andre's deception had degraded him to the level of that species of military criminal whom the army

that uses him, not less than the army upon which he practices his deceptions, most cordially despises.

Maj. Andre's exploit is recalled by Funston's, though the two are not altogether alike. They differ primarily in the fact that Andre was a spy against us, while Funston was a spy for us. In details, also, there are differences, but they are in Andre's favor. Andre became a spy to perfect negotiations with a treacherous commandant for the surrender of an enemy's post; Funston became one to seize the person of a faithful and patriotic leader of the enemy. Andre's lie consisted in doffing his British uniform and clothing himself in civilian's dress; Funston's consisted in pretending to be a prisoner of war, whereas, in fact, he was leading into the enemy's camp a band of Filipino soldiers, turned traitors to their cause—a job lot of Benedict Arnolds. Andre's passports were genuine; Funston's were forgeries. Caught in his lie, Andre was hanged; successful in his, Funston has been raised to the high grade of brigadier general in the regular army. But notwithstanding these differences, it is impossible to see in Funston's adventure anything that distinguishes it essentially from Andre's. It does not lift him the slightest degree above the low level of a successful spy.

A similar though less despicable service, rendered to the Confederacy during the civil war, is reported to have been sternly repudiated and its advantages promptly relinquished by Gen. Robert E. Lee. The story is published by James N. Miller, of Leavenworth, Kan. We cannot vouch for its truth; but it is told circumstantially, and in the light of Lee's well known character it has every appearance of being true. What is imputed to him he would doubtless have done in the circumstances described. We give the story in Mr. Miller's own words in full:

During the latter part of the civil war a company of confederate soldiers dashed into Cumberland, Md., one night and captured Gens. Crook and Kelly, taking them from their beds at a hotel. It was a deed of daring bravery, well planned and ably executed. But when Gen. Robert E. Lee heard of it he ordered the prisoners

sent back to our lines, saying he did not approve of this style of warfare. He did not consider it honorable. Admitting all the reckless bravery of Gen. Funston's exploit in capturing Aguinaldo, in what respect did it differ from that of the capture of these union generals? The story of the recent capture says: "They were now so weak that it was necessary to send to Aguinaldo's camp for food. Aguinaldo dispatched supplies and directed that the American prisoners be kindly treated." After having their lives thus preserved, they were enabled to march on and meet their preserver under an assumed guise, and by false pretense capture him at a time when he was unarmed. Perhaps Gen. Lee was wrong in his notion of military honor.

Gen. Lee was certainly nice in his ideas of military honor in that case. Very nice, indeed, according to the MacArthur standards. According to any military standards, probably, he was extremely nice. He might have availed himself of the advantages which this case of kidnaping gave him, without incurring censure. But, then, Gen. Lee was a gentleman in a very profound sense. He could not, however, have rewarded his kidnapers with military honors without evoking severe censure from all professional military men. To have done that would have been to defy military ethics.

This must be considered in weighing the objections of regular army officers to Funston's elevation to a high and conventionally honorable place among them. Their objections are attributed to personal jealousy and class feeling; and, indeed, those motives may actuate them. But without assigning motives so mean, their attitude is quite explicable. Gen. Corbin explained it when he said: "The capture of Aguinaldo was the work of a scout, and I don't think scouts ought to be made brigadier generals." For "scout" read "spy"—a scout who enters the enemy's lines in disguise is a spy—and you have an idea of the military view of the matter. Secretary Root gave a pointer in the same direction. Though not a military man, Mr. Root possesses at any rate the military quality of being a gentleman; and the suggestion of turning successful spies into brigadier generals made his gorge rise. He is reported

to have proposed, accordingly, in a semi-jocular manner but with less genial humor than biting wit, to close the episode by making Aguinaldo the brigadier general and sending Funston to Guam. Both Corbin and Root indicate the radical reason among professional military men for objecting to Funston's extraordinary promotion. It is the fact, however tintured possibly with mean motives, that Funston's much lauded exploit was essentially the act of a despicable spy.

Military ethics is a queer compound of the brutal and the manly, of thuggery and tenderness, of moral cowardice and physical bravery, of fraud and honor, of much that makes the man of prey and much that makes the gentleman. Nor does this incongruity furnish good ground for astonishment. The ethical code of military life is not a moral inspiration. In its beginnings it was a brutal code throughout. The incongruities that characterize it have been made by the pressure into an originally savage system, of the good and the true from without. Rather than think of military ethics as a bundle of incongruities, we should think of it as in process of transformation from savage to civilized.

But be our speculations on that point what they may, the plain fact is that professional military men have by education and association adapted themselves to certain conventional standards, a departure from which is to them intolerable. These standards are not morally correlated. Gen. Howe, for instance, could negotiate with Gen. Arnold for the treacherous surrender of West Point without incurring military contempt. But Andre could not personally carry the necessary documents back and forth without concededly deserving the felon's fate he suffered. Likewise, Gen. MacArthur could authorize Funston to write lies, to forge letters, to lead a band of wretchedly sordid Filipino traitors into the Filipino camp, to pretend to be their prisoner, and in this disguise to seize the person of the Filipino leader and carry him off—in a word to be a spy,—all this could be authorized by Gen. MacArthur without making him unworthy of military honor. But Funston could

not do the actual work, without degradation. That is the military view.

And it is not very different from the civil view of civil conventionalities. Are we not all familiar with the sentiment that does not hesitate to honor the judge who passes capital sentences, but despises the hangman who merely executes them?

If we will remember that professional military men are still men like ourselves, with ethical standards differing only in some details from our own—if, for instance, we recall the common feeling regarding hangmen, who do merely what we command them to do—we shall easily enough understand the military objection to Funston's spectacular promotion. Though we authorize dirty work, we instinctively recoil from honoring the man who does what we regard as dirty work. That is the way, also, that professional military men feel about it. Though their code of ethics allows them to accept spying service, they abhor spies.

With that feeling of abhorrence, when once understood, it must be difficult for civilians who cherish the American instinct of fair play not to sympathize.

To read of Funston's exploit must leave such civilians with a bad taste in the mouth; to read the flattering comments of American newspapers and of the flattering reward of the president must nauseate them. Funston is praised for his ingenuity and daring. The ingenuity he displayed, a network of commonplace falsehoods, would ruin the reputation of anyone above the grade of a confidence man who should resort to it in the interest of his private affairs; his daring is equaled almost every night in Chicago by some venturesome porch-climber who has no possible chance of becoming thereby a brigadier general in the regular army.

This promotion of Funston from the volunteer service, in which his enlistment expires next June, to the rank of brigadier general in the regular army, is probably the first instance in modern military history of the appointment to high military office of a spy for a successful adventure merely as a spy.

Though Andre would doubtless have been promoted by the British had he accomplished his errand, which would have ended the American revolution in favor of King George, it is not conceivable that he would have been raised to the grade of brigadier general. He did get a modest monument, but he had lost his life, and death is a great burnisher-up of reputation. Besides that, Andre was a secondary actor in the treacherous drama. He as a spy was overshadowed by Arnold as a traitor. But in Funston's case, Funston himself stands out in bold relief as having concocted a deceitful scheme such as spies concoct, made pretenses of the kind that spies make, told the lies that spies tell, written or procured the forgeries that spies write and procure, taken the personal risks that spies take, invaded an enemy's camp in friendly guise as spies do, outraged the generous hospitality of the enemy after the manner of spies, and accomplished the kind of work that only spies undertake. That is the sum and substance of his exploit. For that alone has he been raised to the rank of brigadier general in the regular army.

Nations at war are usually willing to avail themselves of the services of spies, and are usually ready to reward them. But they have always held the spy in contempt. It has remained for our nation to reward a spy, as such, with high and honorable military office. If the American people do not feel the shame of this now, the time is surely coming when they will.

Even if they never recover their bearings on vital questions of national righteousness, their old-time sensitiveness to the requirements of personal honor and fair play cannot be always deadened. They must awake at least to the importance, when they give rewards for military service, of discriminating between the ingenuity that plans military movements and the skill and bravery that executes them intelligently and faithfully—of discriminating between such military service on the one hand and that service, on the other, which if ingenious is the ingenuity of lying and forging, and if skillful and daring is the skill and daring that strenuous criminals furnish examples of, and

which spies adopt. Though we as a nation never again admire and applaud the courage and devotion of a brave people fighting a foreign foe hopelessly but stubbornly for independence and their native land, may we not at any rate hope to recover so much of our former sanity as to distinguish a spy, even though he be our spy, from an officer and gentleman?

NEWS

Since our last issue the details of Gen. Funston's exploit in kidnaping Aguinaldo have been cabled from Manila. They were taken from the lips of Gen. Funston himself. On the 28th of February, Funston obtained from a treacherous confidential officer of Aguinaldo full information of the latter's retreat and several letters from him. The letters contained disclosures enabling Funston to forge deceptive replies from the Filipino general Lacuna, the mechanical part of the forgeries having been made possible by Funston's previous capture of Lacuna's camp, which put him in possession of that officer's seal and a quantity of his official papers and correspondence. With this material Funston caused two letters to Aguinaldo, purporting to be from Lacuna, to be forged. Having then outlined his plans and secured Gen. MacArthur's approval, he organized an expedition consisting of 78 Macabebes (native barbarians), 20 of whom he dressed as Filipino soldiers. The others wore the dress of Filipino laborers. They were officered by four ex-officers of Filipino troops, one of the four being a Spaniard. Funston took with him also four American officers. The expedition embarked March 8, on the gunboat Vicksburg, which landed them in the province of Principe, 25 miles south of Casiguran. Funston and the other American officers then assumed the role of prisoners of war of the rest of their party, who pretended to be Filipino troops. At Casiguran the Filipino officers, ostensibly in command, announced to the Filipino authorities there that they were on the way to join Aguinaldo, and were taking to him five American prisoners of importance whom they had captured after a fight in which they had killed a number of other Americans. In corroboration of their statement they exhibited Funston and his American com-

panions to the Casiguran officials, who were thereby completely deceived; and from this place the forged Lacuna letters were forwarded to Aguinaldo. On the 22d the party had come within a few miles of Aguinaldo's camp. They were then so weak from hardship and privation that they sent to his camp for food. In response, Aguinaldo furnished them supplies and directed that the American prisoners be treated kindly. It was on the next day, the 23d, that Funston accomplished his purpose. Having got safely into Aguinaldo's presence, his party attacked the small bodyguard, and after a brief fight, in which one of Aguinaldo's officers was killed, secured the famous Filipino and brought him a prisoner to Manila.

For this exploit of Funston's, Gen. MacArthur cabled to Washington on the 28th a glowing recommendation that Funston be rewarded with a brigadier generalship in the regular service under the army reorganization bill. President McKinley promptly responded. He cabled congratulations to Funston on the 3d, and later on the same day appointed him a brigadier general.

Aguinaldo is kept in close custody. Newspaper representatives are not allowed to interview him. But official cabling about him has been going on, and it has been evident that he was being officially pressed for some kind of decision. On the 2d a report leaked out from Washington that the cabinet had considered secret proposals from him regarding which Secretary Root had cabled instructions to Gen. MacArthur; and on the same day MacArthur reported officially that Aguinaldo, relying almost entirely upon the advice of Chief Justice Arellano, had sworn to the following declaration of allegiance:

I hereby renounce all allegiance to any and all so-called revolutionary governments in the Philippine islands, and recognize and accept the supreme authority of the United States of America therein; and I do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to that government; that I will at all times conduct myself as a faithful and law-abiding citizen of said islands, and will not, either directly or indirectly, hold correspondence or give intelligence to any enemy of the United States; neither will I aid, abet, harbor or protect such enemy. That I impose upon myself this voluntary

obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, so help me God.

As given out to the press by the war office, the copy of MacArthur's dispatch telling of Aguinaldo's having taken this oath of allegiance contained four asterisks, indicating information withheld by the department from publication. The war office officials refused any explanation.

Since the capture of Aguinaldo, Gen. Geronimo and other Filipino commanders are reported to have surrendered. But these indications of the collapse of the Filipino cause are not regarded as justifying a reduction of the American military force. According to a Washington dispatch of the 1st, it will be necessary to keep the army in the Philippines up to its present strength of 50,000 men for months to come.

The Chinese question arising out of the demands of Russia for a secret treaty giving her some sort of authority over Manchuria (page 810) is rapidly culminating. Assurances have been given by Russia to England, so said the British secretary for foreign affairs, speaking in the house of lords on the 28th, that the contemplated treaty is merely a temporary arrangement in the nature of a *modus vivendi*, intended to prevent disturbances in the vicinity of the Russian frontier; and that Russia is not seeking territory or any protectorate authority over Manchuria. Similar assurances were made by Russia on the same day to the United States. Japan, also, was assured by her to the same effect and with a promise that when signed the treaty will be communicated to the powers, and that if it does not prove acceptable to Japan Russia will discuss the matter in a friendly spirit. Meanwhile China again appealed to the powers to support her in refusing to sign the treaty. In making this appeal to the United States the Chinese minister informed the state department that he had received from the Chinese court several decrees directing him to request the United States to use its good offices to induce Russia to withdraw the treaty. But no positive action was taken by the powers, and on the 3d the Chinese government formally notified Russia that China declines to sign the treaty. In doing so it asserted the desire of China "to keep on friendly terms with all na-