

guiltless at least of having helped start it. And for this they are indebted to Rear Admiral Kempff. He could have involved us as easily as "rolling off a log" and made a glorious jingo reputation by it besides. But he chose, even at the risk of being sneered at as a "little American" by his ambitious and strenuous countrymen, to respect the rights of the nation in whose waters his vessels lay. The true courage and true patriotism of this naval officer are worthy of grateful remembrance.

Mr. Bryan's statement of his views on the Chinese question is a model of statesmanlike exposition. There is great relief in turning to it from the rhetorical trap doors of McKinley's pronouncements on public affairs. Mr. Bryan builds no misleading phrases. There is nothing in his statement to compare with "criminal aggression," or "plain duty," but what he says has in it the ring of sincerity. And not only does it ring true, but it exhibits the insight of a statesman and displays the force of a natural leader. Realizing that the threats of European nations to dismember China would naturally arouse among the Chinese a feeling of hostility to foreigners, Mr. Bryan has no stomach for a policy of vengeance against them, but urges a policy of justice and fair dealing. This he believes will not only set an example to other nations "but will give to our citizens residing in China the best promise of security." He would endeavor, if it appears that the Chinese government is acting in good faith, to secure suitable punishment of the guilty Chinese and reparation and indemnity for Americans who have suffered. Should it appear, however, that the Chinese government has not acted in good faith, he would advise no hasty measures of redress in cooperation with other powers, but would refer the matter to congress, through which alone the American people can speak. With reference to trading and proselyting in China, Mr. Bryan throws out a hint which hon-

est merchants and devoted missionaries will not object to considering. He says:

It will be better for our merchants to have it known that they seek trade only when trade is mutually advantageous. It will be better for our missionaries to have it known that they are preaching the gospel of love and are not the forerunners of fleets and armies.

Admiral Dewey is out in a denial of the interview which one of Aguinaldo's generals, in a letter to Senator Pettigrew, recites as having occurred between him and Dewey at Hong-Kong a few days before the battle of Manila bay, and in which he says Dewey promised the Filipinos independence. Characterizing the interview as a "tissue of falsehoods," the admiral specifically denies that he gave any such promise. Had he stopped here, his word would have been enough, so far as that particular interview is concerned. But Admiral Dewey goes on until he seriously discredits himself as a witness. He says, referring to the time of the battle of Manila bay, that the Filipinos—

had absolutely no thought then of independence. That was an afterthought of their leaders during the interim between the smashing of the Spanish fleet and the arrival of the United States troops.

This assertion is positively contradicted by American official documents, which show that the Filipino leaders were not only thinking about independence but were openly working for it before the smashing of the Spanish fleet. And the circumstances are such as to indicate that Admiral Dewey must know the fact.

In an official dispatch of April 30, 1898, printed on page 342 of "Senate Document 62" of the third session of the Fifty-fifth congress, the American consul at Singapore reported that at his interview with Aguinaldo prior to the latter's arrangement to go with Admiral Dewey to Manila, at Dewey's request, Aguinaldo had—

further stated that he hoped the United States would assume protec-

tion of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their own.

That was before the smashing of the Spanish fleet. Besides this, there was sent to the Philippines a proclamation by the Filipino leaders in Hong-Kong. It was sent in advance of the sailing of Admiral Dewey's squadron from Hong-Kong to Manila, and of course before the smashing of the Spanish fleet. The purpose was to warn the Filipinos not to oppose the Americans when they should arrive, but to rally to their support as friends and liberators. It was forwarded to the American secretary of state by the American consul at Singapore. It must be well known to Admiral Dewey. It may be found in full at page 346 of "document 62." It began in these words:

Compatriots: Divine providence is about to place independence within our reach, and in a way the most free and independent nation could hardly wish for.

Even if Admiral Dewey was ignorant of these facts at the time, which is unlikely, he must have learned them since from "document 62," which is the president's message transmitting the treaty of peace with Spain to the senate. Yet he dares to say that the idea of independence for the Filipinos was "an afterthought of their leaders during the interim between the smashing of the Spanish fleet and the arrival of the United States troops."

Quite naturally those republicans who really are republicans do not relish the thought of being called imperialists. But what else shall we call them for short if they cling to the imperialized republican party? That party is now devoted to the doctrine that the American government is empowered to rule millions of men in distant lands, without the consent of the ruled and in disregard of constitutional limitations. It demands that the flag shall never be hauled down where it has once been raised, but insists that the constitution does not follow the flag. If this is not im-