

you produce a British speech. But the British people have now awakened to the hollowness of all that sort of talk. The news from South Africa admonishes them that if the war was nearly over during the elections, it has revived with all the vigor it ever had. They are beginning to suspect that it was not nearly over then, and that they were fooled by tory politicians. This suspicion is well founded. Nor is it the worst of the matter. There is no likelihood of course, that the British will be ultimately defeated; but it is now morally certain that their final victory will come only after the invaded country has been depopulated and devastated.

And as the British outlook in South Africa is growing darker, so is that of the Americans in the Philippines. "Lincoln," the Washington correspondent of the Boston Transcript, predicts a change of policy in the not distant future. He bases his prediction not upon any intimations the administration is throwing out, but upon the fact that President McKinley is an opportunist, coupled with the further fact that the situation in the Philippines is from a military point of view becoming serious. Upon what he regards as good authority, "Lincoln" says that the only solution of the Philippine problem consistent with the continuance of the present policy is extermination. There, then, we have the British Tories and the American Republicans facing the same alternative regarding the peoples whose countries they are respectively invading. They must either abandon their demands for unconditional surrender or exterminate the objects of their benevolent attentions.

Ex-President Harrison's Ann Arbor speech, which he delivered on the 15th before a large audience at the University of Michigan, is calculated to revive the hopes of those who have feared that the reelection of McKinley might prove to be a conclusive indorsement of the McKinley policy of colonialism. It is a blunt con-

demnation of that policy throughout. Mr. Harrison makes quick work of demolishing the notion that treaties are the supreme law of the land in the sense of being superior to the constitution. He puts the constitution where its founders placed it. Within its sphere it is superior to all legislation, and all treaty making. Whether it denies powers to congress or confers powers upon congress, the functions of congress are thereby limited. That body can legislate neither against its restraints nor beyond its concessions. The Paris treaty, therefore, in so far as it confers upon congress legislative powers over Puerto Rico and the Philippines, is subject to constitutional limitations. Congress cannot substitute the treaty for the constitution, and legislate at will. Its legislation must recognize the principles of personal rights guaranteed by the constitution, and must do so, not from motives of benevolence, but because the constitution forbids hostile legislation. For this reason it must observe all other constitutional limitations. It can no more disregard the constitutional rule of uniformity in taxation than it can defy the rule about ex post facto laws. From which it follows, of course, that the whole McKinley policy regarding "our new possessions" is unsound. The speech was an able presentation of the doctrine that the constitution does follow the flag.

It is somewhat remarkable that Mr. Harrison should have made this speech, in flat opposition to McKinley's policy, only a few days before the question was to be argued before the supreme court. The case in which that question has been raised is trifling in itself. It involves merely the right to import into the United States a few diamonds from the Philippines free of duty. But that right rests upon the theory that the Philippine people are United States citizens. Should this theory be sustained by the supreme court, President McKinley will be confronted with the alternative

of abandoning either his colonial policy or his protection policy, unless he decides to adopt the Bryan plan of dealing with the Philippines. The decision will be awaited with interest by the public generally, and from present appearances not without trepidation by Mr. McKinley and his party friends.

When the colonial question came before the supreme court on Monday last, Attorney General Griggs made the argument in person for the McKinley crown colony policy. Mr. Griggs was very frank. He evaded nothing except the use of one distasteful word. When dwelling upon his proposition that the treaty of Paris, though intended to make the Philippines and Puerto Rico part of the United States, was intended not to make the inhabitants citizens, he was unable to force himself to say that it intended to make them subjects. Yet he left no room for an inference that he regarded them as anything else. Mr. Griggs took the broad ground that congress is superior to the constitution with reference to the inhabitants of all United States territory, except the states. That doctrine is fundamentally the reverse of Mr. Harrison's; and nothing more is needed to turn the republic into an empire.

When Don M. Dickinson and William C. Whitney propose to reorganize the democratic party on Grover Cleveland lines, because Bryan has been twice defeated—a consummation to which they contributed their little utmost—they are acute enough to divert public attention from the low ebb of vitality, not only in principle but also in popular favor, to which their own kind of democrats had brought the party before Bryan came to the leadership. They do this by comparing the Cleveland vote of 1892 with Bryan's vote in 1896 and 1900. But that is not a fair comparison. With reference to the relative popular strength of Clevelandism and Bryanism, the comparison should not be