

had been a confederate brigadier. Mr. Bryan was in fact equipped with much better reasons. Crisp was a protectionist, whereas Mills, his adversary, was a free trader like Bryan himself. The confederate brigadier issue has long been deader than a coffin nail, except when politicians of the McLaurin variety raise it to excite idiotic prejudice in one direction in the south and in another in the north.

Georgia has a sheriff to be proud of, in the person of Joseph Merrill. He is sheriff of Carroll county, in the western part of the state, and has won deserved distinction by rigidly enforcing the law against a white mob, for the protection of a despised and probably criminal negro. The negro had been convicted of murdering a white boy, and was to have been legally hanged at Carrollton on the 7th. But his lawyers made out a case entitling him to a hearing on appeal before the supreme court, and the execution was stayed. Disappointed and angered at this delay, the mob which had assembled to gratify a morbid passion to see the hanging, made an assault upon the jail. Despite the warning of the sheriff, they battered down the outside door and entered the building. Then they demanded of the sheriff the key to the negro's cell. When he refused, they advanced threateningly upon him and his little squad of deputies. It was his cue, according to precedents in negro cases (north as well as south), to yield gracefully at that point to superior force, and allow the negro to be taken out and hanged or burned. But Sheriff Merrill exhibited an unexpected indifference to the precedents. Instead of yielding, he told the mob to stop or they would be fired upon; and when they persisted in their advance he gave the order to fire. One of the mob dropped dead and two were badly wounded. The surprise of the survivors was indescribable. Here was something novel. They had not calculated upon dealing with a sheriff who knew his duty and dared perform it; and when they realized the truth,

they were so demoralized by panicky fear that they retreated, helter skelter, every man for himself, like the pack of cowards they were. The sheriff now consulted the county judge, communicated with the governor, got military assistance, and sent the helpless negro convict safely to Atlanta. Both the county judge and Gov. Candler acted with commendable judgment, and up to the full measure of their official responsibility; but to Sheriff Merrill justly belongs the credit of protecting his prisoner, maintaining the orderly process of the law, and saving his state from the disgrace of another infamous lynching.

An astounding report is sent out from Washington. It is nothing less than a statement that the post office department has decided to override an act of congress after consulting a few newspapers of the country and receiving their approval. According to this story the third assistant postmaster general, Mr. Madden, has long been anxious to exclude from second-class privileges in the mails those publications that depend upon the distribution of premiums and prizes for a subscription list and live upon their advertisements. These publications are really not legitimate periodicals, and Mr. Madden is quite right in wishing to have them excluded from second-class privileges. But when congress refused to cut them off, he prepared to resort to an expedient which is utterly without justification, unless the postal service is indeed subject to the arbitrary control of the postmaster general. Having taken the opinion of 372 newspapers, and found that a majority approve his purpose, he contemplates doing by a department regulation what he could not induce congress to do by statute. In other words, he purposes usurping the powers of congress, under color of departmental interpretation and depending for support upon the newspapers he has consulted. That is the only inference admissible. If the exclusion from second-class privileges can be done by legitimate department-

al regulation, why was it not done long ago? Why did Mr. Madden try to get congress to make the exclusion by statute? On the other hand, if a statute was needed, by what right does Mr. Madden make the exclusion by means of a department regulation?

At the convention of the American Medical association, held this month in St. Paul, the meeting of military surgeons recommended the reestablishment of the army "canteen," a recommendation which the convention subsequently approved. The "canteen" is a military drinking club, intended for privates and noncommissioned officers. Congress has prohibited it, and the temperance and prohibition sentiment of the country is strongly opposed to its reestablishment. The objections urged against the "canteen" are in the nature of objections to having the United States government go into the retail liquor business. Over against these objections, advocates of the "canteen" set the argument of military necessity. They say that soldiers will drink, canteen or no canteen, and that it is not only better for them, but necessary from considerations of discipline, to have them drink a little at a time in a military saloon, which is under military control and to which they have constant access, than to load up in irresponsible saloons and come back drunk whenever they go off on leave. The question is really a very simple one. At bottom it is not a temperance question at all. If we are to have a standing army, with soldiers scattered in every part of the world, we must either recruit it from total abstainers or provide places at which unadulterated liquors can be procured and where they may be drunk in comfort, with moderation, and under the control of commandants. And inasmuch as it is impracticable to confine recruiting to total abstainers, or in any other way to maintain a regular army in which there shall be no drinking, the real question is not whether we shall have "canteens," but whether we shall have a regular army.