

the chief responsibility for the inevitable horrors of crowding out those principles be saddled upon the victims of the laws that do it? Beneficiaries of perennial injustice should not escape, they must not escape, they ought to rise superior to so much as a wish to escape, that greater responsibility for social disaster which goes with their better opportunities for understanding the social injustice which causes social disasters, and their larger powers of education and influence for bringing that injustice peacefully to an end.



"Collectivism."

In an admirable address on "The Trend Toward Collectivism," delivered before the Chicago City Club and published in its Bulletin of April 19th, Professor Rauschenbusch makes a distinction which needs to be emphasized. By "collectivism" he means, as in this address he explains, "something larger than Socialism usually means." In its organized form, Socialism seems to him to be "only one section of a far larger movement;" and this larger movement he designates "by the word 'collectivism,' not because that is the ordinary use of the word, but simply in order to have an algebraic symbol for something we want to express." Socialists would probably shrink from regarding "collectivism" as larger than Socialism; and many persons who are not Socialists would be at least surprised to learn that Socialism and collectivism are not identical. It is nevertheless true that the movement or trend which Professor Rauschenbusch symbolizes as "collectivism" is larger than the Socialism which makes class-war its *sine qua non*, be that war considered as peaceable or as violent; it is also true that the idea he indicates with the term "collectivism" is not necessarily technical Socialism either in part or altogether. The trend toward collectivism, while socialistic as all things societary are socialistic more or less, is in some of its aspects not Socialist at all in any of the legitimate senses in which the term "Socialism" is now current.



But it may be that in his definition of what he means by "collectivism" Professor Rauschenbusch has fallen short of a precise definition of what he probably does mean. As it is difficult to believe that he is not as solicitous for private welfare and private rights as for public welfare and public rights, he may fail to guard his terms completely when he speaks favorably of "collectivism" as putting "emphasis on public welfare and

public rights rather than private welfare and private rights," and of increasing "the amount of public property as against private property." Of course *emphasis* may be placed upon public welfare and public rights without at all minimizing private welfare and private rights; and a desire to increase *the amount* of public property as against private property may be realized without in the slightest degree impinging upon just rights of private property. Yet criticism, even if only captious, might be made. We do not presume to speak for Professor Rauschenbusch, nor in any wise to substitute our phrases for his in the expression of his thought. For the purpose, however, of expressing our own thought, which we regard as quite in agreement with his, and to express it so as to prevent misapprehension, we offer this slight paraphrase of his explanation, as our statement of our own view: "Our proposition is that we are all moving in the direction of what we may call 'collectivism.' By 'collectivism' we mean the putting of emphasis on public welfare and public rights *for the sake* of private rights, and a desire to extend public ownership as against private ownership of *public* property." By this paraphrase we do not mean that "collectivism" has yet become thus definitely discriminating in its tendency. That would not be true. There is probably as yet no great sensitiveness to the importance, both to individuals in the mass and to the mass itself, of the distinction *between private and public* welfare, rights and property. But that this distinction indicates root differences, and that those differences should be clearly distinguished in promoting the manifest trend toward "collectivism," is of vital importance alike to public interests, to personal freedom, and to permanent progress.



Good Trusts and Bad.

This is the trust issue in Mr. Roosevelt's mind, as he discloses himself: Good trusts or bad trusts. President Taft interprets his policy as meaning that Mr. Roosevelt would by paternalistic methods determine between trusts, on the question of their goodness or badness, arbitrarily. We surmise not. Judged by the trusts he seems to like and has favored, Mr. Roosevelt's method is not arbitrary. He would seem rather to intend a distinction between the trusts that connive and fight and contract and conspire to choke competition, and those which are fortified by law, through their basic property holdings, against all effective competition. Take the Harvester and the Steel trusts for example. These appear to be in Mr. Roosevelt's category of good trusts. Yet they are the

most powerful, and the most absorbent of power, of all the trusts. They may not contract contrary to the Sherman law, they may not conspire, they may not connive and fight to choke competition. But they don't need to. They have it choked to begin with. The Steel trust with its monopoly of mineral deposits and terminal points, and the Harvester trust with its control directly of its lumber supplies and indirectly through the Steel trust of its mineral supplies and terminal facilities, can absorb the earnings of the masses and yet be as "good" as a star-scholar at Sunday school. If Mr. Roosevelt's distinction between good trusts and bad were defined, the difference would probably not be far from this: A good trust is an exploiting industrial organization which has its feet firmly upon the ground, and, reaching out lawfully for what it wants, gets it; a bad trust is an exploiting industrial organization which has its feet in the air, and, kicking about boisterously for what it wants, gets it if the good trusts don't want it.



Secrets of the "Money Trust."

Great anger has been excited among the senior crowd in Wall Street by impudent interrogatories of the Congressional committee investigating the "money trust." Mr. Morgan is reported to be much wrought up over the "impudence" of that committee. Another finance "sharp" of renown "would like to be jailed" for refusing to answer these impudent questions, for then he would "get a writ of habeas corpus and fight the action right up to the Supreme Court of the United States," which "would probably take three years and by that time most if not all of the politicians now in Congress would be out of office." His confidence in the supreme power of the courts blinds him to the fact that if Congress refused to obey the mandate of a branch of the government only co-ordinate with itself, he might have to remain in duration until his financial friends had bowled out those inquisitive Congressmen. These irritated financial gentlemen are perfectly willing to have the "money trust" investigated, *provided its secrets are not exposed!* That is the substance of what they say. But if its secrets are not exposed, how are its crimes to be checked?



Charles Frederick Adams.

Charles Frederick Adams, the New York lawyer of whose interesting career we told two years ago,* has since that time made two lecturing tours

across the continent—through the Canadian Provinces as well as the Middle, the Northwestern, the Rocky Mountain and the Southern States,—and is now devoting three weeks to the filling of daily appointments in Chicago. His speaking style and charming personality have been cordially recognized in every part of the country and by every class of auditor; and his fairness to all persons, theories and interests, his wide and profound learning and clear thinking, his exactness and eloquence yet spontaneity in exposition, make his message universally welcome whatever his special subject may be. The confidence and affection in which Mr. Adams has been held in Brooklyn, Washington and New York from early manhood, have begun to attach to him in the wider society of the whole continent in his maturer years. He is to speak on the 10th, in Kimball's Cafe, at the dinner tendered to Margaret Haley by the Chicago Single Tax Club on her return from the Pacific Coast and in honor of her work in the Seattle Singletax campaign.



TYPICAL OBJECTIONS TO LAND VALUE TAXATION.

The intense weakness, intellectually, of the opposition to land value taxation, a weakness which was demonstrated in the recent anti-Singletax campaign in Seattle, is emphasized in the Missouri Singletax campaign now opening, and also in the campaign in New York City, for progressively shifting taxes from improvements to land values.



In Missouri, an opposition organization has been set on foot which, in the name of "the farmers of Bates County"—though not with the approval of any considerable number, as we venture to hope out of regard for their intelligence—puts forth these extraordinary "arguments" against the Singletax:

That it places the financial burdens of government upon producers, though all receive equal protection and benefits; that when applied to the fullest extent it is destructive of land values; and that in this country land values do not belong to the people as a whole, because the government, which is of the people, has by Constitutional laws duly conveyed the public domain to individuals for a consideration and provided that all property should be taxed.

If it were possible to bring fallacy to the aid of falsity more transparently than do those apologists for land-value grabbing in Missouri, the

*See The Public of June 10, 1910, page 532.