

political truth, will lend the weight of his authority candidly to truth as he sees it, those political, social and commercial "evils" which constitute a "serious menace to the permanent prosperity of our country" will the more speedily disappear. The first, the greatest, the most important of all the causes which result in "menacing conditions" he will find to consist, if indeed he does not already know it, in legal power to control natural opportunities. If it were unprofitable to control land not fully in profitable use, an immediate, spontaneous, automatic and beneficent consequence would follow. There might still be selfish desires among men. But if there were they would only raise questions of conscience. They could do no social harm with legal sanction. On the contrary, they would operate for general good instead of general harm.

#### PRESIDENT CLEVELAND AND THE CHICAGO STRIKE.

That ex-President Grover Cleveland is a receptive candidate for the Democratic nomination for President, is an open secret. Never once have his closer friends abandoned effort or hope.

While the monopolistic interests of the country were content to manage the Republican convention, as they did, even with the erratic Roosevelt injected into the bargain, there is from that quarter no lack of broad hints that "Cleveland is not half bad" and "could probably defeat Roosevelt if the Democrats were sane enough to nominate him."

Cleveland himself has indeed refused to be a candidate (vol. vi, p. 553). He has not only refused himself; he has named Parker (p. 8). But his conduct has not in this respect been well calculated to inspire confidence.

He has repeated his approval of Parker (p. 137) in a manner well adapted to make that reticent jurist uneasy, an effect which this left-handed approval is said upon good authority to have produced.

He has recently seemed to court favor in the South by protesting over-indignantly that he never allowed a Negro (p. 65), no matter

how much of a man the Negro might be, to meet him as Booker T. Washington met Roosevelt.

He has for the first time since his retirement to private life publicly defended the "bond deal" of 1894 (p. 83), whereby his friends, J. Pierpont Morgan and August Belmont, reaped a rich financial harvest at the expense of the public treasury and in defiance of the sanest public opinion.

He has lectured on the Chicago railway strike (p. 65), ten years after the event, eight years after the good faith of his participation in the suppression of that strike had been publicly and circumstantially challenged by Gov. Altgeld, and two years after Altgeld's power of reply had been taken away by death; and in doing this he has broken a silence on that subject, a studied silence in which he had persisted from the beginning, a silence as profound as the present silence of Altgeld's grave,—has broken it by attacking this dead man with whom in life he did not venture to try conclusions. That attack is now renewed by Mr. Cleveland in an article in McClure's Magazine. Since cowardice is not one of Mr. Cleveland's faults, this conduct toward Altgeld is not easily accounted for by any other theory than Mr. Cleveland's desire to court the favor, for campaign purposes, of those plutocratic circles wherein the erratic Roosevelt is supposed to be regarded as a Hobson's choice.

It is fairly evident, then, that Mr. Cleveland is industriously erecting Presidential lightning rods, with their tips invitingly pointed toward the two most important centers of magnetic energy in politics—race insanity at the South, and "frenzied finance" at the North.

But it is not with his Presidential ambitions that we concern ourselves. So far from shuddering we regard those ambitions with composure, believing that if the Democratic convention is to be governed at all by monopoly corporations, as was the Republican convention almost wholly, it were better that the candidate be Mr. Cleveland. He truly and fully represents corporate interests, and would be more quickly and generally recognized as representing them than anyone else—even

Gorman or Parker. What we purpose here to consider is not Mr. Cleveland's ambitions, but his version of his administration's connection with the Chicago strike, as he gives it in the July McClure's.

#### I

Like his "bond deal" story (p. 83), Mr. Cleveland's strike story is too long for verbal reproduction here, even if that were proper. We therefore offer a syllabus, which, for convenience of distinguishing, we shall print in smaller type than our comments:

"In the last days of June, 1894," writes Mr. Cleveland, "a very determined and ugly labor disturbance broke out in the city of Chicago." This was the strike which Eugene V. Debs led, and which the Federal government suppressed. "Almost in a night," Mr. Cleveland continues, "it grew to full proportions of malevolence and danger. Rioting and violence were its early accompaniments;" "railroad transportation was especially involved in its attacks;" "the carriage of United States mails was interrupted; inter-State commerce was obstructed, and railroad property was riotously destroyed."

The trouble began with a strike on the 11th of May by the Pullman car-building employes. No injury was done or attempted while the strike was confined to these men, and during that time very little disorder occurred. But on the 22d of June, 1894, the convention of the American Railway Union—"an association of all the different classes of railway employes," in which "the employes of the Pullman Palace Car company could not on any reasonable and consistent theory be regarded as eligible to membership," although "nearly 4,000 of these employes were enrolled"—declared that "unless the Pullman Palace Car company should adjust the grievances of its employes before noon of the 26th day of June, the members of the American Railway Union should, after that date, refuse to handle Pullman cars and equipment." No adjustment having been made at that time, the railway strike accordingly began all over the country.

The city of Chicago was "the field of its most pronounced and malign manifestations, as well as the place of its final extinction." "Early and persistent complaints of mail and inter-State commerce obstructions" came from that city. On the 30th of June the district attorney at Chicago reported the stoppage of mail trains by strikers and recommended appointment of special deputies for protection of mails. "In reply to this dispatch Attorney General Olney on the

same day authorized the marshal to employ additional deputies as suggested, and designated Edwin Walker, an able and prominent attorney in Chicago, as special counsel for the government, to assist the district attorney in any legal proceedings that might be instituted." The attorney general advised this special counsel to proceed not only criminally, but by means of injunctions, against "interference with the mails and the obstruction of inter-State commerce."

On the 1st of July the district attorney reported legal preparations, and that "very little mail and no freight was moving, that the marshal was using all his force to prevent riots and the obstruction of tracks, and that this force was clearly inadequate. On the same day the marshal reported that the situation was desperate, that he had sworn in over 400 deputies, that many more would be required to protect mail trains, and that he expected great trouble the next day." Instructions were thereupon sent to the district attorney, directing him to report "if the process of the court should be resisted by such force as the marshal could not overcome, and suggesting that the United States judge should join in such report." At same time a dispatch was sent "to the special counsel requesting him to report his view of the situation as early as the forenoon of the next day."

"There was plenty of domestic violence in the city of Chicago and in the State of Illinois during the early days of July, 1894." Mr. Cleveland here interposes, by way of meeting the objection that he sent troops into Illinois without application from its constituted authorities; "but no application was made to the Federal government for assistance." He adds: "It was probably a very fortunate circumstance that the presence of United States soldiers in Chicago at that time did not depend upon the request or desire of Gov. Altgeld."

Resuming his narrative, Mr. Cleveland tells of official reports from Chicago on the 2d of July. The district attorney and the special counsel, Walker, reported "a sweeping injunction" against Debs and others, and "the special counsel also expressed the opinion that it would require government troops to enforce the orders of the court and protect the transportation of mails." Military orders were thereupon given on the 2d by Gen. Scofield, major general commanding the army, to "make all necessary arrangements confidentially for the transportation of the entire garrison at Fort Sheridan—infantry, cavalry and artillery—to the lake front in the city of Chicago." But it had not "been definitely determined that the use of a military force was inevitable." On the 3d, however, a letter was received "from Mr. Walker, the special counsel,

in which, after referring to the issuance of the injunctions and setting forth that the marshal was engaged in serving them, he wrote: 'I do not believe that the marshal and his deputies can protect the railroad companies in moving their trains, either freight or passenger, including of course the trains carrying United States mails. Possibly, however, the service of the writ of injunction will have a restraining influence upon Debs and other officers of the association. If it does not, from present appearances, I think it is the opinion of all that the orders of the court cannot be enforced except by the aid of the regular army.'" A few hours afterward the request for troops came. The marshal stated that a mob of from 2,000 to 3,000 persons had ditched a mail train and prevented the passing of other trains, whether mail or not, and that when he read the injunction to them they merely jeered and hooted, and shortly afterward blocked the track. He said he could not disperse the mob, and believed "regular troops of the United States" were necessary. Upon that statement, Judge Grosscup, the district attorney and the special counsel, Walker, declared their opinion that the immediate presence of United States troops was necessary. Accordingly, troops were ordered by Gen. Scofield "to execute the orders and processes of the United States court, to prevent the obstruction of the United States mails, and generally to enforce the faithful execution of the laws of the United States." They were to "confer with" the marshal, the district attorney, and the special counsel (Walker). On the 4th they were on the ground.

On the 5th General Miles, then commanding at Chicago, reported rioting, and that "the injunction of the United States Court is openly defied, and unless the mobs are dispersed by the action of the police or they are fired upon by United States troops, more serious trouble may be expected, as the mob is increasing and becoming more defiant." Rioting continued on the 6th, and on that day Mayor Hopkins issued a proclamation against riots. On the same day Gov. Altgeld put a brigade of State troops on duty in Chicago. A presidential proclamation against rioting was issued on the 8th; on the 10th Debs was arrested under indictments "for complicity in the obstruction of mails and inter-State commerce;" three days afterward "our special counsel expressed the opinion that the strike was practically broken;" on the 17th Debs was prosecuted for contempt of court for disobedience of the injunction; and on the 20th the Federal troops were withdrawn.

As "part of the history of this perplexing affair," Mr. Cleveland now describes "a contribution made by the governor of Illinois to its annoyances."

Alluding here to Gov. Altgeld, he says: "This official not only refused to regard the riotous disturbances within the borders of his State as a sufficient cause for an application to the Federal government for its protection 'against domestic violence' under the mandate of the Constitution, but he actually protested against the presence of Federal troops sent into the State upon the general government's own initiative and for the purpose of defending itself in the exercise of its well-defined legitimate functions. "The beginning and the end of Gov. Altgeld's dispatch of protest are quoted by Mr. Cleveland, but he omits the whole of Gov. Altgeld's statement of his grounds of protest, as being "a lengthy statement which so far missed actual conditions as to appear irrelevant and, in some parts, absolutely frivolous." His own reply to Gov. Altgeld is given in full, but Gov. Altgeld's response, like his original protest, is divested of all but the opening and concluding sentences, the omitted part being described as "a rather dreary discussion of the importance of preserving the rights of the States and a presentation of the dangers to constitutional government that lurked in the course that had been pursued by the government." His patience "somewhat strained" by Gov. Altgeld's insistence, President Cleveland closed the controversy by telegraphing: "While I am still persuaded that I have neither transcended my authority nor duty in the emergency that confronts us, it seems to me that in this hour of danger and public distress, discussion may well give way to active efforts on the part of all in authority to restore obedience to law and to protect life and property."

Mr. Cleveland concludes his version of this strike and the relation to it of his administration by telling of the result of the contempt proceedings against Mr. Debs. They were decided against Debs by the circuit court in December, 1894, and by the Supreme Court in January, 1895. The latter established "the inherent power of the government to execute by means of physical force through its official agents, on every foot of American soil, the powers and functions belonging to it," and "the government's resort to the court, the injunction issued in its aid, and all the proceedings thereon, including the imprisonment of Debs and his associates, were fully approved."

## II

It is to be regretted that a man of Mr. Cleveland's importance should have dealt so unsatisfactorily with a subject which he himself evidently regards as one of extraordinary historical value. His most devoted admirers can-

not but feel some sense of disappointment, if they make themselves acquainted with the facts; while impartial readers who test his statements will be inclined to modify very considerably such good opinion as they may hitherto have had of him.

To a man so deeply concerned as is Mr. Cleveland in the events of which he writes, full allowance should of course be made for such color effects as he may give to his story, provided they are not produced by deliberate misrepresentation or suppression of important facts.

We may therefore be generously considerate of his misleading form of statement, that the strike was declared by the Debs organization because the Pullman Palace Car company did not "adjust the grievances of its employes" before the 26th of June. It was in fact declared because that company refused to "arbitrate" those grievances.

For Mr. Cleveland to have frankly written "arbitrate," instead of "adjust," would have given a different color to the origin of the strike. It would have indicated that the strikers were not so bad a lot at heart as Mr. Cleveland makes them out to be. Still, the discrepancy is not vital, and we are more disposed to charge it to Mr. Cleveland's rather partisan point of view, than to any deliberate purpose of misrepresentation. As an indication, however, of partisanship to the verge of unfairness, it ought not to pass without mention. The fact that the strikers demanded not "adjustment" of grievances but "arbitration" of grievances, must have been known to Mr. Cleveland; for his own strike committee, consisting of Carroll D. Wright, John D. Kernan, and Nicholas E. Worthington, reported to him November 14, 1894 (see their official report: Senate Document, 53d Congress, 3d session, Ex. Doc. No. 7, at page xxxix), that—

the delegates, under instructions from their local unions, unanimously voted that the members of the union should stop handling Pullman cars on June 26 unless the Pullman company would consent to arbitration.

Another bit of color, much more excusable on every ground, is ob-

servable in the care Mr. Cleveland takes, when applauding the Supreme Court for establishing "government by injunction," to avoid the use of that common name for this revolutionary policy. He says of "those most nearly related by executive responsibility" to the events he has narrated, that they "may well congratulate themselves especially on their participation in marking out the way and clearing the path now unchangeably established." Part of this path is the practice then invented by his administration, and in that case sustained by the Supreme Court, of abolishing juries and other safeguards of innocence in criminal cases, by resorting to injunctions. This is now well known as "government by injunction."

But Mr. Cleveland was entirely at liberty to avoid using that unpleasant term. No one but Wendell Phillips ever condemned the old slave oligarchy for avoiding the word "slavery" and substituting "peculiar institution;" and Mr. Cleveland has as good reason for avoiding the disagreeable phrase which his administration has evoked—"government by injunction."

We are not so sure that he is quite excusable for an omission of fact in connection with the origin of "government by injunction." He tells his readers that Debs was arrested July 10, on indictments for obstructing the mails and inter-State commerce, and that on the 17th he was prosecuted for contempt of court for disobeying an injunction. The story of this contempt case Mr. Cleveland follows to its conclusion; but he makes no further mention of the indictments.

That omission seems to us significant, possibly, of a disposition to give to the story a higher degree of color than can be justified by personal point of view, or excused on grounds of partisanship. It is calculated to create an impression that Debs was convicted of crime, whereas the record shows that he was never convicted of crime and in all probability was not guilty.

Let us explain.

The indictments charged Debs with the same acts which

the injunction forbade—obstructing the mails and interfering with inter-State commerce. In the contempt proceedings he was found guilty of these acts. But those proceedings were before a judge without a jury. They were devoid virtually of all the more important safeguards of innocence, and constituted a sort of "star chamber" trial. The judge was Woods, of Indiana, a man of very unsavory reputation, as any reader of the New York Evening Post of a few years before will remember. It is upon this conviction that Mr. Cleveland implies the criminality of Debs. Yet Mr. Cleveland says nothing of the indictments. Possibly the story of what became of them may explain why.

Debs was brought to trial on those indictments before a jury. As the trial was coming to a close one of the jurors fell ill. Debs offered to proceed to a verdict with the other eleven men, but the prosecution refused. Debs offered to take another juror and proceed, but the prosecution refused that also. There was consequently a mistrial. When Debs subsequently appeared in court and demanded another trial, the prosecutors evaded a jury's verdict by then and there, in open court, abandoning the prosecution.

Common report had it at the time that the prosecution had utterly failed to make out a case against Debs, and this view was confirmed by President Cleveland's "strike commission," named above, which declared at page xlv:

There is no evidence before the commission that the officers of the American Railway Union at any time participated in or advised intimidation, violence, or destruction of property.

Was it quite fair of Mr. Cleveland to assert Debs's conviction and to imply his criminality, from his trial for contempt before a judge without a jury, and yet remain silent about his trial before a jury, in the regular and orderly course of criminal procedure, when the latter trial resulted in the abandonment of the indictments against him? Was this fair, especially when Mr. Cleveland's own "strike commission" reported that they could find no evidence of criminality against Debs, and

he does not mention that fact either?

Still another of Mr. Cleveland's omissions, while possibly not altogether culpable, is hardly suggestive of a judicial attitude of mind. We refer to his avoidance of details when describing the dreadful character of the strike.

It began on the 26th of June. It was "very determined and ugly." "Almost in a night it grew to full proportions of malevolence and danger." "Rioting and violence were its early accompaniments." Those are some of the descriptive sentences. But in all Mr. Cleveland's article not a single act of violence prior to July 3 is stated with sufficient circumstantiality to make its corroboration or explicit refutation possible.

We concede that extreme particularity as to incidents is not usually necessary in a descriptive article. In most articles of that kind unverified generalization is sufficient. But Mr. Cleveland's unverified generalizations relate to an important period and a serious dispute.

Gov. Altgeld has denied that these terrible conditions existed during that period, and Mr. Cleveland must know of this denial. Why, then, and especially as he makes his article the occasion for an attack upon Altgeld, does he merely generalize about "rioting and violence," prior to July 3d, naming no instance? Is it because there were no instances to name?

That can hardly be, for there really was some disorder prior to July 3, as Mr. Cleveland's "strike commission," named above, reported to him. At page xliii of their report they quote the superintendent of police as saying:

"So far as I understand, there had not been very much violence or depredations committed prior to the 3d of July, when the troops arrived."

He added that "the indications looked bad and the arrival of the troops," he thought, "was opportune," because he "had at that time 3,000 or 3,100 men in service, and every one of them was engaged in that particular business of preventing violence." Of his whole statement the commission reports that it "appears to be a correct statement of the situation

prior to July 3." So there was no serious violence prior to the coming of Federal troops, and such as threatened was prevented—which were Altgeld's contentions.

That conclusion is supported also by Mayor John P. Hopkins, a partisan of Cleveland's, whose testimony at page 344 of the report reads:

"So far as I know, and I believe I am thoroughly conversant with the case, the police did all the work required of them. In fact, I have the assurance of the officials of the different railroads that they received the most efficient protection they had ever received during similar troubles; that condition of things existed until July 5.

Such being the circumstances can Mr. Cleveland's readers who want the truth, fully excuse him for indicating that there was prior to July 3 a condition of lawlessness so vast and malevolent as to warrant him in making the bare generalizations on which he rests his insistence upon the necessity for having ordered Federal troops to Chicago? Can they not see that his neglect to specify is accounted for by the fact that specifications would have been absurdly insignificant?

Again, such being the circumstances can those of Mr. Cleveland's readers who like fairness, respect Mr. Cleveland's candor when he blames Gov. Altgeld for neglecting to call upon the Federal government for assistance, and states that "there was plenty of domestic violence in the city of Chicago" during "the early days of July, 1894"? By early days of July he must in this connection have meant the 1st and 2d, for he ordered out the Federal troops on the 3d; after that, Gov. Altgeld had no occasion to ask for Federal assistance, whether he thought it needed or not. What manner of accuser is this Mr. Cleveland who accuses so recklessly?

It is worthy of remark, also, that Mr. Cleveland is as silent in his article about one important fact in connection with the Chicago strike as he was until recently about the entire subject. He does not once mention the General Managers' Association. This is highly significant, for the strike was a direct conflict between the American Railway Union, which represented the strikers and which

Mr. Cleveland frequently mentions, and the General Managers' Association, which represented the combined railroads and which Mr. Cleveland never mentions.

It is not pleasant to suspect Mr. Cleveland of repeatedly resorting to that subtle form of misrepresentation which consists in suggesting the false by suppressing the true; but this suspicion becomes more and more obtrusive as the facts disclose themselves.

A legitimate explanation of this ignoring of the General Managers' Association is, it is true, ready at hand in the suggestion that it was not a criminal body nor managed in a criminal way, and therefore that it has no proper place in Mr. Cleveland's story of the great "malevolence" which he boasts of suppressing with the strong arm. But that explanation is untrue. The General Managers' Association was not only as important a factor with reference to the action of the Federal government as was the Debs organization, but it was criminal under the very law—the Sherman anti-trust act—under which Mr. Cleveland's injunction was asked for and granted and finally sustained against Debs.

This is evident from the report of Mr. Cleveland's "strike commission," quoted from above. At pages xxviii to xxxi, that report describes the General Managers' Association as follows:

"This voluntary, unincorporated association was formed in 1886, and has as members the 24 railroads centering or terminating in Chicago. . . . In its constitution the object of the association is stated to be 'the consideration of problems of management arising from the operation of railroads terminating or centering at Chicago.' It further provides that 'all funds needed shall be raised by assessments divided equally among the members.' There are no limitations as to 'consideration of problems' or 'funds' except the will of the managers and the resources of the railroad corporations. . . . It dealt with all questions concerning transportation centering at Chicago in which the roads had a common interest. It thus determined the policy and practically fixed the relations of all of the roads toward the public as to switching, car service, loading and unloading cars, weights of live stock, rates, etc., and sustained each road in maintaining the position of the association as to these matters. Until June, 1894, the association dealt incidentally and infrequently with wages. . . . In March, 1893, the switchmen demanded more pay

from each road. The association concluded that they were paid enough—if anything, too much. . . . This was the first time when men upon each line were brought sharply face to face with the fact that in questions as to wages, rules, etc., each line was supported by 24 combined railroads. . . . This association likewise prepared for its use elaborate schedules of the wages paid upon the entire lines of its 24 members. The proposed object of these schedules was to let each road know what other roads paid. . . . It was an incident of the General Managers' Association to "assist" each road in case of trouble over such matters, one form of assistance being for the association to secure men enough through its agencies to take the places of all strikers. . . . The further single step of admitting lines not running into Chicago to membership would certainly have the effect of combining all railroads in wage contentions against all employes thereon. The Commission questions whether any legal authority, statutory or otherwise, can be found to justify some of the features of the Association which have come to light in this investigation. If we regard its practical workings rather than its professions as expressed in its constitution, the General Managers' Association has no more standing in law than the old Trunk Line Pool. It cannot incorporate, because railroad charters do not authorize roads to form corporations or associations to fix rates for services and wages, nor to force their acceptance, nor to battle with strikers. It is a usurpation of power not granted. . . . The association is an illustration of the persistent and shrewdly devised plans of corporations to overreach their limitations and to usurp indirectly powers and rights not contemplated in their charters and not obtainable from the people or their legislators. An extension of this association, as above suggested, and the proposed legalization of "pooling" would result in an aggregation of power and capital dangerous to the people and their liberties as well as to employes and their rights. . . . It should be noted that until the railroads set the example a general union of railroad employes was never attempted. . . . The refusal of the General Managers' Association to recognize and deal with such a combination of labor as the American Railway Union seems arrogant and absurd when we consider its standing before the law, its assumptions, and its past and obviously contemplated future action.

Yet that arrogant and lawless body, of which Mr. Cleveland makes no mention in his article, was able to call into its service unquestioningly the law department and the military government

under President Cleveland. No wonder Mr. Cleveland refrains from mentioning even the existence of this lawless General Managers' Association, notwithstanding that it stood throughout the strike in the same relation to the railroads as the Debs organization to the strikers, and was quite as conspicuous throughout the contest.

But can Mr. Cleveland be regarded as altogether candid after the significance of this studied omission of his is exposed?

That Mr. Cleveland's reticence regarding the General Managers' Association is really a conscious and studied and purposeful reticence, is susceptible of proof.

Turn to his article at page 232 of McClure's for July, and you find him saying that Attorney General Olney designated Edwin Walker, "an able and prominent attorney in Chicago," as special counsel for the government.

Why did Mr. Cleveland take the pains to describe Mr. Walker as "an able and prominent attorney of Chicago," which is to be presumed, and yet say no more to identify him? The answer will be found in "Who's Who in America," for 1903-1905.

"Who's Who in America" is "a biographical dictionary of notable living men and women of the United States." It is published by A. N. Marquis & Co., of Chicago, and edited by John W. Leonard. The biographical data are obtained directly from the persons concerned. This is what appears with reference to Mr. Walker, the "able and prominent attorney in Chicago," whom the Cleveland administration employed as special counsel against the Chicago strikers of 1894:

Walker, Edwin, lawyer; b. Genesee Co., N. Y., 1832; academic ed'n; admitted to N. Y. bar at Buffalo, 1854; practiced Logansport, Ind., 1854-65; removed to Chicago, 1865; has represented several railroads as gen. solicitor since 1860. Illinois counsel for Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. R. since 1870; also partner in firm of W. P. Rend & Co., coal miners and shippers. Was counsel for the ry. cos. and sp'l counsel for U. S. in the lawsuits growing out of the great railroad strike of 1894. Residence: 2612 Michigan Av. Office: 184 La Salle St., Chicago.

So Mr. Walker was not only a railroad corporation lawyer, the

general solicitor of several roads for over 30 years, and Illinois counsel for one of the great railroads concerned in the strike and belonging to the arrogant and lawless General Managers' Association, but he was counsel for that arrogant and lawless Association itself. He implies this in his little autobiography, wherein it appears that he "was counsel for the ry. cos. and sp'l counsel for U. S. in the lawsuits growing out of the great railroad strike of 1894." Mr. Cleveland's reticence as to the General Managers' Association and his superfluous description of Mr. Walker as an able and prominent attorney in Chicago," are thus fully explained.

At the same time, Mr. Walker's employment as special counsel for the government is fully accounted for. Mr. Walker was employed by Mr. Cleveland as special counsel for the government because he was already the favorite attorney of the General Managers' Association. It was their "pull," and not Mr. Walker's ability and prominence, neither of which was extraordinary at the Chicago bar, that brought about the appointment.

Through that appointment, the General Managers' Association became for all practical purposes, in connection with the strike, the government of the United States.

### III

One of Mr. Cleveland's sins of omission in his McClure's article is so conspicuously unbecoming as to demand attention by itself. This is his evisceration of Altgeld's protesting telegrams.

Altgeld's protest and his reasons for it constitute the central fact or core of all that gives serious historical value to this Chicago strike. Without that feature no story of the strike would be much more than a reminiscence, and Mr. Cleveland is not indulging in reminiscences. No other documents, therefore, are so vital, in every word, to the merits of the case Mr. Cleveland is trying to make for his administration, as Altgeld's telegrams and Cleveland's replies. Yet Mr. Cleveland, while giving his own replies in full, cuts out from Altgeld's dispatches all but the bare protests.

Simply as historical writing this treatment of the subject is so bad as to raise a presumption against Mr. Cleveland either of incompetency or something worse.

Moreover, it is such treatment of an adversary as no one with a particle of chivalry in his character, to say nothing of the most primitive sense of fairness and decency, would be guilty of. Cleveland's real attack in his article is upon Altgeld. He aims to leave the impression that Altgeld was wantonly indifferent to law and order. This effort he attempts two years after Altgeld's death, he having remained silent during all the preceding eight years, although challenged by Altgeld to do then what he essays to do now. Circumstances might excuse his silence during Altgeld's life; circumstances might excuse his breaking that silence after Altgeld's death. But, granting this, there are still no circumstances conceivable which would tempt a fair man, upon breaking silence for an attack after the death of his adversary, to cut ruthlessly out of a document he quotes, the brief and respectful defense which that adversary had left behind and in his hands. Yet that is what Cleveland does.

The first telegram from Altgeld to Cleveland, dated July 5, 1894, is quoted in part by Mr. Cleveland at page 238 of McClure's. We give the whole telegram below, putting in blacker type the part that Mr. Cleveland characterizes as "a lengthy statement which so far missed actual conditions as to appear irrelevant and, in some parts, absolutely frivolous," and which, with that explanation, he cuts out:

**Executive Office, State of Illinois, July 5, 1894.**

**Hon. Grover Cleveland, President of the United States, Washington, D. C.**

Sir:—I am advised that you have ordered Federal troops to go into service in the State of Illinois. Surely the facts have not been correctly presented to you in this case, or you would not have taken this step, for it is entirely unnecessary, and, as it seems to me, unjustifiable. Waiving all questions of courtesy, I will say that the State of Illinois is not only able to take care of itself, but it stands ready to furnish the Federal government any assistance it may need elsewhere. Our military force is ample, and consists of as good soldiers

as can be found in the country. They have been ordered promptly whenever and wherever they were needed. We have stationed in Chicago alone three Regiments of Infantry, one Battery and one troop of Cavalry, and no better soldiers can be found. They have been ready every moment to go on duty, and have been and are now eager to go into service, but they have not been ordered out because nobody in Cook county, whether official or private citizen, asked to have their assistance, or even intimated in any way that their assistance was desired or necessary.

So far as I have been advised, the local officials have been able to handle the situation. But if any assistance were needed, the State stood ready to furnish 100 men for every one man required, and stood ready to do so at a moment's notice. Notwithstanding these facts the Federal Government has been applied to by men who had political and selfish motives for wanting to ignore the State government. We have just gone through a long coal strike, more extensive here than in any other State, because our soft-coal field is larger than that of any other State. We have now had ten days of the railroad strike, and we have promptly furnished military aid wherever the local officials needed it.

In two instances the United States marshal for the Southern District of Illinois applied for assistance to enable him to enforce the processes of the United States court, and troops were promptly furnished him, and he was assisted in every way he desired. The law has been thoroughly executed, and every man guilty of violating it during the strike has been brought to justice. If the marshal of the Northern District of Illinois or the authorities of Cook county needed military assistance they had but to ask for it in order to get it from the State.

At present some of our railroads are paralyzed, not by reason of obstruction, but because they cannot get men to operate their trains. For some reason they are anxious to keep this fact from the public, and for this purpose they are making an outcry about obstructions in order to divert attention. Now, I will cite to you two examples which illustrate the situation:

Some days ago I was advised that the business of one of our railroads was obstructed at two railroad centers, and that there was a condition bordering on anarchy there, and I was asked to furnish protection so as to enable the employees of the road to operate the trains. Troops were promptly ordered to both points. Then it transpired that the company had not sufficient men on its line to operate one train. All the old hands were orderly, but refused to go to work. The company had large shops which worked a number of men who did not belong to the Railway Union and who could run an engine. They were appealed to to run the train but flatly refused. We were obliged to hunt up soldiers who could run an engine and operate a train. Again, two days ago, appeals which were almost frantic came from the officials of another road stating that at an important point on their

line trains were forcibly obstructed, and that there was a reign of anarchy at that place, and they asked for protection so that they could move their trains. Troops were put on the ground in a few hours' time, when the officer in command telegraphed me that there was no trouble, and had been none at that point, but that the road seemed to have no men to run trains, and the sheriff telegraphed that he did not need troops, but would himself move every train if the company would only furnish an engineer. The result was that the troops were there twelve hours before a single train was moved, although there was no attempt at interference by anybody.

It is true that in several instances a road made efforts to work a few green men and a crowd standing around insulted them and tried to drive them away, and in a few other cases they cut off Pullman sleepers from trains. But all these troubles were local in character and could easily be handled by the State authorities. Illinois has more railroad men than any other State in the Union, but as a rule they are orderly and well-behaved. This is shown by the fact that so very little actual violence has been committed. Only a very small percentage of these men have been guilty of infractions of the law. The newspaper accounts have in many cases been pure fabrications, and in others wild exaggerations.

I have gone thus into details to show that it is not soldiers that the railroads need so much as it is men to operate trains, and that the conditions do not exist here which bring the cause within the Federal statutes, a statute that was passed in 1881 and was in reality a war measure. The statute authorized the use of Federal troops in a State whenever it shall be impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States within such States by the ordinary judicial proceedings. Such a condition does not exist in Illinois. There have been a few local disturbances, but nothing that seriously interfered with the administration of justice, or that could not be easily controlled by the local or State authorities, for the Federal troops can do nothing that the State troops cannot do.

I repeat that you have been imposed upon in this matter, but even if by a forced construction it were held that the conditions here came within the letter of the statute, then I submit that local self-government is a fundamental principle of our Constitution. Each community shall govern itself so long as it can and is ready and able to enforce the law, and it is in harmony with this fundamental principle that the statute authorizing the President to send troops into States must be construed; especially is this so in matters relating to the exercise of the police power and the preservation of law and order.

To absolutely ignore a local government in matters of this kind, when the local government is ready to furnish assistance needed, and is amply able to enforce the law, not only insults the people of this State by imputing to them an inability to govern themselves, or an un-

willingness to enforce the law, but is in violation of a basic principle of our institutions. The question of Federal supremacy is in no way involved. No one disputes it for a moment, but, under our Constitution, Federal supremacy and local self-government must go hand in hand, and to ignore the latter is to do violence to the Constitution.

As Governor of the State of Illinois, I protest against this, and ask the immediate withdrawal of the Federal troops from active duty in this State. Should the situation at any time get so serious that we cannot control it with the State forces, we will promptly ask for Federal assistance, but until such time, I protest, with all due deference, against this uncalled for reflection upon our people, and again ask the immediate withdrawal of these troops. I have the honor to be, yours respectfully,  
**JOHN P. ALTGELD,**  
 Governor of Illinois.

The Democrat who could describe as irrelevant and frivolous that part of the above telegram which we print in black type, is not a safe guardian of democratic principles.

To the foregoing dispatch President Cleveland replied as follows:

Executive Mansion,  
 Washington, July 5, 1894.

Hon. John P. Altgeld, Governor of Illinois, Springfield, Ill.:

Sir:—Federal troops were sent to Chicago in strict accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the United States, upon the demand of the post office department that obstructions of the mails should be removed, and upon the representation of the judicial officers of the United States that process of the Federal courts could not be executed through the ordinary means, and upon abundant proof that conspiracies existed against commerce between the States. To meet these conditions, which are clearly within the province of Federal authority, the presence of Federal troops in the city of Chicago was deemed not only proper but necessary; and there has been no intention of thereby interfering with the plain duty of the local authorities to preserve the peace of the city.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

Gov. Altgeld's reply is treated by Mr. Cleveland in his McClure's article with the same lack of historical consideration and personal generosity that the initial telegram received. This omitted part he describes as "a rather dreary discussion of the importance of preserving the rights of the State and a presentation of

the dangers to constitutional government that lurked in the course that had been pursued by the government." We print the whole telegram, distinguishing the part Mr. Cleveland omits by putting it in blacker type:

To the Hon. Grover Cleveland, President of the United States, Washington, D. C.

Sir:—Your answer to my protest involves some startling conclusions and ignores and evades the question at issue—that is that the principle of local self-government is just as fundamental in our institutions as is that of Federal supremacy.

First—You calmly assume that the executive has the legal right to order Federal troops into any community of the United States, in the first instance, whenever there is the slightest disturbance, and that he can do this without any regard to the question as to whether that community is able to and ready to enforce the law itself, and, inasmuch as the executive is the sole judge of the question as to whether any disturbance exists or not in any part of the country, this assumption means that the executive can send Federal troops into any community in the United States at his pleasure, and keep them there as long as he chooses. If this is the law, then the principle of self-government either never did exist in this country or else has been destroyed, for no community can be said to possess local self-government, if the executive can, at his pleasure, send military forces to patrol its streets under pretense of enforcing some law. The kind of local self-government that could exist under these circumstances can be found in any of the monarchies of Europe, and it is not in harmony with the spirit of our institutions.

Second—It is also a fundamental principle in our government that except in times of war the military shall be subordinate to the civil authority. In harmony with this provision, the State troops are ordered out to act under and with the civil authorities. The troops you have ordered to Chicago are not under the civil authorities, and are in no way responsible to them for their conduct. They are not even acting under the United States Marshal or any Federal officer of the State, but are acting directly under military orders issued from military headquarters at Washington, and in so far as these troops act at all, it is military government.

Third—The Statute authorizing Federal troops to be sent into States in certain cases contemplates that the State troops shall be taken first. This provision has been ignored and it is assumed that the executive is not bound by it. Federal interference with industrial disturbances in the various States is certainly a new departure, and it opens up so large a field that it will require a very little stretch of authority to absorb to itself all the details of local government.

Fourth—You say that troops were or-

dered into Illinois upon the demand of the postoffice department, and upon representations of the judicial officers of the United States that process of the courts could not be served, and upon proof that conspiracies existed. We will not discuss the facts, but look for a moment at the principle involved in your statement. All of these officers are appointed by the executive. Most of them can be removed by him at will. They are not only obliged to do his bidding, but they are in fact a part of the executive. If several of them can apply for troops, one alone can; so that under the law, as you assume it to be, an executive, through any one of his appointees, can apply to himself to have the military sent into any city or number of cities, and base his application on such representations as he sees fit to make. In fact, it will be immaterial whether he makes any showing or not, for the executive is the sole judge, and nobody else has any right to interfere or even inquire about it. Then the executive can pass on his own application—his will being the sole guide—he can hold the application to be sufficient, and order troops to as many places as he wishes and put them in command of any one he chooses, and have them act, not under the civil officers, either Federal or State, but directly under military orders from Washington, and there is not in the Constitution or laws, whether written or unwritten, any limitation or restraint upon his power. His judgment, that is, his will, is the sole guide, and it being purely a matter of discretion, his decision can never be examined or questioned.

This assumption as to the power of the executive is certainly new, and I respectfully submit that it is not the law of the land. The jurists have told us that this is a government of law, and not a government by the caprice of an individual, and, further, instead of being autocratic, it is a government of limited power. Yet the autocrat of Russia could certainly not possess, or claim to possess, greater power than is possessed by the executive of the United States, if your assumption is correct.

Fifth—The executive has the command not only of the regular forces of all the United States, but of the military forces of all the States, and can order them to any place he sees fit; and as there are always more or less local disturbances over the country, it will be an easy matter under your construction of the law for an ambitious executive to order out the military forces of all of the States, and establish at once a military government. The only chance of failure in such a movement could come from rebellion, and with such a vast military power at command this could readily be crushed, for, as a rule, soldiers will obey orders.

As for the situation in Illinois, that is of no consequence now compared with the far-reaching principle involved. True, according to my advices, Federal troops have now been on duty for over two days, and although the men were brave and the officers valiant and able, yet their

very presence proved to be an irritant because it aroused the indignation of a large class of people, who, while upholding law and order, had been taught to believe in local self-government and, therefore, resented what they regarded as unwarranted interference.

Inasmuch as the Federal troops can do nothing but what the State troops can do there, and believing that the State is amply able to take care of the situation, and to enforce the law, and believing that the ordering out of the Federal troops was unwarranted, I again ask their withdrawal.

JOHN P. ALTGELD.

Mr. Cleveland gives his reply, already reproduced in our syllabus of his article, with the following explanation: "I confess that my patience was somewhat strained, when I quickly sent the following dispatch in reply to this communication."

That Mr. Cleveland should have regarded Gov. Altgeld's second dispatch as "a rather dreary discussion," which "somewhat strained" his patience, goes far to indicate that Mr. Cleveland has no very profound interest in the principles of American statesmanship.

Who can revere the democratic character of the Democratic President who figured in that correspondence? Who can admire the personal generosity of the man who is capable of treating a dead adversary as Cleveland treats Altgeld with reference to that correspondence? Who can respect the judicial fairness of the official historian who thus emasculates this correspondence in publishing what purports to be an authoritative narrative of the historical episode of which it is the central fact?

#### IV

The labor strike of which Mr. Cleveland writes so unfairly and with the manifest purpose of awakening pleasant recollections among the monopolists of the country on the eve of the Democratic convention, was caused as well as managed by the arrogant and lawless conspiracy of railroads known as the General Managers' Association.

Organized in 1886 to oppress the public generally, this Association had reached the point in 1893 where it could dictate terms of employment by railroad combination

and arbitrary power. Through it, all the roads could be concentrated against segregated unions of workmen and the deadly "black-list" be thereby universally applied. To meet that emergency the entire railway labor service was organized in 1893 into the American Railway Union, under the leadership of Mr. Debs.

Among the members of this union were the employes of the Pullman Palace car shops. While the union was yet young, these members, oppressed by exasperating hardships, insisted upon striking. The officers and directors of the union "did not want a strike at Pullman" and "they advised against it," says Cleveland's "strike commission" in its report at page xxvii; "but the exaggerated idea of the power of the union, which induced the workmen at Pullman to join the order, led to their striking, against this advice;" and, "having struck, the union could do nothing less, upon the theory at its base, than support them." So the delegates at their convention at Chicago, acting "under instructions from their local unions"—we are quoting from the same report at page xxxix—"unanimously voted" on the 21st of June 1894, "that the members of the union should stop handling Pullman cars on June 26 unless the Pullman company would consent to arbitration." The Pullman company did refuse to arbitrate, and "on June 26 the boycott and strike began." And "throughout the strike," continues this official report, "the strife was simply over handling Pullman cars, the men being ready to do their duty otherwise." There was no conspiracy to interfere with the post office service.

Meanwhile, and we quote now from the same report at page xlii, "on June 22 an officer of the Pullman company met the General Managers by invitation, and the General Managers, among other things, resolved: 'That we hereby declare it to be the lawful right and duty of said railway companies to protest against said proposed boycott; to resist the same in the interest of their existing contracts, and for the benefit of the traveling public, and that we will act unitedly to that end.'"

The General Managers' Association might have prevented the

strike by advising the Pullman company to arbitrate. But that would have frustrated their chief design, which evidently was to take advantage of the opportunity to destroy the American Railway Union and make their own lawless combination resistless. They therefore agreed to act unitedly; and, according to the official report of Mr. Cleveland's "strike commission" at page xliii, "from June 22 until the practical end of the strike the General Managers' Association directed and controlled the contest on the part of the railroads, using the combined resources of all the roads to support the contentions and insure the protection of each."

Continuing with reference to this General Managers' Association, which it finds to be arrogant and lawless, President Cleveland's "strike commission" further says at page xliii:

Headquarters were established; agencies for hiring men opened; as the men arrived they were cared for and assigned to duty upon the different lines; a bureau was started to furnish information to the press; the lawyers of the different roads were called into conference and combination in legal and criminal proceedings; the General Managers met daily to hear reports and to direct proceedings; constant communication was kept up with the civil and military authorities as to the movements and assignments of police, marshals and troops. Each road did what it could with its operating forces, but all the leadership, direction, and concentration of power, resources, and influence on the part of the railroads were centered in the General Managers' Association. That association stood for each and all of its 24 combined members, and all that they could command, in fighting and crushing the strike.

One of the forces they commanded for that purpose was the "pull" necessary to secure the appointment by Mr. Cleveland's administration of their own lawyer, Edwin Walker, as special counsel for the Federal government.

What purpose Mr. Walker served, Mr. Cleveland, despite his reticence on that tender point, discloses in his McClure's article. As soon as the injunction was procured, the special counsel asked for United States troops. This was on the 2d. On the 3d he asked again. And when troops had been sent and Debs had been arrested,



he it was who expressed the opinion, not that order had been restored—no great disorder had existed; and, at any rate, suppression of disorder was not the purpose he had in view—but, as Mr. Cleveland quotes him, that “the strike was practically broken.”

To break the strike and destroy the American Railway Union, not to enforce law, were the objects of the General Managers' Association; and President Cleveland brought the government to its aid for those purposes, the point of contact between him and the Association being Walker, the “able and prominent” lawyer who was the paid counsel for both.

There had been but little violence until the troops came, and none with which the local authorities could not and did not cope. The Mayor, one of Mr. Cleveland's own followers in politics, did not find it necessary to issue a proclamation against rioting until July 6, three days after the arrival of Federal troops. No call was made upon Gov. Altgeld for State troops until that time, and he promptly responded with a brigade.

Nor was the influence of the lawyer for the lawless General Managers' Association, the man whom Mr. Cleveland's administration selected for special government counsel, confined to getting Federal troops. Observe this quotation from the Cleveland “strike commission” report at page xlv, of which, by the way, Mr. Cleveland takes no notice in his McClure's article:

United States deputy marshals, to the number of 3,600 were selected by and appointed at request of the General Managers' Association, and of its railroads. They were armed and paid by the railroads, and acted in the double capacity of railroad employes and United States officers. While operating the railroads they assumed and exercised unrestricted United States authority when so ordered by their employers, or whenever they regarded it as necessary. They were not under the direct control of any government official while exercising authority. This is placing officers of the government under control of a combination of railroads. It is a bad precedent, that might well lead to serious consequences.

One of the serious consequences may not improbably have

been destruction of railroad property by those deputies for the purpose of charging the crime to strikers. At any rate, the deputies are not free from that suspicion; and they appear to have been at least as capable of the crime as were the strikers. Of the character of the deputies Mr. Ray Standard Baker, then a Chicago reporter and now one of the editors of McClure's, gave an unflattering account in his testimony before the “strike commission.” At page 370 he said of their character: “From my experience with them I think it was very bad indeed. I saw more cases of drunkenness, I believe, among the United States deputy marshals than I did among the strikers.” Why may it not be, as the strikers charge, that these deputy marshals caused such disorder as occurred?

It is not true that Altgeld refused to send troops when they were called for. The contrary is the fact, as the records show.

It is not true that the destruction of railroad property was great. This destruction is estimated by the “strike commission” at \$685,308, including the “hire of United States deputy marshals;” and up to the 6th of July, according to the Chicago fire department's official report, the total damage had been less than \$6,000.

It is not true that freight movements were stopped by rioting at Chicago prior to the coming in of the Federal troops. On the 2d of July the General Managers' Association published reports stating that freight and passenger trains generally were running without interruption.

It is not true that the mails were obstructed at the time of the appointment by the Federal government of the General Managers' lawyer as special counsel for the United States. That appointment was made on the 30th, yet on the 30th the superintendent of the railway mail service at Chicago reported to the department: “No mails have accumulated at Chicago so far; all regular trains are moving nearly on time with a few slight exceptions.”

Mr. Cleveland may have been sadly perplexed by the situation,

as he says he was, but his action calls for the reproach of all law-abiding men.

He found a lawless and arrogant combination of railroad corporations striving to crush a defensive organization of railroad workmen; and instead of assuming an attitude of impartiality, he entered into collusion with the lawless railroad combination and appointed their own attorney as the special legal adviser of the government.

Acting then in accordance with the plans of this lawless organization, he ignored and finally insulted the governor of the State, and over his head threw a Federal military force into his State and placed it at the service, through this special counsel, of the special counsel's lawless client, the General Managers' Association.

He also appears to have connived at the appointment of 3,600 hired servants of this association as United States deputy marshals, under its own immediate control—men of bad character and bad conduct, to whom, as reasonably as to the strikers, may be attributed such violence as occurred.

And now he boasts of having been sustained by the Federal courts in this evil policy, and in his device for “government by injunction” which was part of it.

As to those revolutionary decisions of the courts, even that of the Supreme Court, which Mr. Cleveland regards as having established a permanent policy, he should not forget how ephemeral the Dred Scott decision of that same Supreme Court proved to be.

As to Mr. Cleveland himself, in connection with this strike, he merited impeachment for his high-handed course in affiliation with the General Managers' Association, rather than the praise and the prize he covets for his success in breaking a labor strike that was meritorious, on pretense of putting down a labor insurrection that had no existence.

Mr. Cleveland's article may confirm the confidence in him of the plutocratic classes whose favor he solicits by it; but it can have no other effect upon fair-minded men who test it by the facts, than

to make them ask how the official career of such a President could possibly have ended otherwise than it did—in administrative disaster and popular distrust.

## NEWS

Week ending Thursday, June 30.

The Republican national convention (p. 182) closed on the 23d with the nomination of Theodore Roosevelt, of New York, for President of the United States, and Charles Warren Fairbanks, of Indiana, for Vice President.

The vote for Roosevelt was not only unanimous, but every one of the 994 delegates voted. They represented 45 States, 6 Territories, the District of Columbia, and the two Colonies—Porto Rico and the Philippines. Ex-Governor Black, of New York, made the nominating speech and Senator Beveridge, of Indiana, made the seconding speech. The nomination of Mr. Fairbanks was by acclamation. Before the afternoon of the 23d was half gone, the convention, which had been opened for the day with prayer by the third day's chaplain, the Rev. Thaddens A. Snively, adjourned sine die.

George B. Cortelyou, of New York, a member of President Roosevelt's cabinet, was chosen as chairman of the national committee, with Cornelius N. Bliss, of New York, as treasurer.

The Prohibition national convention met at Indianapolis on the 29th. Homer L. Castle was made temporary, and A. F. Wolfenbarber permanent, chairman.

The Democratic convention for Missouri met on the 29th. It instructed for United States Senator Francis M. Cockrell.

Conditions in the strike regions of Colorado (p. 184) are reported as having improved, but the improvement appears to be such only from a strictly military point of view. The fourth wholesale deportation of union workmen by the military under Gen. Bell took place on the 28th, the number deported

on that occasion being 34. This makes a total of 181 deportations.

Plans appear to be on foot to place Denver also under martial law, Gen. Bell having so indicated on the 25th, in an interview published in the Chicago Record-Herald of the 26th by saying:

I should not be surprised if Denver were to be put under martial law, and I think we shall have to do it before this insurrection in the State is suppressed. The streets of Denver are filled with the men we deported from the mining districts, and they will start trouble here before very long.

An address to all organized labor has been issued by President Gompers, of the American Federation of Labor, in behalf of the Colorado strikers, calling for moral support and financial assistance. More pronounced action has been taken by the executive committee of the International Association of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers, of which Frank Buchanan is the president. This committee adopted a series of resolutions on the 23d reciting the facts about the military usurpation in Colorado, concluding as follows:

These circumstances demand a protest from all good citizens. In that protest we join, with the hope that a way may yet be found to give it legal effect, and to the end that the law may be respected by all classes because enforced without partiality for any. Finally, we hereby request the officers of the American Federation of Labor, of the Mine Workers of America, of the Western Federation of Miners, and of all other national, international, and central federations of labor, to call an emergent delegate conference, to meet at an early date in some city centrally located, for the purpose of dispassionately considering the circumstances and dangers to organized labor in general of the Colorado situation, and we recommend that this conference take positive action in at least three particulars, namely: First, that it vigorously set in motion proceedings to discover and lawfully to punish the perpetrators of the dynamite crime at Independence, without regard to whether the criminal acted as an agent of the miners, or as a matter of personal animosity, or as the agent of the mine owners. Second, that it vigorously set in motion legal proceedings to punish the corporate and official criminals who have outraged the rights of union labor in Colorado; and third, that it adopt measures calculated to prevent in the future any repetition, whether in Colo-

rado or any other State, of corporate and official lawlessness of like character.

No action in accordance with the above request appears yet to have been taken by the officials appealed to, unless it be the call by Mr. Gompers, noted above, for moral support and financial aid.

It is reported that the Department of Commerce and Labor of the United States is making an investigation of the Colorado situation and the facts leading up to it, under the direction of Mr. Carroll D. Wright.

News of an impending battle of great magnitude in the Russian-Japanese war (p. 185) has been coming over the wires for several days. From this it appears that the Japanese had got as far north as Kaichow, as reported last week, and have even pushed farther northward. The impending battle is expected to occur between Kaichow and Haicheng, probably near Simucheng, about 15 miles southeast of Haicheng and the same distance eastward from the line of railway. The opposing armies are four, the Russian main army under Gen. Kouropatkin, and three Japanese armies, one under Gen. Kuroki, one under Gen. Nodzu, and the third under Gen. Oku. These three Japanese forces are reported to be advancing from three points—south, southeast and east—toward Haicheng, their apparent point of concentration.

A slight naval diversion was created on the 23d by the escape in the night of the whole Russian fleet from Port Arthur harbor. It was attacked by the Japanese fleet eight times before dawn on the 24th. Late in the afternoon of the 24th the Russian vessels sought refuge again in the Port Arthur harbor.

### NEWS NOTES.

—John Alexander Dowle landed in New York on the 25th upon his return from Australia by way of England.

—Pericardis and Varley, the captives whom the Moorish leader, Raisuli, was holding to ransom (p. 157), were released on the 24th.

—Helen Keller, the young woman, now 24 years old, who has been deaf, dumb and blind from infancy, received