

If any demon did possess us it was probably the same demon who, in less disagreeable but more dangerous form, possesses so many to make the sweeping success of the war a shield of defense against irrefutable charges of gross mismanagement. In the intoxication of victory the American people are too prone to ignore mismanagement and malfeasance. Yet if these were not condemned with emphasis, tinctured even with gall, the United States would be in danger of succumbing to our unwholesome tendency to worship mere success. An apt comparison will not be out of place. During the Crimean war, the English papers devoted themselves to fault-finding, while the French papers flattered. As an immediate result, the French army was supposed everywhere, even in England, to be about perfect, and in contrast in every way with the English army; but the ultimate effect upon the English army was in the highest degree healthful, while that of the flattering policy upon the French army was disgraceful collapse sixteen years later.

In the article which our friend criticizes, we had no intention of minimizing the sweeping character of our victory. Nor was there any purpose in it to detract from the glory of the navy. With the exception of the manifest favoritism regarding Sampson, our naval record in the war was without serious blemish. It was more than that; it was brilliant. Though the discovery of the utter weakness, incapacity, rottenness, of the enemy naturally dims this brilliancy, nevertheless it is evident from the way in which Dewey, Schley, Sampson, and their subordinates conducted their maneuvers, that the navy would have won laurels against a competent foe. But notwithstanding the efficiency of the navy, "the egg of our huge success," as our friend truly describes the destruction of the Spanish fleets, would have been added by the war department had we not been favored with extraordinary good luck. From the unwarrantable supersedure of the

commanding general, with a subordinate in favor with the head of the department, to the final upsetting of pretty battle plans by the unconsidered lay of the land, the army campaign in Cuba was a succession of blunders. They were blunders, too, which would have culminated in driving our troops in shame from the island, but for the still greater blunders of the enemy, supplemented by the alertness and effectiveness of Sampson's squadron.

Congressman Dingley, of tariff fame, puts on a sanctimonious face and joins the land grabbing crew. Our disclaimer as to grabbing territory was honestly meant, he says, but recent events as to Cuba "appear to indicate that the island is unequal to self-government." What are those events? What single indication have we that Cuba is not equal to self-government? Not one. Even if she were in fact unequal to self-government, that would be none of our business. We have no commission to set up governments for people that we choose to regard as incapable of self-government. Mexico governs herself. The Central American states govern themselves. The nations of South America govern themselves. Their governments are not up to our ideas, but what of that? Would Mr. Dingley have us send gunboats and troopships down there to set them up in the government business according to our standards? He certainly would not say so. Why, then, this hypocrisy about Cuba. It could govern itself as well as any of our continental neighbors to the south, and better than they have done at some points in their history. The true inwardness of all the talk about Cuban inability with reference to self-government, Dingley's included, is that we want to annex Cuba and are in search of some hypocritical excuse for throwing our pledge against annexation to the winds.

The native political societies of Hawaii, which protest with great dignity and earnestness against annexation

without reference to the will of the people of the Hawaiian islands, basing their protest expressly upon that part of the declaration of independence which proclaims that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," are guilty of a strange oversight. They ought to know that the administration doesn't put much store by the declaration of independence. It was Lincoln, not McKinley, who gave the republican party its reputation for respecting that document, and Lincoln is out of date.

The address of her private secretary to the natives of the Hawaiian islands, in which the deposed queen relinquishes her hopes, is pathetic; not on account of her personal disappointment, but because she so evidently voices the sorrow of the people. She reminds them that they have been swamped in their own hospitality and generosity. Those whom they welcomed to the islands from the great republic, have accepted their welcome only to betray them; and the great republic itself has seized their islands because it happens to need them or to think it does. While the address contains not the slightest expression of ill-feeling toward this country, but merely alludes, and that but briefly, to familiar facts, it cannot be read by any sensitive American without bringing to his cheeks a tingle of shame. The conviction must press itself upon him that in some way his country has acted an indefensible part. All the more must he have this feeling when he reads the mournful congratulation with which the queen closes her address. Though she says that annexation will at any rate give the natives a chance at the ballot box to direct the country which was once their own, he cannot but shrink as he realizes that this is just what it will not do. For he must suspect, if she does not, that under American domination the native Hawaiians are to be disfranchised.

For attempting to kill an insurgent at Manila and succeeding in