

ers were hostile in spirit and tactfully indifferent in action, damning the Johnson movement with such faint encouragement as he thought necessary to keep the Johnson men out of bad humor toward himself. Then the gold fanatics, those McKinley democrats like Harmon, a railroad attorney, and Ingalls, a railroad president, were in the convention, by grace of McLean's faction, representing hostility not only to Bryan, but also to the equitable taxation of railroads in Ohio. These elements were thought to be so powerful that the republican press, and that part of the "democratic" press which is owned by republicans, were full of assurances up almost to the assembling of the convention, that Johnson and his tax reforms would be unceremoniously suppressed. But they were mistaken. Shrewd management on the part of Johnson's supporters—he himself being kept away by the recent death of his brother and his own illness—secured the insertion in the platform of a specific demand for the four principal reforms of the Cuyahoga county platform (see pp 137-38), namely: No municipal franchises without a referendum; free passes from railroads to public officers adequate ground for vacating the office; official visitation of public service corporations for the purpose of making public the true value of their franchises; railroads and other corporations possessing public franchises to be assessed for taxation in the same proportion as farms and other real estate. By this success Johnson and his friends scored a complete victory over the reactionaries upon the only points in which he had prepared for any part in this year's campaign in Ohio. His friends had renounced every purpose of seeking nominations for their section or of influencing the convention in any way except upon the subject of state taxation as a sequel to the tax agitation in Cleveland. McLean's faction offered them places on the ticket by way of compromise, but all such offers they refused. They had but one object in view. That was

to secure a thorough agitation of the tax question throughout the state. They held steadily to that purpose, and in spite of the fact that this was a McLean convention, in spite of the reactionaries who sought to conserve railroad interests, in spite of the not unnatural lukewarmness of the gubernational candidate himself, they won their point.

But McLean and his reactionaries scored a success in every other important respect. It is true that Charles P. Salen, who is Johnson's director of public works and his leading political lieutenant, was temporary chairman; but that had been arranged long before as a sort of salve, which the state committee gave to the Johnson people for refusing to hold the convention in Cleveland. It is also true that Salen was made permanent chairman; but that came about through the superior alertness of the Cuyahoga county delegation. It secured action by the committee of permanent organization when only 13 out of the 21 members were present; and the McLean faction dared not invite friction by reversing this action in the committee or overriding the report in the convention. All the important points, we repeat, except the Johnson tax agitation plan, were won by McLean and his associated reactionaries.

They kept out of the platform all mention of the national platform of the party, and they caused the convention to commit the unpardonable rudeness and inconceivable folly of ignoring the national candidate of the party, who, in two campaigns, and in spite of the secret treachery or open opposition of themselves and such as they, proved his popularity beyond reasonable cavil. At the election in 1896, when these reorganizers "bolted," Mr. Bryan polled a larger proportion of the popular vote than President Cleveland had polled when elected four years before, and within a shade of as large a proportion of the Ohio vote. Yet this McLean convention of Ohio ignores him and both the

Chicago and the Kansas City platforms upon which he ran, and the reactionaries boast of it. They thus superciliously challenge every Ohio democrat, who respects Mr. Bryan or sympathizes with his views, to stay away from the polls next fall.

If this unutterable folly, on the part of the anti-Bryan and pro-corporation magnates of the McLean convention, does not defeat Mr. Kilbourne, we miss our guess. In the nature of things human, it must be a heavy handicap. The republican papers see that, and are prompt in their congratulations. They heartily commend the convention for its wisdom in throwing over Bryan and Bryanism. Why? What other reason could there be than that this makes the situation more promising and comfortable for the republican party and its candidates? And they are probably right. In the face of that contemptuous treatment of the national platform and the national candidate, only one or both of two influences can save Mr. Kilbourne from disastrous defeat. Should the McKinley democrats bring to him as much support as their fatuity (which is a milder word than treachery) drives away, then he may win. But no such contingency is probable. Or, he may win if Johnson's support and the popularity of Johnson's tax agitation prove sufficient to hold in line the Bryan men whom McLean's convention has insultingly dismissed. The latter appears now to be the only hope for Kilbourne.

The evident failure of the Detroit social and political conference is not fairly attributable to faulty management. It is due to the faulty nature of the thing itself. When this conference met for the first time, two years ago, it gave some promise of some success. But no success was really in it. The failure of the second meeting, that of this summer, merely signaled the failure, long ago assured, of the whole movement. It be-

gan in a mistake—the mistake of supposing that reforms are to be accomplished by a union of reformers of all shades and colors. Such unions, like the colored figures in a kaleidoscope, though picturesque, are frail. They are not true unions, but only aggregations. Some one said of the Detroit conference that there were 200 delegates there with 400 imperative reforms. That was an exaggeration. But it was only an exaggeration, as the resolutions finally adopted show. These resolutions seem to be an omnium gatherum into which all the reforms represented at the conference were chucked indiscriminately, upon the assumption that each delegate whose particular reform got this honorable mention would stay with the movement. Nothing justifies that assumption but the probability that each may recommend the movement as showing a tendency to go his way. But that does not really justify the assumption. It only indicates that the movement will be pulled and hauled in as many directions as it represents causes, until it loses all cohesiveness and disintegrates. Even if all reformers could unite organically they could not thereby carry through their reforms. For at no time are reformers more than a small fraction of the masses. Public opinion must be influenced in favor of a reform, to make it win; and public opinion cannot be influenced permanently in favor of a mere mess of reform pottage. In such a conglomeration good flavors are neutralized by bad, and the public rejects the whole dish.

If any man believes that he knows a way of improving social conditions, let him hesitate about uniting with other men who know other ways. In other words, let a reformer of one kind hesitate about making organic unions with those who differ radically. He will find it as impossible to convert them as they will to convert him. Even if he does convert them he will have made no great gain; for they, like himself, are apt to be men apart

from the common thought and common impulse. But let him go direct to the masses of people. If his reform is vitalized by the truth, it will make its own way, slowly, perhaps, but surely, in public opinion. The reform that wins must be capable of converting the masses, rather than adaptable to a unification of reformers. This does not mean that the reformer with a true reform must isolate himself and his cause. Quite the contrary. There is no greater certainty of isolation than in a mosaic union of variegated reformers. It means that he must make himself a fellow among his fellow citizens, and his cause one of the vital subjects of common thought.

In the Australian Commonwealth the political situation is beginning to clear. Trustworthy correspondents assure us that the protection ministry has been forced to throw protection overboard. If they had not done so they could not have remained three months longer in power. The worst law they can possibly secure now is one with extensive tariffs along revenue lines and only a few protective features. It is doubtful whether even so much protection as that will be left to the commercial exclusionists. Though such a bill can be carried through the lower house, which came in with a protection majority, the free trade majority in the senate may not sanction it. Protection as a system is, in the language of our correspondent, "as dead as a door nail in Australia."

But that is only a beginning. The glamour that surrounded the Barton ministry is rapidly disappearing. Mr. Reid, the free trade leader in New South Wales, where he was premier and upon whose policy he has deeply impressed his personality, has jumped into the same commanding position in the parliament of the commonwealth that he occupied in the parliament of his state—a position of influence far and away above that of every one else. That was settled by

his first speech in the federal parliament. When compared with the reply of Barton, the premier, no room was left to question Reid's superior powers of statesmanship. And now that he is a national instead of a local character, the protection newspapers outside his own state are no longer able to misrepresent him as successfully as before. He has consequently made tremendous advances in Victoria. Even the protectionist workmen of that state are falling under his sway. So obvious is all this, that the protectionists are already saying that the next election will make Reid "dictator." Meanwhile it has become fairly certain that only a part of the revenues needed by the Commonwealth (possibly \$40,000,000) can be raised by customs and excise, and that the states will have to raise a large amount by land value taxation.

A federal judge in Ohio, of the name of Wing, has outflown all competitors in the judicial race for government by injunction. When issuing a sweeping injunction against "picketing" by striking molders in Cleveland, Judge Wing made this bold reply to the objection that the "picketing" consisted only in arguing with non-strikers with a view to peaceably persuading them not to work: "Persuasion of itself, long continued, may become a nuisance and unlawful." He therefore issued an injunction broad enough to include peaceable persuasion in furtherance of the strike.

With reference to this class of injunctions, persons who are neither sympathetic with nor tolerant of strikes, jump hastily to the conclusion that the injunctions tend to preserve order and peace, and are therefore quite desirable. It is a dangerously thoughtless way of looking at the matter. Something more far-reaching and important is involved than the judicial regulation of strikes. Think of it a moment. When state