

street car companies have no greater legal right to the streets than the general public, "in conflict with our senses," urges Judge Van Syckel; it is also "rejected by the adjudged cases on the subject." He then collates court decisions from the highest courts of New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Illinois, California, Vermont and New Jersey itself, all holding that franchise rights in the streets are real estate. He concludes that as real estate these franchises are locally taxable. That being the law, a very serious question arises. Why do taxing officials, with so few exceptions, allow these tax dodging street car companies to keep on dodging?

The sponsor for a new religious movement explains that it is intended to promote the affirmative instead of the negative principle of life. "I believe," he says, "that by laying stress on the affirmative the world will be improved; thus, the heart lays stress on the affirmative when it loves, and on the negative when it hates." That is good doctrine, surely, and most people would assent to it. But it is a little like saying "be good and you won't be bad." The difficulty is to decide which of two opposing courses is the affirmative. Many people settle that question offhand by regarding as affirmative whatever has the affirmative form. They would almost strike "not" out of the eighth commandment as objectionably negative. Some of them do so when dealing for instance with the Chinese. But form is not all. Essence, not form, is the real thing. While we should always prefer the affirmative, which is life, to the negative, which is death, we should be sure that it is not merely affirmative forms we are supporting, but affirmative essence. Sometimes the essence is affirmative when the form is negative. Anti-slavery, for example, is negative in form, but it is decidedly affirmative in essence. So with anti-imperialism. Imperialism being evil, and therefore

essentially negative, anti-imperialism is essentially affirmative—it affirms democracy. Anti-wrong is always pro-right.

As the census bulletins begin to report industrial matters, they reveal conditions that must surprise people who imagine that everybody is getting rich because the financial papers boast of American prosperity. We commented several weeks ago (p. 148) on one of these census bulletins—No. 63, which reported upon the coke industry. There now lies before us No. 69, which reports upon manufacturing in Delaware. As No. 63 showed a decline in individual wages, so does No. 69. Following are the items, from the latter bulletin, of wages in Delaware manufacturing industries for 1890 and 1900:

1890—Value of products	\$37,571,846
Cost of materials and miscellaneous expenses	23,013,327
Net product	\$14,558,521
Net product per wage earner (20,479 wage earners)	\$ 711
Individual wages	421
Surplus product	290
1900—Value of products	\$45,387,630
Cost of materials and miscellaneous expenses	28,810,951
Net product	16,576,679
Net product per wage earner (22,203 wage earners)	747
Individual wages	417
Surplus product	330

Here we find that individual wages have decreased from \$421 in 1890 to \$417 in 1900. The coke industry also showed a decrease in wages, though greater—from \$452 in 1889 to \$416 in 1899. But whereas the coke industry showed an enormous increase of profit to the establishments—\$101 per hand in 1889 to \$519 per hand in 1899—the manufacturing interests of Delaware show an increase of only \$40 per hand—from \$290 in 1890 to \$330 in 1900. This difference is doubtless due to the fact that the manufacturing establishments of Delaware are subject to greater competition than the monopolized coke industry, and consequently are not able to keep much of the difference between product and wages. In fact, the net product, after deducting wages, gives them about the same percentage on their

invested capital in 1890 as in 1900. Thus:

1890—Net product (shown above)....	\$14,558,521
Less wages	8,630,475
Profit	\$5,928,046
Capital invested	\$33,695,400
Percentage of profit.....	18 per ct.
1900—Net product (shown above)....	\$16,576,679
Less wages	9,263,661
Profit	\$7,313,018
Capital invested	\$41,203,239
Percentage of profit.....	18 per ct.

When invested capital receives no increased percentage of profit, when the wage-workers get \$417 instead of \$421, and when the percentage of their wages to net product has fallen from 59 per cent. to 56 per cent., how can it be said that the manufacturing industries of Delaware were more prosperous in 1900 than in 1890?

Chicago may boast at least one observant real estate agent who is also intelligent. His name is Wyllys W. Baird. In a newspaper article Mr. Baird invites Chicago real estate investment on the ground that history repeats itself, and that a repetition of the history of Chicago really means large profits for investors in Chicago lots during the next ten years. Real estate values rose wonderfully after the great fire, he says, culminating in the financial crash of 1873. Then they dropped until about 1880, when they rose again until 1893, the crash year of the latest depression. Referring to this history, Mr. Baird advises: "Substitute 1893 for 1873, and 1900 for 1880, and you have substantially a correct statement of the market conditions for the last eight years; and just as those eight years parallel the depression beginning in 1873, with equal certainty may we look for coming years to reflect the activity of 1880." So far as human judgment can be relied upon, Mr. Baird's advice to buy is doubtless good.

The probabilities are that not only Chicago lots, but land in general in the United States, will tend upward during the present decade, and that the speculator who buys now and sells before the inevitable crash, will make money. But to others than specula-

tors, there is a suggestion of more vital importance in this impressive fact of the parallel periodicity of prosperity and rising land values, of hard times and falling land values. So impressive is it as to suggest more than a possibility of cause and effect. If Mr. Baird, for instance, were to think the matter over, he would doubtless incline to an opinion more far reaching than any he has ever yet entertained. He would see that land values rise under conditions of general prosperity because the extraordinary demand for land which prosperity excites is met by a constantly diminishing market supply, due to investments for a rise. He would also see that the culminating crash, instead of being caused in some mysterious way and reducing land values, is the necessary result of a condition in which the demand for land runs ahead of the market supply. There comes a time when the prices thereby caused are so high as to trench upon the profits of actual use. This causes here and there a failure. Similar failures multiply. After awhile comes the crash. Then land values fall, to rise again only after industry has readjusted itself. In a word, speculation in land during prosperous times, which progressively lessens the market supply and raises the market price, is the cause of periodical business depressions, including depressions in the value of land itself.

THE MISTAKE ABOUT CAESAR.

Julius Caesar furnishes an example of the truth of the saying that the greater a man is the longer it takes the world to understand his worth and to do him justice. The world has called Caesar great, but his real greatness, in spite of the modern eulogies of Froude and Mommsen, seems still too little understood by many who use his name. Believing as I do that he was, for his time and environment, one of the greatest and best among the leaders of the people, I am always sorry to see him alluded to by modern democrats as a type of the destroyers of popular liberties.

The reason for the mistake in Caesar's case is perhaps the same as that in the case of other popular leaders. The writers, the makers of literature and recorders of history, are generally on the side of wealth and oligarchy. They set a tone of opinion which dies away only after some lapse of time has given birth to a new historical sense which can harken back to the real notes of the man's purpose and character. It is true that the writers of the Augustan age, who, like Horace, were under court influence, lauded Caesar's memory; but there is no trace in their writings of his great services to the popular cause, and in the following centuries the tone of literature is distinctly adverse to him.

I propose, in brief outline, in as few words as possible, to indicate what seems to me to have been Caesar's policy.

I.

In the year 146 B. C. Rome sacked Corinth and at last utterly destroyed Carthage. She was the mistress of the Mediterranean. She stood glorified by a long line of brilliant external successes.

Within a few years from this date she had to turn her thoughts from conquest abroad to social problems at home. The inevitable results of long wars had come. The rich had gotten richer, and the poor poorer. The masses had been fighting foreign battles, and the land and money sharks had put in their work at home. Small holdings of land rapidly disappeared. The large estates grew. Slave labor increased. Grazing took the place of cultivation.

The first great leader who saw the dangerous trend of affairs was Tiberius Gracchus.

His brave fight for reform in 133 marks a new note in Roman history. He seems to have realized clearly that the fundamental question of social problems was the land question. Read the brief extract of a speech which Plutarch puts in his mouth. It has the internal mark of genuineness. Plutarch, great as he was, could no more have originated its thought than Matthew could have produced the Sermon on the Mount.

From this time we find again and

again mention of proposed "agrarian laws," all of them urged for the purpose of getting the people back to the land. I remember, as a school-boy, how we disliked to see the words "agrarian law" in obscure paragraphs of the school histories. Of course we had little idea of the meaning, and our teachers did not clear up the subject, being apparently as ready to slur it as the pupils were. So the death of Tiberius Gracchus seemed to us merely an incident of a political riot.

The work of Tiberius was taken up by his brother Caius, and he too was killed 12 years later.

It may be true that the two Gracchi made the mistake of being led into acts that transgressed the letter of a constitution that was still revered; but what at bottom they both died for was their attempt to undo the illegal greed of land-grabbers.

After their death things settled back, and the bad causes of concentrating wealth continued. There was more absorption of peasant holdings and common lands at home, more plundering of provinces abroad. What the efforts of the Gracchi had instigated, soon fell into hopeless desuetude.

Let us pass rapidly over the 50 years from 120 to 70 B. C. The war with Jugurtha over in Africa and the great defensive battles against the Cimbri and Teutones in the north intervened to divert attention from social problems. They developed Marius and Sulla—the former a mere soldier, not a great leader in politics; the latter both a soldier and a statesman.

No man in history, so far as I know, ever succeeded so fully as Sulla in turning back the wheels of time. His policy was to restore the old-time power of the senate. He did this; but when he let go there was of course a reaction, and the wealth-seeking middle class came back into their share of the government. This reaction was accomplished by the year 70. But the masses, the plebs, the "fillings," were growing more and more discontented, more and more pauperized, more and more depraved.

Nor were these the only parts of