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When that awfully destructive storm broke last Saturday over the doomed city of Galveston, carrying destruction and death everywhere without respect for persons, the tides of universal brotherhood rose with the fury of the tempest. White families succored negroes with all the manifestations of brotherly and sisterly affection that they displayed toward their own race. Negroes succored whites with even more than their traditional fidelity. Distinctions of color were ignored, and in the face of that terrifying calamity there was no race question.

In his letter of acceptance Mr. McKinley expresses the opinion that "there is a stain of ill-concealed hypocrisy in the anxiety to extend the constitutional guarantees to the Philippines, while their nullification is openly advocated at home." When the native courtesy of Mr. Bryan toward his opponents, which characterizes all his public utterances, is considered, this oblique remark by Mr. McKinley cannot but reflect upon the good manners of its author. But Mr. McKinley's controversial manners are only of minor concern. A more important consideration is the fact that in attempting in his letter to discredit Bryan's good faith he discredits his own. He does so, in the very sentence in which he describes Bryan's anxiety for the constitution as hypocritical. For his reference to the nullification of constitutional guarantees at home is clearly an allusion to the disfranchisement of negroes in the south. It implies that this is approved by Mr.

Bryan. Yet Mr. McKinley must be aware of the fact that Bryan stands for a different kind of democracy from the aristocratic "democracy" of the pro-slavery era in the south, of which such men as Gen. Joe Wheeler is a type, and which is really impatient to throw off its thin democratic mask and join Mr. McKinley's imperialized republican party. In a still graver manner, however, Mr. McKinley exposes himself to the suspicion he so ungraciously attempts to direct toward Bryan. His whole letter is a pretense. Not only is it distinguished for its misleading suppressions and distortions of details, but its very framework is a sham. While putting forward the money question as the principal issue of the campaign, it elaborates the imperialist question at such length and with so much circumstantiality of statement and refinement of argument as to reveal Mr. McKinley's consciousness of the fact that, notwithstanding his pretense to the contrary, the question of imperialism and not that of money standards, is in truth the paramount issue.

Conformably to his assumption that the money issue and not imperialism is paramount, Mr. McKinley begins his letter with a plea to gold standard men. Describing his party as having in 1896 upheld the gold standard and as now indorsing the legislation of the present congress, "by which that standard has been strengthened," he invites the sound money forces to reelect him, so that his honest financial system may achieve a "permanent triumph." But he does not explain why his party, instead of merely strengthening the gold standard, did not establish it, and thereby make its triumph of 1896 permanent, if a permanent triumph is possible. And although he

knows that his party could have made that triumph permanent during its past four years of power, if it could possibly do so with another four years—that, indeed, it could do so during the coming winter, through which its power will extend, though Bryan be elected—he has the temerity to urge Bryan's defeat because the financial issue is "immediate" and "will admit of no delay." There would appear to be in that declaration not only what Mr. McKinley calls "a stain of ill-concealed hypocrisy," but something besides. It is singularly suggestive of a conviction on Mr. McKinley's part that this is one of the times when gold standard men are easily gulled.

Passing from the financial to the tariff issue, Mr. McKinley naively advocates a system of protection for the exclusion of foreign manufactures from our markets, and of reciprocity for the admission of farm products into foreign markets. But he wisely refrains from explaining how the American farm products sent out are to be paid for, if foreign manufactures are not let in. Were he asked, he might say as he did two years ago in Wisconsin, that they are paid for in "pure gold." But he cuts off that explanation a little farther on in his letter, where he boasts of merchandise export balances during his administration to the amount of \$1,689,779,190, and of gold import balances to the amount of only \$436,000,000. Since these gold imports leave \$1,253,779,190 worth of exports still unpaid for, Mr. McKinley ought to have explained where the profit of excessive exporting comes in. He does say that we have been paying off old commercial debts and bringing home American securities, and that we are now establishing credits abroad. But according to the treas-

ury statistics we have made no debts abroad since 1873, and such as we made before must have been paid off long ago, if excessive export balances since 1873 (of which protectionists have always been exceedingly proud) had really gone to the liquidation of excessive imports in the past. Mr. McKinley must be mistaken about the liquidation of our indebtedness. He is also mistaken about our having by means of our excessive exports established credits abroad. When we bought a few British bonds last month—only \$25,000,000 worth—we did not pay for them with drafts against a foreign credit. We had to ship gold. Mr. McKinley further explains in connection with a statement that our exports for 1900 are “about \$500,000 for every day of the year,” that “these sums have gone into the homes and enterprises of the people.” But we think it would puzzle even himself, astute statistician as he is, to show how the sending out from this country of \$500,000 worth of goods a day, for which little or nothing comes back, not even gold, can put anything into the homes and enterprises of our people.

Like his confusion over export balances is Mr. McKinley's idea that the reduction of interest on government bonds is proof of general prosperity. Low interest on government bonds is not evidence of prosperity. It is evidence, on the contrary, that opportunities for profitable and safe investments in productive enterprises are scarce. This is the reason that low interest on gilt-edge securities is always an accompaniment of low wages or precarious employment. When opportunities for employment are abundant and profitable, so are opportunities for business investment. They go together. The very conditions that induce people with money to buy government bonds bearing low rates of interest because they are safer than business investments, are the conditions that diminish opportunities for employment. Mr. McKinley is oblivious to the fact that in

boasting of low interest rates on government bonds he is calling attention to the precariousness of employment. But it is so. Steady employment at good wages never exists when safe opportunities for profitable investment are few.

Sympathizers with the Boers will hardly respond to Mr. McKinley's assurances of friendship for the dying republics of South Africa. His empty offer to Great Britain of “good offices” counts for little against his unfriendly attitude. He says he maintained neutrality in accordance with our “well-known traditional policy,” but all the world knows that in also withholding every possible expression and indication of sympathy from the two republics fighting for independence, he did not follow our traditional policy. Neither will the victims of trusts find anything to console them in his weak and watery and altogether perfunctory condemnation of monopoly combines. And if working men are satisfied with his assurance that they are prosperous it will be because they find his talk about prosperity more filling than the prosperity he talks about. Along with the others whom he tries to cajole are the civil service reformers. There is something sublime in the assurance with which he discusses one of the most flagrant violations of civil service reform principles of which any administration has been guilty—his withdrawal of a horde of clerkships from the protection of civil service rules and turning them over to party workers—as if it were an inspired improvement. This assurance is equaled only by that with which he unctuously supports the ship subsidy steal which his friend and patron Hanna has fathered.

After dealing with these minor questions, touching lightly, as he passes, upon the Isthmian canal question, the subject of pensions and the situation in Cuba and Puerto Rico, Mr. McKinley comes at last to the Philippine question; and although he assumes to treat it as a subordinate

and unimportant issue, he nevertheless devotes to it fully five-eighths of his letter. This part of the letter, upon the face of it not only the longest but the most important part, is notable alike for its misleading statements and its unfair omissions. Mr. McKinley says he has used force in the Philippines only against force. But he neglects to say that the force he has encountered was at the beginning of the fight a well-organized *de facto* government, the only government, according to reports of American officers, that prevailed outside of Manila for the better part of a year, and a government which did preserve order, and good order, until it was wantonly assailed and annihilated by American troops. Mr. McKinley says there was no alliance with the Philippine republic nor promise of independence, and attempts to make his assertion good by showing that there was none of a formal and binding character. But it has never been claimed that legally binding obligations were incurred. The point is that a military alliance was made, that the Filipino leader and people were knowingly and intentionally allowed to infer that independence would follow the defeat of the Spanish, and that out of this relationship obligations of honor arose. Our navy cooperated with their army, and, as Gen. Otis reported (official report for 1899, page 13), “for three and one-half months Admiral Dewey with his squadron and the insurgents on land had kept Manila tightly bottled.” Did we owe them no debt of honor for that?

Mr. McKinley says that the Filipinos “opened fire upon our army.” Here refers to the beginning of the fighting, February 4, 1899, when, as he says, “the insurgents attacked the American army, after being previously advised that the American forces were under orders not to fire upon them except in defense.” But Gen. Otis (report of 1899, page 96) explains the beginning of the fighting by say-

ing that the first shot was fired by an American picket upon a Filipino who approached him and refused to halt or answer when challenged. This shot, which began the engagement, was replied to, says Otis, by the Filipino troops; and he adds that "the engagement was one strictly defensive on the part of the insurgents, and of vigorous attack by our forces."

Even if the first shot had been fired by the Filipinos instead of by an American picket, Mr. McKinley's statement that they assumed the offensive could not hold good. For the offensive was assumed by Mr. McKinley himself as early at least as one month before the first engagement. It was then that he declared war against the only government that existed in the Philippines outside of Manila—the government of the Filipino republic. Spain had once governed the archipelago, but the new republic had driven Spain into Manila, where, in cooperation with Dewey, it kept her "tightly bottled," as Gen. Otis says, and whence she was finally expelled. After being driven out, after her possession was no longer even nominal, after the people of the islands had acknowledged their allegiance to the new government, then it was and not before that she assumed to sell the archipelago to the United States. She was assuming to sell and we to buy what she did not possess. Yet upon the basis of this sham sale of Spain's moribund title, a sale not yet complete, for the senate had not acted, Mr. McKinley issued a proclamation (Otis's report for 1899, pages 68 and 69) in which he asserted American sovereignty over the Philippines, announced his intention of making them an American "province," and commanded the republic to submit to the "strong arm" of American authority. This proclamation, published a month before the fighting, marks the real beginning of the war, if, indeed, previous American encroachments did not begin it earlier. It was an attack by our government upon the life of

the Filipino government. When Mr. McKinley charges the Filipinos with having assumed the offensive, he places his accusation in direct conflict with the testimony of American official reports which he himself has promulgated.

It would be a waste of space to follow Mr. McKinley's disingenuous letter further in its details. The documentary history of his administration condemns his letter as an unfair presentation of the subjects with which it deals. It is, moreover, a model of weakness. How petty, for instance, to speak of the Filipinos as a "tribe," when they have notoriously reached a point of civilization which removes them from everything that the word "tribe" suggests to the American understanding. How absurd to speak of the native supporters of the Filipino republic as a small minority of the Philippine population which terrorizes the peaceable majority who yearn to be American subjects, when this peaceable majority is defended by 60,000 American troops. How wretchedly ridiculous the revamping for American consumption of the wild stories of Filipino conspiracies to loot and burn Manila which were invented originally for Spanish consumption when Spain was engaged in the same work of suppressing liberty in the Philippines that we have taken up. How puerile the argument that if we cannot establish our government in the Philippines without the consent of the inhabitants, we could not adopt Bryan's plan of protecting them while they establish a government of their own—how puerile in view of the fact that the government they did establish we demolished. How inconsistent the contention that "a military support of authority not our own" in the Philippines, for the purpose of giving that country its independence, would be "the very essence of militarism," when Mr. McKinley is professing to do precisely that thing in Cuba. How ignoble the attempt to hold Bryan responsible for the

Philippine policy, because Bryan, to bring the Spanish war to an end, advocated the ratification of the peace treaty with a resolution virtually nullifying the imperial clause in it, when Mr. McKinley himself caused that clause to be inserted in the treaty, and used all his influence to secure its ratification and to defeat the modifying resolution. And withal what folly to assert that our title to the Philippines "is practically identical with that by which we hold our territory acquired since the beginning of the government and under which we have exercised full sovereignty and established government for the inhabitants." The falsity of this assertion will be apparent upon reference to "Our Historic Expansion," an article in another column, wherein the history of American expansion is told and the title documents are quoted. In addition to its weakness in detail, Mr. McKinley's letter of acceptance, taken as a whole, puts him helplessly upon the defensive. Instead of advancing a just and winning principle, he is forced and consciously resorts to the defense of a hateful and losing cause. Nor does he in doing that put forward any policy, with a pledge to recommend and support it. He drifts aimlessly. There is no pledge with reference even to what he tries to treat as the paramount issue—the money question. The letter does nothing but defend imperialism, and it outlines no policy but the policy of drift.

If the Maine election held this week be regarded as foreshadowing the result of the presidential election in November, the supporters of Mr. McKinley can draw no encouragement from it. On the contrary, in so far as it is prophetic at all, it gives satisfactorily strong assurances of Bryan's election. The republican loss in Maine is estimated at 11 per cent. as compared with the election of 1896, whereas the democratic gain is 18 per cent. Since Maine is a hard-shell republican state, the loss to McKinley and the gain for Bryan are

likely to be even greater in the other eastern and middle western states. But even at that rate of change, Bryan would carry Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Maryland, West Virginia and Delaware. Adding these to Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia, which are conceded to him, and we have a Bryan electoral vote of 222. If, then, we add the other states that he carried in 1896, namely, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming, we have 45 more votes, making a total of 267—43 more than a majority. And this takes no account of Kentucky, which Bryan lost in 1896 but is quite as likely to carry this year, notwithstanding local complications, as he is to lose any of the states he carried four years ago. Upon the basis of the Maine election, therefore, Bryan might lose all the states he carried before, except those that are conceded to him—or, at any rate, all but any one—and yet be elected. If the McKinleyites wish to estimate presidential election probabilities, the Maine election does not offer promising figures for that diversion.

We are assured upon authority second only to the best that our statement on page 339, that Secretary Olney "opposed the election of Bryan in 1896, and through his great influence in business circles contributed materially to McKinley's election," is erroneous; that, on the contrary, he refused to support McKinley either indirectly by countenancing the Palmer-Buckner movement, or directly by favoring McKinley himself. Our statement was based upon the general understanding, never authoritatively denied, as to the attitude of the McKinley cabinet, and we gladly correct it. We also gladly notice the assurances of our informant, which are certainly confirmed by Mr. Olney's recent Bryan letter that Olney is a good deal more of a declara-

tion of independence democrat than he gets credit for being.

With a simple but impressive memorial number in memory of the late A. J. Auchterlonie, one of its former editors, "The New Earth," of New York, after a most useful career of 11 years, suspends publication. The paper was started and maintained as a labor of love, by a small group of Swedenborgians who were followers also of Henry George. Though the number of its readers was not large, it has circulated all over the English speaking world, carrying its philosophic message of a new heaven resting upon a new earth. Its publication is discontinued on account of the loss of Mr. Auchterlonie's efficient editorial assistance, and the last number has been made a beautiful tribute by his coeditors to their departed associate.

Mr. Charles C. Jackson, of Boston, representing the uppercrust bankers and brokers of State street, and a leading spirit in the gold conventions of recent years, remarks of Mr. Olney's letter that it "seems to be addressed to the lower classes, and not to the educated thinking man." Well, whom do the McKinley orators address when they emblemize their party's attractions for votes with a "full dinner-pail." Little pictures of the full dinner-pail are profusely scattered through the page margins of the bought-up comic papers and other illustrated journals of civilization acquired of late by trust millionaires to be worked in the interest of "the syndicate President." The highly educated Senator Hanna, in his speech at the opening Ohio rally, declared that "the whole paramount issue boiled down is in that dinner pail." Mr. Hanna's ideal of the American republic, no doubt, is a nation of millions of men with dinner pails working at an average wage of less than a dollar apiece a day, with a half-hour for lunch out of dinner pails, to enable a few score of Hanna's Fricks, Rockafellers and other representatives of the upper classes to

lunch at the buffets of their private cars and steam yachts. Is it not time that somebody addressed to the "lower classes" something better than the poor bribe of fodder enough to fill a tin dinner-pail?

Roosevelt is not gentle with Dewey when he says in his campaign speeches that—

not one competent witness who has actually known the facts believes the Filipinos capable of self-government, for Dewey is on record at page 383 of "senate document 62" in an official dispatch, dated Manila, August 29, 1898, as saying:

In a telegram sent to the department on June 23, I expressed the opinion that "these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races." Further intercourse with them has confirmed me in this opinion.

As Mr. Roosevelt's party is making a little capital just now out of the president's plans for giving self-government to the Cubans, it is to be presumed that they are in Mr. Roosevelt's opinion capable of self-government. It would be interesting to know, therefore, whether Roosevelt regards Dewey as an incompetent witness or as ignorant of the facts.

A republican member of the Hamilton club, a republican club of Chicago, has appealed to its president to call a special meeting of the club for the purpose of changing its name. This remarkable proceeding was prompted by the fears of the protesting member that in retaining for its own name the cognomen of Alexander Hamilton, the club gives unpleasant color to the democratic contention in the present campaign that the republican party is no longer a party of the people, but has become an aristocratic party with a tendency to centralize power, and that it is forcing the country out of its career as a republic and into the career of an empire. That this protest is not groundless the club member in question shows by reference to the life of Hamilton, written by his warm admirer, Senator Lodge,