

convention which the Interests are trying to foist upon them, they will lose it, and without knowing it until too late. Eternal vigilance is the price also of what Senator Bourne justly calls "the best system of popular government in the world," the government of Oregon; and a Constitutional convention is a dangerous thing for a people already armed with the initiative, the referendum, the recall, direct primaries and the Australian ballot.

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#### President Cleveland's Military Invasion of Chicago

In commenting upon a recent coal strike in Nova Scotia, the Ottawa Citizen of April 30 made reference to the late President Cleveland's use of Federal troops in the Chicago railroad strike of 1894. The Citizen says that—

the National Guard were found useless for the purpose of maintaining order, and finally President Cleveland stretched his powers under the Constitution sufficiently to order regular troops to the scene, and after one brush with them the rioters dispersed. That President Cleveland stretched his Constitutional powers is a mild form of the truth (vol. vii, p. 195); but the Ottawa Citizen is mistaken in the remainder of its statement. According to President Cleveland's own strike commission, there was not much violence prior to the coming of Federal troops, and none at all that the local authorities did not suppress. Not only did President Cleveland "stretch" his Constitutional powers in sending Federal troops to Chicago during that strike, but even if he had acted within his Constitutional powers there was nothing in the situation to warrant the action.

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#### Is It Good Citizenship or Good Business?

In the report of the Chicago Commercial Club's meeting of last winter on the subject of the plans for remodeling Chicago (vol. xii, p. 1111; vol. xiii, p. 37) so as to make it a "City Beautiful"—a "City Practical," as one of the speakers at that meeting preferred to call it—the president of the Club, Theodore W. Robinson, is quoted as conceding the plan to be a dream, "but a dream of business men for whose *disinterested* effort there can be no other reward than the satisfaction of good citizenship." We italicize "disinterested" not for the purpose of implying that the business men alluded to by Mr. Robinson are expecting more marketable rewards than "the satisfaction of good citizenship;" but as a basis for suggesting that some of them will reap substantial rewards abundantly and that they can hardly be quite free of such expectations, if the expenses of the plan are met out of general taxation. That Charles H.

Wacker, the chairman of the plan commission, understands this, is fairly evident from his speech as it appears in the same report. Real estate on the West side, he said, "has been practically a drug in the market," for lack of public improvements. Does he not realize then that public improvements such as the city plan would be, would add greatly to the value of real estate? Not buildings, of course, for he knows that they could still be built cheaply, but building lots. Business men who own building lots to be increased in value by the "City Beautiful"—or the "City Practical" as you please—may not be so "disinterested" as Mr. Robinson implied, nor so completely limited for reward to "the satisfaction of good citizenship." A test of their disinterestedness would be their attitude toward the proposition to pay for the "City Beautiful"—or the "City Practical"—out of the increase in lot values (the "unearned increment," as it would be called in Great Britain), instead of paying for it out of general taxation. How do the *disinterested* business men of Mr. Robinson's dream regard that proposition? Not with a great deal of enthusiasm we have reason to suspect.

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#### Migration from Great Britain—Why?

The protection organs of Great Britain—they call it "tariff reform" over there, being ashamed to say "protection," or afraid that the word may recall the "hungry '40's" under British protection—point to migration from Great Britain to Canada as evidence of the superiority of protection over free trade, Canada having a protective tariff. But if British emigrants are going to Canada now because Great Britain is free trade and Canada is protection, why did British emigrants come to the United States in the '40's when both England and the United States were protection? Or, if free trade in Great Britain explains British migration to protected Canada now, why did Britons migrate from free trade England to the United States in the '50's, when this country also was free trade? Again, if British free trade is the reason for British migration to Canada, why don't those British emigrants come to the United States? Our tariff protection is ever so much farther away from free trade than the Canadian. Further, if free trade in Great Britain explains the British migration to protected Canada, why do Americans also migrate to Canada? Canada's tariff policy is nearer to free trade than ours. There is one, and only one explanation of all those migrations, and it is not the tariff. The true explanation is the relative dearness of land in Great

Britain. Land was dear in Great Britain and cheap in the United States in the protection '40's and the free trade '50's, and it is dear in Great Britain and in the United States now and cheap in Canada. Tax the unused land of Great Britain high enough to make the lordly monopolists eager to sell it, and British migration will cease.

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## THE BALLINGER INVESTIGATION.

There is in progress at Washington, as every newspaper reader knows, a Congressional inquiry into the official conduct of Richard A. Ballinger, Secretary of the Interior, the successor (under President Taft's appointment) to James R. Garfield, who was appointed by President Roosevelt and who held the place until President Roosevelt's term expired.

The investigating committee consists of the following members of the two Houses:

Republicans: Senators Nelson (chairman), Flint, Sutherland and Root; Representatives McCall, Madison, Olmstead and Denby.

Democrats: Senators Fletcher and Purcell; Representatives James and Graham.

The testimony taken is voluminous, and a summary of that which has been produced by Louis D. Brandeis, the Boston lawyer who is prosecuting the charges, has been furnished to the American press. The points of this brief of facts, the only summary as yet available for public use, we purpose here setting out.

### I.

The first point relates to the Cunningham coal claims of Alaska.

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Some time prior to March 4, 1907, about 900 coal claims in Alaska had been "located," which means staked out by intending claimants; and only 33 of these had passed to "entry," which means to the point of payment of \$10 an acre to the government and the delivery of a receipt therefor. Those 33 were the so-called "Cunningham claims."

Nothing remained to be done regarding the Cunningham claims, in order to transfer title from the government to the claimants, but the issue of "patents" for them by the Commissioner of the General Land Office in the Department of the Interior.

While they were in that state, and on March 4, 1907, Mr. Ballinger became Commissioner of the General Land Office under Secretary Garfield.

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Meanwhile the Land Office had been frequently

advised of fraudulent schemes for monopolizing Alaska coal mines.

Consequently, Assistant Commissioner Dennett instructed Special Agent Jones on June 21, 1907, to investigate and report. But sometime between July 20 and 29, 1907, Commissioner Ballinger told Jones to make only a partial report—enough to enable him (Ballinger) to advise Congress intelligently to enact legislation favorable to Alaska claimants.

Jones accordingly furnished only a partial report. He recommended, however, that a strict investigation of every claim be made; and at a later date, August 13, 1907, he reported to Commissioner Ballinger a list of claimants of different groups, one of them being the Cunningham group, for use "in a further investigation of frauds in coal lands in Alaska." The latter report closes with a recommendation "that these entries be carefully investigated by an experienced and fearless agent."

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In November, 1907, Louis R. Glavis, another special agent, got permission to go to Washington, where he laid before his superior, Commissioner Ballinger, reasons for strict inquiries before "clear listing" the claims. "Clear listing" a land claim means to "O. K." it for a "patent," and implies that if there was ever any suspicion it has been removed through investigation.

Notwithstanding that recommendation, however, and about December 26, 1907, Commissioner Ballinger ordered the Cunningham claims "clear listed." He explains now that he did so upon a favorable report by Special Agent Love of August 2, 1907. But after that report Mr. Love wrote that he "did not 'clear list' those entries for patent, but on the contrary raised a question of their regularity." He is borne out in this assertion by the text of the very report upon which Commissioner Ballinger says he acted.

Right at this point a peculiarly significant fact appears. An option for a half interest in the Cunningham claims which had been bought (before Mr. Ballinger became Commissioner of the Land Office) by the syndicate composed of J. P. Morgan's banking house and the Guggenheim family, was taken up by the Morgan-Guggenheim syndicate at about the time that Commissioner Ballinger (against the advice of his agents, Glavis and Love) ordered the Cunningham claims to be "clear listed." The inference would not be far fetched, therefore, that Commissioner Ballinger was influenced not by Love's report, as he weakly ex-