

While the president in his message gives details of battle casualties, he makes no allusion to the mismanagement of the war, to the suffering of soldiers with sickness and their death from disease, nor to the inquiry which he is prosecuting through Gen. Dodge's committee. His attitude regarding the question of newly acquired territory is treated in an article on another page entitled, "Our New Possessions."

It is not long since British approval of anything American, instantly condemned it in republican eyes. British approval of a message of Cleveland's, for instance, would have been regarded as shocking evidence of treason in the white house. But something must have happened, for republican papers and statesmen are clapping their hands enthusiastically at the British approval of McKinley's message.

Admiral Sampson's report, made public the latter part of last week, goes far to confirm a suspicion as to Gen. Shafter's campaign in Cuba which other sources of information had aroused and strengthened. It was from the first inconceivable to the non-military mind that a competent general in Shafter's situation should in good faith have marched into the interior, out of the reach of naval support, and invited such casualties, apparently useless, as those which Shafter suffered the 1st and 2d of July. The obvious point of attack would have seemed to be upon the fortifications at the harbor entrance, with the navy clearing the way as the army advanced along the southern coast.

Shafter has given four reasons for not adopting that course. He has said that the line of march would have been through poisonous undergrowth; that the army could not have availed itself of the streams for water; that the Spanish position at the mouth of the harbor was so strong that it could have been carried only with great loss to the assailants; and that the Spanish would have had an

open line of retreat from Santiago to the north and west.

Most of these explanations do not explain. As all the streams referred to emptied into the waters of the southern coast it is not easy to see how they offered better facilities for water supply in the interior than nearer the sea, unless the tides affected them, in which case water from the transports might have been safely depended upon. The plea that the Spanish would have an open line of retreat is also flimsy. Their open line of retreat would have led them into a devastated country from which hunger would have soon driven them back. Of the dangers of a march through poisonous undergrowth, the non-military mind is of course incompetent to form an opinion. But Gen. Shafter appears to have been alone in scenting that danger; and it may be inferred, not unreasonably, that the danger might have been encountered by the soldiers with as much fortitude as a galling Spanish fire from entrenchments against which heavy guns could not be brought to bear. As to the comparative impregnability of the Spanish defenses at the mouth of the harbor, Admiral Sampson does not agree with Gen. Shafter. Quoting from his own official dispatch of July 14, the admiral says: "I have been ready at any time during the last three weeks to silence works, to clear entrance of mines, and to enter harbor whenever the army will do the part which the proper conduct of war assigns to it." The "proper conduct" of the army which Admiral Sampson contemplated, was a land attack, by way of the coast, upon fortifications at the harbor entrance. This could have been made under the protection and with the aid of the great guns of the fleet, which would have cleared the way for an almost bloodless advance of the army. The successful accomplishment of such an attack would have put Shafter in control of the mine fields in the harbor and made it prudent for Sampson to move up the channel. After that, the army and navy, in further coopera-

tion, could have placed Cervera's fleet and the city of Santiago at once at their mercy.

But in the execution of that programme the navy must have shared honors with the army; and for that reason, apparently—at any rate, no other plausible reason appears—Shafter, whether of his own notion or under orders from Washington is not yet clear, plunged far into the interior. Beyond the possibility of naval assistance, without guides, without scouts, without artillery, he there made upon the strongest and least exposed of the Spanish intrenchments a disordered infantry attack which occasioned enormous loss; and which, but for the reckless bravery of his troops, would have culminated in complete disaster. It was an attack, too, which, even when victorious, could have accomplished nothing but for the unexpected folly of Cervera's fleet. Had Cervera staid where he was, Shafter would still have been obliged, after his bloody victory in the interior, to capture the entrance fortifications and secure control of the field of mines for Sampson, before a substantial victory could have been gained.

It may be presumptuous to criticise Gen. Shafter in this way, but as the criticism, one that in substance we made long ago, is now buttressed by Admiral Sampson's official report, we may venture to repeat it.

Besides criticising the Shafter campaign we have had the temerity also to criticise the condition of affairs at the camp at Montauk, where many a soldier died from neglect and maltreatment and many another was barely rescued by friends before it was too late. These criticisms were based upon the best information; but if the testimony of Dr. Forwood be true, we owe an apology for them to some one.

The burden of the complaints as to Montauk Point was that, although this camp was within 60 miles of the American metropolis, where any of

the world's products could be had for the asking, wholesome food and food suitable for the sick, as well as medicines and hospital accommodations and medical attention, were lacking. But Dr. Forwood tells the "willing whitewashing" committee a different story. He says that from the beginning to the end, at the general hospital at Montauk, there were from 50 to 500 vacant beds! That there were medical supplies in abundance—"wasteful abundance"!! That the water was pure and plentiful!! That army rations at the hospital were supplemented with everything that could be found in the Waldorf-Astoria hotel, including roast turkey, pheasants, squab, lambs, sheep, pigs, game of all kinds, pate de fois gras, mineral waters, the finest champagnes and liquors!!!! What delicate-stomached wretches those private soldiers at Montauk must have been, to complain of fare like that. And what ascetic friends they had, to drag them away to city hospitals on pretense of wishing to save their lives. If Dr. Forwood's testimony were only corroborated by that of a few private soldiers who lived at Montauk on Waldorf-Astoria fare—except as the beneficiaries of Helen Gould's charity—we should feel like apologizing to the war department.

There is something amusing in the laborious effort of the Hawaiian annexation committee to exclude the Chinese and Japanese citizens of Hawaii from American citizenship without excluding other non-white races. To accomplish this bit of legal jugglery the commission has actually proposed to enact that negroes are white men. "All white men," they say, "including . . . . persons of African descent," shall be American citizens. As Chinese and Japanese are not white men, nor yet Africans, they are excluded as neatly as you please; but this is at the expense of legislation that wrenches language to declare that the term "white men" includes black men without including yellow men. It may be well to re-

mark that it has long been a universally recognized law that upon a change of government all the citizens of the old become of right citizens of the new.

Following the agreement for the cession of the Philippine archipelago by Spain to the United States, come two significant reports from the Philippines. The natives, according to one of these reports, are cruelly murdering Catholic priests; according to the other they are threatening resistance to the authority of the United States as Spain's assignee. Of these reports, the first is gauzy. It has evidently been manufactured with the object of exciting hostility on the part of American Catholics toward the Filipinos in order to strengthen the demand among Americans for the subjugation of the Filipinos. But the second report is doubtless well founded. It is not probable that the natives of the Philippines, after fighting Spain "to a standstill," and almost achieving their independence, will submit to be turned over to any power on earth, without being so much as consulted. We would not do it ourselves under similar circumstances. Why should we expect them to?

It is claimed by the Filipinos that before the purchase of the Philippines by the United States they themselves had wrested from Spain the Island of Luzon, part of the Visayas islands, and the Island of Mindanao; and that although the Americans had helped them indirectly by attacking Manila, yet they would even without that help have ultimately won. They also claim that Spain cannot sell the whole archipelago, for she has never been able to make it her own. And, asserting that they are unanimous in demanding nothing less than independence, these Filipinos announce their determination, Yankee fashion, to fight for it. Suppose they execute their determination, how shall we assert our sovereignty over them? Shall we subdue them? Why, that would be forcible annexation, which President McKinley himself has most soi-

emly denounced as unthinkable, because by our code of morality, as he says, it would be criminal aggression. How, then, could we morally justify an attempt to complete our Spanish purchase of the Philippines by the use of force against the Filipinos? We could not do it at all. If the Filipinos resist our aggression, every American with the blood of the revolutionary fathers in his veins, with the principles of the declaration of independence in his heart, with Lincoln's immortal oration at Gettysburg in his memory, with President McKinley's reference to our code of morality upon his conscience—every such American must pray for their triumph.

In the December number of the *Nineteenth Century Magazine* an article in justification of lavish expenditure of wealth appears. It is from the pen of Bradley Martin, Jr., he of the Bradley Martin ball. Mr. Martin's argument runs along the old lines. It is like this: By spending money lavishly in luxuries, the rich set at work producers of luxuries, who, being thereby enabled to buy luxuries and necessities for themselves, set at work producers of other luxuries and of necessities, who in turn set at work other producers of luxuries and necessities, and so on in an ever widening circle until the whole industrial community feels the benefit of the first impulse.

As an argument, irrespective of the assumed premises, Mr. Martin's plea for idle luxury is not gainsaid. It is, indeed, true that industrial communities prosper through spending and not by hoarding. If everybody were strictly economical in his expenditures, a very large proportion of the world's industries would be closed down. But in his premises Mr. Martin is weak. He assumes that it makes no difference whether the rich earn their wealth or not, so long as they keep the wheels of industry turning by spending it. That assumption begs the whole social question. How the rich spend their wealth, or