

cuss them now. In so far, however, as they may assume to suggest any conditions whatever, they will deserve and can honorably receive no consideration at the hands of congress. For the United States is under an irrevocable obligation—to the Cuban people, to the American people, to the civilized world—which in honor demands that congress make no attempt to dictate terms to Cuba. This obligation was deliberately expressed by congress in the resolutions of April 18, 1898, signed by the president two days later, which authorized the war with Spain. The first of those resolutions declared—

That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent—

and the fourth—

That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

Upon the faith of that pledge, congress cannot, without tarnishing the American name, exact a single condition as the price of its acknowledgment of the Cuban constitution.

There is another consideration, in the light of which the inspired correspondence from Washington and the profound editorials in the administration press upon the importance of reserving authority in the United States to protect the Cubans from themselves and foreigners, appear to be extremely ridiculous. We refer to the recent decision of the supreme court in the Neely extradition case. That decision rests, in principle and in the express terms of the court's opinion, upon the fact that Cuba is a "foreign country." Upon what theory can our government assert a right or appeal to a necessity of setting up a protectorate over a foreign country? The only explanation that possesses the slightest flavor of plausibility is the danger we might incur by leaving Cuba a possible prey to Eu-

ropean powers, which, with Cuba for a base, might attack the United States. But the flavor in that explanation is hardly distinguishable. One European power did have possession of Cuba for hundreds of years, until we drove it out; but it never occurred to Spain to make Cuba a base of operations against the United States nor to turn it over to a greater power for that purpose. Besides that, this slightly favorable explanation applies no better to Cuba than to Mexico. If we need a protectorate over Cuba for our own protection, we need one over Mexico, too; for Mexico would make a better base than Cuba for European operations against the United States. And after all is said and done, we may, if the necessity ever arises, rely upon Cuba's voluntarily giving us an opportunity to head off European invaders. It will be as much to her interest as ours. Some other and less altruistic reason, it is to be feared, exists for the anxiety of the imperialists to meddle with the internal affairs of this "foreign country" near our coast, a country which we ourselves have declared to be free and independent and have solemnly promised to pacify and then restore to its people. Some hint at what that reason is has been given in an administration paper quoted by the Chicago Chronicle. It asserts the necessity of requiring the new republic to recognize and respect the "vested rights acquired during the time of the military government." It is considerations of that character, doubtless, that raise all these questions with which the atmosphere at Washington is alive, about imposing conditions upon the acceptance by our government of the constitution of the "foreign country" called Cuba. Right and left, we are told, American syndicates have grabbed Cuban franchises during the American military regime. Neely was only a vulgar thief. Instead of pillaging the post office in the old-fashioned ways of crime, he should have got him a franchise. Then he would have been a highly respected and influential own-

er of vested interests instead of a prisoner. Whoever it was that said "the imperialists are not jingoes, they are only thieves," was not far wrong.

There are brighter prospects of peace in the Philippines. So the country is assured by an Associated Press dispatch from Manila, which has earmarks of military influence in dictating its composition. These reports of early peace are now an old story. They began to come in early in the spring of 1899. One of them was personally vouched for by President McKinley in the early summer of that year. They preceded every battle and followed every victory. In the presidential campaign they punctuated all the public documents, with the reservation, however, that their verification would depend upon the result of the election. Just before that event the period was fixed at 60 days, provided Bryan were defeated. All these reports have given some reason for expecting the peace they predicted. The latest one is based upon the rigor with which the campaign of arrests has been made. The Manila "prisons are daily becoming more crowded," says the Associated Press report, "and an additional one is being built on Subig bay." Gen. MacArthur probably expects to produce peace by putting the whole native population into jail. Even that is a better mode of "benevolent assimilation" than the earlier one of putting them into graves:

Inasmuch as Gen. MacArthur has banished an American citizen from the Philippines and sent him home as a prisoner, it is interesting to know the breadth and depth of this man's offending; and we are indebted to Senator Teller for information upon the subject. The facts furnished by Mr. Teller will be found in the Congressional Record of February 5, at page 2,132. The offender is George T. Rice. He was editor of the Daily Bulletin, a maritime trade paper. In

one of the issues of the Bulletin he criticised the manifest neglect of the captain of the port, an American naval lieutenant, with reference to pilotage and mooring regulations. The criticism was fair and well tempered, but because of it Mr. Rice was forbidden permission in future to enter the office of the captain of the port. Let it be noted in passing that the whole affair related to civil concerns. The only military element in it was the naval commission held by the offended captain of the port. Mr. Rice's retort to his unwarranted exclusion from an official source of maritime news was a statement in the Bulletin of the circumstances and an admonition that he would not be deterred from telling his readers the truth about the maladministration of the office of captain of the port. An ex parte military investigation was then made by Inspector General Mills, a personal friend of the captain of the port, who exonerated the captain of the port and contradicted the editor and the merchants from whom he had obtained his incriminating information. Upon Inspector General Mills's recommendation Mr. Rice was thereupon thrown into jail and subsequently shipped to the United States as a prisoner. The order of banishment, signed by Gen. MacArthur, described Rice as a "dangerous incendiary and a menace to the military situation." There appears to have been nothing to justify this characterization beyond the circumstances recited above. Senator Teller has done well in bringing the case to the attention of the country. It serves to reveal the autocratic methods of our military authorities in Manila, and to suggest the possibilities of tyranny which are embodied in Mr. McKinley's policy of "benevolent assimilation."

"Let West Point go," is the proposal of the Peacemaker, Mr. Alfred H. Love's paper in Philadelphia. Of course, such a proposition is instantly dismissed as the silliness of a crank, and yet it would be difficult

for the hard-headed Philistine who mocks the idea of getting along without a regular army (which would be included in the abolition of West Point) to dispose of Mr. Love's argument that West Point furnished the confederate army with its best officers, and thus proved itself, as an institution, not only no safe reliance for the country that sustains it, but even a possible weapon in the enemy's hands. It was proved in the civil war that the West Point training has never guaranteed the production of the highest patriotism. Men may honestly differ on politics, but to turn one's educated skill in destruction upon the flag, the defenses and the defenders of one's country, is a very different matter. It requires a calloused moral nature and an esprit de corps that sticks at nothing demanded of it. These are the very things cultivated, it appears, at our national military academy. The special committee of congress which has been investigating the hazing outrages at West Point concludes the report to the house with these words, which would shock the country had not the horrible facts abundantly supporting the dreadful charge been so fully set forth in the public press: "Your committee, however, were astonished to find that something at the academy has benumbed the conscience of most of these otherwise creditable young men as to the treatment due from the strong and experienced to the weak, the embarrassed and the inexperienced." But, after all, what is this but the spirit of conquest, the spirit expressed in such wars of subjugation as the self-complacent leaders of Anglo-Saxon civilization are at this time waging in their contemptible and conscienceless onslaughts upon the African and Philippine republics? The treatment inflicted by these strong nations upon weak, embarrassed and inexperienced seekers for self-government in far-off lands is precisely what the hateful hazing at West Point, which has so disgusted all right-minded people, brings

up men to enter into with thoroughness and zest. It is, moreover, what is covered by Mahan's high-sounding euphemism of "Sea Power," which is maintained, as he has demonstrated ad nauseum, by forming big fleets to destroy those of weaker powers or grasp any outlying islands or other territory of some embarrassed power that a stronger may have some use for in its business. The only really "astonishing" thing about it is that anybody in this country should be astonished at "benumbed" consciences anywhere as to the crushing of "the weak, the embarrassed and the inexperienced." That is the accepted up-to-date policy, not only of national powers, but also of finance, trade and industry.

An important point has been raised by the lower house of congress in connection with the proposed reduction of war taxes. The house having passed a bill for this purpose, for which the senate, under the formalities of amendment, has substituted another and totally different bill, the house objects that it is not within the province of the senate thus affirmatively to dictate revenue legislation. This objection rests upon section 7 of article I. of the constitution, which provides that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives." The evident object of the provision is to place the national purse strings under the control, chiefly, of the more popular body. Under the same section authority is given the senate, it is true, to "propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills." There is an assumption, however, in the section as a whole, that the senate will recognize the superior authority of the house as the money disbursing body. Of course the supreme court could not nullify a house revenue bill though it had been amended out of all recognition by the senate. No claim of unconstitutionality in that degree is made. But the senate itself is bound to limit its action by constitutional restraints. This obligation it