mary and digest of the evidence it has collected. This discloses clearly the fact that the monopoly of the anthracite coal lands and of railroad rights of way and terminals is so far shielded from competition that no combination of laborers, subject to the competition of other laborers, can reasonably expect to cope with it by means of a strike. On this point the commission declares:—

Effective control by unity of stock ownership is given to a large proportion of the entire output of the field. It appears that the trend toward consolidation by actual purchase, not only of one railroad by another, but of independent coal holdings by the railroads, together with the extension of the community of ownership idea, is unmistakable. It cannot be long before the anthracite coal business of the United States in all its enormous extent and commercial value will be entirely monopolized by a few powerful financial interests. The only safeguard for the public against exorbitant prices must be found either in the competition of other fuels, in enlightened self-interest on the part of the railroads, or the immediate application of governmental regulation. Competition between either the producers of anthracite coal or the railroads which transport their product can no longer be regarded as of the slightest effect. Competition cannot be perpetuated. It has disappeared apparently once and for all.

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To ordinary observers all that has long been evident. The curious thing about it is that so many observers, as well as this commission, do not distinguish the key to the monopoly. They see it and describe it, but they confuse it so hopelessly with non-essentials that they fail to recognize it as the key. What really makes it possible to monopolize the anthracite coal business is not any consolidation of the business of digging coal or of carrying coal. It is not the consolidation of ownership of mining machinery, for that can be reproduced at will; nor is it the consolidations of ownership of railway rolling stock, for that also can be reproduced at will. It is in part the consolidation of the ownership of the anthracite beds; these cannot be reproduced. It is in other part the consolidation of terminal sites of railroads, where coal is shipped and where it is delivered; neither can these be reproduced. They are all in the category of land, while the rolling stock and mining machinery are in the category of reproducible capital. Why be so shortsighted, then, as to suppose that this monopoly can be destroyed only by government regulation or ownership of the coal business? All that is necessary is to terminate private control of coal land and railroad land. Competition in producing and transporting coal would then set in more briskly than ever. If all the reproducible capital in the world were consolidated in a trust, competition would soon break up that trust; but if all the land in the world were so consolidated there would be no competition except the competition of landless men for a chance to work.

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When the legislature of Ohio adjourned last week it had passed but two of the "ripper" bills with which the Republican majority threatened Cleveland. Both were designed to cripple Mayor Johnson in his work of giving to Cleveland a good non-partisan, but fundamentally democratic government. One was brazenly in the interest of the local monopolies, and each was cynically defiant of local public sentiment.

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The park board "ripper" takes the management of the city parks out of the control of the city authorities and turns them over to a county board to be appointed by a Republican official, whom the law designates by the title of his office but whom it might with equal propriety and no greater impudence have designated by name. This "ripping" was done on the theory, distinctly announced by a Republican leader in the legislature, that the Cleveland parks ought to be managed by the rich and not by the public at large. A proposition to submit the measure to a vote of the people of Cleveland was therefore voted down by the Republican majority in the legislature.

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The other "ripper" relates to taxation. Mayor Johnson's administration having sought to tax the local franchises on the basis of 60 per cent. of their value, the same as other property (vol. iv, p. 741), those interests combined and under the dictation of Senator Hanna secured from the Republican majority in the legislature a measure empowering the county auditor of any county to apply in his discretion to the state officials—dominated by railroad interests—for the appointment by them of a local board in which all power over taxation shall be vested. The significance of this measure will be understood when it is explained that the county auditor of the Cleveland county, Craig, is a friend of the corporations, one of the beneficiaries of railroad pass privileges (vol. iv, p. 115), who became so brazen in serving them that at last fall's election he was defeated for re-election in his strong Republican county. But his term of office does not expire until next fall. Consequently this Hanna law enables him to perpetuate the power of serving local monopolies, which the voters took away from him, by authorizing him to secure the appointment of a tax board to his own liking. He has applied for the appointment of such a board, and Mayor Johnson declares his intention of resisting the Hanna law under which the application is made as unconstitutional.

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Among the other acts of the Ohio legislature just adjourned were tax measures calculated to protect railroad companies from equal taxation while heavily taxing competitive business corporations. The earnest efforts of Mayor Johnson and his friends to secure laws making taxation equitable, and putting a stop to the tax dodging of railroad, street car and other monopoly corporations were frustrated by the Republican majority.

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But two or three hopeful measures did slip through this boss-led and monopoly-ridden Ohio legislature. One was a bill establishing a uniform system of accounting in the public offices throughout the state. Even this bill,

however, was not made applicable to public service corporations. So, while it will have a tendency to check official corruption, it will not disclose the secret bookkeeping of monopolies which water their stock in order to create an appearance of small pro rata earnings. Another of the hopeful measures is a resolution amending the Ohio constitution, which is to be voted upon at the coming election. It would abolish that snare and delusion, the "uniform rule" of taxation, under which all property in Ohio is now required to be taxed equally but never is. It would also authorize classifications of taxable objects, so that the legislature might impose varying rates as between different classes, though required to treat all the objects of the same class alike. For instance, if building lots were put in one class and buildings in another, all building lots would have to be taxed at the same rate ad valorem; but buildings, though they also would have to be taxed at the same rate as compared with one another, might be taxed at a very different rate from the lots. Again: the franchises of railroads might be put in one class and taxed at one rate, while the rolling stock was put in another class and taxed at a different rate. Only a few objects could be wholly exempted from taxation, they being the same as are now exempt.

As we surmised last week, President Roosevelt has decided that it is not a breach of neutrality for Great Britain to buy munitions of war and load British war vessels with them for transportation directly by those war vessels to the seat of war in South Africa. It was not probable that an officer of the state department would publish his opinion to that effect in a magazine unless the decision had already been reached even if not announced. And the President skips the same hard place, in reaching his decision, that the state department expert did. He holds, and correctly, that our people have the right to sell munitions of war to either belligerent in regular course of commerce. But he does not explain why he considers it regular course of commerce to establish on our soil a British army depot, in charge of British army officers, for storing munitions of war, and to ship them, not upon commercial vessels, but upon British war vessels which lie for days in our ports loading with these munitions, and which carry them directly to the seat of war. That seems much less like commercial enterprise than like military operations.

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Great Britain so regarded similar transactions during our war with Spain. On the 3d of April, 1898, the governor general of Newfoundland promulgated a British proclamation (see The Public, Vol. i., No. 5, p. 10) forbidding the delivery of coal to any belligerent ship except for the express purpose of enabling them to proceed directly to their own country, or to some specified neutral destination, and advising against supplying coal to belligerents for any purpose if there were reasonable grounds for suspecting bad faith. Now there is no doubt that the people of Newfoundland had at that time a right to sell coal to the American government, or to the Spanish government, or both, in the ordinary course of commerce; but Great Britain decided that its delivery to American or Spanish war vessels for war purposes would not be in regular course of commerce and therefore would be in violation of neutrality. If there is any difference between the delivery of British coal in British ports to American war vessels for American war purposes, and the delivery of American mules in American ports to British war vessels for British war purposes, it would be interesting to see the difference defined. Mr. Roosevelt's decision implies that there is a difference.

In his speech on the 20th before the Presbyterian General Assembly at New York, President Roosevelt did a little patriotic boasting which will not bear very close examination. Referring to the recognition of Cuba, he said:

> We have the right to feel proud that we have kept every pledge to the letter and established a new national precedent. I don't remember another such case—and I have looked for one with care—a case where, as the result of such a war, the victorious nation has contented itself by starting a new nation, free on the difficult path of self-government.

Is national fidelity to national pledges so rare a thing that the head of a great nation may boast of being true? Even if we had kept our pledge with Cuba to the letter, boasting of so obvious a duty would be in poor taste. But when in fact we have halted, and hesitated, and in the end assumed to reserve to ourselves a power at variance with the pledge, such boasting violates other standards besides those of taste. And is it true that there is no other case "where, as the result of such a war, the victorious nation has contented itself" with—what? With doing that for which it made the war. Did we not go to war with Spain for the purpose of liberating Cuba and making her an independent republic? Was not that the only purpose of the war? Certainly it was the only professed purpose. How then can we boast of our virtue in liberating Cuba and making her an independent republic? Does our wretched Philippine policy, which stultifies our national ideals and contravenes the spirit of our war pledge, weigh so heavily upon Mr. Roosevelt's conscience that he finds relief in pointing, though mistakenly, to the fulfillment of the letter of that pledge? When we boast of keeping the letter of the pledge in dealing with Cuba, do we not disclose a consciousness of having violated its spirit in dealing with the Philippines? Remorse sometimes seeks shelter in brag. Is this such a case?

Why didn't the flag "stay put" in Cuba? If it came down because in good faith and good morals it ought to have come down, then why should it "stay put" in any other place when in good faith and good morals it ought to come down? To be perfect-