

for which the nature of trusts, when examined and understood, clearly affords no excuse—it is often urged that it is in harmony with prevailing tendencies. But that is not a good reason. There are tendencies and tendencies. Some are good and some are bad. It is never enough, therefore, in order to justify a policy, to urge that it is in harmony with a tendency. No policy is justifiable unless it is in harmony with good tendencies. Bad tendencies must be controlled and discouraged. Consequently, the argument which refers to tendencies must not only premise the tendency but also that the tendency is good. We agree, of course,—no-body can deny it—that centralization of power at Washington is a tendency just now, a marked and strong tendency. But so at some times and in some places is the bubonic plague. The crucial question is not whether the tendency exists, but whether it is beneficent; and on that question the advocates of centralization dare not state their case in explicit and comprehensive terms. They dare not advocate the principle of concentration. What they do is to advocate specific infractions of the principle, such infractions as a federal trust law would be, and then, by piling one precedent upon another, they bring down upon us the burden of all the evils and oppressions of the very centralization which they dare not defend in terms. In addition to this objection, federal supervision is precisely what the trust magnates want and what some of their representatives advocate. While it is true that all advocates of federal control are not friends of the trusts, yet most friends of the trusts are advocates of federal control. This fact deserves thoughtful consideration, and that is what it appears to have received from the Pennsylvania Grange.

The November report of American exports and imports is calculated to make renewed demands upon the intellectual agility and statistical dexterity of the “favorable balance” ex-

perts. This report is for the eleven months of the current calendar year, and shows that the excess of exports—merchandise, gold and silver, all included—is \$553,407,425. None of that great outgo comes back to us in “pure gold,” as the lamented McKinley explained with reference to our exports in general, for gold is included. In fact, the exports of gold alone have exceeded gold imports thus far during the year by \$2,790,195; and silver exports are \$22,548,466 in excess of silver imports. How then are we enriched by our boasted exportation also of over 500 millions more merchandise than we have imported? If our country were getting equal or greater values back, we could understand the boast. But it is getting nothing back. On the contrary, it is shipping silver and gold. If we were paying off our debts, then we could understand the boast. But our old excess of imports has been paid off over and over since the balance shifted, some thirty years ago. If we were establishing a credit abroad, then the boast would be explicable. But we are not. The surmise that we are doing so is no longer entertained by financial men. The New York Herald, for instance, in a financial review on the 17th of the stock markets, speaks of “the enormous sum which is owing abroad,” of “the enormous foreign borrowing” of our bankers, of the curious spectacle of this country “borrowing and deferring payment to impoverished Europe,” and gives warning that “this foreign money must be repaid some day.” There appears to be nothing to show for our excessive exports but a little matter of tourists’ expenses and some payments for foreign freights. Will some one kindly rise up and explain, with veracity as to facts and common sense as to conclusions, what there is in our excessive exports to boast about and why this balance is called “favorable”?

Wilbur F. Wakeman, the appraiser of the port of New York, has had a surprising experience. Knowing that

the Republican tariff laws are for “protection”—that is, to discourage Americans from buying foreign-made goods when they wish to,—and that it is the function of his office to enforce those laws in letter and spirit, and being withal a conscientious protectionist himself, he enforced the laws. Not only did he enforce them strictly against commercial importers, thereby seeing to it that comparatively poor Americans are properly fined for buying foreign-made goods of American merchants; but he enforced them also and with equal severity against rich travelers, who buy their foreign-made goods on the other side. Thereupon a howl rent the air. Not at protection. Bless you, no! Protection is a bulwark. But at this enforcement of protection against the luxurious classes. Had Mr. Wakeman confined his attention to steerage passengers, that would have been different. But this obtuse protectionist, in his zeal for the cause, actually invaded the privacy of the cabin. So his resignation has been demanded. Mr. Wakeman’s reflections are probably confused. At any rate he declines to resign.

Mayor Johnson is being attacked by the Republicans in a new direction. His administration has been so successful that they are without hope of ousting him at the ballot box, so they are trying to get rid of him by revolutionizing the government of the city and leaving him as mayor without any power. Some ten years ago, an act was passed by the Republican legislature of Ohio which gave to Cleveland a government on what is known as the federal plan—in imitation, that is, of the federal government of the United States. The mayor was made elective and given full administrative powers, including the appointment of “directors” of various departments who bear to the mayor in some measure the relation of the cabinet of the United States to the president. This law has been in force ever since. All the mayors elected under it down to Johnson’s time have been Repub-

licans, or Democrats who train with the Republican machine; but mostly Republicans. No reason, therefore, has yet appealed to the Republicans to repudiate this law of their own making. But Johnson has proved to be that anomaly in modern official life, a democratic Democrat; and not only that, but one who knows how. He is consequently recognized as dangerous to those plutocratic interests from which the Republicans get campaign funds and to the political service of which they are pledged. The Republican attorney general of Ohio, has therefore brought suit in the supreme court of the state, composed of Republicans, to declare the Republican law federalizing the local government of Cleveland to be unconstitutional.

The ostensible reason is (1) that the constitution of Ohio forbids special legislation, and (2) that this law applies only to Cleveland and therefore is special legislation. If the second clause of that contention is true now, it has been true all these ten years. It was true when the Republicans enacted the law and it was true when they governed the city pursuant to the law. They seem, therefore, to regard this law as the traditional hunter did his gun, the sights of which were so adjusted that he could fire at an animal concealed in the bushes, in full confidence that he would hit it if it were a deer and miss it if it were a calf. This Republican law was, in Republican estimation, to be a law of Republicans and for Republicans to be killed by Republicans when Republicans should be defeated at the ballot box.

A decision favorable to the attorney general in this Cleveland case would have one important result—possibly two. It would, for one thing, throw Mayor Johnson's cabinet appointees out of office and weight him down with appointees of the Republican governor. These Republican appointees could overrule him in all important matters and make him virtually their clerk. In other words,

such a decision would overturn the election results of last spring in Cleveland, by making the administration Republican in fact though Democratic in name, when the people intended it to be Democratic in fact as well as in name. It would be "ripper" adjudication, to borrow an adjective which admirably describes a kind of legislation that has recently become popular in Republican legislatures. The additional possibility is that this would in turn make Mayor Johnson stronger than ever in popular estimation, not only in Cuyahoga county but throughout the state of Ohio.

It is to be regretted that a man who is usually so judicially minded as Judge Phillips, of Cleveland, should have overstepped the barrier which the law erects between judge and jury, and undertaken to administer a rebuke to a jury in a criminal case for a verdict of acquittal which he did not approve. If the question of guilt or innocence had been within his province, he should have dismissed the jury and decided the case himself. Of course it was not within his province. The law required him to leave the verdict to a jury, and to be bound absolutely by its decision if favorable to the prisoner. But in that case he had no right to scold the jury for its verdict, no matter how much he thought the verdict wrong. If he had reason to believe the jurors corrupt, he should have laid the facts before the grand jury. If he had none, then it was his duty to be as mute regarding their performance of a function peculiar to juries as it was theirs to be mute regarding his performance of functions peculiar to judges. If they had rebuked him in open court for his rulings or his charge, he would have punished them for contempt. Yet they would have had as much right to do that to him as he had to rebuke them. Probably he would have held them in contempt had they at once remonstrated with him for invading their province and rebuking them for their decision. Yet they would have been

justified in remonstrating on the spot; and it is to be hoped that some juror will sometime be courageous enough to do this, respectfully but firmly, when a judge forgets himself as Judge Phillips is reported to have done in the Cleveland case. Some of the jury in that case are doing the next best thing. Ten of them have joined in a written protest in which they demand that Judge Phillips either have their action investigated or retract his unwarranted arraignment. In that demand the absurdity of the judge's action is pointedly indicated, by the unanswerable proposition that "if the verdict of the jury is subject to criticism, then the jury system is a farce, and the judge might just as well try the case and render the decision." The credit for having set on foot this much needed movement for vindicating the rights of jurors, and through them of persons on trial, against impertinent interference or criticism by judges, is due to W. B. Kettingham, editor of the Collinwood News, who happened to be one of the rebuked jurymen.

Rather serious humor was that of the Chicago street railway company which, in issuing passes to aldermen last week, made each pass read: "Pass So-and-So, employe." While some aldermen do not object to being street car employes, the wages being fat and strictly confidential, none of them can be expected to relish being so described on their passes.

At last the long delayed British report of the death rate for October in the South Africa reconcentrado camps has been published. It is coupled with the report for November. According to these reports the number of deaths for October was 3,156 and for November 2,807. Of the 3,156 in October, 2,633 were children, and of the 2,807 in November, 2,271 were children. The number of prisoners for these two months was 111,879 in October and 118,255 in November; and the table of reconcentrado casualties as previously reported