

and every group of men to treat each and all, not as 'ways of behavior' but as personalities having similar duties and privileges one with another." It would have been more definite to say, "having reciprocal duties and rights," instead of "similar duties and privileges;" but the thought was doubtless intended to be the same. In another place the report declares that "the industrial difficulty lies more in the moral than in the economic order." This is open to the criticism that moral order without economic order cannot abolish economic disturbance. What is probably meant, however, is that if men come into moral order, they will insist upon economic order. And that is true. If the churches earnestly inculcate moral righteousness, regardless of class, condition or laws and institutions, economic righteousness will be promoted, for moral righteousness produces economic righteousness. The real objection to ignoring economic order while teaching and preaching moral order is that economic disorder will react and produce moral disorder—even to such a degree that the very preachers of morality will come to defend immorality rather than disturb vested interests in economic disorder. Economic disorder and moral order cannot coexist.

Public school reform in Chicago.

Both Mayor Dunne and President Tilden, the latter of the Chicago Board of Education, are to be congratulated as well as commended for what promises to be a far reaching reform in school management. Mayor Dunne's appointments of trustees (p. 233), though of the highest order, fell short of constituting a majority of the Board; but now Mr. Tilden, who was supposed to be out of sympathy with the Mayor, has so far cooperated with him as to give the Board the complexion of which the Mayor's excellent appointments were prophetic. By transferring the Rev. R. A. White from the school management committee, where his ill-

vised and absurd hostility to the Teachers' Federation was perpetually irritating, to the buildings and grounds committee, where, in cooperation with men like Emil Ritter and John C. Harding, his sterling honesty can be made effective, President Tilden has done much, not only to produce harmony and to promote honesty of administration, but also to further sound educational policies. And he has done even more in both directions by appointing Jane Addams to the chairmanship of the school management committee, and giving her such associates as Dr. Cornelia De Bey, P. Shelley O'Ryan, and Mrs. Blaine. In accord with these appointments by its president, was the selection by the Board itself, unanimously though in the face of covert opposition from the old regime, of Ella F. Young for principal of the Normal school. Altogether these events imply at least a strong tendency toward abandonment of the "factory" system of public school instruction for a system more idealistic and human. Rational culture instead of mechanical adjustment on the pedagogical side, and honest management instead of grafty "business" methods on the administrative side, now appear to be close at hand in the public school work of Chicago.

The profit of good government.

In his Chautauqua speech at Milwaukee on the 23d, Gov. Folk of Missouri referred to the economic effects of enforcing the law rigorously. "No State," he said, "can be injured by enforcement of the law;" and to prove that this policy in his own State has paid, he stated that its population is increasing and "real estate values have advanced 25 per cent." This result of the enforcement of the law suggests a question quite as important as the important one of law enforcement. If real estate values have increased 25 per cent. in Missouri, in consequence of the enforcement of the law there, then one class of the community (real estate tenants) are forced to pay

higher rents, and another class (real estate owners) are getting the whole difference, except a slight percentage for taxes—all because of an improved administration of the law. Is this fair? Is it really good government when improved administration enables one class in a community to charge another class for the resulting benefits?

Concentrated prosperity.

A very large proportion of the people of the United States, though they fully understand that the country is prosperous, have been puzzled to reconcile this clamorous fact with the much more obtrusive one that they themselves are not prosperous. But now comes the Commercial Bulletin of Cleveland, with an inadvertent explanation. Our prosperity, so it seems, is of a peculiar kind, and the Bulletin invents a singularly apt descriptive term for it. The term is "concentrated prosperity." Thereby the enigma of a prosperous country with an impoverished populace is solved. The country is prosperous, but its prosperity is concentrated in John D. Rockefeller, et al.

"OPEN SHOP" VERSUS "CLOSED SHOP."

I

Most persons have come to know the meaning of the terms "open shop" and "closed shop." But greater certainty of being understood may be assured if we begin this brief discussion by explaining what the terms mean. Their origin is unimportant. The thing to know is what they mean now.

"Closed shop," then, is the term for a shop, factory, store, or other industrial place where workmen cannot obtain employment without being members in good standing of the labor union of their trade. This is demanded by the unions. Objecting to working in cooperation with "scabs," "rats," "strike-breakers," or other non-union workmen, they insist that the shop shall be "closed" against all employes who, not already belonging to the union of their trade, refuse to join

it. If the union is able to coerce the employer, or he is friendly enough to yield without coercion, this demand is granted and that establishment is consequently a "closed shop."

But if the employer will not yield without coercion, and the union is unable to coerce him, then non-unionists as well as unionists may obtain employment there and the establishment is consequently known as an "open shop."

No term has come into vogue for establishments which exclude unionists from employment. The reason probably is that no employers make this exclusion. The issue they raise is between the "closed shop," which employs only unionists, and the "open shop," which employs unionists and non-unionists without discrimination. And the reason why employers, however inimical to labor organizations any of them may be, never insist upon excluding unionists for being unionists, is because freedom to employ non-unionists is, in present conditions, sufficiently destructive of unionism.

Both sides to the labor controversy realize that the issue of "closed shop" versus "open shop" practically involves the issue of union or no union. Consequently "open shop" or "closed shop" has become the issue over which workingmen's unions and employers' unions are struggling.

Without taking the space at this time to discuss the question of moral right or wrong, of freedom or coercion, of liberty or autocracy, which the issue of "open shop" versus "closed shop" involves, we invite an impartial comparison simply of the probable industrial results of either policy.

Much that is being said and written about the inherent right to work is for the most part pure hypocrisy, when not crass ignorance. Those who say it and write it are usually not worth arguing with, because in their hearts and heads they don't mean it. What they do mean is that non-unionists have an inherent natural right to work—when employers want to use them to break strikes.

This idea of the right to work is true enough as far as it goes. We do not deny it. But the broader one, that all men—not merely strike breakers in strike times,

but all men at all times—have an inherent natural right to work, is still more true, because more comprehensive; and this doctrine is denied by the same speakers and writers, whenever its assertion seems hostile to the interests for which they speak and write.

Let us, then, confine this discussion strictly to the question of industrial results. What would be the effect of the "closed shop," and what the effect of the "open shop," on both workingmen and employers?

To avoid prejudice and the play of selfish impulses either way, we shall find it advantageous, in an inquiry involving so much feeling, sordid and otherwise, to be as abstract as the concrete nature of the question permits. For this purpose, then, let us resolve industrial society into employers with jobs to give, workingmen with a life and death necessity for getting jobs, and a dragon to consume "surplus" products. And for simplicity and transparency of discussion let us suppose that the ratio of workingmen to jobs is as 10 to 9, and that 9 of the workingmen are unionists.

The figures are important only for comparison of greater with less; and the dragon may be ignored as being a factor only in a more complete economic generalization than we intend to make.

II

Now, in those circumstances, what, in the first place, would be the industrial result of the "open shop" policy strictly enforced?

Every shop would be open to the 1 non-union man. But as there are only 9 jobs, his taking a job would disemploy one of the 9 union men.

This would compel the union to support their idle member. If they did not, he would have to leave the union and underbid one of their number for his job, and the latter in his turn would have to leave the union and underbid another, and so on, until the union had been completely disrupted.

But if the union did support its first disemployed member, the wages of the unionists would be by that amount diminished and they thereby weakened in their contest with employers, whose sole object as to them is to get as

much product for as little wages as possible.

As that is the employers' object, it is to be presumed that the non-unionist is getting less than the man he displaced. But if the non-unionist takes less than the unionist he displaced, an attack has been made upon wages. Yet the unionists cannot complain. As the establishment is an "open shop" they cannot object to lower wages for the non-unionist, so long as their own wages are not reduced.

After awhile the shop which employs the non-unionist finds it expedient to reduce its force. Whom will it discharge? Certainly not the cheaper producer, the non-unionist, but the dearer, the unionist. This is not discrimination against unionism; it is discrimination in favor of economy of production.

And now the union must support another idle member during the period of stagnation (when jobs are temporarily less than 9), or have him leave the union and underbid them. In due time, however, demand for labor rises again to 9. But will the employer who reduced his force offer to pay the old wages? Why should he? What object could he have in paying more to the unionist seeking a job than to the non-unionist who is already at work? He will not pay more unless coerced; and the union, with two idle members on its hands, is in no trim for coercive action. So the union strains a point and consents to the return of the union man to work at non-union wages.

But now this employer has an advantage over the others; he can undersell them in the market. So they demand a downward revision of the wages scale. They are good natured about it, for they offer to arbitrate; but as they really are at a disadvantage under the old wages scale, they win in the arbitration, and the whole level of wages is reduced.

The ratio of workingmen to jobs, however, remains unchanged. There are still 10 men and only 9 jobs. If, then, the "open shop" policy continues, what is there to prevent a further reduction of wages through the same process, and then another and another, until the union collapses, and all the 10 men are in a

continuous unorganized, helter-skelter, cut-throat struggle for those 9 jobs? Nothing.

And what of the employers? As wages fall, general purchasing power declines, for workingmen are great consumers, and by the time the workingmen are reduced to pauperism the employers, with an abundance of products spoiling on their hands, are ruined by sluggish trade.

The tendency thus briefly and candidly illustrated, is the inevitable tendency under prevailing industrial circumstances, of the "open shop" policy. If the illustration is imperfect in any determinative respect, we should be glad to have the defect pointed out.

III

But would not the result of a strictly maintained "closed shop" policy, under conditions similar to those of the above illustration, be the very reverse? Incontestably.

In those circumstances the "closed shop" policy, generally and strictly maintained, would raise the wages of the workingmen and maintain an active market for the employers, and this without lessening opportunities for employment of the non-unionist.

Since the non-unionist would be locked out of every job by the "closed shop" policy, he would have to join the union. This might be an infringement of his rights, it is true, but the concrete economic result to him, and it is that and not his abstract right that we are now considering, would be infinitely better than under the "open shop" system. When he had joined the union the 9 jobs would by trade union principles, be distributed so that in effect nine-tenths of each job would be done by one of the 9 men and one-tenth of each job by the 10th man. This would reduce wages below the natural standard, if every man wanted to work full time; but the reduction below that standard would be only one-tenth, whereas under the "open shop" it would be down to the lowest limit of subsistence.

Of course the 9 men might exclude the 10th man from membership. But that point is not involved. Trade union principles demand the admission of all workers.

Even competency is not a requisite. Suppose, however, that we consider the possibility.

Remember, we are not discussing natural rights. What we are discussing is industrial results.

Suppose, then, that the union arbitrarily refuses to admit the 10th man to membership, and consequently that he cannot get employment, the "closed shop" policy prevailing. What would result? Why, the 10th man would die. But now there being only 9 men for the 9 jobs, the employers could not coerce the men, nor could the men coerce the employers. Bargaining would be on equal terms, wages would consequently be at the level of the earnings of the workingmen, trade would be brisk, employers would prosper, and everybody would get what belonged to him,—except what the dragon exacted, and we are not now considering the dragon.

Considered simply with reference to industrial results, is it not evident that the "closed shop" policy is preferable to the "open shop" policy?

IV

Do we favor a "closed shop," then? Not at all.

While, under the circumstances supposed, which we believe illustrate fairly the industrial conditions of our time, we should prefer the "closed" to the "open" shop, simply as a matter of industrial results, we do not prefer it as a matter of just social relations. We object to the principle of the "closed shop." But we object to it totally—not only to its use by and for workingmen, but also to its use in subtler ways to the disadvantage and undoing of workingmen.

The greatest shop on this planet, the one with limitless jobs, with jobs so limitless that there could never be more men than jobs if it were not a "closed" shop, is the earth itself. Yet the earth has by law been made and is still maintained as a "closed" shop, the gates of which can be opened only with a golden key.

Break down those gates, which enclose mineral deposits, farm sites, building sites,—make this earth-shop with all its industrial possibilities, an "open" shop—and there would be continuously more jobs than men. As an industrial

result there would be limitless opportunity for employment in all legitimate vocations, full earnings for wages, brisk trade for employers, and no periods of stagnation. In these circumstances there would be no further contests over "open" or "closed" shops in any of the comparatively little shops regarding which these contests rage now. With the big shop "open" no shop could be "closed."

There would be no such contests then, because the demand for workers in all lines would be so much greater than the supply, all the time, that no workingman would wish to keep out another, and every workingman would be his own labor union.

When those employers and their spokesmen who now decry the "closed" shop which labor unions try so ineffectively to establish—when such men rise up with equal enthusiasm against the laws that make a "closed" shop of the earth, they may count us with them. So long as they only denounce the "closed" shop with which labor unions try to neutralize the industrial ill effects of the great "closed" shop which Nature freely offers as an "open" shop, they deserve neither support nor sympathy. While they maintain that attitude, they are not objecting to wrong things because they are wrong, they are only complaining because their own ox is gored.

NEWS NARRATIVE

Week ending Thursday, Aug. 31.

End of the Russian-Japanese war.

The Russian-Japanese war (p. 327) came virtually to an end on the 29th, when the envoys from the two countries, in conference at Portsmouth, N. H., agreed on the terms of a treaty of peace.

The story of this war may be read in the files of The Public, in continuous narrative, by means of the page references with which we habitually connect our items of news. Readers having access to these files and wishing to arrange the reports for narrative reading, should first insert a slip of paper or other book mark between the