

will reflect upon the intelligence of the average Ohio voter if the tax-dodging monopolies and their political friends are not worsted as badly in the state as they have been already in Cuyahoga county.

Why is it that Congressional resolutions expressive of sympathy with the resistance of the Boer republics to the efforts of the Tory party of Great Britain to subjugate their people and annex their territory, never see the light after once getting into the possession of the committee on foreign affairs? Why are they "held up"? Perhaps none of them ought to pass. Possibly the committee ought not recommend all of them or any one of them. It may be that the adoption of any of these resolutions would put our nation in a false light as a neutral power. We might thereby seem to be taking sides with and aiding the cause of the Boer republics, somewhat as in connection with the British army depot at New Orleans we are actually taking sides with and aiding the British empire. This, of course, ought not to be done. No resolution regarding the Boers ought to be adopted by Congress which would really conflict with our obligations of neutrality. But that is not a valid reason for burying the resolutions in committee.

The function of a committee is to inquire into and report upon matters referred to it, not to "pigeon-hole" them. Whether it reports favorably or unfavorably is for the committee itself to decide. But it is its duty to report. When it refuses to do that, the people have a right to complain. And this is what the committee on foreign affairs of the House does refuse to do with the Boer resolutions in its hands. It has "held up" some of them two years, and congressmen and private citizens have tried in vain to get it to make any report, favorable or otherwise, upon any. How is this accomplished? Through the chairman of the committee, as everyone familiar with congressional procedure knows. What the chairman wants

done his associates of the party in power, constituting a majority of the committee, agree to. Unless they do, they get no plums. It is the same with what he doesn't want done. Consequently, if the chairman of a committee wishes to "hold up" any matter referred to his committee, he does so and "no questions asked."

Upon Robert R. Hitt, then, the chairman of the House committee on foreign affairs and a congressman from Illinois, rests the responsibility for the long and comprehensive "hold up" of Boer resolutions in Congress. Of that there can be no question. But what is Mr. Hitt's motive? There can be but one motive for such conduct. If the resolutions ought not to pass, the chairman should report against them with the reasons. But if there are no valid reasons why they should not pass, yet they are objectionable to him, his only recourse is to bury them. And this is what Mr. Hitt has done with the Boer resolutions that have accumulated in his committee during the past two years or more. Opposed to fair play for the Boers, but conscious of the popular sympathy for them which prevails in his state and over the country, he avoids the issue by pigeon-holing the resolutions. Mr. Hitt serves the Tory party of England, by putting the Boers at an unfair disadvantage with reference to American sentiment. He prevents a discussion and vote upon the resolutions in Congress upon their merits, and thereby fosters the notion, of which the British ministry makes much, that in the South African war the sympathy of the United States is with the British. This ought to answer the question of the Chicago Tribune, which wants to know why Mr. Hitt should not be the next senator from Illinois. It is to be hoped that Illinois wants no sympathizer with British toryism to represent her in the United States Senate.

Senator Hanna is widely commended for his fidelity to Rathbone, the Cuban postal defaulter. This is as it should be. Was not Rathbone

the man whose name figured conspicuously in the charges of bribery in connection with Mr. Hanna's election to the Senate—the man who, as the Toledo Bee tersely puts it "handled the legislators who had to be bought"? If Rathbone did push Mr. Hanna into the Senate, it would be only fair for Senator Hanna to pull Rathbone out of the penitentiary.

OUR DEMORALIZING CONQUEST.

I.

The inhumanity which has characterized the American occupation of the Philippines can no longer be denied. It must now be either defended with bravado or confessed with shame. The trial and verdict in the case of Maj. Waller leave no other alternative.

Maj. Waller was court-martialed for killing natives in the island of Samar, not in battle but in cold blood after capturing them.

His plea in part was that the natives in Samar were treacherous. But he conceded that he had not put his prisoners on trial to ascertain their individual guilt. He had executed them off-hand, without regard to whether they were individually guilty of treachery or not. Defending this as being within the usages of war, he urged that without criticism he had dealt in the same way with "boxers" in China; and that not only did this conduct there go without criticism from his superiors, but it was practiced and approved by officers of the European troops. Indeed, they were inclined to make sport of the Americans for chicken-heartedness, because in other respects the American policy was excessively fair and humane from the prevailing military point of view. Maj. Waller admitted the execution of 11 of his Samar prisoners in this unceremonious fashion, justifying the homicide as a legitimate act of war.

But he did not rest his defense on that plea alone. He made a further plea, the nature of which strongly indicates that his motive after all was not to punish treachery, but to terrorize a stubborn enemy by giving them to understand that they were to receive no quarter. He testified that he had acted pursuant to the orders of Maj.

Gen. Jacob H. Smith, the American general in command on the island of Samar and his superior officer. His testimony in this respect was denied by Gen. Smith, but it was positively corroborated by three officers who went upon the witness stand at the trial. Gen. Smith's order, as recited by all the witnesses and as reported by the Manila dispatches, was to this effect:

I wish you to kill and burn. The more you kill the more you will please me. The interior of Samar must be made a howling wilderness. Kill every native over ten years old.

On the 13th the Waller court-martial made known the verdict which had been arrived at by a vote of 11 to 2. As reported by special cable to the Chicago Record-Herald, a Republican and imperialist paper, in which it was published on the 14th, this verdict found that Waller had acted in accordance with the rules of war, the military necessities of the situation, and the order of his superiors. In other words, the execution without trial of prisoners of war taken by American troops in the Philippines, is regarded by American military authority as being within the military code of ethics.

Whether such base conduct is in truth in harmony with military ethics may well be doubted. The military ethical code is sadly eccentric when invoked in behalf of peoples too weak to assert its authority with force and too friendless to have it asserted for them by powerful onlooking nations; but it is hardly believable that it would justify the off-hand shooting of prisoners of war unconvicted of any offense.

One military officer of long experience in the field, a Republican at that—we refer to Col. Henry L. Turner, of Chicago—has spoken vigorously in condemnation of the theory of military honor which approves the Waller method of warfare. Interviewed for the Chicago Record-Herald of the 14th he said:

To me this principle is so horrible to adopt that I cannot help hoping there will be some qualification of the news received later. Probably there never was a more treacherous, blood-thirsty enemy than the American Indian ever fought by the United States army. And yet I do not hesitate to declare that had Maj. Waller drawn up 11 unarmed prisoners of the blood-thirsty Apache tribe and ordered them shot without trial, his lightest punishment under Gens. Grant, Sheridan, Crook, Miles, Custer or any of our old

line heroes, would have been dismissal from the army in disgrace or imprisonment for life. My own judgment is that Maj. Waller would have been tried by a drumhead court-martial and shot within 24 hours. That a man who has tried to justify the unwarranted killing of Filipinos by the fact that he had ruthlessly shot down the Chinese, should be acquitted with honor and let loose to continue the destruction of human life at his own sweet will is a matter difficult to realize. If campaigning in the Philippine islands has brought the United States army to the point where it justifies this class of warfare, the sooner the troops are brought home the better.

Much more agreeable to humane sensibilities is Col. Turner's view of military ethics than that of Gen. Funston, who at a Republican banquet in Chicago recently exclaimed, referring to the approaching trial of Waller—"I say, Bully for Maj. Waller!" It is to be most earnestly hoped that the banqueting Republicans who applauded that brutal exclamation do not really represent the ethical ideas of their party, but that Republicans like Col. Turner do.

If Maj. Waller's murderous act was not in accordance with the rules of war, as every honorable soldier and humane man must hope is the case, then the further excuse that it was justified by "the military necessities of the situation" must collapse. Even by the military code, military necessity cannot justify military crime. To justify either a general slaughter of captives or the execution without trial of particular prisoners, on a plea of "the military necessities of the situation," is to throw down all moral barriers to barbarism in warfare. "The military necessities of the situation," whenever a powerful foreign invader was baffled by the stubborn resistance of a weak people fighting for their native land, would always be sufficiently pressing, in the invader's estimation, to warrant a resort to barbarous methods. If it would justify such a departure from humane military ethics as Maj. Waller's, it would justify any departure which the achievement of success might seem to require.

That it has seemed to the baffled American troops in the Philippines to require revolting barbarities is now disclosed beyond the possibility of plausible denial. What Gen. Miles characterized as the "severity" of our military conduct in those islands, for which he was promptly rebuked, proves now to have been but inadequately described by him. The Wal-

ler verdict, together with the horrible revelations of the evidence, is an intimation to thoughtful Americans that here is only one instance of a general policy of inhumanity. But for some such policy, tacitly recognized and approved, Waller would hardly have ventured to kill his prisoners without a trial, no matter what their offense had been; Gen. Smith would hardly have ordered a slaughter of captives, and if he had, Waller would probably have disobeyed; and, last but by no means least, the Waller court-martial, had Waller ventured upon such an exploit, would not have acquitted him of the crime. The whole thing testifies to a contagion of inhumanity.

II.

That this shameful condition has long been known by the authorities at Washington has been more than suspected, and with good reason.

Why has Senator Lodge and his Philippine committee refused persistently to investigate charges of cruelty, if he did not believe that a thorough investigation would uncover what the Waller trial has begun to reveal?

Why has the secretary of war suppressed documents tending to expose the revolting situation, if he does not know, what the Waller verdict indicates, how very revolting it would be to the public mind.

Why is a virtual censorship still maintained at Manila, if there is nothing to conceal from the American people?

Why were all correspondents but those of the three monopoly press associations excluded from the hearings of the Senate Philippine committee, unless there was a purpose to keep the testimony "well in hand."

Every disclosure through private sources of facts like those involved in the Waller trial has been met with official denial or scouted as hearsay; and though the anonymous evidence—anonymous because the witnesses dared not reveal their identity lest they themselves might suffer from the same barbaric policy—has been abundant, the official probe has been strenuously withheld. The government itself has stood between officers like Maj. Waller or Gen. Smith and the American people, officially vouching, in the face of circumstantial reports to the contrary, for the humanity of the American troops in the Philippines.

In this connection, so loyal a Re-

publican paper as the Chicago Record-Herald, censures the war department in its issue of the 12th in these measured terms:

It is clearly exceeding its powers and rights as a branch of a representative government which is responsible to the American public whatever the truth may be. . . . It is known beyond doubt that it has censored press dispatches to the perversion of the truth, that it has concealed the facts concerning an outrageous mismanagement of the finances in the transport service, and lastly that its policy with regard to the stories of Weyerism in the Philippines has been one of persistent deceit. . . . the situation as we know it to-day brings shame upon us all. District after district burned, natives tortured, a population mercilessly cut down, and to crown all, editors imprisoned arbitrarily, not for sedition, but for printing stories of corrupt practices in American administration. The liberty of the press, with accountability for its abuse, is ruthlessly violated by the military authorities in the Philippines in wanton defiance of the first principle of American law. Surely the indictment is one that demands something more than protestations and excuses from Secretary Root.

Official protestations and excuses will pass current no longer. Both Secretary Root and the President have come to that conclusion, as their eleventh hour vigor testifies. One thoroughly authenticated and impressive instance of barbarity, indicative of the general policy outlined by the Record-Herald, was all that was needed to awaken the American conscience. Such an instance is afforded by the Waller verdict. That verdict, with the evidence upon which it rests, lends color of truth to all the reports of inhumanity that have attached to the American name in the Philippines.

And what a story it is that those reports tell!

"The 'water cure' has been administered to thousands of natives in the Philippines, at least in Panay," says a returned soldier of Kansas City, who had himself "seen it administered dozens of times" to natives and asserted that the practice was general in the island of Panay, and who approves it.

Other witnesses, produced before the Senate committee, not by the majority—who are responsible for the investigation but have been much more solicitous to conceal the facts than to permit disclosures—but by the minority, have fully confirmed the Kansas City soldier's story. One of

them testified on the 14th, as the Associated Press reports him, that—

he had witnessed the "water cure" at Igarbas, province of Iloilo, November 27, 1900. It was administered to the presidente, or chief Filipino official, of the town. Upon the arrival of his command at Igarbas the presidente was asked whether runners had been sent out notifying the insurgents of their presence, and that upon the official's refusal to give the information he was taken to the convent, where the witness was stationed, and the water cure was administered to him. . . . he was standing in the corridor of the convent, stripped to the waist and his hands tied behind him, with Capt. Glenn and Lieut Conger, of the regular army, and Dr. Lyons, a contract surgeon, standing near, while many soldiers stood about. The man was thrown under a water tank, which held about 100 gallons of water, and his mouth was placed directly under the faucet and held open to compel him to swallow the water which was allowed to escape from the tank. . . . When at last the presidente agreed to tell what he knew, he was released and allowed to start away. He was not, however, permitted to escape, and upon refusing to give further information he was taken again as he was about to mount his horse and the cure was administered the second time. This time the man was not stripped, nor was he taken into the building. Dr. Lyons said the water could be brought to the spot and given there, and when it was brought in a five-gallon can, one end of a syringe was placed in it and the other in the man's mouth. As he still refused, a second syringe was brought and one end of it placed in the prostrate man's nose. He still refused, and a handful of salt was thrown into the water. This had the desired effect and the presidente agreed to answer questions.

The other witness testified that— he had witnessed the torture of two policemen of the town of Igarbas. . . . the details of the "cure" were in the hands of a squad of the Eighteenth regular infantry, known as "the water cure detail." These acts were committed under the command of Capt. Glenn, who was judge advocate of the department of the Visayas. . . . the water was kept running four or five minutes, and the physician in charge frequently placed his hand upon the man's heart to observe the effect of the treatment upon that organ.

Here we have the fact that a squad was detailed to the special duty of administering the torture; and the names of the officers ordering the torture are given so that the witnesses may be easily contradicted if they have not told the truth.

But there can be no reasonable doubt that they have told the truth. The civil governor of Tabayas, an American army officer, officially confirms these witnesses and all others who tell of similar cruelties. For he declares in his report of last December, which the secretary of war suppressed, that this water torture is in general use. In the same report he accuses the American troops of extensive burnings to "lay waste the country so that the insurgents cannot occupy it." In this connection the letter of a soldier in Batangas province to the Rev. Lewis J. Bristow, of Columbia, S. C., published in the Chicago Chronicle of the 15th, is significant. Telling of the orders for a ten days' "hike" he says:

Our orders were to burn everything we passed, houses and food, all clothing, household goods, etc. We found quite a number of houses from which the inmates had fled, leaving everything just as it was when they were at home and happy. We burned it all. Another paragraph of the order given me instructed us to kill every living thing except women, children and very old men. Thousands of horses, cows, chickens, dogs, etc., bit the dust. On this march and every subsequent one these orders were carried out. You may think us a bloodthirsty crew, but you misjudge us. We do not shoot down these poor devils in cold blood, but always give them a chance to surrender; they won't do it, so we have to shoot. But I'll admit it is somewhat like eating olives—you have to get used to it.

These are but samples of a multitude of reports, more or less circumstantial and authenticated, all showing that the American troops in the Philippines yield their native sense of humanity to "the military necessities of the situation."

III.

Now that this long-denied and long-concealed but vigorously prosecuted policy of cruelty and extermination has leaked out through the Waller court-martial proceedings, it will not be enough for the government to explain it as a matter of retaliatory policy.

The evidence is abundant and conclusive that in the beginning the Filipinos were humane in their modes of warfare. Such cruelty as they have practiced did not precede, but has followed, the cruel methods of the Americans. Our troops adopted the "water cure" not in retaliation, but confessedly to extort information. They have laid waste and exterminat-

ed, not to "get even," but on account of "the military necessities of the situation." Baffled by a stubborn people defending their homes, our army began a series of campaigns which, as Gen. Hughes has cautiously admitted before the Senate committee, could not be called civilized warfare.

Under these circumstances the plea of retaliation for Filipino barbarities will not serve our government as an excuse for the barbarities which it appears to have tolerated and which it has certainly tried to conceal.

Neither will it do to shed official tears of regret, and promise vigorous measures of reform. The condition is chronic and will not yield to any efforts at mere reform.

Gen. Hughes was correct in his thought when, before the Senate committee, he said that new commanders coming into the field would start in to conduct their work much "easier" than the old ones; that "they would come into the country with their ideas of civilized warfare and were allowed to get their lesson." That is, "the military necessities of the situation" speedily converted humane officers into barbarians.

In the nature of the case it must be so. We could not take upon ourselves the colonial tasks of Spain, without resorting to Spain's revolting methods. If our human nature seemed before to be better than Spanish human nature, it was not because we were in reality morally superior to the Spanish; it was because we had not yet had the Spanish temptations. With those temptations we have become as Spanish as the Spaniards.

When any powerful nation undertakes the conquest of a weak people, one of two things is inevitable: either the weak people will submit upon realizing the hopelessness of resistance, as the unwarlike Asiatics have usually done; or they will fight until exterminated, as did the American Indians, or until they repel the invader, as did the Americans a century ago and the Swiss centuries before. If they submit, the work of conquest is easy. But if they resist and resist as the Filipinos did against Spain and are now doing against Spain's assignee, then the war of conquest turns—especially if the resisting inhabitants are an "inferior people"—into a war of extermination, with all the cruelties which such a war naturally begets. In that case it is as Gen. Hughes indicated with reference to the American occupation of

the Philippines. Humane officers who replace those that have become inured to cruelty, come into the country with exalted ideas of civilized warfare, and are allowed to get their lesson; which is this, that in such a war "the military necessities of the situation" justify the execution without trial of prisoners of war, require the use of cruel methods to extort information from reticent natives, excuse the wholesale slaughter of able bodied inhabitants and upon occasion even of women and old men and children above ten, and demand the utter devastation of vast areas of country so that the "rebels" cannot occupy it.

The humane tenderfoot of an officer does get that lesson. It is the only lesson he can get. Being under orders to "pacify" the country, he learns to pacify it in the only possible way. It is no native inhumanity of our soldiers that has made the story of our occupation of the Philippines a shameful and inefaceable blotch upon our history. It is "the military necessities of the situation" which our imperialist world-power policy has produced. Not individual military officers, but imperialism is responsible for it all. The true remedy, consequently, is not a futile policy of sending out new levies of humane officers, to be turned in due time into unspeakable barbarians, but an honorable course more in consonance with our national ideals. We must restrain our world-power ambitions. We must recede from our blood stained attempt at Philippine conquest. We must repudiate our whole greedy, grasping, hypocritical and conscience-deadening policy of benevolent assimilation. It is better to be accused of a national "scuttle" than to be longer guilty of a national crime.

IV.

How different the whole sorrowful situation might be, had we as a nation met the temptation to be a world-power empire with the sturdy command: "Get thee behind me, Satan!" We should then have conquered nobly by the spiritual force of high ideals loyally lived out; and a flourishing republic off the coast of Asia, modeled upon our own, would now look trustfully to this nation as its exemplar in government.

For, let it not be forgotten, the Filipinos had set up a flourishing and order-preserving republic before the present war began. That republic exercised actual jurisdiction over nearly all the Philippine archipelago, as

Gen. Anderson, the first American commander in the Philippines, has testified. In an article in the North American Review for February, 1900, Gen. Anderson wrote, referring to the period of the surrender of the Spanish in August, 1898:

We held Manila and Cavite. The rest of the island was held not by the Spaniards, but by the Filipinos. On the other islands the Spaniards were confined to two or three fortified towns.

And that occupation was peaceably maintained, the republic being recognized by the inhabitants and law and order prevailing. This was true at least of the island of Luzon, and there is no reason to doubt that it was true elsewhere. As to Luzon, we have the testimony of Leonard R. Sargent, a naval cadet, who, with a naval paymaster, W. B. Wilcox, spent the months of October and November, 1898, in a semi-official investigation of the interior of the island. Writing to the Outlook for September 2, 1899, Sargent said of this republic:

It cannot be denied that, in a region occupied by many millions of inhabitants, for nearly six months it stood alone between anarchy and order. . . . We traveled more than 600 miles in a very comprehensive circuit through the northern part of the island of Luzon, traversing a characteristic and important district. In this way we visited seven provinces. . . . As a tribute to the efficiency of Aguinaldo's government and to the law-abiding character of his subjects, I offer the fact that Mr. Wilcox and I pursued our journey throughout in perfect security, and returned to Manila with only the most pleasing recollections of the quiet and orderly life which we found the natives to be leading under the new regime.

It was not until the American government interfered that this Philippine republic ceased to stand "between anarchy and order." Then it ceased to do so only because the President of our country gave it a death blow. And that blow was struck six weeks before the first battle. The American republic—which ought to have conserved instead of destroying the Philippine republic—declared war upon it by asserting a hostile sovereignty. We refer to the President's proclamation, promulgated by Gen. Otis on the 4th of January, 1899. At page 66 of his report of "military operations and civil affairs in the Philippine islands," for 1899, Gen. Otis explains certain significant alterations which he made in the language of that proclamation in order to render it less

unpalatable to the people of the islands. He says:

After fully considering the President's proclamation and the temper of the Tagalos with whom I was daily discussing political problems and the friendly intentions of the United States government toward them, I concluded that there were certain words and expressions therein, such as "sovereignty," "right of cession," and those which directed immediate occupation, etc., though most admirably employed and tersely expressive of actual conditions, might be advantageously used by the Tagalo war party to incite widespread hostilities among the natives. The ignorant classes had been taught to believe that certain words, as "sovereignty," "protection," etc., had peculiar meaning disastrous to their welfare and significant of future political domination, like that from which they had recently been freed.

Although Gen. Otis suppressed these significant and "tersely expressive" words, he did not suppress the essence of the hostile proclamation; but, as appears from his report at pages 68 and 69, he issued a pronouncement of his own, as "military governor of the Philippine Islands," in which he quoted the following from the President's proclamation of sovereignty:

... there will be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority to repress disturbances, and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine islands.

Notwithstanding the suppression of such "tersely expressive" words as "sovereignty," this pronouncement of the American "military governor" over the peaceable republic already described, did not vary in substance from the President's. If it had it would have made no difference; for by an accident the President's got published about the same time—with all its incautious though "admirably employed" words so "tersely expressive" of actual conditions, such as "right of cession," "immediate occupation" and "sovereignty."

After that, the fighting was only a question of time. The war had been proclaimed. Friendliness and peace with the new republic were impossible after the United States had asserted sovereignty over all its territory.

Not only did this sovereignty proclamation amount to a declaration of aggressive war against the new republic.

It involved an act of perfidy. For the Filipino republic, admitted by our own officials to be actually organized and beneficently and peacefully governing, had been our ally in the war with Spain.

This is denied. Like the policy of cruelty and extermination now disclosed, it has been denied persistently. Only a few days ago it was denied under oath by Gen. Mac Arthur while testifying before the Senate committee. Having been asked a question by Senator Culberson, based upon an assumed state of facts, Gen. Mac Arthur answered, as reported by the Associated Press through the papers of the 13th—

"Assuming the facts to be as stated," the witness replied, "if that were all there is in the premises it might be admitted that the inference was to be drawn as indicated. But there are other facts which form a part of the case and which show the cooperation in the attack on Manila was not a voluntary one on our part. Gen. MacArthur then related that on the evening previous to the attack upon Manila, after Gen. Merritt had issued his order of battle, Gen. Anderson received a communication from Gen. Merritt directing the latter to inform Aguinaldo that the battle which was to take place the next day was to be between the Americans and the Spaniards, and that he must not participate under any circumstances. The message was sent to Aguinaldo by wire. The Filipino leader received it, but declined to accept the suggestion, and he and his native force participated in the engagement the next day.

It is not necessary to raise an issue of fact with Gen. Mac Arthur in order to prove that there was a military alliance. Entirely apart from the question of cooperation in the battle referred to by Gen. Mac Arthur, the evidence of an alliance is indisputable. No attempt has been made to dispute it. Though the conclusion that there was an alliance is denied, the facts upon which that conclusion rests are not. They are as follows:

The Filipinos were at war with Spain when Dewey's squadron entered Manila bay on that memorable May morning of 1898. This is proved by consular dispatches printed in "Senate document 62," of the Fifty-fifth congress, third session. Thus:

Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists, battles are of almost daily occurrence, ambulances bring in many wounded, and hospitals are full. Prisoners are

brought here and shot without trial, and Manila is under martial law. The crown forces have not been able to dislodge a rebel army within ten miles of Manila, and last Saturday, February 19, a battle was there fought and five dead left on the field.—American Consul at Manila, Feb. 22, 1898, p. 319.

Insurrection is rampant; many killed, wounded, and made prisoners on both sides. A battleship, the Don Juan de Austria, sent this week to the northern part of Luzon to cooperate with a land force of 2,000 dispatched to succor local forces, overwhelmed by rebels. Last night special squad of mounted police were scattered at danger points to save Manila. . . . Rebellion never more threatening to Spain.—Same, Mar. 19, 1898, p. 320.

Cuban conditions exist here possibly in aggravated form. Spanish soldiers are killed and wounded daily, despite claimed pacification, and the hospitals are kept full.—Same, Mar. 27, 1898, p. 321.

In these circumstances, when Dewey was about to sail for Manila bay from Hongkong, he telegraphed to the American consul at Singapore, where Aguinaldo was in exile (see same Senate document, p. 342):

Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.

Aguinaldo went accordingly to Hongkong, but did not arrive in time to sail with Dewey. Dewey provided for his transportation, however, and in a few days he was at work in Luzon reorganizing the Filipino army. This appears in the same Senate document at page 421, where Gen. Greene is quoted as testifying:

When the McCulloch went to Hongkong early in May to carry the news of Admiral Dewey's victory, it took Aguinaldo and 17 other revolutionary chiefs on board and brought them to Manila bay. They soon after landed at Cavite, and the admiral allowed them to take such guns, ammunition and stores as he did not require for himself.

Also at page 347, where the Hongkong Free Press is quoted as saying that Aguinaldo arrived at Manila—on the 19th inst., and was received with great enthusiasm by the natives. Admiral Dewey was very much pleased with him, and has turned over to him two modern field pieces and 300 rifles, with plenty of ammunition.

Aguinaldo's subsequent great efficiency in serving the American cause against Spain on the land, in cooperation with Admiral Dewey on the water, is acknowledged in an official dispatch of June 16, 1898, from the American consul at Manila, printed in the same Senate document

at page 329 and written long before a single American soldier had put foot on Philippine soil:

I have the honor to report that since our squadron destroyed the Spanish fleet on May 1, the insurgent forces have been most active and almost uniformly successful in their many encounters with the crown forces of Spain. . . . The insurgents have defeated the Spaniards at all points except at fort near Matate, and hold not only North Luzon to the suburbs of Manila, but Batanyes province also and the bay coast entire, save the city of Manila. . . . Manila is hemmed in.

Of that situation, Gen. Otis himself reported at page 13 of his report of "military operations and civil affairs in the Philippine islands" for 1899. He said:

For three and one-half months Admiral Dewey with his squadron and the insurgents on land had kept Manila tightly bottled.

With the Spaniards—virtually the whole Spanish army of the Philippines—thus driven into Manila by the Filipino army, and held there "tightly bottled," by Dewey on the water side and Aguinaldo on the land side, before any American troops had arrived, is it strange that Aguinaldo regarded his army as acting in friendly cooperation with the Americans? Our own officers certainly viewed the matter in that light. When Commander Bradford, of the American navy, testified as an expert on military law before the American peace commissioners at Paris regarding Aguinaldo's operations, his reply to a hypothetical question was this (see same Senate document, pages 488 and 489):

We become responsible for everything he has done, he is our ally, and we are bound to protect him.

So long as all that evidence remains in existence undisputed, why pettifog about the question of an alliance at the capture of Manila? That Aguinaldo was an ally of the American navy in bottling the Spaniards up in Manila is an unavoidable inference from the undisputed and indisputable facts.

With perfidy toward an ally, then,—a contemptible ally, if you like, but one whose aid we solicited and accepted—and with unprovoked hostility toward a young republic—only "a little brown man's" republic to be sure, but one which preserved the peace, gave token of prosperity, inspired the devotion of its people and command-

ed the respect of our own investigators,—with this perfidy and unprovoked hostility toward those people, who were entitled rather to our gratitude and our encouragement, we, as a nation, asserted our absolute sovereignty over their country and drove them in self-defense to war. This wanton war of our own making has lasted three years and more, and without being yet ended, has forced upon us the additional stigma of resorting, upon the plea of "military necessity," to methods which even our own generals, while excusing them, characterize as uncivilized.

The quiet and orderly life of an unoffending people, which our naval cadet, Sargent, observed, has been broken up, and northern Luzon, through which he and Paymaster Wilcox traveled with safety and from which they carried pleasing memories, has been laid waste. The latest dispatches assure us that in all this region peace again prevails. But now it is the peace of the graveyard. Why have we caused this misery? Why have we devastated this country? Why have we remorselessly slaughtered thousands upon thousands of its inhabitants, not only in unequal battle, but also in cold blood after captures? Why have we tortured prisoners to extort information? Why have some of our generals commanded their subordinates to make no prisoners, but to kill all natives over ten years of age? Why do we carry on this contest which breeds inhumanity even in the hearts of the humane? Is it because those people resist our assumption of sovereignty? Then why did we assert and why do we endeavor to maintain that power over an alien and unwilling people 10,000 miles away from our shores? Is it for their good, for their benevolent assimilation? From the President down, we all know that that is not the reason.

One of the real reasons was given by Gen. MacArthur to the Senate committee on the 8th, when, as reported by the Chicago Inter Ocean, a Republican paper, he mixed in with a lot of benevolent phrases and some fantastic evolutionary speculations, a declaration that—

the possession, the permanent possession of the Philippine archipelago, is not only of supreme importance, but absolutely essential to American interests.

That is one of the unvarnished reasons; and the others are like it, only on a smaller scale. Since the

islands are rich in natural wealth, American "interests" want a chance at the grab. To satisfy those interests, with their greed for gain and lust of power that outrun satisfaction and surpass understanding, we have placed our nation in the pillory, self-convicted of perfidy to an ally, of making a war of conquest upon a weak and friendly people, and of waging the war with a degree of cruelty and inhumanity that forces our own military officers to admit, even if cautiously, that it cannot be called civilized. How much longer shall this republic so stultify its own best ideals?

NEWS

The Philippine question has suddenly loomed up like a portentous shadow over the field of American politics, in consequence of some startling disclosures with reference to American barbarities in the islands.

One of these disclosures is the astounding verdict of the court-martial at Manila in the Waller case. The principal evidence in this case, as far as reported, was outlined last week (p. 9), but at that time no verdict had been reached. Maj. Waller was upon trial for murdering natives. He admitted that he had commanded the execution of natives without trial, in the island of Samar, and that 11 had been shot upon his order; but he defended the act upon the ground that it was in accordance with orders from his superior, Gen. Smith, and in conformity to military usage. The verdict was reached on the 12th, after half an hour's deliberation; and on the 13th it was publicly announced that the court-martial, by a vote of 11 to 2, had acquitted the accused officer. As reported by the Manila dispatches, the verdict was to the effect that, in giving orders for the killing of natives, Maj. Waller had acted "in accordance with the rules of war, the orders of his superior, and the military necessities of the situation."

The revelations of the Waller court-martial were nearly coincident with the disclosure of an official report giving similar indications of severity in dealing with natives in the Philippines. This report came first to public notice, though only vaguely, on the 29th of March, when President