

Court of Capital and Labor. Nothing is lacking, not even the roaring climax of Marcus A. Hanna as chief justice. With Capital on the outside as the lion was, with Labor on the inside like the reconciled and digestible lamb, and with Mr. Hanna on top, the Easley experiment can hardly fail to succeed—at least in some respects.

It is refreshing to one's democracy to be assured by so prominent an eastern Democrat as Edward M. Shepard, lately the Democratic candidate for mayor of New York, that municipal government is not altogether a matter of business but presents political as well as business problems. The phrase, "municipal government is business not politics," has a seductive sound, but the sentiment is utterly false. If municipal government were business and not politics, none should vote without a stake in the city—a financial interest in its affairs; and strictly the influence of each vote should be in proportion to the financial stake of the voter. That the first of these corollaries to the business theory of city government is recognized by advocates of the theory is evident from the spirit in which they discuss municipal questions; and sometimes they give themselves "dead away" in unmistakable terms. During the recent New York election, for instance, ex-Mayor Hewitt, that excessively interesting type of the un-democratic Democrat, declared for a financial qualification for voting at municipal elections as if it were a generally approved principle. But this theory is distinctly repudiated by Mr. Shepard. At Philadelphia on the 10th, speaking to the subject, "The Municipal Problem," he said:

It has been said that the problems of municipal government are business problems simply. This is not correct. Every municipal problem is a political problem in the proper, though not necessarily in the partisan, sense of the term. Ours is a democratic country. Every municipal problem is a political one that must be determined in the light of popular elections. Since that is the fact, every detail of municipal ad-

ministration depends either directly or indirectly upon the opinions of the voters in the community. I think if we recognize that municipal government is a political affair we will have made some headway in dealing with this problem. The populace must in some way be harnessed to the chariot of political progress. Without that you may make headway for a year or two, with this experiment or that, but you will find yourself defeated at the end.

The necessity for regarding municipal government as a political task is becoming stronger with the drift of our population, on the one hand, toward cities, and the drift, on the other, of our legislative and judicial law-making toward centralization of power in the general government. The once vital conflict between state and nation appears to be reviving in the new form or in a variation rather of the old feudal form, of a conflict of city and empire. That is to say, as the central government overshadows the state at home and reaches out for world-wide power abroad, the resistance of local independence to imperialism becomes concrete in American municipalities somewhat as the protest against feudalism became in the middle ages concrete in the free cities of Europe. It is extremely important, then, the more especially as plutocracy is so marked a characteristic of the new imperialism, that the democratic idea of political equality be retained unimpaired in our municipalities. When municipal government comes to be regarded as business and not politics, the sway of plutocratic imperialism will be well nigh complete.

When the state Grange of Pennsylvania met at Johnstown early this month it adopted a series of resolutions of the utmost importance with reference to the idea of restraining trusts by centralizing power over them in the general government. Farmers are among the principal sufferers from trusts. It is encouraging therefore to find so representative a body of their branch of industry as the Pennsylvania Grange taking an

intelligent stand against making of this evil an excuse for enormously increasing the power of the government at Washington. The resolutions are well worth reproduction in full:

Whereas, the march of centralization in government has already gone very far; and whereas, the tendency of power is to drift farther and farther away from the people in whose hands it properly resides; and whereas, it is now proposed by the president of the United States in dealing with trusts to have the federal authority "assume the power of supervision and regulation over all corporations doing an interstate business;" and whereas, since practically all corporations in a sense are engaged in interstate business, either in buying or in selling across state lines, the extension of this power to the federal government would reduce the states to the grade of counties; and whereas, the president also recommends the erection of another department of government to be known as the department of commerce and industry and to have jurisdiction over all interstate business, it is Resolved, that the Pennsylvania State Grange views these steps toward paternalism and centralization with alarm. It deprecates the increase of federal offices. It doubts the wisdom of enlarging the federal power. It objects to the policy of removing the people's business from the people's own immediate control. It particularly opposes a proposition which might properly appear in a socialistic programme; and it resents the erection of a department of government under which the people of the states would lose control of the corporations of their own creation and of industries operating within their borders and under their protection. The Pennsylvania Grange adopted these resolutions with full knowledge of their profound significance. They were not accepted perfunctorily; they were vigorously discussed. This fact makes their adoption by a large vote especially important. It indicates that the farmers of Pennsylvania are not ready to be caught in imperial traps with anti-trust bait. For the proposed federal regulation of trusts is imperial, no matter which party proposes it. As the foregoing resolutions say, it would virtually make the regulation of all business a federal function.

In support of this method of dealing with trusts—a dangerous method.

for which the nature of trusts, when examined and understood, clearly affords no excuse—it is often urged that it is in harmony with prevailing tendencies. But that is not a good reason. There are tendencies and tendencies. Some are good and some are bad. It is never enough, therefore, in order to justify a policy, to urge that it is in harmony with a tendency. No policy is justifiable unless it is in harmony with good tendencies. Bad tendencies must be controlled and discouraged. Consequently, the argument which refers to tendencies must not only premise the tendency but also that the tendency is good. We agree, of course,—no-body can deny it—that centralization of power at Washington is a tendency just now, a marked and strong tendency. But so at some times and in some places is the bubonic plague. The crucial question is not whether the tendency exists, but whether it is beneficent; and on that question the advocates of centralization dare not state their case in explicit and comprehensive terms. They dare not advocate the principle of concentration. What they do is to advocate specific infractions of the principle, such infractions as a federal trust law would be, and then, by piling one precedent upon another, they bring down upon us the burden of all the evils and oppressions of the very centralization which they dare not defend in terms. In addition to this objection, federal supervision is precisely what the trust magnates want and what some of their representatives advocate. While it is true that all advocates of federal control are not friends of the trusts, yet most friends of the trusts are advocates of federal control. This fact deserves thoughtful consideration, and that is what it appears to have received from the Pennsylvania Grange.

The November report of American exports and imports is calculated to make renewed demands upon the intellectual agility and statistical dexterity of the “favorable balance” ex-

perts. This report is for the eleven months of the current calendar year, and shows that the excess of exports—merchandise, gold and silver, all included—is \$553,407,425. None of that great outgo comes back to us in “pure gold,” as the lamented McKinley explained with reference to our exports in general, for gold is included. In fact, the exports of gold alone have exceeded gold imports thus far during the year by \$2,790,195; and silver exports are \$22,548,466 in excess of silver imports. How then are we enriched by our boasted exportation also of over 500 millions more merchandise than we have imported? If our country were getting equal or greater values back, we could understand the boast. But it is getting nothing back. On the contrary, it is shipping silver and gold. If we were paying off our debts, then we could understand the boast. But our old excess of imports has been paid off over and over since the balance shifted, some thirty years ago. If we were establishing a credit abroad, then the boast would be explicable. But we are not. The surmise that we are doing so is no longer entertained by financial men. The New York Herald, for instance, in a financial review on the 17th of the stock markets, speaks of “the enormous sum which is owing abroad,” of “the enormous foreign borrowing” of our bankers, of the curious spectacle of this country “borrowing and deferring payment to impoverished Europe,” and gives warning that “this foreign money must be repaid some day.” There appears to be nothing to show for our excessive exports but a little matter of tourists’ expenses and some payments for foreign freights. Will some one kindly rise up and explain, with veracity as to facts and common sense as to conclusions, what there is in our excessive exports to boast about and why this balance is called “favorable”?

Wilbur F. Wakeman, the appraiser of the port of New York, has had a surprising experience. Knowing that

the Republican tariff laws are for “protection”—that is, to discourage Americans from buying foreign-made goods when they wish to,—and that it is the function of his office to enforce those laws in letter and spirit, and being withal a conscientious protectionist himself, he enforced the laws. Not only did he enforce them strictly against commercial importers, thereby seeing to it that comparatively poor Americans are properly fined for buying foreign-made goods of American merchants; but he enforced them also and with equal severity against rich travelers, who buy their foreign-made goods on the other side. Thereupon a howl rent the air. Not at protection. Bless you, no! Protection is a bulwark. But at this enforcement of protection against the luxurious classes. Had Mr. Wakeman confined his attention to steerage passengers, that would have been different. But this obtuse protectionist, in his zeal for the cause, actually invaded the privacy of the cabin. So his resignation has been demanded. Mr. Wakeman’s reflections are probably confused. At any rate he declines to resign.

Mayor Johnson is being attacked by the Republicans in a new direction. His administration has been so successful that they are without hope of ousting him at the ballot box, so they are trying to get rid of him by revolutionizing the government of the city and leaving him as mayor without any power. Some ten years ago, an act was passed by the Republican legislature of Ohio which gave to Cleveland a government on what is known as the federal plan—in imitation, that is, of the federal government of the United States. The mayor was made elective and given full administrative powers, including the appointment of “directors” of various departments who bear to the mayor in some measure the relation of the cabinet of the United States to the president. This law has been in force ever since. All the mayors elected under it down to Johnson’s time have been Repub-