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similar improvements have so notably done in Glasgow.

Cleveland is not the only city of the United States that got a single tax mayor out of the municipal elections this month. The city of Solomon, Kan., though a much smaller and less famous city than Cleveland, can also boast a mayor who believes as Johnson does. His name is E. Z. Butcher.

It is not always wise to applaud even the good acts of autocrats, for it is the occasional goodness of the autocrat that makes autocracy tolerable. If there were no good autocrats there could be no bad ones. We are therefore, not enthusiastic over the decree of the Autocrat of the Philippines, addressed to his managing commission, which, in directing the commission to inquire into the tax laws of the islands and improve them where they need it, warns that body that it is to "bear in mind that taxes which tend to penalize or repress industry and enterprise are to be avoided." This is sound doctrine, even if an autocrat did formulate it. And if the Philippine commission were to carry it out literally—remove all taxes that repress industry and enterprise, which would include almost every tax except ad valorem land taxes—the American autocracy in the islands would mark the beginning among the Filipinos of an era of greater liberty and prosperity than the masses of any people in history have ever known.

Our attention has been called to an article from the pen of Herbert N. Casson in the Bellamy Review, which asks us a question about the single tax. The article refers to the late George Francis Gilman, the tea millionaire, who operated 285 tea-stores, from which he made \$20,000,000 besides all he spent. To remedy this concentration of commercial power and congestion of wealth, Mr. Casson says that "the socialist suggests the public ownership of the tea business,"

and he asks us how the single tax would "solve this social problem." As The Public is not a single tax organ it does not undertake to answer socialist riddles in behalf of the single tax belief. It thinks, moreover, that in the present stage of social agitation no good can come from sectarian debate between different schools of social agitators. For those reasons we decline the discussion to which the Bellamy Review courteously invites us, simply referring all who may be interested in Mr. Casson's question to Henry George's discussion of the principle it involves. That discussion will be found in chapter xxviii. of "Protection or Free Trade"—the chapter on "Free Trade and Socialism." We might properly observe, however, that Mr. Casson has not very carefully analyzed the Gilman problem if he thinks it nothing but a question of store-keeping. Tariffs and other taxes, tea gardens and other kinds of land, and disinherited labor, all entered in to give to Gilman, on the one hand, abnormal commercial power and to make his employes, on the other, abnormal commercial power, and to The Gilman problem is much less a question of competitive store-keeping than of legal monopoly.

The Australian land tax reform meets much the same reception in this country as did the Australian ballot reform. Political machines oppose it, regardless of party. The measure was adopted by the democrats in the Colorado legislature, the republicans opposing it in the interest of the great corporations. But in the Maryland legislature the republicans introduced and supported it and the democratic machine turned it down.

It is not strange that even a thoroughly democratic democrat, so far away as the Pacific coast, should get but a dim view of the outlines of so small a figure as the mayor of Chicago. The San Francisco Star is accordingly excused for supposing that Mr. Harrison has "in former years

made a record against granting long franchises." It is quite true that Harrison opposes franchises of more than 20 years' duration, but as the state law forbids longer terms that is a narrow basis for a record.

PERMANENT SIDE PARTIES IN POLITICS.

Circumstances connected with the recent municipal election in Chicago, make a discussion in these columns of the question of side parties in politics appropriate at this time. In that campaign the leading candidates of both leading parties were in our view objectionable, and, for reasons which we stated then, we advised radical democrats to vote for the republican candidate. Without repeating those reasons now, we shall merely note our conviction that when the democratic party nominates undemocratic candidates, the cause of radical democracy is often best served by voting outright for the republican. But because in this instance we advised radical democrats to support the republican candidate against Harrison for mayor of Chicago, we have been more or less severely rebuked by some friends of the paper—not for advising opposition to Harrison, but for declining to urge support of some one or other of the several reform side parties that were in the field.

The particular reform party which our critics admonished us we were conscience-bound to support was in each instance, of course, the one with which the critic himself had affiliated. There, would, indeed, have been no lack of variety for a choice, not less than five of these parties being represented on the official ballot. Their importance as political factors may be inferred from the vote they commanded. The socialist party polled 4,713, less than 1 2-3 per cent. of the total. The prohibition party polled 2,804, less than 1 per cent. The social-democratic party polled 1,844, less than 2-3 of 1 per cent. The single tax party polled 950, less than 1-3 of 1 per cent. The socialist-labor party polled 638, less than 1-4 of 1 per cent. We are inclined to think that men who take politics seriously will

see in these figures sufficient justification in the event for our decision not to support any of the third parties.

But it is easy to confound seriousness in politics with zeal in political activities, though the latter may be nothing but exciting play whereas the former is rational concern for the public good. We shall, therefore, present in extenso our reasons for opposing such side parties in politics as those we have mentioned; not for the purpose of explaining the past, but to make our policy understood in the future.

Our reference, let us say, is to side parties that are permanent. Parties that organize for the purpose of influencing a particular election, or of disciplining the old party organization from which its supporters mainly come, may or may not serve a useful purpose. They depend for justification upon special circumstances and are not properly subject to general criticism. And let us emphasize the fact that we mean side parties as such, side parties which live and move and have their being as side parties, without any reasonably grounded hope of ever being anything else. We do not criticise new parties that start out with the intention and reasonable expectation of becoming factors in politics. The only question in such cases is whether the expectation has a reasonable basis. Our criticism is leveled at parties that are formed and maintained regardless of reasonable probabilities of success—at side parties in perpetuity.

In again stating our position on this subject* we have no hope of curing chronic cases of side-party disease. But these are few. Most people find little enjoyment in everlastingly playing at politics. We may hope, however, to stimulate the thought of earnest men, who have been or may be tempted into side parties by impatience for political activity in the direction of reforms that appeal to them. At any rate, it is to such men that we address these considerations on the subject of permanent side parties in politics.

*We discussed the same subject quite fully more than two years ago, under the title of "Third Party Politics." See Public, No. 21, page 6, November 5, 1896.

I.

It should be observed, in the first place, that party politics, like every other field of human effort, has limitations. It may be that objects highly desirable in themselves and appropriate to other fields, are not to be served in this field. A political party, therefore, unless it have an object appropriate to political partisanship, has no reason for existence.

What objects, then, are appropriate?

Primarily, party politics is the field for choosing public officials. But as legislation is enacted by officials, it is also a field for influencing legislation. Obviously, then, a political party may appropriately have either or both of two objects. It may exist solely for the purpose of influencing the election of public officials; or solely for the purpose of influencing legislation; or for both purposes, as has always been the case in actual experience.

And inasmuch as popular agitation in behalf of new reforms, and popular education with reference to them, are necessary precursors of reform legislation, it is also appropriate for political parties to exist for the sole purpose of agitating and educating for or against a reform.

Besides these four—electing officials, influencing legislation, agitating and educating—we can think of no reason for being that any political party can appropriately have. Nor do we suppose that even the most inveterate side-party devotee would ask for further concessions. He would probably agree that if a side party cannot justify its existence upon this broad basis, it cannot do so at all.

We have, then, four possible legitimate objects of a party—popular agitation, popular education, public legislation and public administration.

With reference to permanent side parties, the latter function must be ignored. Since they do not elect public officials, they have no share in public administration. The side party that does elect public officials, or has reasonable expectations of doing so, is not a permanent side party. It is a political factor, and must be reckoned with as such. The same thing is true

with reference to the function of legislation. A party that influences legislation, or has a reasonable expectation of doing it, is not a permanent side party but a political factor. On these two points, therefore, the question raised by the organization or maintenance of a permanent third party is not whether its expectation of influencing elections justifies its existence, but whether the expectation itself is justified.

That is a question which we shall consider farther on. For the present let us turn our attention to the remaining functions of partisanship with reference to permanent side parties, namely, agitation and education.

II.

To argue that permanent side parties are useless for purposes of agitation in the political field, where agitation consists in arousing the public in mass, would seem to be a work of supererogation. It borders upon the absurd to dignify as instruments of political agitation, party organizations so small in size and so light in impressive qualities that the public is hardly aware of their existence and professional gamblers only notice them to offer bettors their pick at \$30,000 to \$1. The kind of agitation of which such instruments are capable is positively hurtful to the causes they profess to represent. It tends to bring the causes into the same popular contempt in which the lilliputian parties themselves are held.

Side parties do sometimes agitate with impressive effect. An instance was given by the united labor party of New York city in 1886, which drew to Henry George 68,000 votes for mayor, enabling him to outstrip Theodore Roosevelt, the republican candidate, and placing him second in the contest. Lee Meriwether's fight in St. Louis affords another instance. Still another is furnished by Mayor Jones, of Toledo, both in his three successful contests for mayor, and in his unsuccessful but brilliant campaign for governor of Ohio.

But none of these instances illustrates the permanent side-party idea. In each the side party sprang into being without nursing or coaxing. It was also a factor in politics, the people having been aroused in mass

by it. The latter is the essential quality. To agitate beneficially and effectively, in politics, a party must be a political factor. It must challenge the respectful attention of the electorate. Parties toward which the electorate is contemptuously indifferent are powerless for beneficial agitation.

If the possibilities are few of popular agitation in the political field, along lines not at issue in the public mind, the possibilities of education along those lines are less. A party so contemptibly weak as to be unable to challenge public attention, cannot possibly educate the public through party methods as well as its adherents might by other methods. This is a common sense proposition. It is proved, moreover, by experience. Most converts that permanent side parties in politics can claim have been attracted to and educated in the party's cause not by the party but by other agencies.

In the case of one of the socialist parties that fact is somewhat obscured by the duplex character of its organization. As the party is engaged perennially in what are essentially non-political methods of agitation and education, the converts made in fact by non-political methods of work go nominally to the credit of the political methods, all work being done in the name of the party. But it would be no rash assertion to say that the socialists have done nothing in the United States in the way of socialistic agitation and education that could not have been done more effectively and extensively without the aid of the socialist side parties.

That is true also of the prohibitionists. It is true of all permanent side parties. Not by independent political action without political possibilities, but by political action with political possibilities and by non-political modes—modes, that is, which could be utilized as well or better without a side party in politics than with one—are popular attention to and consideration of a cause secured and converts made.

For these reasons, which might be amplified had we the space to spare, but which we have stated with sufficient fullness to furnish intelligent

readers with a substantial basis for rationally considering the matter themselves, we discover no place in the political field for permanent side parties as agitating and educational agencies. A party that is doomed to remain a side party in perpetuity if it stays in the political field, cannot justify its existence by the plea that it agitates and educates. The agitational and educational possibilities of a political party being dependent upon its political possibilities, the whole question regarding third parties reverts to the primary consideration in each case of whether the party is or may reasonably be expected to become a factor in politics.

III.

A third party that is a factor in politics, is not a side party; and a third party that may reasonably be expected to become a factor in politics, is not a permanent side party. To such third parties, then, if any there be in this country, this criticism does not apply. But it does apply to the prohibition party, to the Chicago single tax party, and to all the socialist parties. It applies to others also, which the circumstances do not require us to specify.

That none of these third parties is a political factor is too patent to need more than a bald statement. In no way does any of them affect legislation or administration.

The only facts at variance with this statement, and they are but apparently so, is the election in small scattered places of side-party local officials. The prohibitionists have probably had this measure of success at times, and the socialists certainly have. But these elections were in no instance side-party victories. They were due not to the influence of the winning party, but to local and temporary causes, such as ordinarily find expression through local and temporary organizations. The statement still holds that the parties named are not factors in politics. Whether or not they are to remain side parties permanently, they are side parties now.

Our subject is, therefore, reduced to the question of whether these par-

ties may reasonably be expected to become factors in politics in the future.

IV.

The idiosyncrasies of human nature and the history of politics, alike testify that third parties cannot be built up slowly from small beginnings to great accomplishments. A political party that does not come to maturity almost at a bound, is not likely to come to maturity at all—except as a dwarf. In other words, there is no reasonable probability that a party which starts as a side party, or falls to the low estate of a side party, can ever become a factor in politics.

Against this view the history of the socialist party in Germany is often urged. But the experience of that party confirms rather than refutes the principle. It was not a party of slow growth. At its first parliamentary contest, 1877, it polled nearly half a million votes. A party that can do that is a political factor to be reckoned with. And the German socialists were reckoned with. They were proscribed for 12 years. This persecution naturally augmented their voting strength. Persecution might lift even a side party into political importance. It pushed the German socialist party forward so fast that a large proportion of its members are socialist only in party name. So strong has this element become that the socialistic programme element, backed by the machinery of the party and strengthened by party loyalty and tradition, has for a considerable time been but barely able to prevent the relegation of the economic programme of the socialists to second place, and the formal adoption by the party as its prime purpose of a general policy of political opposition. This is suggestive of the probable culmination of reform parties when they do come to political maturity. But that by the way, our reference to the German socialists being intended only to show that the history of their party fails to refute our idea that political parties are not like the tall oaks which from little acorns grow. It did not begin small; it began large.

American history is replete with illustrations, every one of which

testifies to the soundness of the principle we have stated.

Prior to the forties, American third parties were only factions of old parties. But in 1840, the abolitionists made a presidential nomination under the title of the liberty party, and their candidate polled 7,609 votes.

They nominated again in 1844, but wisely withdrew their candidate and abandoned their party to support the free soilers, a faction of the democratic party. The free soilers had bolted the democratic convention because they failed to secure satisfactory representation; but as they came out against the extension of slavery in the territories the abolitionists were content to join them. This marks no growth, let it be observed, of the liberty party as a party. It lasted four years as a side party and then dissolved. Nor did the free soil party originate in the liberty party. It was a "bolt" from the democratic party. In 1848 it polled its largest vote, 291,263; and in 1852 it also dropped out of politics and into history, with a vote diminished to 156,149.

Then the republican party was founded—not by the liberty party, not by the free soil party, nor as a product of either in any party sense. It was organized by democrats and whigs who resented the treachery of the democratic party and the poltroonery of the whig party in connection with the repeal of the Missouri compromise and the opening of Kansas to the possibilities of a slave system.

There is nothing in our history prior to the civil war to warrant the supposition that side parties may reasonably expect to become political factors. It all indicates that parties which do not become political factors at once can never hope to.

Since the civil war all third party experience has pointed in the same direction.

The liberal republicans and the straight democrats of 1872 are not to be considered as parties. They were only factions of old parties, and died with the election that had caused their organization, making no effort to perpetuate themselves. But the

greenback party, like the liberty party of the forties, was a true type of third party organization. At its first appearance, 1876, it polled 81,740 votes. Its vote rose in 1880 to 307,206, but fell in 1884 to 133,825, when the party died. Meantime it had elected members of congress, members of legislatures, and local officials, sometimes as the result of local and temporary causes, but usually because the party was really a factor in politics over a large part of the country. In those places it was locally not a side party. But as a national party, it cannot be said, except in its congressional successes, to have been a political factor. If it ever was a political factor, however, the time came when it ceased to be, and then it died.

Instead of maintaining it as a permanent side party, greenbackers organized the union-labor party, which polled 148,105 votes in 1888.

That party was then abandoned, and the greenback sentiment went to the support of the populist party which in 1890 became a factor in politics locally to an extent sufficient to make it a factor in politics nationally. In 1892 it polled 1,041,028 votes. And it had so influenced the politics of the country by 1896 as to color the platform and in some degree to dictate the nominations of the democratic party.

None of these movements can be classed as permanent side-party movements. The parties were either political factors while they lasted, or were abandoned as soon as it was discovered that they could not become such. In the whole history of the country the only distinctively third party to become a permanent factor in politics is the republican party; and that party, organized in 1854, became a factor in national politics in 1856, and the leading party of the country in 1860.

Of the permanent side parties, the oldest is the prohibition. It was organized nationally in the early seventies, and without having yet become a factor in politics has been maintained in the vain hope that some time, somehow, it will rise to political prominence and ultimate victory. It has probably done as much to ob-

struct restrictive liquor legislation as any other single influence outside the liquor interest. Had it organized within the republican party, it might have forced that party to accede in degree to its demands. For politicians are very deferential to the demands of voters whose numbers are unknown and whose support they may possibly gain. But the support of a side party cannot be gained by any concession short of absolute surrender to it, and upon the face of the returns side parties don't amount to much anyhow. That is the way politicians look at such matters. And for that reason the prohibition party has lessened the hold of temperance sentiment upon the republican party by organizing outside instead of inside. Not that it could have hoped to make the republican party a prohibition party complete. That could not have been done unless a very large proportion of the sentiment of the country had demanded prohibition. But it could have made it prohibition in places where prohibition sentiment was strong, and so secured its professed objects in far greater degree than it has. It could also have promoted prohibition sentiment and prohibition tendencies within the republican party. As it is the prohibition party has secured nothing. The notion that prohibition in states where it prevails is the work of the prohibition party is not well founded. That party has secured no temperance legislation. It is not a political factor. As to the possibility of its gradually becoming one, let the following figures of its vote for president be considered:

1872	5,607
1876	9,737
1880	9,678
1884	150,626
1888	249,945
1892	264,133
1896	145,976
1900	208,555

As the single tax party of Chicago is a local affair of recent origin, it calls for only a word or two in this connection. It has been through two elections, that of the fall of 1900 and that of the spring of 1901. At the former, the head of the county ticket polled in the city 465 votes; at the latter

the head of the ticket polled 950. Measured in percentages this increase is phenomenal. It is over 100 per cent. If we had had no experience with political matters until day before yesterday, we might calculate the date of assured success for the party in the future at the rate of 100 per cent. increase per election. But the statistics of side parties are not lacking in instances of gains of 100 per cent. and more, which have quickly turned to losses never recovered. The prohibition party's experience is an instance in point. Nothing is more deceptive in economics and politics than percentages. It was Cory O'Lanus, of the old Brooklyn Eagle, who fell back upon percentages to measure the growth of his popularity. As a candidate for constable he had increased his vote over that of his previous candidacy by 100 per cent., whereas his adversary's vote had grown only three per cent.; from which Mr. O'Lanus argued that at the same rate of relative increase his ultimate triumph was assured. This seemed plausible until he explained that his vote had increased from 1 to 2, whereas his adversary's had increased from 100 to 103.

The other side party—or group, rather, of such parties—is the socialist. A justification of permanent side party organization in the socialist movement might be based upon the socialistic doctrine of class consciousness. That is, a segregated movement might, with consistency at least, adopt a segregated system of political activity. But that point is quite apart from the question of whether a side party tends to grow into a real party, and on this point the history of the socialist party in this country throws light.

The party began its independent political career in New York, in 1887, as the socialist-labor party. Its vote in the city of New York in 1887 was about 6,000, and at one election subsequently it polled something like 25,000.

At the presidential election of 1896 its vote was 21,164. Four years later it was 36,274. At the next presidential election, 1900, the social-democratic party, with Debs for presidential candidate was organized na-

tionally, and part of the socialist-labor party joined it. But as the rest remained outside, there were two socialist tickets. Together they polled 123,540 votes—84,003 for the fusion and 39,537 for the old socialist labor party. A comparison of these three presidential votes, 1892, 1896 and 1900, shows a continuing increase.

Standing by itself that would indicate the possibility of side-party growth. But upon further investigation it will be seen that the increase is attributable to the extension of the party to new places and not to growth in places where it has long existed. In New York city, for instance, the total vote of both socialist parties in 1900 was only 1,000 more than in 1896. Debs's personal popularity would more than account for that. Here, then, in the place where the socialist party has had a ticket in the field regularly since 1887, there is no increase. A similar condition is observable in Chicago. We make no comparison with the large socialist vote of some years ago, which was not a socialist vote, but only a temporary outburst. Our comparison is of last fall's vote with that of this spring. The total socialist vote of last fall was 6,009. This spring there were three socialist tickets, and a large body of the general voters were opposed to both the republican and the democratic candidates for mayor, two conditions that must have had a tendency to increase the vote for the socialists. Yet the total socialist vote for mayor this spring was only 7,195. Similar results will follow a comparison of the regular socialist vote of the present with its regular vote of the past, wherever it has been long enough in the political field to have reached its maximum. If its vote as a national party is still increasing, that does not prove that it will keep on increasing, but only that its third party maximum, from which it will decline, is not yet reached. That maximum the prohibition party seems to have reached.

From the history of third parties, then, it appears that side-partyism in politics is not a road leading to political influence. And this is in harmony with what might be inferred

in the first instance from a consideration of human nature.

Though some men may "stay by" a hopeless fight, men in masses will not. What general would expect to win a war if he gave his army to understand that every battle until the last, to be fought in the distant future, would end in overwhelming defeat? No possible prospect of the ultimate victory could keep the spirits of his men alive. It is so in politics. Men in masses will not act with a party that hasn't a fighting chance. Since politics has to do with men in masses, this factor must be considered. To ignore it is to exhibit incompetency for promoting causes which depend for success upon popular support. Politically speaking, the permanent side party is "neither fish, flesh, fowl nor good red herring."

One of the best theoretical politicians of our time, a man who more than once successfully put his political theories to practical test, on two occasions in connection with temporary third parties—we refer to Henry George—lays down these sound doctrines for political action in support of causes:

The advocates of a great principle should know no thought of compromise. They should proclaim it in its fullness, and point to its complete attainment as their goal. But the zeal of the propagandist needs to be supplemented by the skill of the politician. While the one need not fear to arouse opposition, the other should seek to minimize resistance. The political art, like the military art, consists in massing the greatest force against the point of least resistance; and, to bring a principle most quickly and effectively into practical politics, the measure which presents it should be so moderate as (while involving the principle) to secure the largest support and excite the least resistance. For whether the first step be long or short, is of little consequence. When a start is once made in a right direction, progress is mere matter of keeping on. It is in this way that great questions always enter the phase of political action. Important political battles begin with affairs at outposts, in themselves of little moment, and are generally decided upon issue joined, not on the main question, but on some minor or collateral question. . . . To bring an issue into politics it is not necessary to form a party. Parties are not to be manufactured; they grow out of existing parties by the

bringing forward of issues upon which men will divide.—Protection or Free Trade, chapter 29, "Practical Politics."

V.

We should not do justice to our subject if we stopped with showing that permanent side parties are futile. Like most futile things, they are in our opinion also positively harmful—harmful to the causes for which they nominally stand. We therefore believe that it is prejudicial to a cause to support or otherwise encourage its permanent side party. And it makes no difference whether there is anything else worth supporting or not. If we believed a permanent side party representing a cause which to us was the cause of causes, was a good thing for that cause, we should support it under all circumstances. Believing such parties to be not only useless but harmful to their causes, we support them under no circumstances. Nor are we unmindful that a righteous cause cannot be ruined by anything. That is true. But it may be embarrassed and obstructed and its progress delayed. There are many ways of doing this, and all do not originate in the malice of enemies.

—"evil is wrought by want of Thought
As well as want of Heart."

And of all friendly ways of obstructing the progress of a cause, few seem to us so rich in possibilities of harm as permanent side parties in politics.

One of the harmful possibilities of such parties is associated with the chances they afford for corrupt deals in close elections to the prejudice of the cause they profess. That objection, however, we shall pass by, since it is not the corrupt acts of side-party managers that we are considering, but the evils that belong of necessity to the parties themselves.

In our reference to the prohibition party we have indicated how that party has obstructed its cause by segregating itself from the party to whose politicians it could to a great extent dictate had it remained within their party. But that is a very minor kind of the harm that these futile parties do to the cause they proclaim.

A greater harm is the false idea of

the strength of a cause that side-parties propagate. Unable to draw their own vote, they do not represent the strength of the cause at all. But its strength is estimated by their vote, and in a world where success breeds success and failure failure this is an injury not to be lightly invited.

Such a party is almost certain, too, to oppose what influence it has to the opportunities that constantly arise for promoting its cause. Debs's nomination last year illustrates that evil. Loyalty to the socialist-labor party name stood in the way of united socialist action in his support. In that case it made no practical difference, for he fell far short of election and the votes of both parties are counted together in estimating socialist strength. But if Debs's nomination had involved a fighting chance to win, that "bolt" might have insured his defeat. The bolters would have been coddled by the enemy, and their attacks upon Debs, under the trade-mark of "the only simon-pure" party of the cause, would have been used with effect by the opposition press. As an example of the possibilities in this direction, nothing more illuminative could be desired than the history of the middle-of-the-road populists. Or, as an illustration which single taxers will appreciate, suppose there had been a well-seasoned permanent side-party of single taxers in Cleveland when Tom L. Johnson was nominated for mayor by the democrats, upon a three-cent fare platform. Isn't it almost a dead certainty that a little handful of the loyal members of that party would have denounced him as not coming up to single tax standards, and have furnished "hot stuff" about Johnson to the republican papers?

Under evils of that sort, which are inseparable from permanent side parties, there lies the natural tendency of mankind to set up fetiches and worship them. To third party devotees their little party becomes a fetich, which dethrones the cause it nominally represents. This evil is not a peculiarity of third party men. It is characteristic of human nature. But it is more virulent, and, within third party possibilities, more injurious, with third party men than with others; because third party men

transfer all the zealous energy of their original devotion to the cause, over to the fetich which in their conscience they substitute for the cause. Hearty loyalty to the cause gives way to intense loyalty to the side-party of their love and hopes, and all things and all persons are tested by the demands which they suppose this fetich to make.

It is matter of conscience with them, therefore, not only to vote with their side-party, but to insist that every other believer in their cause ought to vote with it too—also as matter of conscience.

These fetich worshipers become dead, apparently, to the ethics of voting. It is not the way in which a man votes that is within the forum of conscience. That is matter of judgment. The jurisdiction of conscience is over his motive. If after the question of motive had been adjusted in the forum of conscience, the act of judgment in deciding how to vote in order best to give effect to that motive—if this act also were matter of conscience, it would hardly be possible to have parties enough to meet the demands of conscientious men. For if we cannot in conscience vote with the republican party because it does not come up to high standards, nor with the democratic party for like reason, then we cannot in conscience vote with any party that falls short of our ideals. This is not far from the ground taken by conscience voters who support side-parties, which partially accounts for the ease with which side-parties split up. But imagine everyone acting upon that principle! Since the old man was about right who said to his wife: "Betsey, all the world's queer but me and thee, and I think thee's just a little queer," there would have to be a side party for nearly every voter with a conscience. One truth that conscience voters of all parties need to take to heart, was expressed by Jefferson in his first inaugural. "Every difference of opinion," said he, "is not a difference of principle."

If our suggestions of the evil that permanent side-parties bring to the cause they profess do not impress the zealous reformer, if he still regards side-party activity as the "practical"

side of reform work, the best advice we can give him is to join one of these parties, and after looking up its antecedents to follow its fortunes for awhile. The chance is one in 30,000, or thereabouts, that he may become a chronic side-party man. But if he misses that lonesome chance, he will have had his demon of impatience exorcised and be in good condition thereafter to work intelligently for his cause instead of blindly for a fetich.

NEWS

A sensational report upon Chinese news was sent out from Washington on the 6th. It came in the form of a dispatch purporting to be from the American charge d'affaires at Peking, Mr. Squiers. The terms of the dispatch were: "Peking, April 6, 11 a. m., Secretary of State, Washington.—The Russian minister refuses to receive official communications from the Chinese peace commissioners. (Signed) Squiers, charge d'affaires American Legation." The dispatch had earmarks of forgery, but it was commented upon as indicating Russia's intention of making war upon China for rejecting the proposed Manchurian treaty. On the 7th, however, Secretary Hay authorized a denial of the report that such a dispatch had been received.

Both that dispatch and the denial were preceded by a circumstantial official statement from the Russian government regarding the Manchurian treaty question. The statement explained that, pending the settlement of the Chinese questions affecting all the powers, Russia considered it necessary to establish permanent order along the Russian-Manchurian frontier. To that end provisional terms were agreed upon between Russia and the Chinese governors of three Manchurian provinces, with reference to local civil administration. Subsequently Russia drafted a special agreement with China for the gradual evacuation of Manchuria by Russia and the adoption of measures to insure peace in the province. This agreement was intended as a basis "for the restoration to China, as contemplated by the Russian government, of the province of Manchuria, which, in consequence of the alarming events of last year, was occupied

by Russian troops;" but false texts of the proposed agreement were published by a hostile foreign press, importing an intention on Russia's part to establish a protectorate over Manchuria, in consequence of which hindrances were placed in the way, and the acceptance of the agreement by China, "which was indispensable for the gradual evacuation of the province, proved to be impossible." Referring to the possibility of an eventual restoration of Manchuria to China, this official explanation declares it to be—

manifest that such intention can only be carried out when the normal situation is completely restored to the empire, and the central government established at the capital independent and strong enough to guarantee Russia against a recurrence of the events of last year.

The explanation concludes with this diplomatic intimation as to Russia's Manchurian policy:

While the Russian government maintains its present organization in Manchuria, to preserve order in the vicinity of the broad frontiers of Russia, and remains faithful to its original and oft-repeated political programme, it will quietly await the further course of events.

Upon the publication of this explanation, Russia was officially advised by the American minister, pursuant to instructions from Washington, of the gratification it afforded the president.

There are heavy headline reports of another uprising in northern China, under the leadership of Tung-Fu-Sian, but it is not regarded in official circles as at all menacing. The only other Chinese news of moment is the decision of the American government, given out from Washington on the 4th, directing Gen. Chaffee to take no part in the destruction of the Chinese forts from the coast to Peking, and the establishment in their place of a chain of fortified foreign posts, which course has been determined upon by the other powers.

The war in South Africa has advanced a stage. Great Britain captured, on the 8th, the town of Pietersburg, which has been the capital of the South African republic since the fall of Pretoria. Pietersburg is a village in a sparsely settled country at the northern terminus of the railway which runs from Cape Town northward through Pretoria and into the

mountains. It is about 170 miles above Pretoria. The capture was made after slight opposition, only 60 Boer prisoners being taken and only two British being killed. The Boer garrison had evacuated the village the night before the British force arrived. Some other skirmishes are reported, none of which are important except the capture by a force of Boers, after several hours' fighting, of 75 out of a British force of 100. This event occurred at a point northward from Aberdeen, Cape Colony, and is reported by Lord Kitchener.

The British casualties in South Africa for the month of March, as reported from London on the 4th, are as follows:

	Officers.	Men.
Killed	9	103
Wounded	26	270
Total	35	373

In an interview at Utrecht on the 4th, President Kruger gave his views on the subject of arbitration. He expressed his entire readiness to submit all questions between the South African republic and the Orange Free State, on one side, and Great Britain on the other, to an impartial tribunal, including even the question of independence. His language was:

Not even excepting the question of independence. We would sacrifice our liberty if the verdict of arbitration decided that one or the other of the chiefs of the republics had done anything to forfeit it.

Mr. Fischer, the delegate from the Orange Free State, was present and assented.

Philippine news consists largely of reports of surrenders here and there in the islands, and of prognostications as to the character of the American civil government, to be inaugurated July 1. Meanwhile a mystery hangs about the prisoner Aguinaldo. While apparently provided for comfortably, he is kept in close confinement. No newspaper correspondent has yet been allowed to see him. It is said that other visitors are freely admitted, but this may be reasonably doubted. If such visitors were admitted freely, the exclusion of newspaper men would be without purpose or effect. Secret influences are evidently being brought to bear upon Aguinaldo in his prison to induce him, as the head of the Filipino government, to proclaim a general sur-