

tion comes over the wires as follows:

The cry of "emperor," "czar," and "man-on-horseback" are but extravagant appeals to an instinct which ought to exist and happily does exist among us against submission to unlawful authority, however trifling may be its exercise and however beneficent its despotism. There is a constant tendency to ignore such limitations and condone the transgression of them by public officers, provided the thing done is done with good motives, from a desire to serve the public. Such a process, if general, is most injurious. If continued long enough, it results in an attitude of personal superiority on the part of great officers which is inconsistent with our institutions, a destruction of responsibility and independent judgment on the part of lower officers, and a neglect of the habit of asserting legal rights on the part of the people. The more frequently men who hold great power in office are permitted to overreach the limitations imposed by law upon their powers, the more difficult it becomes to question anything they do, and the people, each one weak in himself and unable to cope with powerful officers, who regard any questioning of their acts as an affront, gradually lose the habit of holding such officers accountable, and ultimately practically surrender the right to hold them accountable. Constant accountability of public officers for strict observance of the limits imposed by law and customary and undoubted assertion of the private right of the citizen to have no power exercised over him except in strict accordance with the letter and the spirit of the law—these are the essential conditions of free government and personal independence.

Had these eminently sound doctrines been observed when the Philippine temptation came we should have a grander history and a higher future; had they been observed in the Chicago strike of 1894, the Colorado usurpation might not threaten republican institutions now.

Before Dr. Gunsaulus made himself guilty of the unpatriotic act of denouncing the fundamental statement of the American Declaration of Independence, to the graduating class of the Armour Institute at Chicago this year, he should have made himself familiar with its doctrine. It is not good form for distinguished educators to trifle with the unripened minds of their students. And Dr.

Gunsaulus ought to learn that it is trifling to assume that the Declaration of Independence asserts that "all men are created equal" in every possible sense in which the term "equality" can be used. What that document does assert is, that in justice "all men are created equal" in their rights under just human laws. Lincoln interpreted this great Fourth of July document truly when he said:

I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men, but they did not mean to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say that all men were equal in color, size, intellect, moral development or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness in what they did consider all men created equal—equal in certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This they said and this they meant. They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth that all were then actually enjoying that equality, nor yet that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society which should be familiar to all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors, everywhere. . . . The assertion that "all men are created equal" was of no practical use in effecting our separation from Great Britain; and it was placed in the Declaration, not for that, but for future use. Its authors meant it to be—as, thank God, it is now proving itself, a stumbling block to those who in after times might seek to turn a free people back into the hateful paths of despotism. They knew the proneness of prosperity to breed tyrants; and they meant, when such should reappear in this fair land and commence their vocation, that they should find left for them at least one hard nut to crack.

All this is obvious upon any common sense reading of the American Declaration, and it is demonstrated by its context. Do the Gunsauluses deny the truth of its assertion as to equality in that meaning? If they do, why not deny it candidly? If they do not deny it, then why do they pettifog? For it is pettifogging to argue that because men are not created

"equal" as to height and might, or mental and moral temperament, they are therefore not created "equal" as to legal rights, and that the great Declaration of human liberty is as to this, its basic clause, "a glittering generality" or "an interesting falsehood."

In his baccalaureate address President Hadley, of Yale, traced "almost every evil—political, social, or commercial—which constitutes a serious menace to the permanent prosperity of our country, to our tolerant acceptance of selfishness." It is an encouraging sign of the times that a man occupying President Hadley's position recognizes definitely that conditions are "menacing." If it were possible for him, with his wide influence, to denounce the means whereby selfishness becomes a social menace, some of the evil manifestations of selfishness as a social factor would speedily disappear. That the menacing conditions to which President Hadley points are logical and necessary consequences of adequate causes, will not be denied by anyone who believes that this is a universe of law; and no one will find it easy to account for them adequately upon any other theory than that they are the pains of social disease caused by legal privilege. There is consequently but one cure for them, and that is the destruction of legal privilege. Most of the manifestations of selfishness to which President Hadley alludes spring from a sense of that utter helplessness of the individual in the face of narrowing opportunities, from a realization that life is a struggle against overwhelming odds, from a consciousness of complete absence of equality of legal right and opportunity as a heritage of all. They are merely self-defense reduced to its lowest terms. If President Hadley, resisting every impulse of his mind to perpetuate institutions as they are, with all their defects and perversions and oppressive possibilities, and inspired solely by a motive to translate moral truth into terms of economic and

political truth, will lend the weight of his authority candidly to truth as he sees it, those political, social and commercial "evils" which constitute a "serious menace to the permanent prosperity of our country" will the more speedily disappear. The first, the greatest, the most important of all the causes which result in "menacing conditions" he will find to consist, if indeed he does not already know it, in legal power to control natural opportunities. If it were unprofitable to control land not fully in profitable use, an immediate, spontaneous, automatic and beneficent consequence would follow. There might still be selfish desires among men. But if there were they would only raise questions of conscience. They could do no social harm with legal sanction. On the contrary, they would operate for general good instead of general harm.

PRESIDENT CLEVELAND AND THE CHICAGO STRIKE.

That ex-President Grover Cleveland is a receptive candidate for the Democratic nomination for President, is an open secret. Never once have his closer friends abandoned effort or hope.

While the monopolistic interests of the country were content to manage the Republican convention, as they did, even with the erratic Roosevelt injected into the bargain, there is from that quarter no lack of broad hints that "Cleveland is not half bad" and "could probably defeat Roosevelt if the Democrats were sane enough to nominate him."

Cleveland himself has indeed refused to be a candidate (vol. vi, p. 553). He has not only refused himself; he has named Parker (p. 8). But his conduct has not in this respect been well calculated to inspire confidence.

He has repeated his approval of Parker (p. 137) in a manner well adapted to make that reticent jurist uneasy, an effect which this left-handed approval is said upon good authority to have produced.

He has recently seemed to court favor in the South by protesting over-indignantly that he never allowed a Negro (p. 65), no matter

how much of a man the Negro might be, to meet him as Booker T. Washington met Roosevelt.

He has for the first time since his retirement to private life publicly defended the "bond deal" of 1894 (p. 83), whereby his friends, J. Pierpont Morgan and August Belmont, reaped a rich financial harvest at the expense of the public treasury and in defiance of the sanest public opinion.

He has lectured on the Chicago railway strike (p. 65), ten years after the event, eight years after the good faith of his participation in the suppression of that strike had been publicly and circumstantially challenged by Gov. Altgeld, and two years after Altgeld's power of reply had been taken away by death; and in doing this he has broken a silence on that subject, a studied silence in which he had persisted from the beginning, a silence as profound as the present silence of Altgeld's grave,—has broken it by attacking this dead man with whom in life he did not venture to try conclusions. That attack is now renewed by Mr. Cleveland in an article in McClure's Magazine. Since cowardice is not one of Mr. Cleveland's faults, this conduct toward Altgeld is not easily accounted for by any other theory than Mr. Cleveland's desire to court the favor, for campaign purposes, of those plutocratic circles wherein the erratic Roosevelt is supposed to be regarded as a Hobson's choice.

It is fairly evident, then, that Mr. Cleveland is industriously erecting Presidential lightning rods, with their tips invitingly pointed toward the two most important centers of magnetic energy in politics—race insanity at the South, and "frenzied finance" at the North.

But it is not with his Presidential ambitions that we concern ourselves. So far from shuddering we regard those ambitions with composure, believing that if the Democratic convention is to be governed at all by monopoly corporations, as was the Republican convention almost wholly, it were better that the candidate be Mr. Cleveland. He truly and fully represents corporate interests, and would be more quickly and generally recognized as representing them than anyone else—even

Gorman or Parker. What we purpose here to consider is not Mr. Cleveland's ambitions, but his version of his administration's connection with the Chicago strike, as he gives it in the July McClure's.

I

Like his "bond deal" story (p. 83), Mr. Cleveland's strike story is too long for verbal reproduction here, even if that were proper. We therefore offer a syllabus, which, for convenience of distinguishing, we shall print in smaller type than our comments:

"In the last days of June, 1894," writes Mr. Cleveland, "a very determined and ugly labor disturbance broke out in the city of Chicago." This was the strike which Eugene V. Debs led, and which the Federal government suppressed. "Almost in a night," Mr. Cleveland continues, "it grew to full proportions of malevolence and danger. Rioting and violence were its early accompaniments;" "railroad transportation was especially involved in its attacks;" "the carriage of United States mails was interrupted; inter-State commerce was obstructed, and railroad property was riotously destroyed."

The trouble began with a strike on the 11th of May by the Pullman car-building employes. No injury was done or attempted while the strike was confined to these men, and during that time very little disorder occurred. But on the 22d of June, 1894, the convention of the American Railway Union—"an association of all the different classes of railway employes," in which "the employes of the Pullman Palace Car company could not on any reasonable and consistent theory be regarded as eligible to membership," although "nearly 4,000 of these employes were enrolled"—declared that "unless the Pullman Palace Car company should adjust the grievances of its employes before noon of the 26th day of June, the members of the American Railway Union should, after that date, refuse to handle Pullman cars and equipment." No adjustment having been made at that time, the railway strike accordingly began all over the country.

The city of Chicago was "the field of its most pronounced and malign manifestations, as well as the place of its final extinction." "Early and persistent complaints of mail and inter-State commerce obstructions" came from that city. On the 30th of June the district attorney at Chicago reported the stoppage of mail trains by strikers and recommended appointment of special deputies for protection of mails. "In reply to this dispatch Attorney General Olney on the