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EDITORIAL

The President's keynote speech.

President Roosevelt's speech at Chautauqua on the 11th, which was evidently intended, in conjunction with Secretary Taft's on the same day at Manila, to sound the key note of his own administrative policy, is superior in tone to anything that has ever fallen from his lips or come from his pen. Entirely free from the college-boy hoodlumisms which have usually characterized Mr. Roosevelt's speeches, it must be recognized as a statesmanlike utterance, whatever may be thought of the policy for which it declares.

The President's foreign policy.

The Monroe doctrine, to which

the President gave first place in his Chautauqua speech, is adopted by him as the core of his foreign policy. Relative to this doctrine, he insists upon three things. We must make it evident that we intend no conquests at the expense of the republics at the south of us; we must not permit those republics to make the doctrine a shield from the consequences of their own misdeeds; and, "inasmuch as by this doctrine we prevent other nations from interfering on this side of the water," we must "ourselves in good faith try to help those of our sister republics which need such help, upward toward peace and order."

The third requirement, a pretty plain assertion of paternal authority over the South American republics, indicates the direction in which President Roosevelt is headed. He himself regards this requirement as "really the most important thing of all," and to it he devotes most of the first part of his speech. In elaborating the point, he clearly shows that "bearing one another's burdens" is to be the guiding principle of his foreign policy, and that this principle is not essentially different from Mr. McKinley's "benevolent assimilation."

The President's Philippine policy.

Secretary Taft's speech at Manila, also on the 11th, extended the paternalistic principle of President Roosevelt's foreign policy to his Philippine policy, and this in accordance with President Roosevelt's instructions. The Secretary explained to the Filipinos that American sentiment regarding them and their country may be grouped in four classifications: the "real imperialistic idea" of holding the Philippines for the purpose of extending the power of the American government in the Orient for business reasons; the idea of independence for the sake of ridding the United States of the burdens of the Philippine government; the idea of independence for the sake of the American prin-

ciple of self-government; and the idea that the United States are trustees of the political rights and destinies of the Filipinos.

The last is the idea of which President Roosevelt is chief exponent, according to Secretary Taft; and he had instructed Secretary Taft, as the latter expressly stated, to say to the Filipinos that he "feels charged with the duty of proceeding on this policy and maintaining the sovereignty of the United States" in the Philippines, "as an instrument of the gradual education and elevation of the whole Filipino people to a self-governing community." When this work of elevation is to be regarded as complete, and the trusteeship at an end, is not clearly foreshadowed, although Secretary Taft hints at its continuing "a generation and probably longer." And whether or not the trusteeship will be relinquished when its paternal purpose is served, is likewise indefinite. It is made to depend by Secretary Taft upon "the individuals who will control the two nations"—he should have said "the stronger of the two nations"—a generation or two hence. As evidence of our good faith in all such cases, President Roosevelt pointed with pride in his Chautauqua speech to "the way in which we liberated Cuba."

Our liberation of Cuba.

Our behavior toward Cuba is not, unfortunately, as much of a guarantee of our good intentions in the pursuit of the benevolent foreign policy of "bearing one another's burdens," as President Roosevelt appears to regard it. We may, truly enough, take genuine pride, as his speech has reminded us, in the fact that we liberated Cuba; but the worthiness of our pride must be largely due to the novelty of the act. We are not famous for liberating. Mr. Roosevelt's party has stood sturdily for the doctrine that the flag once up must never come down. Instead, for instance, of liberating Porto Rico

we have appropriated her. We should have appropriated Cuba also, as everyone with a memory knows, if our treaty of peace with Spain had not forbidden it; and the treaty of peace would not have forbidden it if in making war upon Spain Congress had not solemnly declared to the world that we had no purpose of acquiring Cuba. We liberated Cuba because we had bound ourselves to do so. Even at that, the liberation was but barely secured and at the price of concessions from Cuba which we had no right in honor or justice to demand. If the Filipinos have no better guarantee of independence than the precedent of our liberation of Cuba, to which we were bound by a declaration and a treaty that we regard as inapplicable to the Philippines, not even the additional assurance of an after-dinner promise by Secretary Taft, redeemable a generation or more hence, if our posterity then consent, is sufficient to justify confidence in a restoration to the Filipinos of that promising republic of theirs which our nation most wantonly and wickedly destroyed.

President Roosevelt's domestic policy.

Like the foreign policy outlined in his Chautauqua speech, President Roosevelt's domestic policy relative to corporations, outlined in the same speech, is also frankly paternalistic. He proposes that all corporations engaged in inter-State commerce shall "be under the supervision of the national government." This does not mean that they shall be under that supervision in the manner in which all corporations and all persons must be subject to appropriate governmental authority, for the prevention of injuries and the redress of wrongs. It means that the jurisdiction of the States in this respect shall be abrogated, and that complete regulative power shall be vested in a Washington bureau. For Mr. Roosevelt, somewhat vaguely yet clearly enough, explained, when urging his policy, that in such matters the jurisdiction of the Federal government is

supreme when it chooses to exercise it.

What he evidently intends is not merely that the Washington bureau shall restrain the corporations of one State from operating in another if their operations are contrary to Federal statutes, but that this bureau shall have the larger power of authorizing the corporations of any State to operate in any other State, even against the will, the policy and the laws of the State they are thus authorized to invade. In other words, President Roosevelt's domestic policy in this particular contemplates plenary bureaucratic regulation and control by the Federal government of all inter-State trade. This would soon result in a greater centralization of power at Washington over the American empire, than that which is exercised from London over the British Empire.

President Roosevelt's paternalism.

Not only in the specific statement of his points of foreign and domestic policy, which he made at Chautauqua, but also in the vein of theory that ran through his speech, President Roosevelt showed what those of us who have watched his career for the past twenty years have observed, that in so far as he is not moved by personal considerations in his attitude toward public affairs, he is moved by the philosophy of paternalism. His idea of a well-ordered society is paternalistic, and nothing but paternalistic. It is one which regards home affairs, public and private, as things to be paternally regulated, in general and in details, by a powerful central government, operating benevolently through administrative bureaus responsible to a governmental head-center; and it contemplates foreign affairs as consisting in a paternal regulation of little nations in return for protecting them from the aggressions of big ones. This Rooseveltian idea stands out clear and unafraid in the Chautauqua speech. It is despotism, of

course, and with nothing to recommend it but that which despotism always pleads in its own defense: its benevolent and ethical purpose. The plea is now as always a bad one. Even if benevolent and ethical despotism were a good thing, who could guarantee the benevolence and vouch for the ethics of the despot? Much wiser than his Philippine policy is the sentiment of President Roosevelt's letter to the Negro business men's convention at New York on the 16th, in which he advised the Negro race that, "It is as true of a race as of an individual, that while outsiders can help to a certain degree, yet the real help must come in the shape of self-help." Why is that true of oppressed American Negroes seeking protection, and not true of conquered Filipinos seeking independence?

Good municipal government.

Persons who become enthusiastic over the work of good government clubs, which usually distinguish the wicked by their raiment, may reflect with profit upon this really profound editorial observation of the New York Mail of the 5th: "It is something, it is much, for any city to have a mayor that will not take orders from dives. But it is far more to have a mayor that will not take orders from anybody, for at the last analysis the order comes from a public service corporation, and its purpose is to despoil the community."

Mayor Dunne's traction plan.

Mayor Dunne has removed all public excuse for supposing that in recommending his "contract plan" for introducing municipal ownership and operation of the Chicago street car system (p. 296), he contemplated abandoning his original policy. In an interview on the subject, published in the Examiner of the 21st, he distinctly said of his contract plan:

The plan was devised that we might get immediate action. The sole purpose of the building company is to bridge over the time that must necessarily elapse before the city can pay for the property and take over the operation. If we could buy the lines to-day, or even if we owned them, we could not operate, and some such plan as that I have proposed would have to