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When the late Henry D. Lloyd induced the Chicago Federation of Labor to call upon its delegates and other citizens to attend the meetings of the city council (p. 394) for the purpose of watching the behavior of that body in connection with pending negotia tions for extending the franchises of the street car corporations, most of the local newspapers—those under the influence of franchise grabbers—denounced the proposal as an attempt to coerce councilmen by intimidation.

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There was no such design, nor did the outcome lend any color to the suspicions of the newspapers. On the contrary the response to this call which Mr. Lloyd had inspired was of a character that would have gratified him had he been alive, and that should gratify every good citizen. In the gallery of the council chamber on the 28th there gathered a large crowd of the kind of citizens who are not easily fooled and whose rights cannot be lightly trifled with. The crowd was orderly and quiet throughout the entire proceedings. It was there to watch, not to disturb. If every council meeting were under the surveillance of such a body of spectators it would be a good thing for city government; and it is sincerely to be hoped that Chicago citizens of the same type will make it their special business to be in the coun cil room gallery every Monday night henceforth, at least until the traction question is settled, and to observe the impressive and effective decorum which characterized the crowd that gathered there last Monday night.

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So far from being coercive of any councilman, this manifestation of good citizenship is necessary for the encouragement of councilmen who mean well but are in fear of the secret methods of coercion which rich and respectable "grafters" and their subservient newspapers are resorting to in behalf of traction interests. Confronted as such councilmen are by this secret but powerful coercion, they can hardly be blamed for neglecting their pledges to the people, if the people exhibit no disposition to en courage them. While the presence in the council room gallery of a large body of sane citizens opposed to franchise "grafting" cannot intimidate a single "boodler" who supports the corporations for pay, nor a single Hamiltonian who supports them because he does not trust the people, it can encourage councilmen who shrink from the dangerous task of defying the coercion of the corporations. The people of Chicago should leave no honest and really democratic councilman to fight their battles in the council cham ber alone. They should bring to the support of every pledged but timid member all the encouragement which their presence in the gallery is capable of giving.

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That it is no light matter for councilmen to defy the Chicago corporations is observed by Lincoln Steffens in his able and for the most part admirable article on Chicago in the October McClure's. In telling of the partial renovation of the council accomplished by the Municipal Voters' League, Mr. Steffens explains how the "business men" of Chicago like it. "They don't like it at all," he says, and then tells why:

> I spent one whole forenoon calling on the presidents of banks, great business men, and financiers interested in public utility companies. With all the evidence I had in other places that these men are the chief source of corruption, I was unprepared for the sensation of that day. Those financial leaders of Chicago were "mad." All but one of them became so enraged as they talked that they could not behave decently. They rose up, purple in the face, and cursed reform. They said it had hurt business; it had hurt the town. "Anarchy," they called it; "socialism." They named corporations that had left the city; they named others that had planned to come there and had gone elsewhere. They offered me facts and figures to prove that the city was damaged. "But isn't the reform council honest?" I asked. "Honest! Yes, but—oh, h—l!" "And do you realize that all you say means that you regret the passing of boodle and would prefer to have back the old corrupt council?" That brought a curse or a shrewd smile or a cynical laugh, but that they regretted the passing of the boodle regime is the fact, bitter, astonishing,—but natural enough.

That being the attitude of the "presidents of banks, great business men, and financiers interested in public utility companies," encouraged as they are in subtle ways by the most respectable newspapers of the city, how long before "the old corrupt council" will come back again—and without waiting for a new election, either—if the masses of the people themselves do not openly encourage councilmen to stand firm to their pledges?

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Indeed, it is not necessary that vulgar "boodling" should be resumed in order to place the city, as completely as vulgar boodling itself could do it, at the mercy of the "presidents of banks, great business men, and financiers interested in public utility companies." Many of the reform councilmen, personally honest men (as personal honesty goes) are Hamiltonians in political principle and

"financiers" in class association. As Hamiltonians they are on principle opposed to allowing the city to perform any functions that can be farmed out; and as "financiers" they are hungry for investments, strenuous for the sanctity of investments, and fearful of anything which may "hurt the town" and thereby contract investments. In their latter character they personify in a small way the sentiment of John Randolph of Roanoke, when he said that there is nothing more timid than a million dollars except two million.

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Besides those dangerous elements in the Chicago council—the elements of vulgar "boodle" and of respectable financiering "graft,"—which could not probably be influenced by the attendance of honest and indignant citizens in large numbers at the council meetings during the present critical period of the traction question, there is the element of mental indolence unstirred by any perception of civic ideals. To what extent this affects the aldermanic members of the council, only the result can reveal. Even that may not reveal it, for there are times when the "boodler" and the lazy alderman are on the same side and no one can tell which one gets the bribe and which is honest but lazy. Although there is no light on this point as to the aldermen, Mr. Steffens has thrown out a ray or two as to the Mayor. In the same article in McClure's he says of Mayor Harrison:

> He is an honest man personally, but indolent; a shrewd politician, and a character with reserve power, but he has no initial energy. Without ideals he does only what is demanded of him. He does not seem to know wrong is wrong, till he is taught; nor to care, till criticism arouses his political sense of popular requirement. That sense is keen, but think of it: Every time Chicago wants to go ahead a foot it has first to push its mayor up inch by inch.

Whether this is a correct description of Mayor Harrison's character or not, it doubtless describes the character of more than one alderman. Such officials need to be aroused from their indolence and inspired with civic ideals to a degree sufficient at least to assure their active opposition to the traction plans which certain robust Hamiltonian leaders and "business men" both within and without the Chicago city council are now cooking up with the traction companies and Judge Grosscup's receivers (p. 248). These are the men that can be encouraged, by a regular and orderly attendance of good citizens at the council meetings, to redeem their pre-election pledges.

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What are those pledges? They are pledges to do precisely the reverse of what the traction ring is arranging to do. The ring is arranging to defer municipal ownership of the Chicago street car systems by secret negotiations for franchise extensions; the council (all the aldermen of both political parties and the Mayor) are pledged to secure municipal ownership at the earliest practicable moment—immediately if possible. That this reform is possible immediately, we shall show farther on. For the present we stop to prove the pledges and to justify the suspicion that there are plans on foot to repudiate them.

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At the municipal election in Chicago in April, 1902, the people voted on the question of municipal ownership of the street car systems. The vote was taken under a "public policy" law, which is peculiar to Illinois. It provides for a referendum, not mandatory but advisory. On this question the vote stood (vol. v, p. 11) 142,826 in the affirmative and only 27,998 in the negative. At the next municipal election both parties were consequently well disposed toward the municipal ownership idea, although the Republican convention of March 7, 1903, disclosed marked indications of corporation influence. Yet it did declare (vol. v, p. 775) for what its representatives are now trying to dodge, namely:

> Immediate enabling legislation giving to Chicago the power and authority to own and operate street railways and other public utilities.

The platform of the Democratic convention, held March 16, 1903, (vol. v, p. 791) appeared to be free from corporation influence. It declared:

> We insist that it is more important that the traction question be settled right than that it be settled speedily.

It also demanded—

> the passage by the legislature of a municipal ownership enabling act, this to be an absolute prerequisite to any consideration of the traction question.

Also—

> The reference of all proposed extension ordinances to a vote of the people for their sanction and indorsement.

Also—

> provision for municipal ownership at the earliest possible date.

Moreover Mayor Harrison issued a public statement (p. 6) upon his reelection in which he said:

> I am willing to take up the settlement of the traction question at any time. It must be understood in advance, however, that no ordinance is to be passed until the legislature has given Chicago the right to own and operate street car lines.

It is obvious that the intention of these pledges was to assure the people of Chicago that there should be no extension of franchises—not even a consideration of the question of extensions—until an enabling act empowering the city to provide for municipal ownership had become law in Chicago.

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But no such act is law in Chicago yet; and unless appearances are deceptive the city council intends to extend the street car franchises before any such act can become law in Chicago. The apparent purpose is to extend the franchises pursuant to the old laws, which have no provision for municipal ownership. This is the fraud that seems about to be practiced upon the people in the interest of "presidents of banks, great business men, and financiers interested in public utility companies."

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True enough, the legislature has enacted a municipal ownership enabling act. It is known as the Mueller act. Both candidates for mayor insisted upon its enactment, and large committees went

to Springfield to urge it. It was finally passed as the result of a riot (pp. 59, 97) in the lower House of the legislature. But this act contains the following clause:

> This act shall not be in force in any city until the question of its adoption in such city shall first have been submitted to the electors of such city, and approved by a majority of those voting thereon.

Consequently the Mueller act is not law in Chicago; for no popular vote has yet been taken. Nor can that be done until the city council orders the submission of the act to popular vote. The question of municipal ownership in Chicago is therefore in precisely the same condition as if the Mueller law had never been enacted by the legislature. Until the city council orders this law to be submitted to the people of Chicago all the party and personal pledges remain unredeemed; and if the council should extend the corporation franchises before the people of Chicago vote upon the adoption of the Mueller act, those pledges will have been plainly repudiated.

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That repudiation is designed may be fairly inferred from several facts. A petition to submit the Mueller law to popular vote was presented to the city council several months ago. The council referred it to the committee which is negotiating with the corporations for an extension of franchises, and that committee has pigeon-holed it. It was ordered to report back in two weeks; over three months have elapsed, but it has done nothing. Why that delay?

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Consider the next fact: While disregarding its instructions as to the Mueller act, this committee has practically completed negotiations with the traction corporations for an extension of franchises—so, at least, one of its members is reported as saying. But the proposed extension ordinance is withheld from inspection. The whole subject is enveloped in secrecy by the very committee which has pigeon-holed the petition for giving legal vitality in Chicago to the Mueller act. The reasonable suspicion consequently arises, that the council is being used by what Lincoln Steffens calls "the presidents of banks, great business men, and financiers of public utility companies," —used by them to extend corporate franchises before the Mueller act becomes operative, thereby evading its provisions and violating the spirit if not the very letter of all pre-election pledges.

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But "of what avail would the Mueller act be if it were made a law in Chicago before franchises are extended?" "The franchises would have to be extended anyhow, for municipal ownership would be impossible for years, even if the Mueller act were adopted forthwith." Such is the substance of the explanations that official triflers are advancing for their purposed perfidy. These explanations rest upon the notion that litigation over the 99-year franchise (p. 195) would stave off municipal ownership—the extraordinary proceedings before Judge Grosscup being referred to as an instance of the obstacles to early municipal ownership. The fact is, however, that all those obstacles would melt away at once if the Mueller act were adopted. Not only is this the fact, but there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the multifarious representatives of and apologists for the traction interests, both within and without the city council, know it to be the fact.

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Our reasons for saying that all obstacles to immediate municipal ownership in Chicago would melt away if the Mueller act were adopted, refer both to legal and to financial obstacles—to the only objections that are urged. As to financial obstacles, the Mueller act makes sufficient provision for overcoming them. It would allow the city to issue "street railway certificates," amply secured, to the full cost of the property, with ten per cent. added for working capital. As to legal obstacles, the power to condemn, which the Mueller act would give, disposes of them all—the 99-year franchise included. If the Mueller act were in force in Chicago to-day, condemnation proceedings against the traction companies could begin to-morrow; and under a procedure which the monopoly corporations themselves have built up, the whole street railroad system could be lawfully acquired and put in operation under municipal ownership, probably before another year had run its course. This is the opinion of Charles L. Bonney, a leading Chicago expert in traction law; and his opinion is confirmed by other prominent Chicago lawyers. All that is needed as the first of three steps is the submission by the city council of the Mueller act to the people. The second step would be its adoption. Condemnation proceedings would be the third.

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Mayor Harrison is reported as saying that it makes no difference whether the Mueller act is adopted before an extension of old franchises or not. The reason he gives is that the powers under the Mueller act can be availed of in behalf of municipal ownership by the retroactive clause of the act, which reads:

> If the city council in any city shall incorporate in any grant to a private company of the right to construct or operate street railways, a provision reserving to such city the right to take over such street railways at or before the expiration of the grant, in case the people of such city shall later adopt this act as herein provided, such provision shall be as valid and effective for all purposes, in case such city shall later adopt this act as herein provided as if the said provision were made a part of such grant after the adoption by the city.

If Mayor Harrison is correctly reported, he would appear to be endeavoring to justify Mr. Steffens's picturesque estimate of him. True enough, the city might take over the street car systems even if the Mueller act were not adopted until after franchises had been extended, provided a reservation to that effect were made in the extension ordinance. But not so if no reservation were made. Not so in any manner other than as

provided in the contract of reservation. Not so upon any better terms than those of the reservation, however onerous. On the other hand, if the Mueller act were adopted before the granting of franchise extensions, the property of the companies could be condemned by regular condemnation proceedings, its value being determined not by secret contract with a councilmanic committee but by fair assessment by a jury. Does not Mayor Harrison realize that there is suspicious method in this mad hurry scurry to rush through franchise extensions before submitting the Mueller act to the people? A later interview indicates that he does. In this he is reported as saying:

> The law provides that it may be voted on for adoption at any general or special election. That means that if there is a general or special election, on that day the law may also be voted on. There is no general or special election until next Spring. I think it likely the bill must be submitted at the Spring election before a franchise extension ordinance can be passed, judging from present indications.

Gov. Cummins, of Iowa, has given the Republican party a new "Iowa Idea." Driven by the national bosses of his party to abandon his attack upon the sacred tariff as a "shelter for monopoly," he now comes to the defense of the tariff with this extraordinary doctrine:

> The chief purpose of government is to prevent natural consequences and to restrain the operation of natural law. Free commerce is no more sacred than freebooting or free killing.

One noticeable thing about this idea of government is its conformity with the idea of the anarchists. They also hold that "the chief purpose of government is to prevent natural consequences and to restrain the operation of natural law." They differ from Gov. Cummins only in the application of their common doctrine. Because they regard that as the chief purpose of government, they object to government; they believe in natural law. But Gov. Cummins, for the same reason, approves of government; he does not believe in natural law. If Gov. Cummins isn't making fun of protection, any well-balanced man must prefer the anarchist idea of government to his. For if the chief purpose of government really is to restrain the operation of natural law, so much the worse for government and not so much the better for tariffs.

Mrs. Stuyvesant Fish, one of the aristocracy of our world-power republic, is a thoroughly likable woman, she is so delightfully candid. Most of her set pretend; she does not. She is an aristocrat and knows it; her country is developing classes, and she knows that; and believing it all to be a good thing, she frankly says so. Would that the rest of her class would declare themselves as candidly as did Mrs. Fish the other day when she said to a Chicago Tribune correspondent at St. Louis:

> I do not believe in equality; it would never do. We are coming more and more to have an aristocracy and a common people. I do not believe in being too democratic. Europe is older than we, and she cannot get along without the different classes.

A REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE AND THE SINGLE TAX.

Mr. Myron T. Herrick, the Republican candidate for governor of Ohio, has raised the single tax question in his campaign in that State, doing so upon no better basis than the fact that his adversary is a well-known believer in single tax principles.

In fact, the single tax question is not at issue in Ohio. If Mr. Johnson instead of Mr. Herrick were elected governor, the single tax policy could not be adopted. The single tax policy cannot be adopted in Ohio without a single tax amendment to the State constitution, and that cannot be accomplished without a direct vote by the people.

But, issue or no issue, Mr. Herrick raises the question. He makes no argument in support of his assertions. To do that would fall beneath the dignity of a candidate whose object seems to be not to discuss public questions but to appeal to what he supposes to be public prejudices. Since Mr. Herrick has gone thus far, however, it is proper to meet his assertions, leaving him to defend them or to hold his peace as may seem the more discreet to himself.

As Mr. Herrick read his speech from a manuscript, which has been published in full, we are able to reproduce his very words. He read this manuscript at the opening meeting of the Republican campaign on the 19th of September, at Chillicothe, and we take his words from the verbatim reproduction of that manuscript in the Cleveland Plain Dealer of September 20, as follows:

> The only issue between the parties this year, having reference to taxation, is whether taxes raised for the maintenance of the State and its counties and municipalities, shall be raised in accord with methods long approved, not only in the State of Ohio, but in the other States of the Union, and whether we shall make such improvements by legislation, as experience has taught us can be safely made for the benefit of all citizens of the State, or whether we shall discard all recognized proper methods of taxation and adopt the methods based upon the speculative theories of Henry George and his followers. It is fair to discuss single tax, because the leader of the present Ohio Democracy has declared for it, and is supported on the stump by recognized exponents of that doctrine. I cannot resist calling public attention, in brief, to the fact that such a tax is objectionable to all classes, because it abolishes all plans of established revenue service; it prevents the assessment of desirable excise; it cannot be equitably assessed; it threatens free institutions; it cuts off the possibility of taxing trusts and corporations; it is unjust and not universal; it puts the whole burden of revenue on the few, and not equally; it makes the farmer and the home-owner overpay, and the dangerous forms of wealth escape; it would not remove a single hardship, it would not relieve the poor, would not reach the so-called monopolistic class, and, above all, has been a disastrous failure in the only instances of experience. Contemplating what we have, we can ill afford to sanction, even by the inference of indorsement, Ohio's commendation of such a peril.

Let us arrange Mr. Herrick's points of objection to the single tax in such manner as to make each stand out in full relief. He denounces this method of taxation as objectionable to all classes, because—

1. It abolishes all plans of es tablished revenue service;