

polled for their candidate 18 per cent of the popular vote and 23 per cent of the electoral vote, in a quadrilateral contest. This result testifies strongly enough to the fact that their party was one of some moment. The second notable bolt was that of 1848, out of which the Free Soil party sprang. Two factions of the Democratic party had come to the national convention from New York, each claiming to represent the Democracy of that State. Both were admitted, with half a vote. But the democratic faction, strongly anti-slavery, refused the compromise and bolted. In June the bolters held a State convention which called a national convention. The latter met in August and nominated Martin Van Buren. At the election following this party polled 10.14 per cent of the total vote in a tri-lateral contest, which is about 1.5 per cent more than Gen. Weaver polled in the phenomenal Populist year of '92. That fact should entitle the Free Soil party to be regarded as a party of some moment. Bolts are of moment when there is a strong popular sentiment back of them. Without that, no independent political movement is of any moment, as a political movement, whether it originates in a spontaneous bolt or in a premature organization.

In closing this discussion let us assure Mr. Edgerton and his sympathizing associates in the Denver movement, that we have no more idea of getting in the way of their efforts to bring about "a union of reform forces" than of obstructing the latest inventor of a perpetual motion machine. Their task is hopeless enough in itself. But this movement—insignificant of popular endorsement as the size of its conference showed it to be, and hopeless as its purpose of uniting the irreconcilable "reform forces" in a side party is—is nevertheless a subject for fair comment. We have made and shall make no other kind. It is also an object for con-

demnation. This may seem unfair to its supporters. But condemnation is both the right and a duty of those who from observation and experience have learned that under our present political system side parties fritter away energy in "futile banding," even at the best, while at the worst they fall a prey to petty "grafters" from within and plutocratic politicians from without. As we have on other occasions definitely and circumstantially pointed out (vol. iv., p. 3), no third party is ever likely to be anything but a futile or otherwise objectionable side party, unless it rises spontaneously out of a great popular demand and quickly becomes either the first party or the second. Real political parties are born, not made.

The Grover Cleveland organ of Chicago represents the shameless mendacity and malignant hatred of the whole tribe toward Bryan. "During the last eight years," says this organ in its issue of the 10th, "Mr. Bryan has had no visible means of support. He has traveled extensively. He has not done a day's work in any honest occupation. He has had no business. He has not even pretended to be a lawyer. Yet in that time he has grown rich." To readers who know the facts, the foregoing statement is so transparent a lie, that it must defeat its own purpose. A man whose extensive traveling is for the most part as a lecturer commanding and everywhere conceded to be deserving of high pay, and whose daily work consists in editing a weekly paper of exceptional popularity and influence, which has a circulation of 150,000 copies and is his own property through no one's favor, is not to be regarded by candid men, however hostile their feelings, as an idler who has grown rich without visible means of support. But if the misrepresentations of the Chicago Chronicle are made so blunderingly as to be self-destructive, that is not the case with the equally mendacious criticisms with which Eastern

papers of the Cleveland cult stuff their gullible readers. Yet it all has its funny side. The gullers pretend and the gulled believe that Bryan, whose popularity throws them both into spasms of fear, is an innocuous "has-been"! By the way, speaking of getting rich without visible means of support, why are the friends of Mr. Cleveland so reluctant to explain that enigma in his behalf?

PSYCHOLOGY OF NEGRO LYNCHING.

In his complimentary letter of last week to Gov. Durbin, of Indiana, President Roosevelt very properly condemns the Negro lynchings that have become so ominously prevalent.

Less ambiguity might have been desired in some respects. When, for instance, the President writes that "The nation, like the individual, cannot commit a crime with impunity," the reader is encouraged to hope for a revival of genuine national morality in an unexpected place. And his satisfaction grows as, reading on, he finds the President sounding this true note of warning: "If we are guilty of lawlessness and brutal violence, whether our guilt consists in actual participation therein or in mere connivance and encouragement, we shall assuredly suffer later on because of what we have done." But there is a natural reaction of feeling when the President indicates that by "crime" and "lawlessness" he alludes not at all to defiance of the moral law but only to infractions of statutory regulations. "The corner stone of this republic," he goes on to say, "as of all free governments, is respect for and obedience to the law." That seems, at least, to refer only to municipal law and not to moral principle. And in another part of the letter the reference is confirmed; for there the President writes about penal statutes as if their proper object were vengeance—not reform of the criminal nor protection for the community, but ven-

geance. "It certainly ought to be possible," he writes at this point, "by the proper administration of the laws to secure swift vengeance upon the criminal; and the best and immediate efforts of all legislators, judges and citizens should be addressed to securing such reforms in our legal procedure as to leave no vestige of excuse for those misguided men who undertake to reap vengeance through violent methods." It would appear, then, that President Roosevelt thinks of criminal law only as a decent substitute for lynching; and that his ideas of social order do not go beneath the surface of obedience to statutory regulations, be they morally right or wrong.

But allowance must be made both for the inadequacy of language and for Mr. Roosevelt's verbal habits. It may be that he does allude to a higher law, and seems not to only because, his attention being fixed upon a moral crime which contravenes statutory regulations, he unconsciously emphasizes the latter. There is confirmation for this inference, also, in other parts of his letter. For it is possible to conclude, after some reading between the lines, that President Roosevelt really recognizes, in a vague way, that the Negro lynchings are but manifestations of a spirit of moral lawlessness which by no means confines itself to the race problem.

Respect for statutory regulations, merely as such, is, indeed, a thing to be rationally inculcated. Peace and order do depend, in a very large measure, upon observance of such regulations. Whether the law of the road, for instance, requires you to turn to the right or to the left, you ought to respect it. Yet it makes no difference which way it requires you to turn. All that is needed is uniformity, for the sake of peace and order. So is it with many other statutory regulations.

But there are statutory regulations regarding which it does make a difference, a very great

difference, which way they require you to turn. These are regulations that either express or defy the moral law. Of the former class are those that forbid murder; of the latter are such as support slavery. The one are to be respected, the other condemned.

He who refrains from murdering merely because human law forbids it, and who promotes slavery because human law supports it, exalts human law above moral law. He is a mere legalist, not a moralist. Whether a thing is right or wrong, he cannot tell you until he has read the session laws. Such a man would commit murder without compunction if human restraints were removed. Nor does he always require those restraints to be removed formally. Although the session laws are held in higher esteem by your legalist than is the moral law, he never hesitates to regard them as repealed the moment he knows they cannot be enforced. Therein may be found an explanation of Negro lynching. Lynching is murder. It is morally wrong. Not only is it morally wrong, it is legally wrong. But in respect of Negroes its illegality has been informally set aside under certain circumstances. In the mind of the legalist, therefore, there is nothing wrong in murdering Negroes under those circumstances.

This view of the psychology of Negro lynching was recently set forth with great clearness by Prof. William James, the distinguished psychologist, of Harvard, in an article in the Springfield Republican. Says Prof. James:

I find it hard to comprehend the ignorance of history and of human nature which allows people still to think of Negro lynching as of a transient contagion destined soon to exhaust its virulence. It is, on the contrary, a profound social disease, spreading now like forest fire, and certain to become permanently endemic in every corner of our country, North and South, unless heroic remedies are swiftly adopted to check it. . . . The North is already almost as fully inoculated as the South, and the young white American of the lower classes is

being educated everywhere with appalling rapidity to understand that any Negro accused of crime is public spoil, to be played with as long as the fun will last. Attempts at general massacres of Negroes are certain to be the next thing in order, and collective reprisals by Negroes are equally certain. The average church-going civilizee realizes, one may say, absolutely nothing of the deeper currents of human nature, or of the aboriginal capacity for murderous excitement which lies sleeping even in his own bosom. Religion, custom, law and education have been piling their pressure upon him for centuries mainly with the one intent that his homicidal potentialities should be kept under. . . . But the water-tight compartment in which the carnivora within us is confined is artificial and not organic. It never will be organic. The slightest diminution of external pressure, the slightest loophole of licensed exception, will make the whole system leaky, and murder will again grow rampant. . . . Negro lynching is already a permitted exception in the midst of our civilization. . . . One or two real fanatics there may be in every lynching, actuated by a maniacal sense of punitive justice. They are a kind of "reversion," which civilization particularly requires to extirpate. The other accomplices are only average men, victims of the moment when the greatest atrocities are committed, of nothing but irresponsible mob contagion, but invited to become part of the mob and predisposed to the peculiar sort of contagion, by the diabolical education which the incessant examples of the custom and of its continued impunity are spreading with fearful rapidity throughout our population. Was ever such a privilege offered? Dog fights, prize fights, bull fights, what are they to a man hunt and a Negro burning?

Commenting upon what it justly calls this "acute analysis of the lynching mania," The Nation carries the logic of the analysis a step farther. At least it points more definitely than does Prof. James to the possibilities of a complete subversion of social peace, in which the race problem will have ceased to be a factor:

The whole phenomenon, with the steady march of lawlessness and ferocity to the North, is enough to stagger the stoutest patriot. We are in the presence of a new national peril. Senator Tillman is quite right in maintaining that lynching can no longer be said to be sectional. As a nation, we are disgraced by it. As a nation we are also put in imminent danger by it. For let no man attempt to deceive the people with smooth words. Prof. James is irrefragable. A plague worse than the cholera is upon us. Epidemic lawlessness, stamped all over with fiendish

brutality, is a thousand-fold more to be dreaded than epidemic disease. There is no need to waste breath in either describing or denouncing the frightful evil. Every man not steeped in ignorance or lapped in delusion knows what it is—knows that it is not merely making us a hissing and scorn in the eyes of the world, but is undermining our own safety, and causing American society to revert to the time when no man knew at what moment a savage foe might not spring upon him from ambush. The time has passed to apologize for lynching, or even to explain it; and we must all unite to put it down if we would not see it topple all our laws and courts into the abyss.

But both Prof. James and The Nation fall short, as does President Roosevelt, when they come to deal with remedies. Prof. James calls for special legislation, of a kind apparently which would itself be lynch law under a different name—the law of irresponsible tyranny instead of the law of the murderous mob. The Nation does much better. It calls for no special legislation, saying—

There are laws enough. The statutes against murder are ample—and lynching is murder. If governors and sheriffs and police officers will enforce the present laws up to the hilt, we need ask no further enactments against lynch-ers. Let every officer who refuses to parley with the mob, and talks to it in the only language it can understand, receive a special meed of praise from his fellow citizens. That sheriff in Danville, who stood to his guns and disabled a dozen of the rioters, deserves well not only of his county and state, but of the entire nation. He did what he could to strike down an enemy more formidable than any foreign levy. It was upon the fanged head of the new domestic treason that he set his heel. If the citizens of Illinois know what becomes them at such a moment, they will find some means of testifying their gratitude to Sheriff Whitlock for his great public service. Sheriffs everywhere must be given to understand that this is what is expected of them. It is said that an "ungovernable homicidal instinct" takes possession of the mob; a vision of blood is before them. But if they are made to know that the blood will, in every case, be their own, and not that of a trembling and helpless victim, they will find a way to govern their instincts. It is good psychology as well as good patriotism which calls for the putting down everywhere of the lynching madness with an iron hand that knows no faltering.

That is good as far as it goes. Murderous mobs must be held at

bay and dispersed, by the fullest exercise of all the power that can be brought against them and which the necessities of the case require. But the civilization that stops with suppressing mobs "with an iron hand" is unworthy of the name. Though the iron hand may be at times a terrible necessity in aid of civilization, it is itself neither civilization nor a sign of civilization. Much more than the iron hand is needed—so much more that when we have it there is no necessity for the iron hand. This is dimly recognized by The Nation, for it follows its demand for the iron hand with the following eminently sensible, even if inadequate, appeal to public opinion:

But there is also a great duty laid upon every law-abiding citizen, whether directly in contact with the lynching spirit or not. He must do his part to bring about a correct state of public sentiment. Against all forms of race discrimination he must set his face like a flint; for he will see, if he keeps his eyes open, that the prime initiative of all this shameful access of lynching has been, as Prof. James says, the notion, which has spread with "appalling rapidity," that "any Negro accused of crime is public spoil, to be played with as long as the fun lasts." This is the fruitful mother of all our woes. Even if we thought the Negro always a brute beyond the pale of the law, we should be bound not to assert it, or ever to say thoughtlessly: "Served him right," since through the Negro the licensed mob is striking at our national life, and no man will be safe if the thing goes on. So we affirm that every form of apologetic reference to the lynching mob is, as the case stands to-day, a kind of participation in the crime from which every good citizen will refrain. Let us hear no more about "passional crimes," and "if we were only in their place," or "Could we but see the woman's face." The terrible fact is that we are face to face with a kind of national dementia. We are in danger of going mad. An individual over whom such a peril hangs observes the strictest regimen. So must the nation. We must all desist from countenancing, even in our private speech, even in our secret thoughts, anything but the severest and most sweeping condemnation of lynching. Only so can we nerve the officers of the law to do their duty and prevent all our institutions from tumbling into the pit. In the present hour of peril from furious mobs driven by wild obsessions, we can only denounce as a recreant any man who is able to find words of extenuation or tolerance for them.

This is inadequate, sadly so

from such a source, because the appeal strikes no deeper and rises no higher than President Roosevelt's seems to. It adjures the people to frown upon lynching, merely for self-protection. The moral note is wholly lacking.

We realize, of course, that appeals to the protective instinct may be proper without allusion to moral obligation. But here is a social disease which originates in moral insanity, and from which recovery is impossible without restoration of the moral function. At bottom the Negro lynchings are not attributable to the cause that Prof. James assigns and The Nation adopts. The murderous propensity is secondary. That which, primarily, makes these horrors possible at this stage of our civilization, is a general deadening of the moral sense which has taken place within the past generation or two.

None but the very thoughtless can have failed to observe the loss of that moral sense in the body politic to which it was once possible to appeal. It has been so completely deadened in the individual that in almost any group, churches not excepted, a majority are not only deaf to such appeals, but will bluntly subordinate moral considerations to selfish ones, or deny their existence altogether.

This tendency was most notable in the United States during the American war of conquest in the Philippines, and in England during the British war of conquest in South Africa. But it has been observable for a long time in other connections.

The moral element in the suffrage question, for instance, has been so far ignored in the South that even ballot-box stuffing, in order to deprive one class of the ballot, is approved by public opinion. Both North and South the same moral element has been denied in order to withhold the suffrage from women. Even women suffragists have denied it, so as to enable them consistently to advocate the suffrage for some women while insisting upon denying it to others. In the North especially it is denied for the purpose of propagating the idea of disfranchisement of the "lower" class of white men.

These examples arise out of the "better than thou" feeling—one expression of which is the comfortable idea that "I am fit to vote, but you are not." It is expressed by the millionaire with reference to the "Alameda citizen;" by millionaires and "Alameda citizens" together, with reference to the mechanic; by all three with reference to the common laborer; by the whole four with reference to the Negro; and by some Negroes with reference to others. This pharisaical feeling is a product of the conviction not alone that some men are inferior, but that the "inferior" ones have no rights which the "superior" is under any moral obligation to respect—whether they be rights of suffrage, rights to work and own and trade the products of work, or even the right to live and when dying to die without being brutally tortured.

It is out of the same conviction that there arises that murderous instinct to which Prof. James refers. Given a condition in which one class denies equal rights to another, and you have only to remove the restraints of statutory regulation to see the "inferior" class disfranchised, robbed, mobbed, murdered, and tortured, and the infamy applauded or excused by the public opinion of the "superior" class. The mania for lynching Negroes, this exhilarating man hunt, in which white men are hunters and Negroes the hunted, is not a Negro problem peculiarly. It is a man problem with a moral setting. Negro lynchings are only one expression of a general repudiation of the idea of a moral sense and moral obligations.

And why isn't it logical? If there is no moral law, why shouldn't white men lynch Negroes, provided they get satisfaction out of it and don't get caught? More than that, if there is no moral law, why shouldn't workmen fight each other for jobs—with bricks, or knives, or pistols—if they want to and are strong enough to hold in check the restraints of municipal law? Indeed, why shouldn't they, if there is no moral law, and they can override statutory regulations—why shouldn't they in that case, go a little farther and resort to the lynching method for set-

ting disputes with obdurate employers?

Is it answered that wholly apart from any question of morals society must have peace and its members must have personal security? But it is not true that society must have peace, apart from considerations of justice. To illustrate with extremes: The choice between a society where all members but one are slaves and peace prevails, and a society where all are free and mobs run riot, lies decidedly with the latter. The peace of tyranny is the peace of death. The only peace worth having is the peace that makes for justice. But that peace cannot be considered apart from morals, for justice is of the essence of morals.

Throw morals overboard, and only a choice between the tyrant and the mob remains. No, not even that choice would remain, for first would come the mob and then the dictator. Our own experience proves it. So far as the Negro is concerned, the mob is here; and so far as Prof. James is concerned, the dictator is consequently in effect demanded.

We have invited both. When a people evade moral obligations by running to cover under the theory that there are none, the natural effect is a recession towards the lowest forms of might;—first toward the naked might of the mob, and then toward the naked might of the mob's master. And this running to cover from the demands of the moral law is what our people in all sections have been doing. Our colleges have taught the right of might as "scientific;" our lower schools have chorused the refrain; our honored statesmen have translated the diabolical doctrine into "destiny determines duty;" even our churches have garbed it in ecclesiastical phrase and taught it as the religion of the righteous Nazarene. As with every new disorder our surgeons rush with ready knives to rip out an organ, so with every new demand for justice have our social leaders rushed upon the body politic to rip out a moral principle. At last none are recognized; and the great cumbersome body politic, bereft of moral impulses, has begun to run amuck. Superficial differences of race have made the Ne-

gro its first victim. The labor question offers an inviting field for its insane orgies, when Negroes shall have come to be looked upon as small game for a man hunt. Just where the dictator may step in no one knows. But his advent is certain if the moral insanity that cannot distinguish right from might continues.

Until the people come to their senses, the iron hand may frequently be necessary in dealing with mobs. But it can only check insane outbursts. It cannot cure the insanity; for that is rooted deep in the moral philosophy of the time—the philosophy, namely, that there is no moral philosophy. So long as public opinion is swayed by the doctrine that might makes right, so long will that doctrine express itself terribly on the lower and more brutal planes of injustice. So long, also, will the teachers and exemplars of this indefensible doctrine be primarily responsible for those barbarous expressions of its true character. Its brutal manifestations will disappear when the doctrine is discarded. So, also, will those more subtle manifestations, whereby the privileged are enriched and the industrious impoverished, which make this philosophy acceptable among men of "light, leading and lucre."

The one cure for social disorder, from lynchings to conquests, from petty larceny to monopoly, is the general recognition of the moral law and general acquiescence in its application. Nor is the moral law difficult either to recognize or to apply. As related to society, its root is the principle that with reference to elementary rights—life, liberty and pursuits—none may justly have dominion over others. Its best expression is the golden rule, which requires each to judge the rights of others by the standard he sets up for himself.

Men without moral sense are murderers at heart, as Prof. James says, and are restrained from committing murder only by the pressure of customs and laws. When this external pressure is removed such men will lynch, and hang, and burn, and shoot, and administer water cures to Filipinos, and loot palaces in China, and do

all manner of wickedness. They deny human equality, and to them there is no moral law.

But men with the moral sense are different. They are not murderers at heart. Realizing that every man is their equal, knowing that no one's elementary rights are inferior to their own, perceiving that physical might is essentially a different thing from moral right, and having adopted moral right as their ideal, these men need no external restraints to hold their murderous instincts in check, nor any iron hand to prevent them from murdering their fellow men. Abolish all municipal law, and they would nevertheless harm no one.

The fundamental cause of lawlessness, therefore, is false notions of human inferiority, and consequent indifference to the primary elements of the moral law; its remedy lies in the inculcation of respect for human rights and love for the moral law. In the degree in which the philosophy of moral right is propagated by pulpit, newspaper and high official, and takes possession of the multitude, displacing the prevalent philosophy of physical might—in that degree, and only in that degree, can the peace and order of a true civilization reign undisturbed and unquestioned.

NEWS

Week ending Thursday, Aug. 13.

The long expected Balkan war (vol. v, pp. 712, 728) seems now to be almost certain to break upon Europe. As one of the cable dispatches reports the situation, "Turkey is face to face with another crisis in Macedonia, and war with Bulgaria seems to be a question of the tossing of a coin. The entire Balkan region is aflame and Turkish troops are constantly employed in putting down insurgent bands." A general European war is consequently within the possibilities. For, as the London Spectator has said, "If there is a chance of the revolutionaries succeeding, there would be a horrible scramble, certain before it ends to involve the great neighboring Powers, who cannot be expected to act in concert. The interest of Russia is to make a

Greater Bulgaria, such as the treaty of San Stefano would have built up; the interest of Austria is to clear her road to Salonica, where only she can hope to acquire Oriental trade; and the interest of Italy, or her presumed interest, is to obtain some foothold on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. There will be just the kind of muddle of ambitions, national aspirations, and diplomatic plans which almost invariably ends in an appeal to the sword." The Spectator might have added that Great Britain and Germany would be interested in holding Russia in check, and that France would be interested in supporting Russia in order to retaliate upon Germany and to humiliate Great Britain.

The Balkan region takes its name from the Balkan mountains, the eastern branch of the mountain system which comprehends the ranges of Montenegro, Herzegovina and the Dinaric Alps. The Balkans extend from the plain of Sophia to Cape Emineh, on the Black sea, and, forming the southern boundary of the basin of the Danube, separate Bulgaria from Eastern Rumelia. They are of great strategical importance. The principal route across them is through the Shipka Pass, where one of the fiercest battles of the war of 1877 between Turkey and Russia occurred. At the close of that war the treaty of San Stefano was signed between the belligerent powers. This treaty would have reduced European Turkey to a narrow strip, and have established a Bulgarian nation, including the territory in which revolts against Turkish dominion now threaten the European peace. But England and Germany interfered, jealous of an extension of Russian influence toward the Mediterranean, and a conference of the Great Powers—Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy—was called, which met at Berlin. Abrogating the treaty of San Stefano, this conference substituted for it what is known as the Berlin treaty of 1878, whereby the governmental relations of several Turkish dependencies and of some Turkish territory were re-adjusted.

One of these dependencies was Roumania, consisting of the Danubian principalities that were united in 1861 under that name and had proclaimed independence of Turkey in 1877. Another was Servia, to the throne of which Karageorgevitch ascended as successor to Alexander upon the triumph of the recent Servian revolution (p. 200). A third was Montenegro, which had achieved substantial independence of Turkey as early as 1697, but remained in nominal dependency until the treaty of Berlin. Bosnia and Herzegovina were at this time still Turkish provinces, and what are now known as Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia (or Southern Bulgaria), were also part of the Turkish empire. The Balkan States, therefore, as constituted by the treaty of Berlin, consist of Roumania, Servia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Southern Bulgaria and Bulgaria. The independence of Roumania was recognized by the treaty. So was the independence of Servia. Montenegrin sovereignty, also, was recognized, though with the limitation that the waters of Montenegro should be closed to the ships of war of all nations, and that her maritime and sanitary police should be under the control of Austria. Bosnia and Herzegovina were placed fully under the administration of Austria. Bulgaria was erected by the treaty into a tributary principality under Turkish suzerainty, with the proviso that its local government should be Christian and that it should have a national militia. The prince was to be elected by the people, subject to confirmation, however, by the Sultan, with the consent of the signatory Powers, no member of any of the reigning houses of the great European Powers to be chosen. Eastern Rumelia also was carved out of Turkish territory. It was to remain under the direct political and military authority of Turkey, but with administrative liberties. A revolution broke out seven years later, 1885, when it proclaimed its independence of Turkey and its union with Bulgaria. Thereafter, by consent of the Powers, Turkey agreed to place East Rumelia under the governor-generalship of the Prince of Bulgaria, upon