

country as a whole; it will be better for them as a race. There were sentimental reasons why they should have supported the republican party almost as a body in the years following the acquisition of their rights. These rights had been bestowed by that party, and their bestowal had been wrongfully and foolishly opposed by the so-called democrats. But, if this sense of gratitude had not prevailed, the race question would have been settled in favor of the negro long ago. Had his race split their vote, both political parties would have sought for the largest slice, and each would have electioneered for it. That matter, however, has gone into the past. The present question for the negro to solve, and he must solve it for himself, is whether he will allow his gratitude to the party of Lincoln to make of his race a political attachment to the party of Hanna. From the outrageous treatment his race receives at the hands of some so-called democrats at the south—mere survivals of a period when the democratic party was pro-slavery and imperialistic—he may naturally feel, if he does not stop to analyze conditions, that the democratic party is still the enemy of his race. But if he does analyze he will observe that the democratic party is rapidly becoming the liberty party of the country, while the republican party is as rapidly losing its claim to that title. Old things are passing away in politics; all things are becoming new. Just as an anti-slavery Boutwell comes over from the republicans to the democrats to get away from the new republican doctrine about the subjugation of "inferior races," so the Robert Toombs type of southern democrat is finding his way into the republican party as the only political home for men who believe in that doctrine. Negroes who fall in with this doctrine of subjugating "inferior races" ought to support Mark Hanna's party. Those who believe in equality regardless of race will find in the new democracy the only party that now makes that principle its ideal.

In these days of Christianizing and civilizing of barbarians at the point of the bayonet and the grim music of machine guns, it is worth one's while, for it may help to precipitate the mud of deviltry that beclouds his religious aspirations, to read a book just published by the Cassell company, called "A White Woman in Central Africa." It is by Helen Cad-dick, an English woman. Day by day and night by night she was alone in the charge and at the mercy of barbarian blacks. Yet their respect and care for this white woman could not have been surpassed, if indeed it would have been equaled, in the midst of our boasted Christian civilization. To appreciate a striking difference between "barbarism" and "civilization," one has only to inquire what would be the experience of a black woman who should attempt such a solitary trip through enlightened America as this white woman made through Central Africa!

If imagination fails to indicate how a lone barbarian woman might fare at the hands of civilized men, let this story suggest. It is told by the wife of E. B. Drew, British commissioner of customs at Tientsin, a lady who recently arrived at San Francisco from China and told the story to an Associated Press reporter. We extract it from the Chicago Record of the 8th. Mrs. Drew said of the Russian soldiery (and are not the Russians our civilized allies):

They pillaged, looted, tortured and murdered right and left. There were many infants and children killed by bayonet thrusts. And many were tossed time and again. There is ample evidence of these unspeakable occurrences. And about Chinese women. They were mistreated and murdered in house after house. It seemed as if nothing could stay the mad frenzy of these Russians. Out from Tientsin are numerous little villages. The Russians swept through the villages, destroying life and property. In these places they also tossed infants and older children in the air from bayonets. The Russians also drove women and children into the river, where they were drowned.

In a recent lecture, Prof. Harry

Pratt Judson, of the University of Chicago, touched upon the disposition of some people to think that they are persecuted pioneers of truth when in fact they are justly discredited cranks a few degrees removed from insanity. Because some epithet like "crank" has been applied to all great reformers, these people jump to the conclusion that if they themselves are called cranks they are presumably great reformers whom society will delight to honor. Prof. Judson describes this logic as so deliciously innocent as to be quite irresistible. In that he is quite right. But he clearly mistakes the attitude of mind which likens the treatment of so-called cranks in our day with the scurvy treatment of pioneers of truth in the past. Few so-called cranks try to prove by reference to the similarity of their treatment to that of the treatment of historic reformers that they also are great reformers. What these references to the bad treatment of dead and gone reformers by the thoughtless herd of their time usually mean is that the thoughtless herd now is the same as the thoughtless herd then. Now as aforetime, when something new is proposed, it is denounced and its proposer is crucified, regardless of whether it is a false or true, but simply because it is new and disturbing. In this view of the matter it is the cranks who are right, and not Prof. Judson. Since historic time began, and it was doubtless so long before, every new truth has come into the world as a babe born in a manger, and after confounding in its youth the professors, has been denounced by them and crucified at the behest of the mob, to arise from the dead, glorified at last. As many falsities have gone through the same experience, except the last — for a falsity once killed is killed forever; it has no resurrection—we cannot reasonably infer that persecution is evidence of the truth of the thing persecuted or of the inspiration of its preachers; but we can infer that the wise mob and the foolish mob in all

periods may be depended upon to oppose new truth whenever it rubs up against settled convictions or vested interests.

**THE AMERICAN EXPORT TRADE.**

Foreign markets are commonly supposed to be commercial necessities. More or less intelligently it is assumed that without that outlet domestic markets would be glutted, to the ruin of home business and the impoverishment of home labor through over-production. Why they should be so popular as an outlet is not clear. Overproduction might be avoided as effectually by burning our surplus or dumping it into the ocean as by thrusting it upon other peoples. Probably, however, the preference comes from a vague feeling that foreign markets, while avoiding overproduction, yield affirmative benefits of some sort in addition. Be that as it may, a notion that overproduction at home can be prevented only by opening markets abroad, has in one way and another long influenced the foreign policies of commercial nations.

It explains the "open door" policy in China, which England has made peculiarly her own: she asserts the right of sending her surplus goods to China upon the same terms as to entry as the most favored nation enjoys. It is the meaning, paradoxical as that may seem, of opposition to the "open door": the object of the nations that oppose the policy is a monopoly of Chinese markets for their own surplus goods. It throws light upon the commercial aspects of the colonial policy of this country: upon the theory that exports follow the flag, our colonies are expected to absorb our surplus.

In none of these instances does the question of buying in foreign markets cut any figure. No nation appears to want to buy. Emphasis is placed altogether not upon opportunities for getting goods, but upon opportunities for getting rid of them. So dominant is that theory of commerce that in common speech, and to an astonishing degree in common thought, exporting is classed as the only profitable part of international trade. No nation strives to import; all strive to export.

A little unbiased consideration will show that notion to be erroneous. Profitable trading can consist neither in exporting alone nor in importing alone, but in both exporting and im-

porting. As Henry George explains in the chapter on "Exports and Imports" of his famous and wonderfully lucid book on "Protection or Free Trade,"—

exports and imports, so far as they are induced by trade, are correlative—each being "the cause and complement of the other;" and—

so far from its being the mark of a profitable commerce that the value of a nation's exports exceeds her imports, the reverse of this is true.

But in spite of George's rational view, it is the common belief, as we have already noted—a belief generated by the assumption that a country must get rid of its surplus or suffer the "impoverishment of overproduction"—that every energy of a nation should be directed toward obstructing importation and accelerating exportation. Importing is regarded as augmenting the supply of commodities at home, where there is already a surplus, and consequently as tending to frustrate the prime object of exportation; whereas exporting is curiously supposed to increase the national wealth.

Statistics of excessive exports, therefore, are commonly taken,—not merely by uneducated and inexperienced dupes, but also by professional and business men—as conclusive proof of national prosperity. The Chicago Tribune, for instance, in a recent issue, editorially concluded that as "the nation is now able to export a large proportion of its manufactures," it is "thus annually increasing the total wealth of the people by many millions of dollars."

To that common but absurd notion the McKinley-Roosevelt platform shrewdly appeals. Asserting that the country is extraordinarily prosperous, and claiming for the McKinley administration the credit for having made it so, this platform undertakes to prove both the assertion and the claim in the following clause:

No single fact can more strikingly tell the story of what republican government means to the country than this—that while during the whole period of 107 years, from 1790 to 1897, there was an excess of exports over imports of only \$383,028,497, there has been in the short three years of the present republican administration an excess of exports over imports in the enormous sum of \$1,483,537,094.

The people are thus asked to believe that during McKinley's administration the country has prospered

vastly more than ever before, because it has during that period rolled up an immensely larger balance of exports—that is an immensely greater excess in value of goods sent away over goods received back—than it rolled up during all the previous history of the country. This comparison is treated by the platform, and is being treated by republican editorials, speeches and campaign documents as evidence of a wonderful increase in the aggregate wealth of the country.

But so far as it is evidence of anything, it is evidence of the reverse. Our excessive balance of exports, instead of testifying to an augmentation of wealth at home, testifies to a drain of wealth from home. We shall show the truth of this not alone by reference to general and familiar facts and the elementary principles of common sense, but also from the very collections of commercial statistics upon which the clause of the McKinley-Roosevelt platform quoted above assumes to rest.

II.

Let us at the start give the McKinley administration the benefit of the full balance of excessive exports to the credit of which it is entitled if entitled in this connection to any credit at all. The platform claims a balance of merchandise exports of only \$1,483,537,094. That brings the balance down only to the beginning of March, 1900. But the full amount reported by the treasury department down to the 31st of May, 1900, the date of the last report prior to the McKinley-Roosevelt convention, is not less than \$1,616,432,900.

Our method of arriving at that result may be tested by anyone who cares to take the trouble. From the "Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance of the United States" for May, 1900, issued by the treasury department and to be found in almost any reference library, we gather the data for the following table:

TABLE NO. 1.	
Excess of MERCHANDISE IMPORTS from March 1 to June 30, 1897, the first four months of McKinley's administration ("Monthly Summary," page 335)	\$26,219,675
Excess of MERCHANDISE EXPORTS from June 30, 1897, to June 30, 1899, the next two years of McKinley's administration ("Monthly Summary," page 335)	1,145,307,489
Showing the net excess of MERCHANDISE EXPORTS from the beginning of McKinley's administration to June 30, 1899, to have been	\$1,119,087,814
Excess of MERCHANDISE EXPORTS from June 30, 1899, to May 31, 1900, the date of the lat-	