rests upon the hypothesis that politics is "a dirty pool." Wherever politics is a dirty pool it is made so by dirty men who want it kept so. With school houses for political centers, the slimy influence of dirty men in the political pool would be greatly lessened. To clean dirty pools, let clean currents flow through them.

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Race Hatred.

At the North, antipathy to Negroes is supposed to be peculiar to the South, but that is a mistake. Negroes accused of crime are burned at the South by mobs, but so they are at the North. There are "Jim Crow" cars at the South; but how often do you see a Negro in a dining car or a Pullman sleeper at the North—except as a servant? In that capacity you may see them in "white" cars at the South. But there are instances of anti-Negro prejudice at the North which could hardly be conceived of at the South. For example: The proposal to build at Hyde Park, Chicago, a Home of the Good Shepard for Colored Girls, brought out a meeting of the neighborhood, which, with a single exception, was unanimously opposed to it. The exception was a clergyman whose Christianity seemed to relate to Chicago today no less than to Jerusalem nineteen hundred years ago. He argued that to him human liberty and American citizenship were more sacred than property rights; and the propertied rabble shouted that his sentiment had run away with his reason. Race snobbishness like this is certainly not usual at the South, if it prevails there at all, unless it be with a class which is itself so self-degraded that it needs to degrade another in order to maintain a semblance of superiority. The institution in question was objected to not because it is to be a "rescue home," but because it is to rescue Negro girls. We hesitate to believe that such a manifestation of antipathy toward Negroes would be possible anywhere in the civilized world outside of Hyde Park, Chicago; and but for the testimony of its own citizens we should also give Hyde Park the benefit of a reasonable doubt.

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Roosevelt's Chances.

If Mr. Roosevelt is to be nominated by the national Republican convention on the 6th of June, 1912, he must somehow get a substantial hold on its "machinery." It is true that there is a great deal of "Roosevelt sentiment" in the mind of the Republican masses just now; and there is no doubt that Mr. Taft is laboring under a burden of unpopularity among the very voters who helped to put him in the White House. But the "sentimental" phase of the situation, both as relates to Roosevelt and to Taft, is one thing; the "practical" side of the case is another thing. For while a great deal is being said about people's rule and insurgency, the fact remains that we are still very largely in the grip of the machine system of politics. Though the days of the practical politician seem to be numbered, he is with us yet; and any estimate of Mr. Roosevelt's chances, either as to nomination or as to election if he is nominated, must reckon with this important fact.

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It is clear that the "machinery" of both the great parties is not in the same condition that it was twenty years ago. Of the two, the Republican is in far better shape than the Democratic, from the standpoint of the practical politician. The old Hanna machine, although slightly patched up and lop-sided, still runs on the main track, held together by the cohesive power of plunder and the prestige of many victories. Four years from now, it *may* be on the scrap heap. By the time the Presidential election of 1916 rolls around, we may have preference primaries, Initiative and Referendum, and a number of other accessories of popular government. But at present we don't have these things; or, rather, we don't have them in sufficient measure to affect the situation materially from the practical standpoint. All of which proves that the Republican Presidential situation this year will be shaped, as in the past, by political schemers rather than by real statesmen who are serving the interests of the people. This being the case, it would seem that the fate of Roosevelt's candidacy is to be decided more by machine considerations than by "sentimental" motives.

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Of course, Republican politicians will reckon with sentiment. They are reckoning with it now. But sentiment may not continue exactly in its present form until June, or until November. Mr. Roosevelt's apparent strength now, may turn out to be a tangible weakness if he is once again presented to the country as the official candidate of the Republican party. If he should be nominated in June, his opponents would undoubtedly raise a great clamor about the "third term tradition"; they would point to his declaration that he would not again be a candidate; they would enlarge on his abuses of Executive power; they would insist that the present rise in the cost of living began and gathered headway during his former terms of

office; they might recall his dexterity in raising campaign funds and his lack of dexterity in enforcing the anti-trust law against friends, and they would be pretty sure to scoff at his intimate association with such "progressives" as Mr. Perkins. All this, and much more, could easily operate against a candidate with as extensive a "past" as Mr. Roosevelt.

Then there is the technical problem of the Republican party as a party. How can the party turn Mr. Taft down without at the same time virtually condemning the present Republican administration? And if it condemns Taft by "damning him with faint praise," how can it have the face to claim supreme wisdom as the savior of the nation? A political party must at least have an appearance of consistency. If the Republican party in 1908, aided by Mr. Roosevelt himself, couldn't pick out a candidate that it dare renominate in 1912, is the party going to face the country with a virtual acknowledgement of its own bankruptcy? If it is going to play the game, it has to be "game."

The situation, then, is not so simple as it seemed at first sight. In considering the availability of Mr. Roosevelt as a candidate, the practical politician will inevitably ask whether the popularity of Roosevelt (which has revealed a tendency to "wobble" a bit since his return from Africa) will be strong enough, between June 6th and November 4th, to surmount the disadvantages entailed by repudiating Taft and renominating a man with a record as extensive and vulnerable as that of the Strenuous One. Mr. Roosevelt himself seems to be dimly conscious of this. For while his recent declaration on the Initiative and the Referendum is marked by the absence of his usual "weasel" words, his personal attitude is very "weasely." His practical instincts, like those of the machine politician, restrain him from condemning Mr. Taft; and, like the machine politician, he gives clear evidence that he will support the regular candidate of the "G. O. P.," whoever is nominated. In other words, he does not make a straight-out fight for the nomination regardless of consequences. So it appears that while Mr. Roosevelt's *words* at Columbus reflect public "sentiment," his personal attitude reflects the existing machine situation in politics. This attitude may be worldly-wise. No doubt it is. But the thing that spells wisdom to some observers is the very thing that suggests uncertainty in the matter of renominating and re-electing Theodore Roosevelt.

Traffic Monopolies.

The Interstate Commerce Committee of the lower house of Congress is reported to have adopted a recommendation with reference to the Panama Canal which would apply to all relations of railroads to water shipments and destroy the connection between the two. This proposal would prohibit railroads from owning, leasing, operating, controlling or having any interest whatever, by stock ownership or otherwise, directly or indirectly, through any holding company or in any other manner, in any common carrier by water with which the railroad or other common carrier does or may compete. This is a laudable effort to regulate traffic by setting competition free; but like most efforts of the kind it utterly ignores the key to the problem. If shipping combines own dockage locations, or railroad lines own terminal sites, or a third interest owns one or both, what difference can it make whether or not any of them owns or controls stock in the other?

Patent Monopolies.

By 4 to 3 the Supreme Court of the United States holds that a patent for an invention gives the patentee absolute control over its use—control so absolute that he can prescribe to lessees and purchasers the very terms in every respect upon which they may use it while the patent lasts. Apparently the majority of the Court have decided this case in strict conformity to the patent law. That is, they have decided the rights of litigants under the law as Congress has made the law, instead of making law to suit the circumstances. But in so deciding they give astounding power to patent owners; and for that reason Chief Justice White and two other judges vigorously dissent.

In his dissenting opinion the Chief Justice points out that under this decision the patentee of a sewing machine might require the lessee or purchaser to buy all the thread, needles or oil used with the machine from the patentee. Doubtless this would be so; but it is no answer to the decision of the other judges that such is the law of Congress—*is*, not necessarily *ought to be*. Apparently the Chief Justice and his dissenting associates would like to decide that this is not what Congress intended. But they would thereby make