They put all their emphasis in Clark's behalf upon his having earned public preferment by long and unbroken service to the Democratic organization, right or wrong; they put all their emphasis in criticizing Bryan, upon Clark's past service to him as the Presidential candidate of his party. The whole Clark campaign, so far as his managers have made it public, was a campaign for personal reward. To that end their demands upon Bryan were to redeem personal obligations which they wrongly assumed that he incurred through the support Clark had given to him in three Presidential campaigns, and which Bryan rightly insisted were not in the nature of personal obligations at all. This animus, which permeated the Clark campaign and broke out at the end in spasms of ridiculous indignation, points to the inherent weakness of Mr. Clark's candidacy—the weakness upon which Mr. Taft's managers had shrewdly counted in their solicitude for Mr. Clark's nomination.

We do not happen to know what it was that drove Bryan into making the nomination of his political associate and one-time favorite for the Presidency impossible. For aught we know, he may only have been put upon his guard, as a capable leader, by impressions created by the whole situation whilst it developed before him. Least of all do we suppose that he had any knowledge of the details of the bargain. The details of such bargains, though they leak out, can never be known by others than the parties to them except at second hand and third hand. It will be understood, therefore, that we ourselves claim no absolute knowledge of that bargain. But the farther the matter is probed, the clearer it will probably appear, as we have reason to believe, that the bargain, schemed out by Senator Crane of Massachusetts, had somewhat such a setting as this, namely:—President Taft is satisfactory to the Interests. He has been tried by them and found true to them. It is important to the Interests, therefore, that Taft be nominated by the Republican convention. This suits Senator Crane as far as it goes. But the Interests want some such man as Governor Harmon or Mr. Underwood nominated by the Democrats, so that no matter who wins they will not lose. This does not suit Senator Crane, his sole object being to re-elect Taft. It was incumbent upon him, therefore, not only to force Taft's nomination at Chicago, but to bring about a weak nomination at Baltimore. And almost he did both—not quite but almost. Of course Speaker Clark wasn't promoting Senator Crane's plan consciously. He only happened to fit into it. The Democratic nomination was necessary to Senator Crane's purpose, and Speaker Clark was available; a complication of weaknesses for the fight at the polls was also necessary to the plan, and these, too, Speaker Clark possessed. We do not say this in any derogatory sense. Speaker Clark is an honest, amiable, brilliant, lovable, trusting man of the old type of Southern statemanship; but among the weaker candidates for election he was the strongest for the Democratic nomination; and that was what Crane needed in his plans for Taft. So the *high hand* took care of Taft at Chicago, and the *deft hand* tried to take care of Taft at Baltimore. But Bryan spoiled Senator Crane's game.

Naturally, Mr. Clark's disappointed supporters —both those who were in the secret with Senator Crane and those who were dupes along with Mr. Clark—are resentful, and Bryan is the object of their wrath. Yet Mr. Clark ought to realize that in accusing Bryan after the manner of the Hearst quotation above, he only helps to force public opinion into regarding him as the victim of men whose schemes it would have been wiser for him to have shunned than to have welcomed. The more vigorously he assails Mr. Bryan, the stronger does his unintended tribute to Senator Crane's sagacity become.

Harmony.

The false note at Baltimore was "harmony." The value and the virtue of harmony depend upon the elements to be harmonized; and all that "harmony" meant at Baltimore was Democratic harmony—the harmony of men and interests with nothing in common except a party label and hunger for office. Harmony among men who regard the Belmonts and Murphys and Ryans and Sullivans and Hearsts as faithful Democrats, and those who believe in Bryan and Wilson and their kind, is a sham. Who cares whether the Democratic party displaces the Republican party in power, if the Interests are to own the incomers as they have owned the outgoers? Nobody outside of the pie-counter brigade. By all means let's have harmony; but let's have it between believers in democracy, not pretenders but believers. Between democrats and plutocrats, the more discord the better.

Roosevelt's New Party.

Mr. Roosevelt demands a new party notwith-

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standing Governor Wilson's nomination by the Democrats. Whatever the motive, the argument is that Wilson's nomination for the Presidency does not renovate the Democratic party in its local organizations. Standing by itself this argument is impressive. Republicans may well hesitate to join the Democratic party as at present organized, even though its candidate for President measures up to all their requirements. Where would be the gain to them in leaving a party of Tafts and Roots and Lorimers for one of Ryans and Murphys and Taggarts and Sullivans? And of course all such bosses will stick; if only they would go over to the party of Taft, Republicans might come into the party of Wilson—a swap that wouldn't hurt the Republican party and would improve the Democratic. But the bosses can't be driven out. It is only sinking ships that rats abandon. The argument for a new party has that much in its favor, the pertinacity of the Democratic bosses; but it has much against it. For instance, such a party at this juncture would be regarded by progressive Democrats with a suspicion that would discourage them from going into a new party of Republican antecedents when the time for one was really ripe. The new party can hardly serve any purpose at all useful unless it be to drive Mr. Roosevelt out of politics with a chorus of laughter. If it were to show vitality, it would be boss-ridden at once; for bosses are not particular about parties, provided the parties are strong.

Had a reactionary been nominated at Baltimore, or a mere party Democrat, a new party might have sprung into the arena with more than a fair prospect of becoming at once the second if not the first party in American politics. But there is no such probability now; and a third party, no matter who leads it, may separate those who ought to be together. Republicans do not need a new party this year in order to avoid the dilemma of either supporting Taft or joining the Democratic party. There is no such alternative. They can vote for Wilson and Marshall electors without abandoning the Republican party. "Scratching" is no longer a party crime; and if one may "scratch" the party candidate for alderman, Mayor or Governor, why not the party candidate for President and Vice-President?

We surmise, however, that the Democrats would welcome a Roosevelt party in this campaign. No voter of any party who wishes to defeat Taft is likely to vote for Roosevelt as a third party candidate when he can more certainly accomplish his purpose by voting for Wilson; and Republicans who cannot stomach any kind of Democrat may be held away from Taft if they can enter a protest by voting for Roosevelt. As to freetraders, they would be fools indeed not to welcome Roosevelt's third party candidacy if he can emphasize what he is now trying to do, the fact that the Democratic party is committed distinctly to a tariff reform program with freetrade for its objective.

Of the official call for the new party, it must be said that it rings true in general principles and purposes. Its weakness is the total absence of any concrete demands in execution of its declarations of general principle. A first-class exordium or peroration, this call is without form in detail. While it points to the true industrial issue in the abstract, it proposes nothing definite. The old Declaration of Independence gave form and force to its splendid generalities by an indictment of King George and notice of separation. In the first Republican platform, its splendid generalities were given form and force by specific opposition to the extension of slavery. But this call for Mr. Roosevelt's party gives no kind of form to its generalities. To be sure it might be said that the place for doing that is not in the call but in the platform when the convention yet to be shall have made one. This explanation would be a good one. But, if Mr. Roosevelt's views in favor of tariff protection be then adopted as part of a platform evolved from such a convention call, the usefulness of this third party will be widely open to question on fundamental grounds. One Protection party is enough.

A Parting of the Ways.

Out of this political chaos one fact rises like Cheops in the desert: our present party system disgraces the American people and must afford sad laughter for all other intelligences in the universe. We are so busy making (or losing) money that we let officeholders—past, present and future—manage the whole sickening game, which is really our own life or death, and holds such great issues that one would suppose we would try to make it once more a game for true men and wise immortals. Struggle as we may with the problem, we cannot escape the conclusion that each one of us is, in issues which come up from time to time, one of three things—conservative, progressive or

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